1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
300 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
302 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
304 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
308 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
311 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
315 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
316 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
318 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
322 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
323 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
329 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
332 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
334 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
336 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
339 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
340 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
342 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
343 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
344 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
345 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
346 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
347 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
348 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
349 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
351 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
353 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
355 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
356 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
358 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
360 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
362 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
363 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
365 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
366 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
368 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
369 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
374 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
377 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
378 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
379 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
380 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
381 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
382 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
383 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
384 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
385 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
386 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
387 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
388 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
389 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
390 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
394 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
396 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
397 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
398 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
399 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
400 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
401 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
402 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
403 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
404 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
405 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
406 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
407 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
408 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
409 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
414 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
415 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
416 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
417 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
418 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
419 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
424 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
425 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
426 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
427 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
428 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
429 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
430 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
431 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
432 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
433 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
434 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
435 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
436 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
437 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
442 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
443 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
444 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
445 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
446 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
447 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
448 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
449 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
453 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
454 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
455 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
457 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
458 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
459 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
460 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
461 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
463 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
464 /// funding transaction to confirm.
465 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
466 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
468 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
469 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
470 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
474 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
475 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
477 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
480 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
489 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
491 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
495 fn $clear(&mut self) {
498 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
500 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
504 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
505 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
507 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
508 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
513 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
515 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
516 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
518 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
519 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
520 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
521 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
522 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
523 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
524 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
525 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
533 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
535 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
536 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
537 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
538 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
539 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
543 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
544 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
547 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
548 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
551 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
553 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
554 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
555 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
559 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
561 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
562 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
563 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
564 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
566 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
572 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
573 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
574 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
575 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
576 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
577 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
578 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
579 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
582 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
584 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
586 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
587 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
588 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
589 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
593 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
595 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
597 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
599 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
600 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
601 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
602 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
603 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
605 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
606 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
608 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
610 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
611 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
613 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
614 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
615 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
616 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
617 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
618 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
620 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
621 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
623 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
624 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
625 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
626 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
627 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
629 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
630 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
632 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
633 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
635 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
636 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
637 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
638 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
644 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
645 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
647 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
648 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
649 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
654 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
655 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
657 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
658 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
659 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
664 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
666 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
667 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
670 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
671 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
672 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
673 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
674 self.logger.log(record)
678 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
679 where L::Target: Logger {
680 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
681 where S::Target: SignerProvider
685 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
686 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
691 macro_rules! secp_check {
692 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
695 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
700 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
701 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
702 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
703 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
704 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
705 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
706 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
707 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
709 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
711 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
713 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
717 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
719 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
720 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
721 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
723 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
724 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
726 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
727 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
728 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
729 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
730 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
732 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
733 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
737 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
743 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
746 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
747 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
748 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
749 holding_cell_msat: u64,
750 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
753 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
754 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
755 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
756 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
757 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
758 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
759 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
760 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
761 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
762 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
763 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
766 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
767 struct HTLCCandidate {
769 origin: HTLCInitiator,
773 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
781 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
783 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
785 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
786 htlc_value_msat: u64,
787 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
792 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
793 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
794 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
795 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
796 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
798 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
799 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
800 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
801 htlc_value_msat: u64,
803 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
804 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
808 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
809 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
810 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
811 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
812 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
813 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
814 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
815 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
816 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
817 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
818 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
821 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
823 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
824 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
825 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
826 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
830 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
831 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
832 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
833 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
834 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
835 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
836 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
839 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
841 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
842 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
843 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
844 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
845 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
846 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
847 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
848 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
849 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
850 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
851 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
852 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
853 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
854 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
855 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
858 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
859 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
860 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
861 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
862 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
863 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
864 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
865 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
866 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
867 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
868 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
869 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
870 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
871 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
872 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
874 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
875 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
876 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
877 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
879 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
880 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
881 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
882 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
884 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
885 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
886 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
887 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
888 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
890 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
891 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
892 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
893 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
895 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
896 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
897 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
899 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
900 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
901 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
902 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
903 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
905 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
906 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
909 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
910 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
912 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
913 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
914 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
915 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
917 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
918 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
920 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
921 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
925 (0, update, required),
928 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
929 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
930 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
931 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
932 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
936 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
937 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
938 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
940 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
942 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
943 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
944 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
948 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
950 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
951 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
957 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
958 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
959 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
960 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
961 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
963 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
964 /// in a timely manner.
