1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
866 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
867 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
868 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
869 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
872 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
873 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
874 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
877 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
878 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
879 self.update_time_counter
882 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
883 self.latest_monitor_update_id
886 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
887 self.config.announced_channel
890 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
891 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
894 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
895 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
896 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
897 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
900 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
901 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
905 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
908 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
909 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
912 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
913 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
914 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
915 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
916 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
921 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
925 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
927 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
928 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
929 self.temporary_channel_id
932 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
936 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
937 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
938 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
942 /// Gets the channel's type
943 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
947 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
948 /// is_usable() returns true).
949 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
950 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
951 self.short_channel_id
954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
955 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
956 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
959 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
960 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
961 self.outbound_scid_alias
964 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
965 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
966 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
967 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
968 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
971 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
972 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
973 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
974 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
977 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
978 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
979 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
982 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
983 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
984 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
985 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
989 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
992 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
993 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
996 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
997 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1000 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1001 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1002 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1005 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1006 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1011 self.counterparty_node_id
1014 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1015 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1016 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1019 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1020 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1021 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1024 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1025 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1027 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1028 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1029 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1030 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1032 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1037 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1038 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1041 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1042 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1043 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1046 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1048 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1050 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1051 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1056 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.channel_value_satoshis
1060 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1061 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1064 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1065 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1068 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1069 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1072 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1073 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1074 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1077 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1078 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1079 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1082 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1083 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1084 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1087 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1088 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1089 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1092 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1093 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1094 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1097 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1098 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1099 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1102 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1103 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1104 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1105 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1106 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1109 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1111 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1112 self.prev_config = None;
1116 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1117 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1121 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1122 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1123 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1124 let did_channel_update =
1125 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1126 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1127 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1128 if did_channel_update {
1129 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1130 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1131 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1132 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1134 self.config.options = *config;
1138 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1139 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1140 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1143 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1144 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1145 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1146 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1147 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1149 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1150 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1151 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1152 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1153 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1154 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1155 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1157 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1158 where L::Target: Logger
1160 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1161 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1162 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1164 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1165 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1166 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1167 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1169 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1170 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1171 if match update_state {
1172 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1173 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1174 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1175 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1176 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1178 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1182 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1183 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1184 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1185 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1187 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1188 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1189 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1191 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1192 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1193 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1194 transaction_output_index: None
1199 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1200 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1201 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1202 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1203 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1206 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1208 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1209 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1210 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1212 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1213 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1217 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1220 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1222 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1223 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1224 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1226 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1227 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1234 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1235 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1236 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1237 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1238 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1243 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1244 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1246 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1248 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1249 if generated_by_local {
1250 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1251 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1260 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1262 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1263 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1264 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1265 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1271 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1272 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1273 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1279 preimages.push(preimage);
1283 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1284 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1286 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1288 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1289 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1291 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1292 if !generated_by_local {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1301 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1303 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1304 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1305 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1306 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1307 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1308 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1310 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1312 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1313 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1314 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1315 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1317 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1319 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1320 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1321 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1322 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1325 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1326 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1327 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1328 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1330 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1333 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1334 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1335 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1336 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1338 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1341 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1347 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1348 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1353 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1355 let channel_parameters =
1356 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1357 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1358 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1361 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1366 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1369 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1370 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1371 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1372 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1374 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1375 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1376 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1384 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1385 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1391 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1392 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1393 /// our counterparty!)
1394 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1395 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1396 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1397 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1398 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1399 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1400 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1402 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1406 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1407 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1408 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1409 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1410 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1411 //may see payments to it!
1412 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1413 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1414 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1416 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1419 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1420 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1421 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1422 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1423 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1426 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1427 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1430 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1434 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1435 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1436 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1437 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1438 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1439 // which are near the dust limit.
1440 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1441 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1442 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1443 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1444 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1446 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1447 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1449 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1452 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1453 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1454 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1457 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1458 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1460 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1461 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1465 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1469 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1472 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1473 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1474 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1476 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1477 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1478 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1479 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1480 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1481 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1483 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1484 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1490 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1491 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1493 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1494 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1495 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1496 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1497 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1498 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1499 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1502 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1505 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1506 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1507 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1509 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1510 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1511 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1512 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1513 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1514 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1516 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1517 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1521 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1522 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1523 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1524 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1525 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1526 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1527 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1529 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1532 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1539 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1540 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1541 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1542 /// corner case properly.
1543 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1544 let context = &self;
1545 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1546 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1547 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1549 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1550 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1551 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1552 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1555 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1557 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1558 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1560 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1562 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1564 if context.is_outbound() {
1565 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1566 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1568 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1569 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1571 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1572 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1573 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1574 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1577 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1578 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1579 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1580 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1582 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1583 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1584 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1585 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1586 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1587 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1588 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1589 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1590 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1591 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1593 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1596 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1597 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1598 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1599 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1600 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1603 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1604 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1606 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1607 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1608 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1610 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1611 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1612 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1613 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1617 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1619 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1620 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1621 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1622 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1623 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1624 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1626 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1627 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1629 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1630 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1631 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1633 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1634 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1635 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1636 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1637 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1640 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1643 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1644 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1645 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1648 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1649 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1650 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1652 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1656 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1657 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1659 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1660 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1664 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1665 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1666 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1667 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1669 outbound_capacity_msat,
1670 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1671 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1676 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1677 let context = &self;
1678 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1681 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1682 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1684 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1685 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1687 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1688 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1690 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1691 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1692 let context = &self;
1693 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1695 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1698 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1699 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1701 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1702 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1704 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1705 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1707 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1708 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1712 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1713 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1719 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1720 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1721 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1724 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1725 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1726 included_htlcs += 1;
1729 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1730 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1734 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1735 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1736 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1737 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1738 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1739 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1744 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1746 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1747 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1752 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1753 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1757 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1758 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1762 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1763 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1765 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1766 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1767 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1769 total_pending_htlcs,
1770 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1771 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1772 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1774 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1776 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1778 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1780 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1785 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1786 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1788 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1789 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1791 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1792 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1794 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1795 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1796 let context = &self;
1797 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1799 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1802 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1803 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1805 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1806 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1808 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1809 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1811 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1812 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1817 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1823 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1824 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1825 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1826 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1827 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1831 included_htlcs += 1;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1838 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1839 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1841 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1842 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1843 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1849 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1850 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1854 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1856 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1857 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1859 total_pending_htlcs,
1860 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1861 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1862 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1864 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1865 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1866 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1868 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1870 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1875 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1876 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1877 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1878 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1884 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1885 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1886 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1887 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1888 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1889 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1890 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1891 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1892 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1893 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1894 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1896 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1897 // return them to fail the payment.
