1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
183 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
188 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
197 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
203 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222 (2, Committed) => {},
223 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 state: InboundHTLCState,
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
239 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
243 /// The amount in msat.
244 pub amount_msat: u64,
245 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247 /// The payment hash.
248 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
251 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
252 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
254 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
256 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
257 /// states may result in `None` here.
258 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
259 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
260 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
261 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
262 /// transactions as well.
264 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
265 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
268 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
269 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
274 (0, htlc_id, required),
275 (2, amount_msat, required),
276 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
277 (6, payment_hash, required),
278 (7, state, upgradable_option),
279 (8, is_dust, required),
282 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
283 enum OutboundHTLCState {
284 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
285 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
286 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
287 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
288 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
289 /// money back (though we won't), and,
290 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
291 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
292 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
293 /// we'll never get out of sync).
294 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
295 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
296 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
298 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
299 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
300 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
301 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
302 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
303 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
304 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
305 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
306 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
307 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
308 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
309 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
310 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
311 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
312 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
315 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
317 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
318 /// through the following states in the state machine:
319 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
320 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
321 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
323 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
324 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
325 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
327 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
329 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
330 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
331 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
332 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
333 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
334 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
336 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
337 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
339 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
340 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
344 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
345 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
346 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
347 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
348 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
351 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
352 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
354 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
355 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
356 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
357 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
358 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
360 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
361 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
363 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
364 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
365 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
367 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
368 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
369 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
375 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
376 (2, Committed) => {},
377 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
378 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
382 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
383 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
384 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
385 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
386 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
389 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
390 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
392 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
393 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
398 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
399 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
401 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
402 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
407 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
408 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
412 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
413 state: OutboundHTLCState,
415 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
419 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
420 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
421 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
423 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
424 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
425 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
427 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
428 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
429 /// The amount in msat.
430 pub amount_msat: u64,
431 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
432 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
433 /// The payment hash.
434 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
435 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
437 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
438 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
440 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
442 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
443 /// states may result in `None` here.
444 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
445 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
446 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
448 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
449 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
450 /// transactions as well.
452 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
453 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
456 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
457 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
462 (0, htlc_id, required),
463 (2, amount_msat, required),
464 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
465 (6, payment_hash, required),
466 (7, state, upgradable_option),
467 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
468 (10, is_dust, required),
471 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
472 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
473 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
474 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
481 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
482 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
491 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
496 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
500 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
501 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
502 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
503 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
504 struct $flag_type(u32);
509 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
512 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
514 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
517 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
520 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
521 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
524 Ok($flag_type(flags))
529 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
531 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
533 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
535 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
539 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
542 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
544 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
546 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
547 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
549 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
551 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
553 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
554 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
557 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
558 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
560 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
563 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
565 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
567 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
570 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
571 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
573 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
574 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
575 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
576 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
577 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
578 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
579 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
580 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
582 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
584 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
586 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
589 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
591 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
593 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
594 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
596 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
597 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
599 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
600 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
605 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
608 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
609 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
610 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
611 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
612 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
613 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
614 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
615 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
616 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
617 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
618 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
619 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
620 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
621 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
625 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
627 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
628 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
629 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
630 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
631 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
632 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
633 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
634 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
635 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
636 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
637 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
638 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
639 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
640 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
645 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
646 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
647 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
648 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
649 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
650 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
655 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
656 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
657 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
658 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
659 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
660 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
661 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
662 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
663 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
664 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
665 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
666 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
667 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
668 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
673 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
674 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
675 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
676 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
677 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
678 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
679 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
680 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
684 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
685 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
686 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
688 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
689 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
690 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
691 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
692 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
694 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
695 /// funding transaction to confirm.
696 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
697 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
699 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
700 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
701 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
705 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
706 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
708 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
711 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
720 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
722 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
726 fn $clear(&mut self) {
729 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
731 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
735 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
736 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
738 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
739 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
744 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
746 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
747 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
749 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
750 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
751 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
752 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
753 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
754 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
755 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
756 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
764 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
766 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
767 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
768 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
769 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
770 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
774 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
775 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
778 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
779 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
782 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
784 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
785 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
786 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
790 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
792 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
793 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
794 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
795 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
797 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
803 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
804 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
805 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
806 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
807 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
808 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
809 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
810 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
813 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
815 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
817 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
818 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
819 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
820 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
824 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
826 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
828 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
830 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
831 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
832 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
833 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
834 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
836 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
837 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
839 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
841 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
842 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
844 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
845 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
846 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
847 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
848 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
849 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
851 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
852 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
854 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
855 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
856 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
857 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
858 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
860 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
861 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
863 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
864 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
866 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
867 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
868 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
869 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
875 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
876 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
878 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
879 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
880 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
885 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
886 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
888 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
889 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
890 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
895 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
897 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
898 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
901 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
902 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
903 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
904 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
905 self.logger.log(record)
909 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
910 where L::Target: Logger {
911 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
912 where S::Target: SignerProvider
916 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
917 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
922 macro_rules! secp_check {
923 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
926 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
931 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
932 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
933 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
934 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
935 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
937 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
938 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
940 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
942 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
944 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
948 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
950 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
951 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
952 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
954 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
955 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
957 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
958 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
959 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
960 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
961 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
963 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
964 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
968 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
974 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
977 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
978 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
979 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
980 holding_cell_msat: u64,
981 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
984 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
985 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
986 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
987 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
988 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
989 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
990 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
991 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
992 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
993 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
994 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
997 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
998 struct HTLCCandidate {
1000 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1003 impl HTLCCandidate {
1004 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1012 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1014 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1016 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1017 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1018 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1023 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1024 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1025 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1026 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1027 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1029 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1030 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1031 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1032 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1034 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1035 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1039 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1040 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1041 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1042 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1043 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1044 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1045 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1046 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1047 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1048 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1049 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1052 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1054 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1055 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1056 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1057 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1060 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1061 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1062 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1063 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1064 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1065 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1066 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1067 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1070 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1072 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1073 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1074 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1075 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1076 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1077 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1078 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1079 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1080 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1081 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1082 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1083 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1084 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1085 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1086 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1090 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1091 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1092 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1093 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1094 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1095 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1096 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1097 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1098 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1099 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1100 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1101 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1102 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1103 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1105 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1106 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1107 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1108 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1110 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1111 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1112 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1113 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1115 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1116 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1117 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1118 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1119 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1121 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1122 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1123 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1124 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1126 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1127 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1128 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1130 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1131 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1132 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1133 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1134 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1136 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1137 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1140 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1141 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1143 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1144 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1145 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1146 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1148 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1149 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1151 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1152 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1156 (0, update, required),
1159 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1160 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1161 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1162 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1163 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1164 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1167 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1168 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1169 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1171 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1173 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1175 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1179 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1181 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1182 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1183 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1188 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1189 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1190 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1191 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1192 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1194 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1195 /// in a timely manner.
1196 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1199 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1200 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1201 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1203 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1204 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1205 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1206 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1210 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1211 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1212 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1214 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1215 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1216 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1217 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1219 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1223 /// The current channel ID.
1224 channel_id: ChannelId,
1225 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1226 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1227 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1228 channel_state: ChannelState,
1230 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1231 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1233 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1234 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1235 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1237 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1238 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1242 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1243 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1245 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1247 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1248 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1249 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1255 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1256 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1271 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1275 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1276 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1277 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1278 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1279 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1280 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1281 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1283 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1284 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1285 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1287 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1288 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1289 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1290 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1291 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1292 /// outbound or inbound.
1293 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1295 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1297 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1298 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1299 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1300 // HTLCs with similar state.
1301 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1302 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1303 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1304 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1305 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1306 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1307 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1308 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1309 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1310 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1312 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1313 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1314 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1316 update_time_counter: u32,
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1320 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1322 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1323 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1325 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1326 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1328 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1329 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1330 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1333 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1334 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1336 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1338 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1340 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1341 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1342 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1343 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1344 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1346 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1347 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1349 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1350 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1351 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1353 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1354 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1355 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1356 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1357 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1358 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1359 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1360 channel_creation_height: u32,
1362 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1365 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1367 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1370 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1372 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1375 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1379 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1380 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1383 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1385 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1388 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1390 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1392 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1393 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1394 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1396 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1398 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1399 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1400 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1402 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1403 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1406 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1408 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1410 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1411 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1412 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1413 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1415 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1416 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1417 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1419 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1420 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1421 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1432 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1433 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1434 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1435 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1436 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1438 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1439 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1441 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1442 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1443 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1444 /// unblock the state machine.
1446 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1447 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1448 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1450 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1451 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1452 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1456 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1457 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1458 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1459 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1460 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1461 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1463 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1464 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1466 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1467 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1468 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1470 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1471 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1472 // associated channel mapping.
1474 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1475 // to store all of them.