965 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
968 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
969 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
970 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
972 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
973 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
974 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
975 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
979 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
980 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
981 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
983 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
984 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
985 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
986 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
988 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
992 /// The current channel ID.
993 channel_id: ChannelId,
994 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
995 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
996 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
997 channel_state: ChannelState,
999 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1000 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1002 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1003 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1004 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1006 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1007 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1008 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1011 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1012 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1014 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1016 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1017 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1018 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1020 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1021 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1022 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1024 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1025 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1026 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1027 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1028 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1029 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1031 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1032 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1033 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1034 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1035 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1036 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1038 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1040 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1041 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1042 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1044 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1045 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1046 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1047 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1048 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1049 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1050 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1052 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1053 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1054 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1056 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1057 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1058 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1059 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1060 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1061 /// outbound or inbound.
1062 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1064 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1066 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1067 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1068 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1069 // HTLCs with similar state.
1070 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1071 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1072 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1073 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1074 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1075 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1076 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1077 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1078 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1079 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1081 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1082 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1083 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1085 update_time_counter: u32,
1087 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1088 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1089 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1090 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1091 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1092 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1094 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1095 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1097 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1098 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1099 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1100 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1102 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1103 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1105 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1107 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1109 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1110 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1111 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1112 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1113 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1115 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1116 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1118 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1119 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1120 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1122 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1123 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1124 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1125 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1126 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1127 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1128 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1129 channel_creation_height: u32,
1131 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1134 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1136 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1139 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1141 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1144 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1146 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1148 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1149 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1152 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1154 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1156 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1157 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1159 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1161 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1162 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1163 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1165 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1167 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1168 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1169 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1171 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1172 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1173 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1175 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1177 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1179 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1180 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1181 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1182 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1184 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1185 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1186 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1188 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1189 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1190 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1192 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1193 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1194 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1195 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1196 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1197 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1201 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1202 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1203 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1204 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1205 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1207 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1208 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1210 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1211 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1212 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1213 /// unblock the state machine.
1215 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1216 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1217 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1219 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1220 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1221 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1224 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1225 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1226 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1227 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1228 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1229 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1230 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1232 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1233 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1235 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1236 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1237 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1239 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1240 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1241 // associated channel mapping.
1243 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1244 // to store all of them.
1245 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1247 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1248 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1249 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1250 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1251 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1253 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1254 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1256 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1257 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1259 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1260 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1261 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1263 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1264 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1265 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1268 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1269 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1270 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1271 self.update_time_counter
1274 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1275 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1278 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1279 self.config.announced_channel
1282 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1283 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1286 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1287 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1288 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1289 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1292 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1293 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1294 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1297 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1298 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1299 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1300 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1301 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1302 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1303 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1306 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1307 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1308 match self.channel_state {
1309 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1310 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1311 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1312 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1313 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1314 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1315 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1317 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1319 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1320 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1324 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1325 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1326 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1327 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1328 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1329 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1332 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1333 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1334 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1338 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1339 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1340 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1341 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1342 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1345 // Public utilities:
1347 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1351 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1353 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1354 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1355 self.temporary_channel_id
1358 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1362 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1363 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1364 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1368 /// Gets the channel's type
1369 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1373 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1375 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1376 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1377 self.short_channel_id
1380 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1381 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1382 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1385 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1386 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1387 self.outbound_scid_alias
1390 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1392 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1393 return &self.holder_signer
1396 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1397 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1398 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1399 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1400 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1401 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1404 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1405 /// get_funding_created.