1898 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1899 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1900 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1902 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1903 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1908 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1909 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1910 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1911 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1912 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1913 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1914 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1915 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1917 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1918 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1919 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1920 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1925 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1926 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1927 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1931 // Internal utility functions for channels
1933 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1934 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1935 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1937 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1939 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1940 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1941 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1943 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1946 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1948 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1951 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1952 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1953 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1955 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1957 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1958 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1959 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1960 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1961 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1964 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1965 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1966 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1967 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1968 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1969 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1970 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1973 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1974 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1976 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1977 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1980 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1982 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1983 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1984 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1985 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1988 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1989 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1990 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1993 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1994 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1995 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1996 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1999 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2000 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2002 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2003 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2004 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2008 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2009 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2010 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2011 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2013 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2014 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2015 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2016 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2017 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2018 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2019 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2022 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2023 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2024 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2025 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2026 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2027 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2028 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2029 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2031 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2032 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2042 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2043 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2044 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2045 // outside of those situations will fail.
2046 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2050 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2055 1 + // script length (0)
2059 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2060 2 + // witness marker and flag
2061 1 + // witness element count
2062 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2063 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2064 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2065 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2066 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2067 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2069 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2070 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2071 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2077 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2078 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2079 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2080 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2082 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2083 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2084 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2086 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2087 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2088 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2089 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2090 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2091 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2094 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2095 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2098 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2099 value_to_holder = 0;
2102 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2103 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2104 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2105 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2107 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2108 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2111 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2112 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2115 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2118 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2119 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2121 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2123 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2124 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2125 where L::Target: Logger {
2126 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2127 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2128 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2129 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2130 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2132 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2133 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2137 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2138 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2139 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2140 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2142 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2143 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2145 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2147 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2149 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2150 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2151 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2153 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2154 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2155 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2156 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2157 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2159 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2160 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2161 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2163 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2164 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2166 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2169 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2170 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2174 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2178 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2179 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2180 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2181 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2182 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2183 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2186 // Now update local state:
2188 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2189 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2190 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2191 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2192 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2194 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2198 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2199 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2200 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2201 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2202 // do not not get into this branch.
2203 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2204 match pending_update {
2205 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2206 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2207 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2208 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2210 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2211 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2214 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2215 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2216 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2217 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2218 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2219 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2220 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2226 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2227 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2228 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2230 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2231 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2232 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2235 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2238 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2239 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2241 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2242 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2245 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2248 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2251 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2253 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2259 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2260 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2261 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2262 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2263 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2264 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2265 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2266 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2267 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2268 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2269 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2270 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2271 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2272 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2273 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2275 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(0)
2276 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2277 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2278 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2279 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2283 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2284 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2290 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2291 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2293 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2297 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2298 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2299 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2300 /// before we fail backwards.
2302 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2303 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2304 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2305 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2306 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2307 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2308 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2311 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2312 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2313 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2314 /// before we fail backwards.
2316 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2317 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2318 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2319 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2320 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2321 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2322 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2324 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2326 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2327 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2328 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2330 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2331 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2332 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2334 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2335 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2336 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2338 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2343 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2344 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2350 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2351 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2352 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2353 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2354 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2358 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2359 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2360 force_holding_cell = true;
2363 // Now update local state:
2364 if force_holding_cell {
2365 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2366 match pending_update {
2367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2368 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2369 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2370 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2374 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2375 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2376 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2377 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2383 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2384 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2385 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2391 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2393 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2394 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2397 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2398 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2399 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2404 // Message handlers:
2406 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2407 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2408 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2409 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2410 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2412 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2415 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2418 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2421 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2422 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2423 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2424 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2427 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2429 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2430 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2431 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2432 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2434 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2435 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2437 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2438 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2440 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2441 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2442 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2443 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2444 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2449 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2450 initial_commitment_tx,
2453 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2454 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2457 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2458 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2461 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2462 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2463 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2464 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2465 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2466 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2467 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2468 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2469 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2470 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2471 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2472 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2474 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2476 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2478 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2479 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2480 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2481 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2483 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2485 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2486 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2490 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2491 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2493 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2494 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2495 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2496 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2498 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2501 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2502 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2503 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2506 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2507 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2508 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2509 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2510 // when routing outbound payments.
2511 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2515 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2517 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2518 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2519 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2520 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2521 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2522 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2523 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2524 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2525 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2527 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2528 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2529 let expected_point =
2530 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2531 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2533 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2534 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2535 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2536 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2537 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2538 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2540 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2541 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2542 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2543 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2544 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2546 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2554 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2555 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2557 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2559 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2562 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2563 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2564 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2565 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2566 if local_sent_shutdown {
2567 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2569 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2570 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2571 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2574 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2577 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2580 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2583 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2587 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2588 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2589 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2592 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2595 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2596 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2597 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2598 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2599 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2600 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2601 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2602 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2603 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2604 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2605 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2607 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2608 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2609 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2610 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2611 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2612 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2616 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2619 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2620 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2621 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2623 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2624 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2625 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2626 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2627 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2628 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2629 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2633 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2634 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2635 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2636 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2637 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2638 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2639 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2643 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2644 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2645 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2646 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2647 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2651 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2652 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2653 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2654 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2655 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2657 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2658 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2661 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2665 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2666 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2667 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2668 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2669 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2670 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2671 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2672 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2673 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2675 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2676 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2677 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2678 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2679 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2680 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2683 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2684 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2685 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2686 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2690 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2693 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2697 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2698 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2699 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2703 // Now update local state:
2704 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2705 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2706 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2707 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2708 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2709 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2710 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2715 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2717 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2718 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2719 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2720 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2721 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2722 None => fail_reason.into(),
2723 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2724 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2725 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2728 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2732 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2733 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2734 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2735 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2737 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2743 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2746 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2747 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2750 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2754 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2757 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2758 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2761 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2765 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2769 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2770 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2773 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2777 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2781 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2782 where L::Target: Logger
2784 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2787 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2790 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2794 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2796 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2798 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2799 let commitment_txid = {
2800 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2801 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2802 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2804 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2805 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2806 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2807 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2808 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2813 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2815 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2816 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2817 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2818 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2821 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2822 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2823 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2827 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2829 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2830 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2831 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2832 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2833 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2834 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2835 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2836 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2837 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2838 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2839 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2845 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2849 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2850 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2851 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2852 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2853 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2854 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2855 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2856 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2857 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2858 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2859 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2860 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2861 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2864 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2865 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2866 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2867 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2868 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2869 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2870 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2872 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2873 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2874 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2875 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2876 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2877 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2878 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2881 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2882 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2885 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2887 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2888 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2889 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2892 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2895 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2896 commitment_stats.tx,
2898 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2899 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2900 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2903 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2904 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2906 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2907 let mut need_commitment = false;
2908 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2909 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2910 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2911 need_commitment = true;
2915 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2916 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2917 Some(forward_info.clone())
2919 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2920 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2921 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2922 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2923 need_commitment = true;
2926 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2927 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2928 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2929 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2930 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2931 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2932 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2933 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2934 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2935 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2936 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2937 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2938 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2939 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2941 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2943 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2944 need_commitment = true;
2948 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2949 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2950 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2951 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2952 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2953 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2955 nondust_htlc_sources,
2959 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2960 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2961 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2962 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2964 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2965 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2966 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2967 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2968 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2969 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2970 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2971 // includes the right HTLCs.