1476 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1478 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1479 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1480 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1481 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1482 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1484 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1485 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1487 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1488 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1490 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1491 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1493 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1494 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1495 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1497 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1498 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1499 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1502 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1503 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1504 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1505 self.update_time_counter
1508 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1509 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1512 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1513 self.config.announced_channel
1516 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1517 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1520 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1521 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1522 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1523 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1526 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1527 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1528 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1531 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1532 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1533 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1534 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1535 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1536 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1537 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1540 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1541 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1542 match self.channel_state {
1543 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1544 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1545 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1546 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1547 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1548 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1549 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1551 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1553 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1554 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1558 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1559 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1560 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1561 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1562 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1563 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1566 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1567 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1568 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1572 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1573 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1574 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1575 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1576 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1579 // Public utilities:
1581 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1585 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1587 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1588 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1589 self.temporary_channel_id
1592 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1596 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1597 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1598 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1602 /// Gets the channel's type
1603 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1607 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1609 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1610 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1611 self.short_channel_id
1614 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1615 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1616 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1619 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1620 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1621 self.outbound_scid_alias
1624 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1626 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1627 return &self.holder_signer
1630 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1631 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1632 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1633 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1634 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1635 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1638 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1639 /// get_funding_created.
1640 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1641 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1644 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1645 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1646 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1647 if conf_height > 0 {
1654 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1655 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1656 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1659 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1660 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1661 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1662 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1666 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1669 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1670 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1673 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1674 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1677 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1678 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1679 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1682 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1683 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1686 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1687 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1688 self.counterparty_node_id
1691 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1692 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1693 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1696 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1697 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1698 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1701 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1702 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1704 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1705 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1706 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1707 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1709 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1713 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1714 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1715 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1718 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1719 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1720 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1723 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1724 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1725 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1727 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1728 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1733 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1734 self.channel_value_satoshis
1737 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1738 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1741 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1742 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1745 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1746 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1747 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1749 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1750 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1751 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1752 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1753 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1755 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1759 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1760 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1761 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1764 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1765 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1766 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1769 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1770 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1771 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1774 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1775 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1776 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1779 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1780 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1781 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1784 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1785 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1786 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1789 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1790 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1791 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1792 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1793 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1796 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1798 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1799 self.prev_config = None;
1803 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1804 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1808 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1809 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1810 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1811 let did_channel_update =
1812 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1813 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1814 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1815 if did_channel_update {
1816 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1817 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1818 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1819 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1821 self.config.options = *config;
1825 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1826 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1827 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1828 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1829 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1832 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1833 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1834 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1835 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1836 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1838 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1839 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1840 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1841 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1842 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1843 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1844 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1846 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1847 where L::Target: Logger
1849 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1850 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1851 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1853 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1854 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1855 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1856 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1858 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1859 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1860 if match update_state {
1861 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1862 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1863 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1864 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1865 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1867 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1871 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1872 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1873 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1875 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1877 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1878 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1879 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1881 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1882 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1883 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1884 transaction_output_index: None
1889 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1890 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1891 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1892 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1893 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1896 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1898 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1899 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1900 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1902 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1903 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1906 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1907 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1910 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1912 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1913 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1914 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1916 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1917 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1923 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1925 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1926 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1927 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1928 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1929 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1930 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1931 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1935 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1936 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1940 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1941 if generated_by_local {
1942 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1943 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1944 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1954 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1956 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1957 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1958 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1959 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1960 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1961 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1962 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1965 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1966 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1967 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1968 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1972 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1973 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1977 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1978 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1980 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1982 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1983 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1986 if !generated_by_local {
1987 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1995 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1996 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1997 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1998 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1999 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2000 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2001 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2002 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2006 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2007 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2008 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2009 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2011 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2013 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2014 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2015 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2016 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2019 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2020 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2021 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2022 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2024 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2027 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2028 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2029 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2030 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2032 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2035 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2036 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2041 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2042 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2047 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2049 let channel_parameters =
2050 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2051 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2052 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2059 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2062 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2063 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2064 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2065 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2073 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2074 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2075 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2076 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2081 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2082 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2083 /// our counterparty!)
2084 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2085 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2086 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2087 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2088 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2089 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2090 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2092 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2096 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2097 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2098 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2099 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2100 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2101 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2102 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2104 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2107 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2108 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2109 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2110 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2111 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2114 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2115 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2118 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2122 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2123 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2124 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2125 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2126 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2127 // which are near the dust limit.
2128 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2129 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2130 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2131 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2132 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2134 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2135 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2137 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2138 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2141 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2142 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2143 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2146 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2147 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2149 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2150 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2151 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2152 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2153 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2154 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2155 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2158 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2161 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2162 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2163 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2165 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2166 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2167 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2168 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2169 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2170 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2172 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2173 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2179 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2180 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2182 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2183 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2184 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2185 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2186 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2187 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2188 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2191 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2194 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2195 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2196 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2198 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2199 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2200 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2201 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2202 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2203 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2205 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2206 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2210 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2212 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2213 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2214 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2215 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2216 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2218 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2219 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2221 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2228 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2229 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2230 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2231 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2232 match holding_cell_update {
2233 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2234 holding_cell_states.insert(
2236 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2239 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2240 holding_cell_states.insert(
2242 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2245 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2246 holding_cell_states.insert(
2248 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2252 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2255 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2256 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2259 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2260 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2262 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2263 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2264 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2265 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2266 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2267 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2268 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2269 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2270 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2271 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2278 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2279 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2280 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2281 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2284 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2285 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2287 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2288 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2289 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2290 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2291 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2292 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2293 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2294 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2295 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2296 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2299 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2300 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2306 } = *holding_cell_update {
2307 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2309 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2310 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2311 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2312 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2313 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2314 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2321 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2322 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2323 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2324 /// corner case properly.
2325 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2326 -> AvailableBalances
2327 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2329 let context = &self;
2330 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2331 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2332 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2334 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2335 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2336 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2337 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2340 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2342 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2343 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2345 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2347 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2349 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2350 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2354 if context.is_outbound() {
2355 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2356 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2358 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2359 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2361 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2362 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2363 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2364 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2367 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2368 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2369 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2370 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2371 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2372 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2373 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2376 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2377 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2378 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2379 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2380 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2381 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2382 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2383 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2384 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2385 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2386 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2388 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2391 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2392 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2393 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2394 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2395 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2398 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2399 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2401 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2402 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2403 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2405 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2406 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2407 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2408 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2412 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2414 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2415 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2416 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2417 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2418 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2419 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2420 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2422 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2423 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2425 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2426 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2427 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2429 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2430 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2431 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2432 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2433 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2436 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2437 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2438 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2439 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2440 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2441 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2444 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2445 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2446 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2448 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2452 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2453 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2455 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2456 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2460 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2461 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2462 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2463 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2465 outbound_capacity_msat,
2466 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2467 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2472 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2473 let context = &self;
2474 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2477 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2478 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2480 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2481 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2483 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2484 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2486 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2487 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2488 let context = &self;
2489 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2491 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2494 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2495 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2497 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2498 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2500 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2501 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2503 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2504 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2508 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2509 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2515 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2516 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2517 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2520 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2521 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2522 included_htlcs += 1;
2525 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2526 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2530 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2531 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2532 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2533 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2534 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2535 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2540 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2543 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2548 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2549 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2553 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2554 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2555 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2558 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2559 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2561 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2562 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2563 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2565 total_pending_htlcs,
2566 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2567 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2568 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2570 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2571 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2572 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2574 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2576 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2581 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2582 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2584 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2585 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2587 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2588 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2590 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2591 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2592 let context = &self;
2593 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2595 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2598 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2599 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2601 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2602 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2604 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2605 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2607 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2608 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2612 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2620 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2621 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2622 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2623 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2627 included_htlcs += 1;
2630 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2631 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2634 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2635 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2637 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2638 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2639 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2644 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2645 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2646 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2649 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2650 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2652 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2653 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2655 total_pending_htlcs,
2656 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2657 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2658 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2660 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2661 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2662 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2664 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2666 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2671 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2672 match self.channel_state {
2673 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2674 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2675 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2676 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2686 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2688 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2689 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2692 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2694 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2695 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2696 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2700 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2701 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2702 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2705 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2707 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2708 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2711 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2712 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2713 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2714 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2715 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2716 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2717 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2718 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2719 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2720 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2721 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2723 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2724 // return them to fail the payment.
2725 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2726 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2727 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2729 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2730 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2735 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2736 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2737 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2738 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2739 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2740 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2741 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2742 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2743 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
2744 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2745 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2746 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2747 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2748 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2749 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2753 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2754 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2756 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2757 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2761 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2762 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2763 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2764 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2765 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2766 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2767 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2768 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2772 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2773 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2774 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2775 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2777 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2778 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2779 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2780 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2782 match &self.holder_signer {
2783 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2784 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2785 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2786 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2787 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2790 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2794 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2795 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2796 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2798 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2799 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2800 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2802 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2803 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2804 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2807 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2808 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2810 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2817 // Internal utility functions for channels
2819 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2820 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2821 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2823 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2825 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2826 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2827 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2829 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2832 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2834 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2837 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2838 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2841 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2843 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2844 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2845 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2846 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2847 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2850 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2851 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2852 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2853 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2854 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2855 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2856 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2859 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2860 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2862 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2863 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2866 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2867 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2868 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2869 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2870 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2871 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2874 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2875 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2876 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2877 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2880 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2881 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2883 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2884 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2885 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2889 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2890 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2891 trait FailHTLCContents {
2892 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2893 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2894 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2895 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2897 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2898 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2899 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2900 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2902 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2903 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2905 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2906 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2909 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2910 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2911 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2912 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2915 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2916 failure_code: self.1
2919 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2920 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2922 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2923 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2925 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2926 failure_code: self.1
2931 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2932 fn name() -> &'static str;
2934 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2935 fn name() -> &'static str {
2939 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2940 fn name() -> &'static str {
2941 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2945 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2946 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2947 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2949 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2950 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2951 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2952 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2954 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2955 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2957 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2959 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2960 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2961 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2962 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2964 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2965 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2975 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2976 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2977 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2978 // outside of those situations will fail.