1406 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1407 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1410 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1411 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1412 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1413 if conf_height > 0 {
1420 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1421 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1422 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1425 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1426 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1427 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1428 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1432 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1435 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1436 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1439 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1440 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1443 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1444 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1445 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1448 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1449 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1452 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1453 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1454 self.counterparty_node_id
1457 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1458 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1459 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1462 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1463 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1464 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1467 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1468 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1470 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1471 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1472 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1473 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1475 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1479 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1480 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1481 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1484 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1485 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1486 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1489 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1490 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1491 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1493 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1494 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1499 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1500 self.channel_value_satoshis
1503 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1504 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1507 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1508 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1511 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1512 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1513 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1515 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1516 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1517 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1518 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1519 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1521 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1525 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1526 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1527 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1530 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1531 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1532 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1535 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1536 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1537 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1540 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1541 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1542 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1545 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1546 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1547 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1550 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1551 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1552 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1555 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1556 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1557 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1558 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1559 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1562 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1564 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1565 self.prev_config = None;
1569 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1570 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1574 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1575 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1576 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1577 let did_channel_update =
1578 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1579 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1580 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1581 if did_channel_update {
1582 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1583 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1584 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1585 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1587 self.config.options = *config;
1591 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1592 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1593 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1594 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1595 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1598 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1599 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1600 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1601 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1602 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1604 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1605 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1606 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1607 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1608 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1609 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1610 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1612 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1613 where L::Target: Logger
1615 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1616 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1617 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1619 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1620 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1621 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1622 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1624 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1625 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1626 if match update_state {
1627 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1628 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1629 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1630 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1631 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1633 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1637 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1638 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1639 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1641 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1643 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1644 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1645 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1647 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1648 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1649 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1650 transaction_output_index: None
1655 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1656 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1657 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1658 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1659 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1662 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1664 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1665 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1666 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1668 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1669 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1672 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1673 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1676 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1678 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1680 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1682 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1683 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1689 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1691 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1692 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1693 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1694 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1695 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1696 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1697 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1701 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1702 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1704 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1706 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1707 if generated_by_local {
1708 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1709 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1710 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1720 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1722 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1723 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1724 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1725 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1726 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1727 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1728 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1731 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1732 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1733 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1734 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1738 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1739 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1743 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1744 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1746 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1748 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1749 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1751 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1752 if !generated_by_local {
1753 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1761 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1762 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1763 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1764 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1765 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1766 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1767 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1768 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1772 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1773 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1774 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1775 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1777 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1779 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1780 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1781 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1782 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1785 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1786 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1787 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1788 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1790 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1793 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1794 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1795 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1796 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1798 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1801 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1802 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1807 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1808 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1813 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1815 let channel_parameters =
1816 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1817 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1818 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1825 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1828 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1829 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1830 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1831 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1839 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1840 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1841 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1842 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1847 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1848 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1849 /// our counterparty!)
1850 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1851 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1852 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1853 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1854 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1855 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1856 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1858 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1862 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1863 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1864 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1865 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1866 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1867 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1868 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1870 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1873 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1874 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1875 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1876 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1877 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1880 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1881 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1884 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1888 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1889 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1890 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1891 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1892 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1893 // which are near the dust limit.
1894 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1895 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1896 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1897 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1898 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1900 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1901 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1903 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1904 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1907 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1908 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1909 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1912 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1913 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1915 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1916 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1917 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1918 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1919 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1920 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1921 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1924 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1927 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1928 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1929 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1931 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1932 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1933 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1934 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1935 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1936 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1945 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1946 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1948 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1949 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1950 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1951 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1952 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1953 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1954 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1957 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1960 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1961 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1962 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1964 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1965 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1966 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1967 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1968 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1969 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1972 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1976 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1977 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1978 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1979 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1980 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1981 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1982 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1984 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1985 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1987 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1994 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1995 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1996 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1997 /// corner case properly.