2972 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2973 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2974 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2975 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2976 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2977 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2979 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2980 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2981 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2984 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2985 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2986 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2987 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2988 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2989 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2990 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2991 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2992 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2996 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2997 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2998 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2999 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3002 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3003 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3004 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3005 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3006 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3007 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3008 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3009 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3012 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3013 /// for our counterparty.
3014 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3015 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3016 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3018 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3020 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3021 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3022 updates: Vec::new(),
3025 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3026 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3027 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3028 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3029 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3030 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3031 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3032 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3033 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3034 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3035 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3036 // to rebalance channels.
3037 match &htlc_update {
3038 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3039 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3040 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3042 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3043 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3045 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3048 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3049 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3050 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3051 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3052 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3053 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3054 // into the holding cell without ever being
3055 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3056 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3057 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3060 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3067 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3068 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3069 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3070 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3071 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3072 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3073 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3074 (msg, monitor_update)
3075 } else { unreachable!() };
3076 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3077 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3079 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3080 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3081 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3082 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3083 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3084 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3085 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3086 // for a full revocation before failing.
3087 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3090 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3092 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3099 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3100 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3102 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3103 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3108 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3109 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3110 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3111 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3112 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3114 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3115 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3116 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3118 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3119 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3125 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3126 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3127 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3128 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3129 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3130 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3131 where L::Target: Logger,
3133 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3136 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3139 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3143 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3145 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3146 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3152 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3153 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3154 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3155 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3156 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3157 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3158 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3162 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3164 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3165 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3168 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3169 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3171 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3173 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3174 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3175 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3176 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3177 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3178 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3179 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3180 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3184 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3185 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3186 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3187 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3188 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3189 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3190 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3191 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3192 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3194 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3195 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3198 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3199 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3200 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3201 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3202 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3203 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3204 let mut require_commitment = false;
3205 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3208 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3209 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3210 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3212 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3213 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3214 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3215 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3216 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3217 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3222 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3223 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3224 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3225 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3226 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3228 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3229 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3230 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3235 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3236 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3238 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3242 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3243 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3245 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3246 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3247 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3248 require_commitment = true;
3249 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3250 match forward_info {
3251 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3252 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3253 require_commitment = true;
3255 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3256 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3257 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3259 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3260 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3261 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3265 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3266 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3267 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3268 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3274 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3275 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3276 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3277 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3279 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3280 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3281 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3282 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3283 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3284 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3285 require_commitment = true;
3289 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3291 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3292 match update_state {
3293 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3294 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3296 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3297 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3299 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3300 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3301 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3303 require_commitment = true;
3304 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3305 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3310 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3311 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3312 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3313 if require_commitment {
3314 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3315 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3316 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3317 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3318 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3319 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3320 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3321 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3322 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3324 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3325 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3326 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3327 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3328 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3331 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3332 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3333 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3334 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3335 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3336 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3338 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3339 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3341 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3342 if require_commitment {
3343 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3345 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3346 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3347 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3348 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3350 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3351 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3353 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3355 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3356 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3357 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3363 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3364 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3365 /// commitment update.
3366 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3367 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3368 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3371 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3372 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3373 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3374 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3376 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3377 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3378 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3379 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3380 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3382 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3383 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3385 if !self.context.is_live() {
3386 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3389 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3390 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3391 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3392 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3393 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3394 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3395 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3396 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3397 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3398 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3402 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3403 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3404 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3405 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3406 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3409 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3410 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3414 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3415 force_holding_cell = true;
3418 if force_holding_cell {
3419 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3423 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3424 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3426 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3427 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3432 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3433 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3435 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3437 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3438 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3439 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3440 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3444 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3445 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3446 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3450 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3451 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3454 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3455 // will be retransmitted.
3456 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3457 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3458 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3460 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3461 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3463 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3464 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3465 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3466 // this HTLC accordingly
3467 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3470 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3471 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3472 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3473 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3476 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3477 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3478 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3479 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3480 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3481 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3486 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3488 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3489 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3490 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3491 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3495 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3496 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3497 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3498 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3499 // the update upon reconnection.
3500 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3504 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3506 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3507 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3510 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3511 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3512 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3513 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3514 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3515 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3516 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3518 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3519 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3520 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3521 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3522 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3523 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3524 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3527 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3528 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3529 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3531 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3532 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3535 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3536 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3537 /// to the remote side.
3538 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3539 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3540 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3541 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3544 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3546 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3547 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3549 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3550 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3551 // first received the funding_signed.
3552 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3553 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3554 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3556 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3557 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3558 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3559 funding_broadcastable = None;
3562 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3563 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3564 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3565 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3566 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3567 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3568 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3569 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3570 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3571 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3572 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3573 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3574 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3575 next_per_commitment_point,
3576 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3580 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3582 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3583 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3584 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3585 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3586 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3587 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3589 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3590 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3591 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3592 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3593 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3594 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3598 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3599 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3601 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3602 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3603 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3606 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3607 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3608 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3609 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3610 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3611 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3612 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3613 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3614 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3618 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3619 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3621 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3624 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3627 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3628 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3630 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3631 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3632 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3633 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3634 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3635 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3636 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3637 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3638 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3639 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3640 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3642 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3644 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3646 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3652 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3653 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3654 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3655 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3656 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3657 per_commitment_secret,
3658 next_per_commitment_point,
3660 next_local_nonce: None,
3664 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3665 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3666 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3667 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3668 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3670 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3671 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3672 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3673 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3674 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3675 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3676 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3677 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3678 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3679 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3684 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3685 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3687 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3688 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3690 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3691 reason: err_packet.clone()
3694 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3695 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3696 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3697 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3698 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3699 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3702 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3703 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3704 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3705 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3706 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3713 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3714 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3715 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3716 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3720 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3721 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3722 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3723 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3724 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3725 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3729 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3730 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3732 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3733 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3734 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3735 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3736 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3737 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3738 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3739 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3742 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3744 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3745 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3746 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3747 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3751 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3752 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3756 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3757 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3758 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3759 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3760 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3763 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3764 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3765 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3766 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3767 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3770 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3771 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3772 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3773 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3774 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3775 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3776 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3777 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3781 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3782 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3783 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3784 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3786 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3790 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3791 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3792 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3793 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3795 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3796 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3797 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3798 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3799 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3803 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3805 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3806 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3808 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3809 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3812 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3813 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3814 channel_ready: None,
3815 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3816 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3817 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3821 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3822 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3823 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3824 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3826 next_per_commitment_point,
3827 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3829 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3830 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3831 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3835 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3836 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3837 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3839 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3840 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3841 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3844 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3850 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3851 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3852 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3853 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3854 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3855 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3856 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3858 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3860 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3861 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3862 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3863 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3864 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3865 next_per_commitment_point,
3866 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3870 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3871 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3872 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3874 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3877 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3878 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3879 raa: required_revoke,
3880 commitment_update: None,
3881 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3883 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3884 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3885 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3887 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3890 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3891 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3892 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3893 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3894 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3895 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3898 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3899 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3900 raa: required_revoke,
3901 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3902 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3906 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3910 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3911 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3912 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3913 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3915 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3917 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3919 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3920 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3921 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3922 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3923 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3924 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3926 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3927 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3928 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3929 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3930 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3932 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3933 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3934 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3935 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3938 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3939 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3940 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3941 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3942 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3943 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3944 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3945 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3946 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3947 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3948 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3949 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3950 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3951 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3952 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3954 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3957 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3958 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3961 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3962 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3963 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3964 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3965 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3966 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3967 self.context.channel_state &
3968 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3969 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3970 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3971 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3974 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3975 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3976 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3977 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3978 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3979 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3982 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3988 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3989 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3990 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3991 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3993 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3994 return Ok((None, None));
3997 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3998 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3999 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4001 return Ok((None, None));
4004 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4006 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4007 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4008 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4009 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4011 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4012 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4013 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4015 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4016 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4017 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4018 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4020 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4021 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4022 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4027 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4028 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4030 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4031 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4034 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4035 /// within our expected timeframe.