2979 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2983 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2988 1 + // script length (0)
2992 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2993 2 + // witness marker and flag
2994 1 + // witness element count
2995 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2996 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2997 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2998 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2999 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3000 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3002 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3003 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3004 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3010 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3011 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3013 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3015 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3016 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3017 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3019 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3020 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3021 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3022 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3023 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3024 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3027 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3028 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3031 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3032 value_to_holder = 0;
3035 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3036 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3037 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3038 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3040 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3041 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3044 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3045 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3048 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3051 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3052 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3054 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3056 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3057 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3058 where L::Target: Logger {
3059 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3060 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3061 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3062 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3063 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3064 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3065 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3066 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3070 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3071 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3072 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3073 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3075 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3076 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3079 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3080 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3081 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3083 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3084 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3085 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3086 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3087 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3088 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3089 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3091 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3092 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3093 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3095 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3096 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3098 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3101 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3102 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3106 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3110 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3111 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3112 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3113 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3114 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3115 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3118 // Now update local state:
3120 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3121 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3122 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3123 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3124 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3125 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3126 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3127 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3129 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3132 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3133 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3134 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3135 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3136 // do not not get into this branch.
3137 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3138 match pending_update {
3139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3140 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3141 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3142 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3143 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3144 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3145 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3149 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3151 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3152 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3153 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3154 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3155 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3156 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3162 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3163 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3164 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3167 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3168 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3170 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3171 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3174 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3175 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3177 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3178 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3180 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3181 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3184 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3187 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3188 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3189 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3190 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3195 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3196 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3197 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3198 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3199 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3200 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3201 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3202 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3203 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3204 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3205 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3206 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3207 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3208 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3209 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3211 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3212 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3213 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3214 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3215 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3218 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3219 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3220 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3226 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3227 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3229 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3233 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3234 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3235 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3236 /// before we fail backwards.
3238 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3239 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3240 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3241 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3242 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3243 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3244 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3247 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3248 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3250 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3251 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3252 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3253 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3254 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3255 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3258 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3259 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3260 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3261 /// before we fail backwards.
3263 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3264 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3265 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3266 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3267 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3269 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3270 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3271 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3274 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3275 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3276 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3278 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3279 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3280 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3282 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3283 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3284 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3286 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3291 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3292 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3298 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3299 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3300 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3301 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3302 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3306 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3307 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3308 force_holding_cell = true;
3311 // Now update local state:
3312 if force_holding_cell {
3313 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3314 match pending_update {
3315 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3316 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3317 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3318 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3322 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3323 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3325 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3326 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3333 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3334 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3338 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3339 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3341 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3342 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3345 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3348 // Message handlers:
3349 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3350 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3351 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3352 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3353 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3354 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3355 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3358 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3360 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3362 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3363 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3364 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3365 debug_assert!(matches!(
3366 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3368 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3369 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3372 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3373 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3375 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3376 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3377 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3378 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3380 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3383 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3384 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3388 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3389 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3390 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3391 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3392 // when routing outbound payments.
3393 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3397 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3398 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3399 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3400 match &self.context.channel_state {
3401 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3402 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3403 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3404 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3405 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3406 check_reconnection = true;
3407 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3408 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3409 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3410 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3411 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3413 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3414 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3417 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3418 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3419 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3421 if check_reconnection {
3422 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3423 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3424 let expected_point =
3425 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3426 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3428 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3429 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3430 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3431 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3432 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3433 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3435 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3436 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3437 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3438 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3439 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3441 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3447 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3448 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3450 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3452 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3455 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3456 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3457 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3458 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3459 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3460 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3462 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3465 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3466 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3467 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3469 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3470 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3473 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3476 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3479 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3482 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3486 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3487 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3488 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3489 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3491 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3495 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3496 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3497 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3498 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3499 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3500 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3501 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3502 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3503 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3504 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3505 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3507 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3508 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3509 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3510 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3511 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3512 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3516 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3517 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3520 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3521 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3522 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3524 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3525 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3526 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3527 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3528 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3529 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3530 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3534 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3535 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3536 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3537 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3538 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3539 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3540 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3544 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3545 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3546 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3547 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3548 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3552 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3553 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3555 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3556 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3557 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3559 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3560 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3564 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3567 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3572 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3573 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3577 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3578 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3579 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3580 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3581 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3582 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3583 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3584 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3585 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3587 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3588 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3589 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3590 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3591 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3594 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3595 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3596 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3597 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3601 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3604 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3608 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3609 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3610 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3614 // Now update local state:
3615 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3616 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3617 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3618 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3619 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3620 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3621 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3626 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3628 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3629 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3630 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3631 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3632 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3633 None => fail_reason.into(),
3634 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3635 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3636 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3639 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3643 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3644 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3645 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3646 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3648 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3654 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3657 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
3658 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3661 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3665 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
3668 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3669 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3672 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3676 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3680 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3681 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3684 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3688 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3692 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3693 where L::Target: Logger
3695 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3696 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3698 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3701 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3702 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3705 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3707 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3709 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3710 let commitment_txid = {
3711 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3712 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3713 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3715 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3716 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3717 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3718 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3719 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3724 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3726 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3727 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3728 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3729 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3732 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3733 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3734 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3738 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3740 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3741 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3742 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3743 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3744 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3745 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3746 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3747 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3748 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3749 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3750 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3756 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3760 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3761 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3762 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3763 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3764 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3765 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3766 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3767 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3768 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3769 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3770 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3771 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3772 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3775 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3776 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3777 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3778 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3779 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3780 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3781 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3783 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3784 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3785 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3786 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3787 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3788 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3789 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3792 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3793 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3796 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3798 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3799 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3800 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3803 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3806 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3807 commitment_stats.tx,
3809 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3810 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3811 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3814 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3815 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3817 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3818 let mut need_commitment = false;
3819 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3820 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3821 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3822 need_commitment = true;
3826 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3827 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3828 Some(forward_info.clone())
3830 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3831 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3832 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3833 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3834 need_commitment = true;
3837 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3838 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3839 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3840 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3841 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3842 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3843 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3844 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3845 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3846 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3847 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3848 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3849 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3850 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3852 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3854 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3855 need_commitment = true;
3859 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3860 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3861 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3862 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3863 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3864 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3865 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3867 nondust_htlc_sources,
3869 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3872 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3873 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3874 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3875 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3876 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3878 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3879 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3880 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3881 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3882 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3883 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3884 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3885 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3887 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3888 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3889 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3890 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3891 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3893 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3894 &self.context.channel_id);
3895 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3898 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3899 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3900 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3901 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3902 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3903 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3904 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3905 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3906 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3910 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3911 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3912 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3913 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3916 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3917 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3918 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3919 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3920 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3921 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3922 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3924 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3925 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3926 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3929 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3930 /// for our counterparty.
3931 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3932 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3933 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3934 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3936 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3937 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3938 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3939 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3941 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3942 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3943 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3944 updates: Vec::new(),
3945 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3948 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3949 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3950 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3951 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3952 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3953 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3954 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3955 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3956 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3957 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3958 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3959 // to rebalance channels.
3960 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3961 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3962 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3963 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3965 match self.send_htlc(
3966 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3967 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3969 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3972 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3973 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3974 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3975 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3976 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3977 // into the holding cell without ever being
3978 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3979 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3980 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3983 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3990 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3991 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3992 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3993 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3994 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3995 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3996 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3997 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3998 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3999 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4000 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4001 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4004 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4005 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4006 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4008 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4009 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4010 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4013 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4015 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4016 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4017 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4018 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4019 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4020 // for a full revocation before failing.
4021 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4022 update_fail_count += 1;
4024 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4026 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4031 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4032 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4034 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4035 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4040 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4041 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4042 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4043 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4044 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4046 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4047 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4048 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4050 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4051 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4057 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4058 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4059 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4060 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4061 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4062 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4063 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4064 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4065 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4067 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4070 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4073 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4077 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4079 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4080 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4085 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4086 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4087 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4088 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4089 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4090 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4091 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4092 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4098 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4099 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4102 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4103 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4104 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4105 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4107 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4109 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4114 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4115 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4116 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4117 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4118 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4119 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4120 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4121 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4122 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4124 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4127 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4128 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4129 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4130 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4131 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4132 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4133 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4134 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4135 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4137 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4138 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4141 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4142 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4143 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4144 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4145 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4146 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4147 let mut require_commitment = false;
4148 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4151 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4152 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4153 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4154 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4156 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4157 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4158 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4159 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4160 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4161 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4163 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4167 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4168 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4169 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4170 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4171 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4173 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4174 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4175 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4180 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4181 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4183 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4187 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4188 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4190 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4191 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4192 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4193 require_commitment = true;
4194 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4195 match forward_info {
4196 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4197 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4198 require_commitment = true;
4200 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4201 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4202 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4204 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4205 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4206 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4210 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4211 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4212 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4213 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4219 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4220 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4221 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4222 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4223 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4225 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4226 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4227 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4228 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4229 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4230 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4231 require_commitment = true;
4235 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4237 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4238 match update_state {
4239 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4240 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4241 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4242 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4243 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4244 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4246 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4247 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4248 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4249 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4250 require_commitment = true;
4251 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4252 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4257 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4258 let release_state_str =
4259 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4260 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4261 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4262 if !release_monitor {
4263 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4264 update: monitor_update,
4266 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4268 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4273 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4274 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4275 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4276 if require_commitment {
4277 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4278 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4279 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4280 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4282 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4283 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4284 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4285 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4286 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4288 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4289 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4290 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4291 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4292 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4295 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4296 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4297 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4298 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4299 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4302 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4303 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4305 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4306 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4308 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4309 if require_commitment {
4310 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4312 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4313 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4314 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4315 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4317 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4318 &self.context.channel_id(),
4319 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4322 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4323 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4325 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4326 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4328 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4329 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4335 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4336 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4337 /// commitment update.