1998 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1999 -> AvailableBalances
2000 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2002 let context = &self;
2003 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2004 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2005 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2007 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2008 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2009 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2010 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2013 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2015 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2016 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2018 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2020 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2022 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2023 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2027 if context.is_outbound() {
2028 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2029 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2031 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2032 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2034 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2035 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2036 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2037 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2040 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2041 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2042 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2043 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2044 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2045 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2046 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2049 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2050 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2051 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2052 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2053 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2054 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2055 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2056 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2057 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2058 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2059 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2061 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2064 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2065 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2066 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2067 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2068 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2071 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2072 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2074 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2075 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2076 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2078 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2079 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2080 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2081 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2085 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2087 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2088 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2089 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2090 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2091 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2092 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2093 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2095 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2096 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2098 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2099 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2100 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2102 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2103 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2104 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2105 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2106 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2109 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2110 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2111 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2112 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2113 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2114 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2117 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2118 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2119 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2121 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2125 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2126 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2128 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2129 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2133 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2134 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2135 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2136 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2138 outbound_capacity_msat,
2139 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2140 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2145 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2146 let context = &self;
2147 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2150 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2151 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2153 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2154 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2156 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2157 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2159 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2160 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2161 let context = &self;
2162 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2164 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2167 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2168 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2170 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2171 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2173 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2174 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2176 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2177 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2181 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2182 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2188 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2189 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2190 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2193 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2194 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2195 included_htlcs += 1;
2198 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2199 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2203 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2204 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2205 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2206 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2207 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2208 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2213 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2215 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2216 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2221 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2222 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2226 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2227 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2228 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2231 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2232 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2234 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2235 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2236 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2238 total_pending_htlcs,
2239 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2240 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2241 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2243 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2244 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2245 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2247 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2249 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2254 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2255 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2257 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2258 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2260 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2261 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2263 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2264 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2265 let context = &self;
2266 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2268 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2271 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2272 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2274 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2275 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2277 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2278 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2280 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2281 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2285 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2286 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2292 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2293 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2294 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2295 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2296 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2297 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2300 included_htlcs += 1;
2303 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2304 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2307 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2308 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2310 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2311 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2312 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2317 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2318 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2319 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2322 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2323 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2325 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2326 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2328 total_pending_htlcs,
2329 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2330 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2331 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2333 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2334 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2335 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2337 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2339 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2344 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2345 match self.channel_state {
2346 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2347 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2348 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2349 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2359 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2361 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2362 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2365 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2367 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2368 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2369 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2373 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2374 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2375 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2378 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2380 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2381 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2384 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2385 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2386 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2387 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2388 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2389 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2390 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2391 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2392 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2393 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2394 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2396 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2397 // return them to fail the payment.
2398 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2399 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2400 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2402 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2403 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2408 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2409 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2410 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2411 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2412 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2413 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2414 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2415 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2416 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
2417 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2418 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2419 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2420 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2421 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2422 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2426 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2427 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2429 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2430 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2434 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2435 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2436 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2437 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2438 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2439 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2440 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2441 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2445 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2446 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2447 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2448 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2450 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2451 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2452 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2453 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2455 match &self.holder_signer {
2456 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2457 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2458 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2459 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2460 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2463 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2467 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2468 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2469 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2471 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2472 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2473 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2475 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2476 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2477 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2480 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2481 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2483 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2490 // Internal utility functions for channels
2492 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2493 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2494 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2496 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2498 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2499 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2500 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2502 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2505 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2507 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2510 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2511 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2512 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2514 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2516 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2517 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2518 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2519 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2520 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2523 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2524 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2525 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2526 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2527 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2528 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2529 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2532 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2533 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2535 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2536 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2539 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2540 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2541 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2542 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2543 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2544 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2547 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2548 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2549 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2550 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2553 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2554 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2556 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2557 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2558 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2562 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2563 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2564 trait FailHTLCContents {
2565 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2566 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2567 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2568 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2570 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2571 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2572 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2573 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2575 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2576 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2578 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2579 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2582 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2583 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2584 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2585 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2588 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2589 failure_code: self.1
2592 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2593 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2595 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2596 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2598 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2599 failure_code: self.1
2604 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2605 fn name() -> &'static str;
2607 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2608 fn name() -> &'static str {
2612 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2613 fn name() -> &'static str {
2614 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2618 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2619 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2620 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2622 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2623 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2624 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2625 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2627 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2628 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2630 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2632 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2633 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2634 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2635 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2637 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2638 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2648 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2649 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2650 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2651 // outside of those situations will fail.