4037 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4038 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4039 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4042 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4045 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4046 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4049 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4050 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4051 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4052 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4054 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4057 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4058 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4059 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4060 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4063 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4064 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4068 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4070 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4074 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4075 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4076 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4079 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4082 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4083 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4084 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4085 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4087 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4090 assert!(send_shutdown);
4091 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4092 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4093 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4095 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4098 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4103 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4105 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4106 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4108 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4109 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4110 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4111 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4112 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4113 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4116 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4117 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4119 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4120 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4121 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4122 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4126 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4127 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4128 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4129 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4130 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4131 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4134 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4141 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4142 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4144 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4147 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4148 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4150 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4152 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4153 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4154 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4155 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4156 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4157 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4158 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4159 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4160 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4162 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4163 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4166 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4170 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4171 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4172 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4173 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4175 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4178 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4181 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4184 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4188 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4192 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4193 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4194 return Ok((None, None));
4197 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4198 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4199 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4202 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4204 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4207 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4208 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4209 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4210 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4211 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4215 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4216 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4221 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4222 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4223 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4224 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4225 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4226 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4227 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4231 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4233 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4234 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4235 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4236 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4238 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4241 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4242 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4243 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4245 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4246 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4247 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4248 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4252 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4253 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4254 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4255 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4257 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4258 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4259 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4265 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4266 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4269 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4272 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4276 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4277 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4278 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4279 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4280 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4282 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4284 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4286 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4287 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4290 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4291 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4292 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4293 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4294 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4295 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4296 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4297 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4302 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4303 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4304 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4305 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4311 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4312 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4313 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4314 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4316 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4322 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4323 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4324 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4325 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4326 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4327 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4328 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4330 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4331 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4334 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4336 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4337 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4343 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4344 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4345 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4346 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4347 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4348 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4349 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4351 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4352 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4359 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4360 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4363 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4364 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4367 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4368 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4372 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4373 &self.context.holder_signer
4377 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4379 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4380 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4381 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4382 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4383 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4384 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4386 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4388 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4396 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4397 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4401 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4402 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4403 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4404 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4407 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4408 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4409 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4412 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4413 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4414 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4415 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4416 Some((self.context.pending_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4417 !self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4420 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4421 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4422 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4423 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4424 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4425 if !release_monitor {
4426 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4435 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4436 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len()
4439 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4440 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4441 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4443 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4444 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4445 if self.context.channel_state &
4446 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4447 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4448 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4449 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4450 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4453 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4454 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4455 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4456 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4457 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4458 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4460 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4461 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4462 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4464 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4465 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4466 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4467 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4468 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4469 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4475 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4476 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4477 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4480 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4481 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4482 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4485 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4486 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4487 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4490 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4491 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4492 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4493 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4494 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4495 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4500 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4501 self.context.channel_update_status
4504 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4505 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4506 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4509 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4511 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4512 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4513 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4517 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4518 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4519 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4522 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4526 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4527 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4528 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4530 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4531 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4532 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4534 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4535 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4538 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4539 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4540 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4541 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4542 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4543 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4544 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4545 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4546 self.context.channel_state);
4548 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4552 if need_commitment_update {
4553 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4554 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4555 let next_per_commitment_point =
4556 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4557 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4558 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4559 next_per_commitment_point,
4560 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4564 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4570 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4571 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4572 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4573 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4574 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4575 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4576 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4578 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4581 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4582 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4583 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4584 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4585 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4586 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4587 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4588 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4589 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4590 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4591 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4592 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4593 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4594 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4595 // channel and move on.
4596 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4597 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4599 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4600 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4601 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4603 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4604 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4605 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4606 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4607 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4608 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4609 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4613 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4614 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4615 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4616 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4617 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4621 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4622 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4623 // may have already happened for this block).
4624 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4625 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4626 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4627 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4630 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4631 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4632 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4633 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4641 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4642 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4643 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4644 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4646 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4647 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4650 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4652 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4653 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4654 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4655 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4657 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4660 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4663 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4664 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4665 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4666 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4668 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4671 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4672 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4673 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4675 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4676 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4678 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4679 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4680 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4688 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4690 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4691 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4692 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4694 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4695 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4698 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4699 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4700 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4701 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4702 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4703 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4704 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4705 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4706 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4709 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4710 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4711 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4712 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4714 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4715 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4716 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4718 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4719 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4720 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4721 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4723 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4724 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4725 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4726 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4727 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4728 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4729 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4732 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4733 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4735 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4738 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4739 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4740 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4741 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4742 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4743 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4744 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4745 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4746 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4747 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4748 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4749 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4750 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4751 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4752 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4753 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4754 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4760 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4765 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4766 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4768 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4769 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4770 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4771 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4773 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4776 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4777 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4778 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4779 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4780 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4781 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4783 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4787 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4788 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4789 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4790 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4792 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4793 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4795 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4796 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4797 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4798 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4799 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4800 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4806 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4807 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4808 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4809 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4811 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4814 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4818 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4822 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4823 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4827 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4831 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4832 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4835 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4839 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4841 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4846 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4848 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4853 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4855 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4857 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4858 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4859 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4863 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4865 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4866 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4867 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4868 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4869 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4870 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4871 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4873 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4874 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4875 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4876 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4877 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4878 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4879 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4880 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4881 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4882 contents: announcement,
4885 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4889 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4890 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4891 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4892 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4893 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4894 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4895 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4896 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4898 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4900 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4902 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4903 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4905 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4907 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4908 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4911 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4912 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4913 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4914 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4917 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4920 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4921 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4922 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4923 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4924 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4925 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4928 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4930 Err(_) => return None,
4932 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4933 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4938 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4939 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4940 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4941 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4942 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4943 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4944 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4945 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4946 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4947 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4948 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4949 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4950 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4951 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4952 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4953 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4956 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4959 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4960 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4961 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4962 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4963 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4964 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4965 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4966 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4967 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4969 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4970 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4971 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4972 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4973 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4974 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4975 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4976 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4977 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4979 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4980 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4981 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4982 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
4983 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
4984 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
4985 next_funding_txid: None,
4990 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4992 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4993 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4994 /// commitment update.