4338 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4339 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4340 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4342 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4343 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4346 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4347 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4348 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4349 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4351 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4352 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4353 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4354 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4355 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4356 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4357 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4359 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4360 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4362 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4363 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4365 if !self.context.is_live() {
4366 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4369 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4370 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4371 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4372 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4373 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4374 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4375 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4376 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4377 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4378 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4382 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4383 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4384 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4385 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4386 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4387 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4390 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4391 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4395 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4396 force_holding_cell = true;
4399 if force_holding_cell {
4400 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4404 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4405 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4407 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4408 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4413 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4414 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4416 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4418 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4419 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4420 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4421 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4425 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4426 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4427 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4431 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4432 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4435 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4436 // will be retransmitted.
4437 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4438 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4439 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4441 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4442 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4444 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4445 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4446 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4447 // this HTLC accordingly
4448 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4451 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4452 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4453 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4454 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4457 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4458 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4459 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4460 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4461 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4462 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4467 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4469 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4470 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4471 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4472 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4476 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4477 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4478 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4479 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4480 // the update upon reconnection.
4481 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4485 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4487 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4488 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4492 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4493 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4494 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4495 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4496 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4497 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4498 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4500 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4501 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4502 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4503 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4504 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4505 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4506 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4508 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4509 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4510 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4511 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4512 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4513 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4514 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4517 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4518 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4519 /// to the remote side.
4520 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4521 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4522 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4523 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4526 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4528 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4529 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4531 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4532 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4533 // first received the funding_signed.
4534 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4535 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4536 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4537 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4539 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4541 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4542 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4543 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4544 funding_broadcastable = None;
4547 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4548 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4549 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4550 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4551 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4552 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4553 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4554 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4555 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4556 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4557 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4558 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4559 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4560 next_per_commitment_point,
4561 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4565 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4567 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4568 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4569 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4570 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4571 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4572 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4574 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4575 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4576 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4577 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4578 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4579 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4583 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4584 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4586 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4587 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4589 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4590 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4593 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4594 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4595 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4596 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4597 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4598 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4599 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4600 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4601 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4605 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4606 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4608 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4611 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4614 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4616 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4617 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4618 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4619 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4620 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4621 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4622 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4623 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4624 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4625 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4627 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4629 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4631 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4637 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4639 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4640 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4641 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4642 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4644 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4645 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4647 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4648 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4651 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4652 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4653 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4654 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4656 SignerResumeUpdates {
4663 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4664 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4665 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4666 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4667 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4668 per_commitment_secret,
4669 next_per_commitment_point,
4671 next_local_nonce: None,
4675 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4676 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4677 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4678 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4679 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4680 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4682 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4683 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4684 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4685 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4686 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4687 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4688 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4689 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4690 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4691 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4692 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4697 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4698 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4700 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4701 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4702 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4703 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4704 reason: err_packet.clone()
4707 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4708 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4709 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4710 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4711 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4712 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4715 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4716 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4718 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4719 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4726 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4727 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4728 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4729 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4733 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4734 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4735 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4736 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4737 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4738 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4739 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4743 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4744 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4746 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4747 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4748 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4749 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4754 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4755 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4760 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4761 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4762 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4763 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4764 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4765 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4766 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4771 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4772 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4774 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4775 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4776 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4777 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4778 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4779 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4780 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4781 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4784 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4786 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4787 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4788 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4789 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4793 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4794 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4798 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4799 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4800 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4801 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4802 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4803 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4806 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4807 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4808 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4809 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4810 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4813 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4814 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4815 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4816 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4817 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4818 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4819 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4820 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4824 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4825 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4826 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4827 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4828 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4829 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4830 our_commitment_transaction
4834 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4835 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4836 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4837 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4839 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4841 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4843 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4844 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4845 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4846 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4847 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4850 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4851 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4852 channel_ready: None,
4853 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4854 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4855 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4859 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4860 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4861 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4862 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4863 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4864 next_per_commitment_point,
4865 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4867 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4868 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4869 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4873 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4874 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4875 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4877 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4878 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4879 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4882 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4885 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4887 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4888 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4889 our_commitment_transaction
4893 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4894 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4895 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4896 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4897 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4898 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4899 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4901 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4903 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4904 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4905 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4906 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4907 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4908 next_per_commitment_point,
4909 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4913 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4914 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4915 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4917 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4920 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4921 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4922 raa: required_revoke,
4923 commitment_update: None,
4924 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4926 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4927 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4928 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4930 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4933 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4934 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4935 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4936 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4937 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4938 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4941 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4942 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4943 raa: required_revoke,
4944 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4945 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4948 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4949 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4950 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4951 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4952 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4955 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4956 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4957 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4958 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4963 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4964 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4965 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4966 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4968 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4970 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4972 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4973 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4974 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4975 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4976 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4977 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4978 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4979 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4981 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4982 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4983 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4984 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4985 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4987 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4988 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4989 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4990 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4993 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4994 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4995 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4996 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4997 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4998 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4999 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5000 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5001 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5002 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5003 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5004 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5005 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5006 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5007 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5009 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5012 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5013 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5016 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5017 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5018 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5019 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5020 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5021 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5024 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5025 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5026 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5027 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5028 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5029 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5032 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5038 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5039 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5040 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5041 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5043 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5044 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5045 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5046 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5047 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5048 return Ok((None, None, None));
5051 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5052 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5053 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5055 return Ok((None, None, None));
5058 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5059 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5060 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5061 return Ok((None, None, None));
5064 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5066 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5067 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5068 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5069 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5071 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5072 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5074 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5075 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5077 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5078 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5079 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5080 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5082 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5083 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5084 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5088 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5094 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5095 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5097 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5098 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5101 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5102 /// within our expected timeframe.
5104 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5105 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5106 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5109 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5112 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5113 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5117 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5118 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5120 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5123 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5124 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5125 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5126 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5129 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5130 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5134 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5136 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5137 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5140 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5141 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5142 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5145 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5148 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5149 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5150 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5151 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5153 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5156 assert!(send_shutdown);
5157 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5158 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5159 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5161 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5164 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5169 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5171 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5172 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5174 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5175 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5176 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5177 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5178 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5179 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5180 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5182 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5184 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5185 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5187 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5188 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5189 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5190 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5194 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5195 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5196 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5197 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5198 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5199 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5201 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5202 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5209 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5210 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5212 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5215 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5216 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5218 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5220 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5221 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5222 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5223 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5224 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5225 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5226 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5227 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5228 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5230 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5231 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5234 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5238 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5239 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5240 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5241 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5243 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5246 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5249 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5252 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5256 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5260 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5261 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5262 return Ok((None, None, None));
5265 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5266 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5267 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5270 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5272 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5275 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5276 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5277 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5278 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5279 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5283 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5284 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5289 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5290 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5292 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5295 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5296 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5297 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5298 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5300 monitor_update: None,
5301 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5302 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5303 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5304 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5305 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5306 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5307 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5308 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5310 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5311 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5312 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5313 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5317 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5319 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5320 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5321 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5322 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5324 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5327 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5328 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5330 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5331 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5332 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5333 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5335 monitor_update: None,
5336 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5337 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5338 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5339 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5340 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5341 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5342 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5343 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5345 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5346 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5347 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5348 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5353 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5354 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5355 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5356 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5358 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5359 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5360 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5362 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5364 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5371 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5372 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5375 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5376 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5378 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5382 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5383 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5384 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5385 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5386 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5388 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5390 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5392 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5393 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5396 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5397 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5398 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5399 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5400 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5401 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5402 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5403 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5408 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5409 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5410 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5411 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5417 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5418 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5419 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5420 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5422 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5428 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5429 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5430 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5431 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5432 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5433 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5434 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5436 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5437 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5440 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5442 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5443 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5449 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5450 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5451 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5452 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5453 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5454 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5455 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5457 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5458 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5465 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5466 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5469 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5470 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5473 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5474 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5478 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5479 &self.context.holder_signer
5483 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5485 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5486 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5487 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5488 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5489 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5490 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5492 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5494 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5502 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5503 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5507 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5508 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5509 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5510 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5513 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5514 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5515 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5516 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5519 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5520 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5521 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5522 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5523 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5524 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5527 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5528 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5529 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5530 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5531 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5532 if !release_monitor {
5533 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5542 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5543 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5546 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5547 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5548 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5550 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5551 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5553 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5554 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5556 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5557 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5558 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5561 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5562 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5563 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5564 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5565 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5566 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5568 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5569 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5570 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5572 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5573 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5574 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5575 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5576 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5577 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5583 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5584 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5585 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5586 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5589 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5590 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5591 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5594 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5595 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5596 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5599 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5600 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5601 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5604 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5605 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5606 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5607 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5608 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5611 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5612 self.context.channel_update_status
5615 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5616 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5617 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5620 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5622 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5623 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5624 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5628 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5629 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5630 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5633 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5637 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5638 // channel_ready yet.