2652 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2656 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2661 1 + // script length (0)
2665 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2666 2 + // witness marker and flag
2667 1 + // witness element count
2668 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2669 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2670 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2671 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2672 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2673 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2675 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2676 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2677 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2683 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2684 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2685 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2686 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2688 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2689 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2690 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2692 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2693 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2694 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2695 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2696 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2697 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2700 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2701 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2704 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2705 value_to_holder = 0;
2708 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2709 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2710 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2711 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2713 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2714 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2717 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2718 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2721 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2724 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2725 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2727 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2729 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2730 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2731 where L::Target: Logger {
2732 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2733 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2734 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
2735 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2736 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2737 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2738 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2739 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2743 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2744 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2745 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2746 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2748 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2749 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2752 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2753 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2754 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2756 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2757 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2758 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2759 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2760 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2761 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2762 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2764 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2765 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2766 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2768 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2769 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2771 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2774 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2775 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2779 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2783 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2784 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2785 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2786 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2787 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2788 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2791 // Now update local state:
2793 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2794 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2795 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2796 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2797 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2798 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2799 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2800 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2802 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
2805 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
2806 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2807 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2808 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2809 // do not not get into this branch.
2810 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2811 match pending_update {
2812 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2813 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2814 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2815 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2817 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2818 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2821 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2822 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2824 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2825 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2826 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2827 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2828 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2829 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2835 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2836 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2837 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2839 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2840 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2844 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2847 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2848 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2850 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2851 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2853 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2854 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2857 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2860 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2861 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2862 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2863 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2868 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2869 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2870 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2871 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2872 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2873 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2874 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2875 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2876 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2877 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2878 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2879 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2880 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2881 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2882 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2884 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2885 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2886 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2887 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2888 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2891 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2892 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2893 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2899 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2900 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2902 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2906 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2907 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2908 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2909 /// before we fail backwards.
2911 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2912 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2913 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2914 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2915 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2916 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2917 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2920 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2921 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2923 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2924 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2925 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2926 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2927 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
2928 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2931 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2932 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2933 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2934 /// before we fail backwards.
2936 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2937 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2938 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2939 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2940 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2942 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2943 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2944 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2947 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2948 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2949 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2951 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2952 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2953 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2955 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2956 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2957 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2959 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2964 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2971 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2972 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2973 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2974 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2975 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2979 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
2980 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2981 force_holding_cell = true;
2984 // Now update local state:
2985 if force_holding_cell {
2986 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2987 match pending_update {
2988 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2989 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2990 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2991 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2995 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2996 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2998 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2999 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3006 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3007 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3011 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3012 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3014 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3015 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3018 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3021 // Message handlers:
3022 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3023 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3024 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3025 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3026 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3027 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3028 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3031 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3033 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3035 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3036 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3037 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3038 debug_assert!(matches!(
3039 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3041 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3042 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3045 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3046 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3048 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3049 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3050 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3051 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3053 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3056 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3057 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3061 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3062 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3063 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3064 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3065 // when routing outbound payments.