4996 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4997 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
4998 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
4999 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5000 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5002 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5003 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5004 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5006 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5007 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5012 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5013 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5015 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5017 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5018 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5020 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5021 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5022 /// regenerate them.
5024 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5025 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5027 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5028 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5029 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5030 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5031 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5032 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5033 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5034 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5036 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5037 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5038 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5041 if amount_msat == 0 {
5042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5045 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5046 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5048 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5051 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5052 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5053 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5056 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5057 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5058 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5059 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5060 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5061 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5062 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5063 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5066 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5067 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5068 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5069 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5070 else { "to peer" });
5072 if need_holding_cell {
5073 force_holding_cell = true;
5076 // Now update local state:
5077 if force_holding_cell {
5078 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5083 onion_routing_packet,
5089 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5090 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5092 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5094 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5099 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5100 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5101 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5105 onion_routing_packet,
5108 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5113 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5114 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5115 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5116 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5118 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5119 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5120 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5122 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5123 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5127 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5128 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5129 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5130 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5131 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5132 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5133 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5136 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5137 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5138 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5139 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5140 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5141 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5144 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5146 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5147 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5148 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5150 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5151 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5154 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5155 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5156 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5157 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5158 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5159 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5160 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5161 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5164 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5168 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5169 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5170 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5171 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5175 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5176 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5177 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5178 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5179 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5180 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5181 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5182 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5183 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5184 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5185 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5191 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5194 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5195 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5196 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5197 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5199 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5201 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5202 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5203 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5204 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5207 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5208 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5212 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5213 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5215 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5217 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5218 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5219 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5220 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5222 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5223 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5224 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5225 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5226 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5227 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5231 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5232 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5236 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5237 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5240 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5241 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5243 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5244 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5245 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5246 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5247 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5248 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5249 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5250 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5251 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5254 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5255 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5256 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5262 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5263 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5266 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5267 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5268 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5269 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5275 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5276 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5278 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5279 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5280 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5281 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5282 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5283 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5284 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5285 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5286 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5289 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5290 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5293 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5294 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5297 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5298 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5300 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5301 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5302 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5305 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5306 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5307 let mut chan_closed = false;
5308 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5312 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5314 None if !chan_closed => {
5315 // use override shutdown script if provided
5316 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5317 Some(script) => script,
5319 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5320 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5321 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5322 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5326 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5327 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5329 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5335 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5336 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5337 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5338 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5340 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5342 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5344 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5345 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5346 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5347 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5348 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5349 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5353 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5355 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5356 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5357 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5360 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5361 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5362 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5363 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5364 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5366 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5367 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5374 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5375 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5377 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5380 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5381 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5382 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5384 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5385 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5389 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5393 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5394 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5395 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5398 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5399 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5400 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5401 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5402 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5403 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5404 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5405 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5406 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5408 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5409 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5410 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5411 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5413 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5414 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5416 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5417 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5419 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5420 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5423 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5426 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5427 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5428 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5429 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5433 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5434 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5436 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5438 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5439 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5440 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5441 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5444 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5445 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5447 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5448 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5449 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5450 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5454 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5455 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5456 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5460 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5461 Ok(script) => script,
5462 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5465 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5468 context: ChannelContext {
5471 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5472 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5473 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5474 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5479 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5481 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5482 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5483 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5484 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5486 channel_value_satoshis,
5488 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5491 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5494 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5495 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5498 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5499 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5500 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5501 pending_update_fee: None,
5502 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5503 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5504 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5505 update_time_counter: 1,
5507 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5509 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5510 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5511 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5512 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5513 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5514 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5517 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5518 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5519 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5521 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5522 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5523 closing_fee_limits: None,
5524 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5526 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5528 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5529 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5530 short_channel_id: None,
5531 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5533 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5534 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5535 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5536 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5537 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5538 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5539 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5540 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5541 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5542 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5543 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5544 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5546 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5548 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5549 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5550 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5551 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5552 counterparty_parameters: None,
5553 funding_outpoint: None,
5554 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5555 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5557 funding_transaction: None,
5559 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5560 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5561 counterparty_node_id,
5563 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5565 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5567 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5568 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5570 announcement_sigs: None,
5572 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5573 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5574 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5575 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5577 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5578 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5580 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5581 outbound_scid_alias,
5583 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5584 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5586 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5587 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5592 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5597 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5598 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5599 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5600 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5601 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5602 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5605 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5606 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5607 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5608 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5609 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5610 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5611 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5612 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5613 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5614 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5615 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5617 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5618 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5620 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5621 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5622 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5623 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5626 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5627 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5629 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5632 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5633 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5634 return Err((self, e));
5638 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5640 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5642 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5643 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5644 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5646 let channel = Channel {
5647 context: self.context,
5650 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5651 temporary_channel_id,
5652 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5653 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5656 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5658 next_local_nonce: None,
5662 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5663 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5664 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5665 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5666 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5667 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5668 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5669 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5670 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5671 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5674 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5675 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5676 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5678 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5679 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5680 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5681 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5688 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5689 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5690 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5691 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5692 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5693 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5694 // We've exhausted our options
5697 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5698 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5701 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5702 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5703 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5704 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5706 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5707 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5708 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5709 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5710 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5711 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5713 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5715 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5718 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5719 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5720 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5722 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5723 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5726 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5727 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5730 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5731 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5735 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5736 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5737 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5738 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5739 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5740 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5741 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5742 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5743 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5744 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5745 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5746 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5747 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5748 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5749 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5750 first_per_commitment_point,
5751 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5752 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5753 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5754 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5756 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5761 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5762 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5764 // Check sanity of message fields:
5765 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5768 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5771 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5774 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5777 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5780 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5782 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5784 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5785 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5788 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5789 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5792 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5795 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5796 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5799 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5800 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5803 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5804 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5806 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5809 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5812 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5815 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5818 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5822 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5823 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5826 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5827 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5829 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5830 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5833 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5836 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5837 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5838 &Some(ref script) => {
5839 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5840 if script.len() == 0 {
5843 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5846 Some(script.clone())
5849 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5856 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5857 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5858 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5859 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5860 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5862 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5863 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5865 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5868 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5869 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5870 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5871 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5872 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5873 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5876 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5877 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5878 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5881 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5882 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5884 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5885 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5891 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5892 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5893 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5896 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5897 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5898 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5899 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5900 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5901 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5902 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5903 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5904 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5905 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5906 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5910 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5912 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5913 // support this channel type.
5914 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5915 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5919 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5920 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5921 // `static_remote_key`.