5639 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5643 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5644 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5645 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5646 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5648 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5649 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5650 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5652 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5653 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5656 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5657 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5659 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5660 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5661 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5662 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5663 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5664 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5665 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5666 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5668 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5672 if need_commitment_update {
5673 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5674 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5675 let next_per_commitment_point =
5676 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5677 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5678 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5679 next_per_commitment_point,
5680 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5684 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5690 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5691 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5692 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5693 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5694 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5695 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5696 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5698 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5701 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5702 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5703 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5704 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5705 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5706 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5707 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5708 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5709 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5710 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5711 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5712 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5713 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5714 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5715 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5716 // channel and move on.
5717 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5718 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5720 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5721 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5722 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5724 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5725 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5726 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5727 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5728 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5729 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5730 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5731 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5736 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5737 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5738 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5739 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5740 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5743 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5744 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5745 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5746 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5747 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5748 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5751 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5752 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5753 // may have already happened for this block).
5754 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5755 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5756 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5757 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5760 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5761 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5762 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5763 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5771 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5772 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5773 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5774 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5776 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5777 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5780 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5782 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5783 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5784 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5785 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5790 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5793 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5794 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5795 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5796 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5801 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5802 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5803 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5805 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5806 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5808 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5809 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5810 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5818 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5820 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5821 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5822 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5824 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5825 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5828 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5829 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5830 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5831 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5832 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5833 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5834 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5835 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5838 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5839 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5840 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5841 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5843 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5844 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5845 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5847 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5848 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5849 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5850 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5852 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5853 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5854 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5855 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5856 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5857 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5858 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5861 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5862 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5864 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5867 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5868 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5869 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5870 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5871 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5872 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5873 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5874 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5875 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5876 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5877 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5878 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5879 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5880 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5881 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5882 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5883 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5889 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5894 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5895 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5897 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5898 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5899 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5900 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5902 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5905 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5907 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5908 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5909 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5910 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5911 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5912 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5914 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5918 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5919 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5920 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5922 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5923 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5925 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5926 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5929 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5930 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5931 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5932 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5933 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5939 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5940 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5941 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5942 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5947 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5951 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5955 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5956 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5960 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5964 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5965 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5968 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5972 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5974 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5979 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5980 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5981 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5983 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5988 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5990 None => return None,
5993 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5995 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5996 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5998 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5999 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6002 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6008 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6010 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6011 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6012 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6013 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6014 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6015 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6016 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6018 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6019 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6020 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6021 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6022 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6023 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6024 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6025 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6026 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6027 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6028 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6029 contents: announcement,
6032 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6037 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6041 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6042 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6043 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6044 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6045 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6046 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6047 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6048 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6050 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6052 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6054 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6055 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6057 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6059 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6060 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6063 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6064 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6066 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6069 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6072 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6073 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6074 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6075 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6076 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6077 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6080 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6082 Err(_) => return None,
6084 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6085 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6090 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6091 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6092 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6093 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6094 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6095 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6096 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6097 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6098 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6099 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6100 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6101 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6102 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6103 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6104 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6105 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6108 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6111 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6112 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6113 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6114 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6115 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6116 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6117 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6118 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6119 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6121 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6122 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6123 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6124 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6125 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6126 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6127 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6128 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6129 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6131 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6132 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6133 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6134 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6135 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6136 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6137 next_funding_txid: None,
6142 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6144 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6145 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6146 /// commitment update.
6148 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6149 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6150 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6151 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6152 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6153 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6154 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6157 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6158 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6159 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6161 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6162 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6167 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6168 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6170 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6172 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6173 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6175 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6176 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6177 /// regenerate them.
6179 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6180 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6182 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6183 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6184 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6185 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6186 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6187 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6188 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6189 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6191 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6192 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6193 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6195 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6197 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6198 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6199 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6202 if amount_msat == 0 {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6206 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6207 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6209 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6212 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6213 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6214 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6217 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6218 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6219 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6220 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6221 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6222 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6223 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6227 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6228 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6229 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6230 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6231 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6232 else { "to peer" });
6234 if need_holding_cell {
6235 force_holding_cell = true;
6238 // Now update local state:
6239 if force_holding_cell {
6240 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6245 onion_routing_packet,
6252 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6253 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6255 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6257 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6263 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6264 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6265 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6269 onion_routing_packet,
6273 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6278 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6279 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6280 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6281 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6283 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6284 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6285 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6287 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6288 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6292 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6293 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6294 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6295 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6296 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6297 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6298 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6301 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6302 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6303 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6304 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6305 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6306 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6309 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6311 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6312 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6313 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6314 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6315 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6317 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6318 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6321 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6322 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6323 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6324 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6325 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6326 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6327 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6328 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6329 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6330 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6331 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6332 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6334 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6336 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6340 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6341 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6342 where L::Target: Logger
6344 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6345 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6346 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6348 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6350 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6351 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6352 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6353 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6354 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6355 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6356 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6357 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6358 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6359 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6360 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6366 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6369 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6370 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6371 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6372 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6373 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6374 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6376 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6377 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6378 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6380 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6381 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6382 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6385 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6386 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6390 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6391 &commitment_stats.tx,
6392 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6393 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6394 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6395 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6397 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6399 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6400 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6401 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6402 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6404 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6405 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6406 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6407 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6408 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6409 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6413 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6414 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6418 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6419 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6421 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6427 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6428 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6430 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6431 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6432 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6433 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6434 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6435 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6436 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6437 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6439 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6440 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6441 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6444 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6445 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6446 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6452 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6454 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6455 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6456 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6457 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6458 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6460 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6462 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6468 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6469 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6470 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6471 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6472 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6474 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6475 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6479 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6482 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6483 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6485 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6486 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6488 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6489 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6490 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6493 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6496 // use override shutdown script if provided
6497 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6498 Some(script) => script,
6500 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6501 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6502 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6503 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6507 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6508 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6510 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6515 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6516 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6517 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6518 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6519 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6521 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6523 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6524 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6525 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6526 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6527 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6529 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6531 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6532 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6534 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6535 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6536 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6539 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6540 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6541 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6542 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6543 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6545 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6546 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6553 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6554 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6556 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6559 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6560 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6561 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6563 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6564 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6568 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6572 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6573 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6574 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6575 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6578 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6579 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6580 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6581 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6582 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6583 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6584 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6585 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6587 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6588 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6589 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6590 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6592 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6595 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6598 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6599 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6600 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6602 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6605 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6606 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6607 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6608 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6609 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6612 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6613 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6615 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6616 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6618 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6620 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6622 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6623 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6624 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6628 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6629 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6631 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6632 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6633 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6634 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6638 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6639 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6640 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6644 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6645 Ok(script) => script,
6646 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6649 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6652 context: ChannelContext {
6655 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6656 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6657 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6658 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6663 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6665 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6666 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6667 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6668 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6670 channel_value_satoshis,
6672 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6674 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6675 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6678 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6679 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6682 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6683 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6684 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6685 pending_update_fee: None,
6686 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6687 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6689 update_time_counter: 1,
6691 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6693 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6694 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6695 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6696 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6697 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6698 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6700 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6701 signer_pending_funding: false,
6703 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6704 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6705 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6706 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6708 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6709 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6710 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6711 closing_fee_limits: None,
6712 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6714 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6715 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6716 short_channel_id: None,
6717 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6719 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6720 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6721 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6722 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6723 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6724 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6725 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6726 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6727 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6728 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6729 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6730 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6732 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6734 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6735 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6736 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6737 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6738 counterparty_parameters: None,
6739 funding_outpoint: None,
6740 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6742 funding_transaction: None,
6743 is_batch_funding: None,
6745 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6746 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6747 counterparty_node_id,
6749 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6751 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6753 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6754 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6756 announcement_sigs: None,
6758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6759 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6761 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6763 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6764 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6766 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6767 outbound_scid_alias,
6769 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6770 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6772 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6773 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
6778 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6779 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
6781 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6785 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6786 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6787 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6788 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6789 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6790 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6791 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6792 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6793 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6795 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6800 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6801 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6802 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6805 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6806 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6807 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6808 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6811 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6813 next_local_nonce: None,
6817 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6818 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6819 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6820 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6821 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6822 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6823 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6824 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6825 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6826 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6827 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6830 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6831 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6833 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6835 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6836 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6837 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6838 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6841 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6842 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6844 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6846 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6847 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6849 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6850 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6851 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6852 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6853 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6854 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6857 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6858 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6860 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6861 if funding_created.is_none() {
6862 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6863 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6865 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6866 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6867 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6868 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6876 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6877 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6878 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6879 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6880 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6881 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6882 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6883 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6884 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6885 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6888 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6889 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6890 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6891 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6892 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6893 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6899 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6900 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6901 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6902 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6903 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6904 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6906 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6908 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6910 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6911 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6916 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6917 // We've exhausted our options
6920 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6921 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6924 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6925 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6926 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6927 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6929 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6930 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6931 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6932 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6933 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6934 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6936 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6938 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6939 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6942 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6943 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6944 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6946 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6947 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6950 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6951 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6954 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6955 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6959 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6960 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6961 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6962 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6963 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6964 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6965 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6966 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6967 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6968 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6969 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6970 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6971 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6972 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6973 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6974 first_per_commitment_point,
6975 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6976 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6977 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6978 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6980 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6985 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6986 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6988 // Check sanity of message fields:
6989 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6992 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6995 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6998 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7001 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7004 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7006 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7008 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7009 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7012 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7013 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
7016 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7019 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7023 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7024 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7027 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7030 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7033 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7036 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7039 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7042 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
7046 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
7047 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7050 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7051 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7053 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7054 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7057 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7058 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7061 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7062 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7063 &Some(ref script) => {
7064 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7065 if script.len() == 0 {
7068 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7071 Some(script.clone())
7074 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7081 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
7082 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7083 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7084 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
7085 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
7087 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7088 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
7090 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
7093 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7094 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7095 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7096 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7097 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7098 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7101 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7102 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7103 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7106 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
7107 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7109 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7110 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7112 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7117 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7118 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7119 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7120 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7121 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7125 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7126 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7128 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7129 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7131 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7132 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7133 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7134 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7137 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7139 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7140 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7141 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7142 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7144 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7145 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7147 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7148 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7150 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7151 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7152 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7153 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7154 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7155 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7159 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7160 initial_commitment_tx,
7163 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7164 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7168 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7169 if validated.is_err() {
7170 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7173 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7174 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7175 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7176 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7177 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7178 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7179 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7180 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7181 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7182 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7183 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7184 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7186 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7187 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7188 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7189 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7190 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7191 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7192 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7193 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7195 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7196 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7197 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7199 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7201 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7202 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7204 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7206 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
7208 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7209 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7210 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7213 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7215 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7216 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7217 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7218 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7219 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7224 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7225 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7226 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7227 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7230 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7231 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
7232 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7233 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7234 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7235 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7236 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
7237 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7241 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7242 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7243 // `static_remote_key`.