3066 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3070 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3071 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3072 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3073 match &self.context.channel_state {
3074 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3075 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3076 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3077 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3078 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3079 check_reconnection = true;
3080 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3081 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3082 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3083 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3084 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3086 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3087 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3090 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3091 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3092 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3094 if check_reconnection {
3095 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3096 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3097 let expected_point =
3098 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3099 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3101 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3102 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3103 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3104 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3105 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3106 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3108 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3109 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3110 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3111 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3112 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3114 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3120 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3121 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3123 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3125 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3128 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3129 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3130 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3131 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3132 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3133 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3135 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3138 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3139 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3140 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3142 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3143 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3146 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3149 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3152 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3155 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3159 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3160 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3161 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3164 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3168 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3169 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3170 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3171 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3172 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3173 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3174 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3175 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3176 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3177 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3178 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3180 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3181 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3182 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3183 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3184 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3185 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3189 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3190 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3193 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3194 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3195 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3197 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3198 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3199 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3200 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3201 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3202 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3203 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3207 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3208 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3209 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3210 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3211 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3212 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3213 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3217 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3218 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3219 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3220 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3221 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3225 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3226 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3228 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3229 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3230 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3232 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3233 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3237 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3240 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3245 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3246 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3250 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3251 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3252 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3253 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3254 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3255 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3256 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3257 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3258 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3260 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3261 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3262 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3263 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3264 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3267 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3268 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3269 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3270 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3274 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3277 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3281 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3282 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3283 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3287 // Now update local state:
3288 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3289 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3290 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3291 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3292 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3293 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3294 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3299 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3301 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3302 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3303 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3304 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3305 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3306 None => fail_reason.into(),
3307 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3308 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3309 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3312 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3316 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3318 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3319 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3321 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3327 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3330 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
3331 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3334 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3338 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
3341 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3342 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3345 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3349 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3353 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3354 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3357 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3361 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3365 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3366 where L::Target: Logger
3368 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3371 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3374 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3378 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3380 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3382 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3383 let commitment_txid = {
3384 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3385 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3386 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3388 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3389 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3390 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3391 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3392 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3397 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3399 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3400 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3401 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3402 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3405 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3406 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3407 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3411 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3413 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3414 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3415 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3416 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3417 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3418 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3419 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3420 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3421 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3422 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3423 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3429 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3433 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3434 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3435 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3436 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3437 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3438 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3439 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3440 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3441 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3442 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3443 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3444 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3445 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3448 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3449 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3450 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3451 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3452 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3453 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3454 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3456 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3457 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3458 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3459 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3460 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3461 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3462 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3465 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3466 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3469 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3471 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3472 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3473 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3476 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3479 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3480 commitment_stats.tx,
3482 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3483 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3484 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3487 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3488 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3490 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3491 let mut need_commitment = false;
3492 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3493 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3494 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3495 need_commitment = true;
3499 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3500 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3501 Some(forward_info.clone())
3503 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3504 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3505 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3506 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3507 need_commitment = true;
3510 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3511 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3512 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3513 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3514 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3515 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3516 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3517 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3518 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3519 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3520 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3521 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3522 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3523 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3525 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3527 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3528 need_commitment = true;
3532 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3533 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3534 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3535 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3536 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3537 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3538 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3540 nondust_htlc_sources,
3542 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3545 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3546 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3547 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3548 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3549 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3551 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3552 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3553 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3554 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3555 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3556 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3557 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3558 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3559 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3560 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3561 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3562 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3563 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3564 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3567 &self.context.channel_id);
3568 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3571 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3572 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3573 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3574 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3575 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3576 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3577 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3578 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3579 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3583 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3584 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3585 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3586 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3589 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3590 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3591 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3592 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3593 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3594 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3595 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3597 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3598 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3599 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3602 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3603 /// for our counterparty.
3604 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3605 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3606 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3607 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3609 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3610 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3611 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3612 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3614 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3615 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3616 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3617 updates: Vec::new(),
3618 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3621 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3622 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3623 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3624 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3625 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3626 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3627 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3628 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3629 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3630 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3631 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3632 // to rebalance channels.