5922 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5925 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5926 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5929 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5932 channel_type.clone()
5934 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5935 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5940 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5942 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5943 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5944 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5945 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5946 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5947 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5948 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5949 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5950 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5953 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5957 // Check sanity of message fields:
5958 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5961 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5964 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5965 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5967 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5968 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5971 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5974 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5977 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
5979 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5980 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
5983 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5986 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5990 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5991 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
5994 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5997 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6000 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6003 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6006 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6009 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6013 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6015 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6016 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6021 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6022 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6023 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6024 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6027 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6030 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6031 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6032 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6034 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6038 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6039 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6040 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6041 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6042 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6046 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6047 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6048 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6049 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6053 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6054 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6055 &Some(ref script) => {
6056 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6057 if script.len() == 0 {
6060 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6063 Some(script.clone())
6066 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6073 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6074 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6075 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6076 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6080 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6081 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6086 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6087 Ok(script) => script,
6088 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6091 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6092 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6095 context: ChannelContext {
6098 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6099 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6101 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6106 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6108 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6109 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6110 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6111 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6114 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6117 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6120 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6121 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6122 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6124 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6125 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6126 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6127 pending_update_fee: None,
6128 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6129 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6130 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6131 update_time_counter: 1,
6133 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6135 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6136 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6137 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6138 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6139 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6140 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6142 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6143 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6144 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6145 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6147 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6148 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6149 closing_fee_limits: None,
6150 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6152 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6154 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6155 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6156 short_channel_id: None,
6157 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6159 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6160 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6161 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6162 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6163 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6164 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6165 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6166 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6167 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6168 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6169 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6170 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6171 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6173 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6175 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6176 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6177 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6178 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6179 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6180 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6181 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6183 funding_outpoint: None,
6184 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6185 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6187 funding_transaction: None,
6189 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6190 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6191 counterparty_node_id,
6193 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6195 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6197 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6198 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6200 announcement_sigs: None,
6202 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6203 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6204 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6205 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6207 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6208 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6210 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6211 outbound_scid_alias,
6213 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6214 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6217 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6222 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6229 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6230 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6233 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6234 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6235 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6236 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6239 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6240 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6242 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6243 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6244 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6245 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6247 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6248 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6250 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6251 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6253 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6254 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6257 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6258 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6260 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6263 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6264 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6265 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6267 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6268 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6269 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6270 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6272 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6273 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6274 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6275 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6276 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6277 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6278 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6279 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6280 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6281 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6282 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6283 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6284 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6285 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6286 first_per_commitment_point,
6287 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6288 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6289 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6291 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6293 next_local_nonce: None,
6297 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6298 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6300 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6302 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6303 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6306 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6307 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6309 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6310 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6312 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6313 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6314 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6315 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6316 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6317 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6318 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6319 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6320 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6323 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6324 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6326 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6327 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6328 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6329 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6331 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6332 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6334 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6335 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6338 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6339 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6340 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6342 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6345 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6346 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6348 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6349 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6350 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6352 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6354 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6355 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6357 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6358 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6359 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6360 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6363 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6364 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6365 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6366 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6367 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6369 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6371 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6372 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6373 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6376 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6377 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6378 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6382 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6383 initial_commitment_tx,
6386 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6387 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6390 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6391 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6394 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6396 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6397 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6398 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6399 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6400 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6401 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6402 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6403 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6404 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6405 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6406 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6408 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6410 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6412 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6413 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6414 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6415 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6417 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6419 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6420 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6421 let mut channel = Channel {
6422 context: self.context,
6424 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6425 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6426 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6428 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6433 }, channel_monitor))
6437 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6438 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6440 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6446 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6448 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6449 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6450 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6452 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6453 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6454 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6455 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6461 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6462 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6463 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6464 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6465 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6466 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6471 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6472 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6473 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6474 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6476 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6477 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6478 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6479 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6484 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6485 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6486 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6487 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6488 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6489 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6494 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6495 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6496 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6499 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6501 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6502 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6503 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6504 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6505 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6507 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6508 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6509 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6510 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6512 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6513 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6514 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6516 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6518 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6519 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6520 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6521 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6522 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6523 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6525 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6526 // deserialized from that format.
6527 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6528 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6529 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6531 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6533 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6534 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6535 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6537 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6538 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6539 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6540 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6543 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6544 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6545 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6548 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6549 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6550 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6551 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6553 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6554 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6556 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6558 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6560 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6562 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6565 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6567 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6572 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6573 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6575 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6576 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6577 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6578 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6579 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6580 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6581 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6583 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6585 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6587 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6590 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6591 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6592 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6595 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6597 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6598 preimages.push(preimage);
6600 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6601 reason.write(writer)?;
6603 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6605 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6606 preimages.push(preimage);
6608 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6609 reason.write(writer)?;
6612 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6613 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6614 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6616 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6617 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6618 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6622 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6623 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6624 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6627 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6631 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6632 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6633 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6634 source.write(writer)?;
6635 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6637 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6638 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6639 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6641 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6642 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6644 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6646 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6647 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6649 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6651 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6652 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6657 match self.context.resend_order {
6658 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6659 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6662 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6663 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6664 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6666 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6667 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6668 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6672 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6673 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6674 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6675 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6676 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6679 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6680 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6681 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6682 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6684 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6685 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6686 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6691 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6692 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6693 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6695 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6696 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6697 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6698 // consider the stale state on reload.
6701 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6707 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6709 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6710 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6716 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6717 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6719 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6722 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6723 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6724 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6726 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6729 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6730 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6732 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6733 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6743 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6745 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6746 htlc.write(writer)?;
6749 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6750 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6751 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6753 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6754 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6756 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6757 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6758 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6759 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6760 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6761 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6762 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6764 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6765 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6766 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6767 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6768 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6770 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6771 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6773 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6774 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6775 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6776 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6778 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6780 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6781 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6782 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6783 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6784 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6785 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6786 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6788 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6789 (2, chan_type, option),
6790 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6791 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6792 (5, self.context.config, required),
6793 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6794 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6795 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6796 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6797 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6798 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6799 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6800 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6801 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6802 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6803 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6804 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6805 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6806 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6807 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6808 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6809 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6810 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6817 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6818 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6820 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6821 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6823 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6824 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6825 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6827 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6828 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6829 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6830 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6834 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6835 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6841 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 let mut keys_data = None;
6852 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6853 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6854 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6856 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6857 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6858 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6859 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6860 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6861 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6865 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6866 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6867 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6870 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6879 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6880 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6881 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6882 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6883 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6884 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6885 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6886 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6887 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6888 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6889 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6890 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6895 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6897 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6898 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6899 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6900 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6901 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6902 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6903 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6904 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6905 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6906 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6908 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6912 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6916 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6919 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6921 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6925 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6926 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6927 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6928 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6929 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6930 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6932 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6935 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6937 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6938 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6939 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6941 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6942 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6949 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6950 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6951 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6952 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6955 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6957 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6961 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6962 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6965 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6967 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6968 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6971 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6975 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6976 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6980 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6981 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6982 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6983 // consider the stale state on reload.
6984 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6987 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6994 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7003 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7004 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7006 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7007 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7015 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7016 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7018 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7019 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7024 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7025 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7026 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7027 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7029 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7032 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7046 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7047 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7049 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7051 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7055 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7056 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7057 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7059 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7065 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7066 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7067 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7068 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7069 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7070 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7071 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7072 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7073 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7074 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7076 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7077 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7078 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7079 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7080 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7081 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7082 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7084 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7085 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7086 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7087 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7089 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7091 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7092 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7094 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7095 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7096 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7097 (2, channel_type, option),
7098 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7099 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7100 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7101 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7102 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7103 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7104 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7105 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7106 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7107 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7108 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7109 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7110 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7111 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7112 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7113 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7114 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7115 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7116 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7117 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7118 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7121 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7122 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7123 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7124 // required channel parameters.