7244 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7247 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7248 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7251 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7252 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7255 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7257 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7258 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7265 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7266 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7267 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7268 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7269 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7270 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7271 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7272 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7273 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7274 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7278 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
7279 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7281 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7282 // support this channel type.
7283 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7285 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
7286 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7287 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7288 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7289 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7290 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7291 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7292 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7293 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7296 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
7297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
7300 // Check sanity of message fields:
7301 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
7302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7304 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
7305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
7307 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7310 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7311 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
7312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7314 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7317 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7320 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
7322 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7323 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
7324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
7326 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7329 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7333 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7334 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
7335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
7337 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7340 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7343 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7346 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7349 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7352 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7356 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7358 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7359 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7364 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7365 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7366 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7367 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7370 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7373 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7374 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7375 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7377 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7378 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7381 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7382 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7383 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7384 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7388 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7389 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7390 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7394 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7395 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7396 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7397 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7401 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7402 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7403 &Some(ref script) => {
7404 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7405 if script.len() == 0 {
7408 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7411 Some(script.clone())
7414 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7421 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7422 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7423 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7424 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7428 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7429 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7434 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7435 Ok(script) => script,
7436 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7439 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7440 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7442 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7445 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7449 context: ChannelContext {
7452 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7453 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7455 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7460 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7462 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7463 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7464 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7465 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7467 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7470 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7472 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7473 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7476 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7477 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7478 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7480 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7481 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7482 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7483 pending_update_fee: None,
7484 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7485 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7486 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7487 update_time_counter: 1,
7489 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7491 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7492 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7493 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7494 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7495 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7496 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7498 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7499 signer_pending_funding: false,
7501 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7502 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7503 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7504 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7506 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7507 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7508 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7509 closing_fee_limits: None,
7510 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7512 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7513 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7514 short_channel_id: None,
7515 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7517 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7518 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7519 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7520 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7521 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7522 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7523 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7524 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7525 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7526 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7527 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7528 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7531 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7533 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7534 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7535 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7536 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7537 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7538 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7539 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7541 funding_outpoint: None,
7542 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7544 funding_transaction: None,
7545 is_batch_funding: None,
7547 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7548 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7549 counterparty_node_id,
7551 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7553 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7555 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7556 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7558 announcement_sigs: None,
7560 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7561 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7562 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7563 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7565 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7566 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7568 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7569 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7571 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7572 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7574 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7575 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
7580 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7582 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7584 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7590 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7591 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7593 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7594 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7595 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7596 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7599 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7600 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7602 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7604 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7605 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7608 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7611 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7612 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7613 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7615 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7616 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7617 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7618 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7620 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7621 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7622 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7623 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7624 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7625 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7626 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7627 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7628 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7629 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7630 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7631 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7632 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7633 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7634 first_per_commitment_point,
7635 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7636 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7637 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7639 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7641 next_local_nonce: None,
7645 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7646 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7648 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7650 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7651 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7654 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7655 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7657 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7658 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7659 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7660 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7661 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7662 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7663 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7664 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7665 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7666 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7667 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7669 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7672 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7673 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7674 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7678 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7679 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7682 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7683 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7685 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7686 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7688 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7690 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7691 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7692 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7693 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7696 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7697 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7698 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7699 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7700 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7702 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7704 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7705 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7706 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7709 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7710 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7711 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7715 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7716 initial_commitment_tx,
7719 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7720 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7723 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7724 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7727 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7729 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7730 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7731 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7732 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7734 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7736 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7737 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7738 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7739 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7740 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7741 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7742 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7743 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7744 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7745 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7746 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7748 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7749 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7750 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7751 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7752 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7753 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7754 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7756 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7757 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7759 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7760 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7761 let mut channel = Channel {
7762 context: self.context,
7764 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7765 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7767 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7771 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7772 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7774 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7780 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7782 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7783 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7784 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7786 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7787 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7788 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7789 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7795 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7796 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7797 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7798 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7799 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7800 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7805 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7807 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7808 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7810 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7811 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7812 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7813 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7818 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7819 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7820 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7821 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7822 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7823 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7828 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7829 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7830 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7833 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7835 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7836 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7837 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7838 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7839 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7841 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7842 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7843 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7844 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7846 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7848 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7849 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7850 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7852 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7854 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7856 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7860 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7861 // deserialized from that format.
7862 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7863 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7864 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7866 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7868 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7869 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7870 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7872 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7873 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7874 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7875 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7878 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7879 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7880 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7883 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7884 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7885 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7886 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7888 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7889 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7891 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7893 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7895 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7897 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7900 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7902 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7907 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7908 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7909 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7911 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7912 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7913 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7914 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7915 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7916 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7917 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7919 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7921 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7923 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7926 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7927 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7928 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7931 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7933 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7934 preimages.push(preimage);
7936 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7937 reason.write(writer)?;
7939 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7941 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7942 preimages.push(preimage);
7944 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7945 reason.write(writer)?;
7948 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7949 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7952 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7953 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7954 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7955 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7956 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7957 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7960 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7961 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7964 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7965 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7966 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7967 source.write(writer)?;
7968 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7970 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7971 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7975 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7976 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7978 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7980 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7981 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7983 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7984 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7986 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7987 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7988 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7990 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7992 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7993 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7998 match self.context.resend_order {
7999 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8000 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8003 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8004 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8005 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8007 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8008 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8009 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8010 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8013 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8014 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8015 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8016 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8017 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8020 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8021 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8022 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8023 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8025 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8026 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8027 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8029 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8031 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8032 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8033 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8034 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8036 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8037 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8038 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8039 // consider the stale state on reload.
8042 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8043 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8044 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8046 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8047 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8048 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8050 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8051 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8053 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8054 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8055 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8057 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8058 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8060 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8063 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8064 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8065 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8067 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8070 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8071 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8073 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8074 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8075 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8077 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8079 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8081 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8083 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8084 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8086 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8087 htlc.write(writer)?;
8090 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8091 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8092 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8094 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8095 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8097 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8098 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8099 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8100 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8101 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8102 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8103 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8105 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8106 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8107 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8108 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8109 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8111 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8112 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8114 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8115 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8116 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8117 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8119 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8121 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8122 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8123 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8124 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8125 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8126 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8127 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8129 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8130 (2, chan_type, option),
8131 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8132 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8133 (5, self.context.config, required),
8134 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8135 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8136 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8137 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8138 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8139 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8140 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8141 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8142 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8143 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8144 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8145 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8146 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8147 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8148 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8149 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8150 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8151 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8152 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8153 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8154 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8155 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8156 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8163 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8164 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8166 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8167 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8169 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8170 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8171 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8173 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8174 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8175 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8176 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8178 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8180 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8181 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8182 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8183 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8184 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8186 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8187 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8190 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8191 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8192 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8194 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8196 let mut keys_data = None;
8198 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8199 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8200 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8201 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8202 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8203 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8204 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8205 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8206 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8207 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8211 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8212 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8213 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8216 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8218 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8219 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8220 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8222 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8224 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8225 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8226 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8227 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8228 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8229 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8230 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8231 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8232 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8233 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8234 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8235 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8236 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8241 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8242 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8243 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8244 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8245 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8246 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8247 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8248 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8249 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8250 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8251 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8252 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8254 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8255 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8258 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8259 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8262 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8263 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8265 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8267 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8268 blinding_point: None,
8272 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8273 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8274 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8275 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8276 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8277 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8278 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8279 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8280 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8281 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8282 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8283 blinding_point: None,
8285 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8286 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8287 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8289 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8290 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8291 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8293 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8297 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8298 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8299 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8300 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8303 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8304 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8305 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8307 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8308 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8309 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8310 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8313 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8314 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8315 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8316 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8319 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8321 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8323 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8324 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8325 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8328 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8329 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8330 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8331 // consider the stale state on reload.