3633 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3635 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3636 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3638 match self.send_htlc(
3639 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3640 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3642 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3645 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3646 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3647 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3648 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3649 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3650 // into the holding cell without ever being
3651 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3652 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3653 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3656 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3663 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3664 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3665 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3666 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3667 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3668 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3669 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3670 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3671 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3672 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3673 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3674 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3677 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3678 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3679 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3681 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3682 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
3683 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3686 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3688 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3689 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3690 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3691 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3692 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3693 // for a full revocation before failing.
3694 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3695 update_fail_count += 1;
3697 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3699 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3704 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3705 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3707 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3708 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3713 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3714 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3715 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3716 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3717 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3719 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3720 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3721 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3723 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3724 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3730 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3731 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3732 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3733 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3734 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3735 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3736 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3737 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3738 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3740 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3743 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3746 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3750 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3752 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3753 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3758 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3759 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3760 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3761 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3762 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3763 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3764 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3765 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3769 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3771 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3772 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3775 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3776 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3777 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3778 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3780 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3782 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3787 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3788 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3789 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3790 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3791 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3792 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3793 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3794 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3795 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3797 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3800 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3801 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3802 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3803 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3804 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3805 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3806 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3807 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3808 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3810 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3811 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3814 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3815 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3816 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3817 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3818 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3819 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut require_commitment = false;
3821 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3824 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3825 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3826 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3827 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3829 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3830 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3831 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3832 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3833 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3834 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3836 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3840 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3841 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3842 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3843 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3844 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3846 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3847 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3848 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3853 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3854 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3856 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3860 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3861 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3863 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3864 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3865 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3866 require_commitment = true;
3867 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3868 match forward_info {
3869 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3870 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3871 require_commitment = true;
3873 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3874 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3875 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3877 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3878 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3879 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3883 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3884 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3885 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3886 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3892 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3893 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3894 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3895 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3896 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3898 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3899 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3900 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3901 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3902 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3903 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3904 require_commitment = true;
3908 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3910 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3911 match update_state {
3912 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3913 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3914 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3915 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3916 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3917 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3919 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3920 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3921 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3922 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3923 require_commitment = true;
3924 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3925 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3930 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3931 let release_state_str =
3932 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3933 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3934 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3935 if !release_monitor {
3936 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3937 update: monitor_update,
3939 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3941 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3946 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3947 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3948 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3949 if require_commitment {
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3951 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3952 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3953 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3955 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3956 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3957 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3958 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3959 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3961 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3962 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3963 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3965 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3968 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3969 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3970 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3971 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3972 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3973 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3975 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3976 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3978 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3979 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3981 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3982 if require_commitment {
3983 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3985 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3986 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3987 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3988 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3990 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3991 &self.context.channel_id(),
3992 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3995 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3996 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3998 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3999 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4001 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4002 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4008 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4009 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4010 /// commitment update.
4011 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4012 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4013 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4015 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4016 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4019 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4020 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4021 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4022 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4024 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4025 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4026 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4027 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4028 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4029 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4030 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4032 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4033 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4035 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4036 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4038 if !self.context.is_live() {
4039 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4042 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4043 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4044 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4045 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4046 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4047 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4048 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4049 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4050 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4051 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4055 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4056 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4057 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4058 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4059 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4060 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4063 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4064 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4068 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4069 force_holding_cell = true;
4072 if force_holding_cell {
4073 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4077 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4078 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4080 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4081 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4086 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4087 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4089 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4091 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4092 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4093 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4094 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4098 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4099 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4100 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4104 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4105 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4108 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4109 // will be retransmitted.
4110 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4111 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4112 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4114 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4115 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4117 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4118 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4119 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4120 // this HTLC accordingly
4121 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4124 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4125 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4126 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4127 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4130 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4131 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4132 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4133 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4134 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4135 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4140 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4142 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4143 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4144 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4145 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4149 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4150 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4151 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4152 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4153 // the update upon reconnection.
4154 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4158 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4160 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4161 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4165 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4166 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4167 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4168 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4169 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4170 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4171 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4173 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4174 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4175 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4176 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4177 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4178 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4179 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4181 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4182 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4183 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4184 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4185 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4186 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4187 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4190 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4191 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4192 /// to the remote side.