7125 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7126 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7127 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7129 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7131 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7132 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7133 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7134 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7137 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7138 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7139 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7141 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7142 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7144 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7145 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7150 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7151 if iter.next().is_some() {
7152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7156 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7157 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7158 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7159 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7160 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7163 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7164 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7166 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7167 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7168 // separate u64 values.
7169 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7171 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7173 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7174 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7175 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7176 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7178 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7179 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7181 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7182 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7183 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7184 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7185 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7188 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7189 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7193 context: ChannelContext {
7196 config: config.unwrap(),
7200 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7201 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7202 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7205 temporary_channel_id,
7207 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7209 channel_value_satoshis,
7211 latest_monitor_update_id,
7214 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7217 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7218 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7221 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7222 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7223 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7224 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7228 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7229 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7230 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7231 monitor_pending_forwards,
7232 monitor_pending_failures,
7233 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7236 holding_cell_update_fee,
7237 next_holder_htlc_id,
7238 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7239 update_time_counter,
7242 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7243 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7244 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7245 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7247 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7248 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7249 closing_fee_limits: None,
7250 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7252 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7254 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7255 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7257 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7259 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7260 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7261 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7262 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7263 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7264 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7265 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7266 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7267 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7270 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7272 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7273 funding_transaction,
7275 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7276 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7277 counterparty_node_id,
7279 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7283 channel_update_status,
7284 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7289 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7290 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7291 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7293 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7294 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7296 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7297 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7298 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7300 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7301 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7304 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7306 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7309 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7318 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7319 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7320 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7321 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7322 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7324 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7325 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7327 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7328 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7329 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7330 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7331 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7332 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7333 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7334 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7335 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7336 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7337 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7338 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7339 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7340 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7341 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7342 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7343 use crate::util::test_utils;
7344 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7345 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7346 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7347 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7348 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7349 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7350 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7351 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7352 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7353 use crate::prelude::*;
7355 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7358 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7359 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7365 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7366 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7367 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7368 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7372 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7373 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7374 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7375 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7376 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7377 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7378 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7382 signer: InMemorySigner,
7385 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7386 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7389 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7390 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7392 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7393 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7396 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7400 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7402 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7404 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7405 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7406 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7409 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7410 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7411 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7412 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7416 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7417 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7418 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7422 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7423 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7424 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7425 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7427 let seed = [42; 32];
7428 let network = Network::Testnet;
7429 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7430 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7431 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7434 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7435 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7436 let config = UserConfig::default();
7437 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7438 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7439 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7441 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7442 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7446 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7447 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7449 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7450 let original_fee = 253;
7451 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7452 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7454 let seed = [42; 32];
7455 let network = Network::Testnet;
7456 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7458 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7459 let config = UserConfig::default();
7460 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7462 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7463 // same as the old fee.
7464 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7465 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7466 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7470 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7471 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7472 // dust limits are used.
7473 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7475 let seed = [42; 32];
7476 let network = Network::Testnet;
7477 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7478 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7479 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7481 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7482 // they have different dust limits.
7484 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7485 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7486 let config = UserConfig::default();
7487 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7489 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7490 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7491 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7492 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7493 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7495 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7496 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7497 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7498 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7499 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7501 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7502 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7503 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7504 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7506 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7507 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7508 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7510 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7511 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7513 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7514 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7515 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7517 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7518 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7519 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7520 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7523 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7525 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7526 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7527 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7528 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7529 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7530 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7531 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7532 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7533 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7535 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7538 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7539 // the dust limit check.
7540 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7541 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7542 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7543 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7545 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7546 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7547 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7548 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7549 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7550 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7551 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7555 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7556 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7557 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7558 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7559 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7560 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7562 let seed = [42; 32];
7563 let network = Network::Testnet;
7564 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7566 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7567 let config = UserConfig::default();
7568 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7570 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7571 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7573 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7574 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7575 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7576 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7577 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7578 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7580 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7581 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7582 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7583 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7584 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7586 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7588 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7589 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7590 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7591 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7592 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7594 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7595 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7596 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7597 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7598 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7602 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7603 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7604 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7606 let seed = [42; 32];
7607 let network = Network::Testnet;
7608 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7609 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7610 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7612 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7614 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7615 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7616 let config = UserConfig::default();
7617 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7619 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7620 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7621 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7622 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7624 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7625 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7626 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7628 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7629 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7630 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7631 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7633 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7634 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7635 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7637 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7638 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7640 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7641 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7642 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7643 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7644 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7645 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7646 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7648 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7650 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7651 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7652 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7653 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7654 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7658 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7659 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7660 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7662 let seed = [42; 32];
7663 let network = Network::Testnet;
7664 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7665 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7666 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7668 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7669 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7670 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7671 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7672 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7673 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7674 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7675 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7677 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7678 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7679 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7680 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7681 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7682 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7684 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7685 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7686 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7687 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7689 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7691 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7692 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7693 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7694 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7695 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7696 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7698 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7699 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7700 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7701 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7703 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7704 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7705 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7706 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7707 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7709 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7710 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7712 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7713 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7714 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7716 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7717 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7718 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7719 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7720 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7722 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7723 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7725 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7726 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7727 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7731 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7733 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7734 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7735 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7737 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7738 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7739 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7740 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7742 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7743 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7744 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7746 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7748 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7749 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7752 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7753 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7754 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7755 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7756 let seed = [42; 32];
7757 let network = Network::Testnet;
7758 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7759 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7760 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7763 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7764 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7765 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7767 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7768 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7770 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7771 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7772 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7774 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7775 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7777 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7779 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7780 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7782 // Channel Negotiations failed
7783 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7784 assert!(result.is_err());
7789 fn channel_update() {
7790 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7791 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7793 let seed = [42; 32];
7794 let network = Network::Testnet;
7795 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7796 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7797 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7799 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7800 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7801 let config = UserConfig::default();
7802 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7804 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7805 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7806 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7807 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7808 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7810 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7811 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7812 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7813 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7814 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7816 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7817 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7818 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7819 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7821 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7822 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7823 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7825 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7826 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7828 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7829 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7830 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7832 short_channel_id: 0,
7835 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7836 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7837 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7839 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7840 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7842 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7844 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7846 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7847 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7848 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7849 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7851 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7852 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7853 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7855 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7859 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7861 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7862 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7863 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7864 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7865 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7866 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7867 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7868 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7869 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7870 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7871 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7872 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7873 use crate::sync::Arc;
7875 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7876 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7877 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7878 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7880 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7882 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7883 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7884 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7885 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7886 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7888 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7889 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7895 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7896 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7897 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7899 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7900 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7901 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7902 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7903 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7904 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7906 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7908 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7909 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7910 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7911 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7912 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7913 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7915 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7916 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7917 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7918 selected_contest_delay: 144
7920 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7921 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7923 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7924 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7926 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7927 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7929 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7930 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7932 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7933 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7934 // build_commitment_transaction.