8332 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8335 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8336 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8337 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8339 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8342 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8343 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8344 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8346 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8347 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8348 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8349 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8351 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8352 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8354 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8355 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8357 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8358 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8359 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8361 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8363 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8364 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8366 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8367 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8370 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8372 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8373 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8374 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8375 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8377 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8380 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8381 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8383 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8385 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8386 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8388 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8389 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8391 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8393 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8394 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8397 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8398 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8399 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8403 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8404 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8405 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8407 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8413 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8414 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8415 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8416 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8417 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8418 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8419 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8420 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8421 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8422 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8424 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8425 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8426 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8427 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8428 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8429 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8430 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8432 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8433 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8434 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8435 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8437 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8439 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8440 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8442 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8444 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8446 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8447 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8449 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8451 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8452 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8453 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8454 (2, channel_type, option),
8455 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8456 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8457 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8458 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8459 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8460 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8461 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8462 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8463 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8464 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8465 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8466 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8467 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8468 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8469 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8470 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8471 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8472 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8473 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8474 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8475 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8476 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8477 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8478 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8479 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8480 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8483 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8484 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8485 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8486 // required channel parameters.
8487 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8488 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8490 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8492 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8493 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8494 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8495 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8498 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8499 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8500 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8502 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8503 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8505 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8506 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8511 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8512 if iter.next().is_some() {
8513 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8517 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8518 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8519 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8520 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8521 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8524 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8525 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8526 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8528 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8529 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8531 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8532 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8533 // separate u64 values.
8534 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8536 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8538 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8539 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8540 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8541 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8543 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8544 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8546 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8547 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8548 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8549 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8550 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8553 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8554 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8556 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8557 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8558 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8559 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8561 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8562 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8564 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8565 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8566 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8567 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8568 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8571 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8572 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8575 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8576 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8577 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8578 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8579 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8580 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8583 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8584 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8585 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8587 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8592 context: ChannelContext {
8595 config: config.unwrap(),
8599 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8600 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8601 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8604 temporary_channel_id,
8606 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8608 channel_value_satoshis,
8610 latest_monitor_update_id,
8612 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8613 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8616 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8617 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8620 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8621 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8622 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8623 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8627 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8628 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8629 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8630 monitor_pending_forwards,
8631 monitor_pending_failures,
8632 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8634 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8635 signer_pending_funding: false,
8638 holding_cell_update_fee,
8639 next_holder_htlc_id,
8640 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8641 update_time_counter,
8644 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8645 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8646 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8647 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8649 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8650 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8651 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8652 closing_fee_limits: None,
8653 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8655 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8656 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8658 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8660 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8661 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8662 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8663 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8664 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8665 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8666 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8667 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8668 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8671 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8673 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8674 funding_transaction,
8677 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8678 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8679 counterparty_node_id,
8681 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8685 channel_update_status,
8686 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8691 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8693 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8695 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8696 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8698 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8699 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8700 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8702 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8703 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8705 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8706 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8708 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8711 local_initiated_shutdown,
8713 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8722 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8723 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8724 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8725 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8726 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8727 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8728 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8729 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8730 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8731 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8732 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8733 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8734 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8735 use crate::ln::msgs;
8736 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8737 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8738 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8739 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8740 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8741 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8742 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8743 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8744 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8745 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8746 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8747 use crate::util::test_utils;
8748 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8749 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8750 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8751 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8752 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8753 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8754 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8755 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8756 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8757 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8758 use crate::prelude::*;
8761 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8762 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8763 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8764 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8766 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8767 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8768 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8769 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8772 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8775 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8776 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8782 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8783 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8784 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8785 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8789 signer: InMemorySigner,
8792 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8793 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8796 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8797 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8799 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8801 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8802 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8805 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8809 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8811 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8813 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8814 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8815 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8818 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8819 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8820 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8821 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8825 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8826 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8827 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8831 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8832 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8833 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8834 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8837 let seed = [42; 32];
8838 let network = Network::Testnet;
8839 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8840 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8841 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8844 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8845 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8846 let config = UserConfig::default();
8847 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8848 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8849 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8851 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8852 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8856 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8857 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8859 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8860 let original_fee = 253;
8861 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8862 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8864 let seed = [42; 32];
8865 let network = Network::Testnet;
8866 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8868 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8869 let config = UserConfig::default();
8870 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8872 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8873 // same as the old fee.
8874 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8875 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8876 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8880 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8881 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8882 // dust limits are used.
8883 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8885 let seed = [42; 32];
8886 let network = Network::Testnet;
8887 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8888 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8889 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8891 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8892 // they have different dust limits.
8894 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8895 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8896 let config = UserConfig::default();
8897 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8899 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8900 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8901 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8902 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8903 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8905 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8906 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8907 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8908 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8909 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8911 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8912 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8913 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8914 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8916 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8917 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8918 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8920 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8921 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8922 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8924 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8925 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8926 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8928 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8929 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8930 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8931 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8934 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8936 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8937 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8938 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8939 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8940 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8941 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8942 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8943 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8944 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8946 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8947 blinding_point: None,
8950 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8951 // the dust limit check.
8952 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8953 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8954 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8955 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8957 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8958 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8959 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8960 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8961 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8962 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8963 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8967 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8968 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8969 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8970 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8971 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8972 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8974 let seed = [42; 32];
8975 let network = Network::Testnet;
8976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8978 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8979 let config = UserConfig::default();
8980 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8982 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8983 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8985 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8986 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8987 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8988 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8989 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8990 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8992 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8993 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8994 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8995 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8996 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8998 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9000 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9001 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9002 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9003 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9004 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9006 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9007 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9008 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9009 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9010 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9014 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9015 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9016 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9018 let seed = [42; 32];
9019 let network = Network::Testnet;
9020 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9021 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9024 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9026 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9027 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9028 let config = UserConfig::default();
9029 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9031 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9032 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9033 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9034 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9036 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9037 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9038 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9040 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9041 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9042 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9043 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9045 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9046 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9047 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9049 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9050 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9051 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9053 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9054 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9055 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9056 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9057 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9058 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9059 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9061 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9063 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9064 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9065 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9066 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9067 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9071 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9072 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9073 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9074 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9075 let seed = [42; 32];
9076 let network = Network::Testnet;
9077 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9078 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9079 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9081 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9082 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9083 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9084 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9085 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9086 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9087 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9088 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9090 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9091 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9092 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9093 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9094 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9095 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9097 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9098 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9099 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9100 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9102 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9104 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9105 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9106 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9107 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9108 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9109 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9111 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9112 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9113 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9114 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9116 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9117 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9118 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9119 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9120 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9122 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9123 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9125 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9126 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9127 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9129 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9130 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9131 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9132 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9133 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9135 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9136 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9138 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9139 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9140 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9144 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9146 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9147 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9148 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9150 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9151 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9152 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9153 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9155 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9156 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9157 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9159 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9161 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9162 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9165 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9166 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9167 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9168 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9169 let seed = [42; 32];
9170 let network = Network::Testnet;
9171 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9172 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9173 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9176 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9177 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9178 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9180 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9181 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9183 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9184 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9185 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9187 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9188 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9190 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9192 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9193 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9195 // Channel Negotiations failed
9196 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9197 assert!(result.is_err());
9202 fn channel_update() {
9203 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9204 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9206 let seed = [42; 32];
9207 let network = Network::Testnet;
9208 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9209 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9210 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9212 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9213 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9214 let config = UserConfig::default();
9215 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9217 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9218 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9219 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9220 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9221 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9223 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9224 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9225 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9226 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9227 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9229 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9230 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9231 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9232 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9234 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9235 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9236 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9238 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9239 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9240 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9242 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9243 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9244 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9246 short_channel_id: 0,
9249 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9250 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9251 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9253 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9254 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9256 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9258 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9260 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9261 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9262 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9263 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9265 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9266 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9267 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9269 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9272 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9276 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9277 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9279 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9280 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9281 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9282 let seed = [42; 32];
9283 let network = Network::Testnet;
9284 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9285 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9287 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9288 let config = UserConfig::default();
9289 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9290 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9291 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9293 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9294 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9295 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9297 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9298 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9299 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9301 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9302 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9303 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9304 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9305 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9308 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9310 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9311 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9312 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9313 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9317 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9319 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9321 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9324 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9326 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9327 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9328 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9329 blinding_point: None,
9331 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9332 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9334 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9337 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9340 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9342 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9345 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9346 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9347 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9349 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9350 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9353 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9354 blinding_point: None,
9356 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9357 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9360 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9361 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9363 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9364 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9366 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9369 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9370 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9371 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9372 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9373 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9374 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9375 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9376 } = &mut dummy_add {
9377 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9378 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9380 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9381 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9382 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9384 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9387 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9389 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9390 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9391 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9392 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9393 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9394 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9395 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9396 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9399 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9401 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9402 use bitcoin::sighash;
9403 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9404 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9405 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9406 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9407 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9408 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9409 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9410 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9411 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9412 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9413 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9414 use crate::sync::Arc;
9415 use core::str::FromStr;
9416 use hex::DisplayHex;
9418 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9419 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9420 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9421 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9423 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9425 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9426 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9427 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9428 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9429 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9431 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9432 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9438 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9439 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9440 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9442 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9443 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9444 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9445 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9447 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9449 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9451 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9452 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9453 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9454 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9455 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9456 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9458 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9459 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9460 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9461 selected_contest_delay: 144
9463 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9464 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9466 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9467 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9469 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9470 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9472 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9473 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9475 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9476 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9477 // build_commitment_transaction.