7935 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7936 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7937 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7938 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7939 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7941 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7942 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7943 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7944 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7948 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7949 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7950 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7951 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7955 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7956 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7957 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7959 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7960 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7962 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7963 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7965 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7967 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7968 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7969 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7970 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7971 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7972 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7973 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7975 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7976 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7977 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7978 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7980 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7981 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7982 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7984 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7986 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7987 commitment_tx.clone(),
7988 counterparty_signature,
7989 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7990 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7991 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7993 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7994 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7996 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7997 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7998 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8000 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8001 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8004 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8005 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8007 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8008 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8009 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8010 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8011 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8012 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8013 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8014 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8016 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8019 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8020 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8021 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8025 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8028 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8029 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8030 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8032 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8033 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8034 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8035 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8036 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8037 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8038 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8039 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8041 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8045 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8046 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8047 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8048 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8050 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8051 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8053 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8054 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8055 "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", {});
8057 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8058 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8059 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8060 "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", {});
8062 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8063 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8065 amount_msat: 1000000,
8067 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8068 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8070 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8073 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8074 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8076 amount_msat: 2000000,
8078 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8079 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8081 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8084 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8085 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8087 amount_msat: 2000000,
8089 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8090 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8091 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8092 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8094 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8097 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8098 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8100 amount_msat: 3000000,
8102 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8103 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8104 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8105 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8107 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8110 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8111 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8113 amount_msat: 4000000,
8115 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8116 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8118 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8122 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8123 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8124 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8126 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8127 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8128 "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", {
8131 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8132 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8133 "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" },
8136 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8137 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8138 "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" },
8141 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8142 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8143 "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" },
8146 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8147 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8148 "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" },
8151 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8152 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8153 "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" }
8156 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8157 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8158 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8160 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8161 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8162 "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", {
8165 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8166 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8167 "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" },
8170 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8171 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8172 "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" },
8175 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8176 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8177 "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" },
8180 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8181 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8182 "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" },
8185 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8186 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8187 "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" }
8190 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8191 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8192 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8194 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8195 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8196 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8199 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8200 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8201 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8204 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8205 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8206 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8209 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8210 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8211 "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" },
8214 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8215 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8216 "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" }
8219 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8220 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8221 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8222 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8224 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8225 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8226 "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", {
8229 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8230 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8231 "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" },
8234 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8235 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8236 "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" },
8239 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8240 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8241 "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" },
8244 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8245 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8246 "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" }
8249 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8250 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8251 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8252 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8254 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8255 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8256 "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", {
8259 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8260 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8261 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8264 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8265 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8266 "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" },
8269 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8270 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8271 "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" },
8274 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8275 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8276 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8279 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8281 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8283 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8284 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8285 "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", {
8288 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8289 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8290 "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" },
8293 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8294 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8295 "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" },
8298 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8299 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8300 "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" }
8303 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8304 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8305 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8307 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8308 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8309 "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", {
8312 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8313 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8314 "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" },
8317 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8318 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8319 "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" },
8322 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8323 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8324 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8327 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8328 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8329 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8331 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8332 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8333 "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", {
8336 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8337 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8338 "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" },
8341 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8342 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8343 "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" }
8346 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8347 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8348 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8349 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8351 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8352 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8353 "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", {
8356 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8357 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8358 "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" },
8361 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8362 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8363 "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" }
8366 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8369 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8371 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8372 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8373 "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", {
8376 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8377 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8378 "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" },
8381 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8382 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8383 "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" }
8386 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8387 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8388 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8390 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8391 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8392 "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", {
8395 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8396 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8397 "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" }
8400 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8401 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8402 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8403 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8405 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8406 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8407 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8410 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8411 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8412 "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" }
8415 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8416 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8417 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8418 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8420 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8421 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8422 "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", {
8425 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8426 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8427 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8430 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8431 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8432 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8433 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8435 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8436 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8437 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8439 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8440 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8441 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8442 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8444 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8445 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8446 "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", {});
8448 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8449 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8450 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8451 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8453 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8454 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8455 "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", {});
8457 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8458 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8459 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8461 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8462 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8463 "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", {});
8465 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8466 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8467 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8468 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8470 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8471 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8472 "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", {});
8474 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8477 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8479 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8480 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8481 "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", {});
8483 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8484 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8485 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8486 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8487 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8488 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8490 amount_msat: 2000000,
8492 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8493 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8495 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8498 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8499 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8500 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8502 amount_msat: 5000001,
8504 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8505 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8506 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8507 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8509 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8512 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8513 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8515 amount_msat: 5000000,
8517 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8518 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8519 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8520 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8522 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8526 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8527 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8528 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8531 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8532 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8533 "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" },
8535 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8536 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8537 "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" },
8539 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8540 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8541 "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" }
8544 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8545 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8546 "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", {
8549 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8550 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
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8555 "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" },
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8558 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8559 "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" }
8564 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8565 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8567 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8568 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8569 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8570 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8572 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8573 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8574 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8576 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8577 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8579 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8580 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8582 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8583 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8584 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8588 fn test_key_derivation() {
8589 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8590 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8592 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8593 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8595 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8596 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8598 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8599 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8601 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8602 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8604 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8605 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8607 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8608 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8610 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8611 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8615 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8616 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8618 let seed = [42; 32];
8619 let network = Network::Testnet;
8620 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8621 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8623 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8624 let config = UserConfig::default();
8625 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8626 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8628 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8629 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8631 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8632 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8633 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8634 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8635 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8636 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8637 assert!(res.is_ok());
8642 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8643 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8644 // resulting `channel_type`.
8645 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8646 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8647 let network = Network::Testnet;
8648 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8649 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8651 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8652 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8654 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8655 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8657 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8658 // need to signal it.
8659 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8660 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8661 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8664 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8666 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8667 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8668 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8670 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8671 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8672 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8675 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8676 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8677 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8678 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8679 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8682 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8683 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8688 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8689 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8690 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8692 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8693 let network = Network::Testnet;
8694 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8697 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8698 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8700 let config = UserConfig::default();
8702 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8703 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8704 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8705 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8706 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8708 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8709 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8710 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8713 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8714 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8715 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8717 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8718 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8719 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8720 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8721 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8722 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8724 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8729 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8730 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8732 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8733 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8734 let network = Network::Testnet;
8735 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8736 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8738 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8739 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8741 let config = UserConfig::default();
8743 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8744 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8745 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8746 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8747 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8748 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8749 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8750 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8752 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8753 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8754 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8755 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8756 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8757 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8760 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8761 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8763 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8764 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8765 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8766 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8768 assert!(res.is_err());
8770 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8771 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8772 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8774 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8775 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8776 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8779 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8781 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8782 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8783 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8784 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8787 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8788 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8790 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8791 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8793 assert!(res.is_err());