9478 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9479 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9480 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9481 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9482 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9484 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9485 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9486 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9487 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9491 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9492 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9493 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9494 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9498 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9499 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9500 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9502 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9503 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9505 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9506 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9508 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9510 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9511 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9512 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9513 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9514 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9515 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9516 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9518 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9519 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9520 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9521 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9523 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9524 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9525 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9527 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9529 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9530 commitment_tx.clone(),
9531 counterparty_signature,
9532 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9533 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9534 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9536 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9537 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9539 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9540 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9541 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9543 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9544 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9547 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9548 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9550 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9551 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9552 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9553 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9554 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9555 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9556 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9557 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9559 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9562 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9563 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9564 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9568 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9571 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9572 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9573 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9574 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9575 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9576 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9578 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9579 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9580 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9581 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9583 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9584 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9585 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9586 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9587 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9589 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9590 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9591 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9592 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9593 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9594 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9596 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9600 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9601 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9602 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9603 "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", {});
9605 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9606 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9608 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9609 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9610 "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", {});
9612 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9613 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9614 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9615 "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", {});
9617 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9618 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9620 amount_msat: 1000000,
9622 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9623 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9625 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9628 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9629 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9631 amount_msat: 2000000,
9633 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9634 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9636 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9639 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9640 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9642 amount_msat: 2000000,
9644 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9645 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9646 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9647 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9648 blinding_point: None,
9650 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9653 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9654 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9656 amount_msat: 3000000,
9658 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9659 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9660 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9661 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9662 blinding_point: None,
9664 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9667 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9668 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9670 amount_msat: 4000000,
9672 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9673 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9675 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9679 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9680 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9681 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9683 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9684 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9685 "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", {
9688 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9689 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9690 "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" },
9693 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9694 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9695 "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" },
9698 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9699 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9700 "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" },
9703 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9704 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9705 "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" },
9708 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9709 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9710 "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" }
9713 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9714 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9715 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9717 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9718 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9719 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9722 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9723 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9724 "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" },
9727 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9728 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9729 "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" },
9732 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9733 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9734 "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" },
9737 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9738 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9739 "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" },
9742 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9743 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9744 "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" }
9747 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9748 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9749 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9751 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9752 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9753 "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", {
9756 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9757 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9758 "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" },
9761 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9762 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9763 "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" },
9766 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9767 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9768 "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" },
9771 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9772 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9773 "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" }
9776 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9777 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9778 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9779 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9781 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9782 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9783 "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", {
9786 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9787 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9788 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9791 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9792 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9793 "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" },
9796 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9797 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9798 "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" },
9801 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9802 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9803 "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" }
9806 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9807 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9808 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9809 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9811 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9812 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9813 "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", {
9816 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9817 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9818 "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" },
9821 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9822 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9823 "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" },
9826 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9827 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9828 "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" },
9831 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9832 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9833 "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" }
9836 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9837 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9838 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9840 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9841 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9842 "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", {
9845 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9846 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9847 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9850 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9851 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9852 "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" },
9855 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9856 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9857 "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" }
9860 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9861 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9862 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9864 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9865 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9866 "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", {
9869 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9870 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9871 "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" },
9874 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9875 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9876 "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" },
9879 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9880 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9881 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9884 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9885 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9886 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9888 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9889 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9890 "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", {
9893 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9894 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9895 "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" },
9898 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9899 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9900 "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" }
9903 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9904 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9905 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9906 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9907 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9908 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9910 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9911 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9912 "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", {
9915 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9916 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9917 "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" },
9920 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9921 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9922 "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" }
9925 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9926 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9927 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9928 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9929 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9931 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9932 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9933 "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", {
9936 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9937 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9938 "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" },
9941 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9942 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9943 "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" }
9946 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9947 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9948 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9950 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9951 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9952 "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", {
9955 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9956 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9957 "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" }
9960 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9961 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9962 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9963 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9964 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9966 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9967 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9968 "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", {
9971 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9972 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9973 "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" }
9976 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9977 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9978 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9979 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9980 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9982 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9983 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9984 "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", {
9987 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9988 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9989 "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" }
9992 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9993 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9994 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9995 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9997 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9998 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9999 "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", {});
10001 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10002 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10003 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10004 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10005 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10007 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10008 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10009 "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", {});
10011 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10012 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10013 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10014 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10015 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10017 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10018 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10019 "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", {});
10021 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10022 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10023 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10025 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10026 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10027 "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", {});
10029 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10030 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10031 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10032 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10033 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10035 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10036 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10037 "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", {});
10039 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10040 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10041 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10042 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10043 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10045 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10046 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10047 "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", {});
10049 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10050 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10051 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10052 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10053 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10054 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10056 amount_msat: 2000000,
10058 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10059 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10061 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10064 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10065 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10066 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10068 amount_msat: 5000001,
10070 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10071 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10072 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10073 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10074 blinding_point: None,
10076 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10079 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10080 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10082 amount_msat: 5000000,
10084 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10085 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10086 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10087 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10088 blinding_point: None,
10090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10094 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10095 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10096 "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", {
10099 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10100 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10101 "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" },
10103 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10104 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10105 "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" },
10107 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10108 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10109 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
10112 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10113 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10114 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10115 "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", {
10118 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10119 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10120 "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" },
10122 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10123 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10124 "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" },
10126 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10127 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10128 "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" }
10133 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10134 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10136 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10137 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10138 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10139 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10141 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10142 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10143 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10145 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10146 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10148 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10149 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10151 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10152 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10153 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10157 fn test_key_derivation() {
10158 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10161 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10162 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10164 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10165 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10167 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10168 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10170 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10171 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10173 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10174 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10176 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10177 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10181 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10182 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10183 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10184 let seed = [42; 32];
10185 let network = Network::Testnet;
10186 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10187 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10189 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10190 let config = UserConfig::default();
10191 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10192 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10194 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10195 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10197 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10198 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10199 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10200 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10201 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10202 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10203 assert!(res.is_ok());
10207 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10208 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10209 // resulting `channel_type`.
10210 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10211 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10212 let network = Network::Testnet;
10213 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10214 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10216 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10217 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10219 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10220 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10222 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10223 // need to signal it.
10224 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10225 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10226 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10227 &config, 0, 42, None
10229 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10231 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10232 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10233 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10235 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10236 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10237 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10241 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10242 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10243 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10244 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10245 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10248 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10249 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10253 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10254 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10255 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10257 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10258 let network = Network::Testnet;
10259 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10260 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10262 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10263 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10265 let config = UserConfig::default();
10267 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10268 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10269 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10270 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10271 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10273 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10274 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10275 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10279 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10280 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10281 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
10283 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10284 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10285 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10286 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10287 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10288 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10290 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10294 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10295 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10297 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10298 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10299 let network = Network::Testnet;
10300 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10301 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10303 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10304 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10306 let config = UserConfig::default();
10308 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10309 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10310 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10311 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10312 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10313 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10314 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10315 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10317 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10318 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10319 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10320 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10321 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10322 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10326 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10327 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10329 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10330 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10331 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10332 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10334 assert!(res.is_err());
10336 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10337 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10338 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10340 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10341 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10342 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10345 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10347 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10348 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10349 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10350 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10353 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10354 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10356 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10357 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10359 assert!(res.is_err());
10363 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10364 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10365 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10366 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10367 let seed = [42; 32];
10368 let network = Network::Testnet;
10369 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10370 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10371 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10373 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10374 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10375 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10376 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10378 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10379 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10380 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10385 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10395 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10396 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10397 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10402 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10403 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10409 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10412 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10413 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10414 &accept_channel_msg,
10415 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10416 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10419 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10420 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10421 let tx = Transaction {
10423 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10427 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10430 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10433 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10434 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10435 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10436 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10437 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10438 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10442 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10443 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10451 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10452 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10453 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10454 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10456 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10457 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10464 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10465 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10466 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10467 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10468 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10470 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10471 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10472 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10480 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10481 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10484 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10485 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10486 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10487 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());