4193 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4194 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4195 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4196 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4199 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4201 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4202 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4204 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4205 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4206 // first received the funding_signed.
4207 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4208 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4209 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4210 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4212 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4214 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4215 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4216 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4217 funding_broadcastable = None;
4220 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4221 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4222 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4223 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4224 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4225 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4226 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4227 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4228 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4229 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4230 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4231 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4232 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4233 next_per_commitment_point,
4234 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4238 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4240 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4241 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4242 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4243 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4244 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4245 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4247 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4248 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4249 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4250 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4251 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4252 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4256 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4257 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4259 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4260 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4262 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4263 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4266 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4267 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4268 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4269 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4270 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4271 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4272 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4273 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4274 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4278 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4279 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4281 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4284 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4287 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4289 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4290 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4291 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4292 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4293 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4294 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4295 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4296 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4297 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4298 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4300 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4302 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4304 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4310 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4312 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4313 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4314 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4315 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4317 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4318 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4320 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4321 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4324 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4325 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4326 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4327 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4329 SignerResumeUpdates {
4336 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4337 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4338 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4339 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4340 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4341 per_commitment_secret,
4342 next_per_commitment_point,
4344 next_local_nonce: None,
4348 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4349 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4350 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4351 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4352 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4353 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4355 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4356 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4357 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4358 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4359 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4360 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4361 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4362 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4363 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4364 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4365 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4370 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4371 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4373 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4374 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4376 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4377 reason: err_packet.clone()
4380 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4381 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4382 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4383 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4384 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4385 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4388 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4389 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4390 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4391 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4392 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4399 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4400 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4401 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4402 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4406 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4407 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4408 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4409 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4410 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4411 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4412 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4416 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4417 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4419 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4420 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4421 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4422 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4427 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4428 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4433 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4434 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4435 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4436 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4437 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4438 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4439 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4444 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4445 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4447 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4448 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4449 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4450 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4451 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4452 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4453 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4454 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4457 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4459 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4460 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4461 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4462 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4466 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4467 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4471 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4472 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4473 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4474 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4475 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4476 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4479 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4480 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4481 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4482 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4483 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4486 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4487 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4488 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4489 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4490 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4491 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4492 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4493 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4497 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4498 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4499 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4501 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4502 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4503 our_commitment_transaction
4507 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4508 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4509 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4510 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4512 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4514 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4516 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4517 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4518 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4519 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4520 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4523 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4524 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4525 channel_ready: None,
4526 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4527 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4528 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4532 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4533 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4534 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4535 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4536 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4537 next_per_commitment_point,
4538 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4540 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4541 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4542 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4546 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4547 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4548 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4550 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4551 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4552 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4555 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4558 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4560 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4561 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4562 our_commitment_transaction
4566 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4567 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4568 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4569 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4570 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4571 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4572 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4574 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4576 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4577 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4578 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4579 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4580 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4581 next_per_commitment_point,
4582 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4586 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4587 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4588 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4590 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4593 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4594 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4595 raa: required_revoke,
4596 commitment_update: None,
4597 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4599 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4600 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4601 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4603 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4606 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4607 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4608 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4609 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4610 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4611 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4614 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4615 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4616 raa: required_revoke,
4617 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4618 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4621 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4622 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4623 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4624 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4625 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4628 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4629 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4630 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4631 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4636 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4637 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4638 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4639 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4641 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4643 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4645 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4646 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4647 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4648 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4649 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4650 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4651 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4652 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4654 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4655 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4656 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4657 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4658 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4660 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4661 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4662 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4663 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4666 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4667 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4668 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4669 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4670 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4671 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4672 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4673 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4674 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4675 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4676 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4677 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4678 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4679 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4680 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4682 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4685 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4686 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4689 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4690 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4691 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4692 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4693 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4694 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4697 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4698 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4699 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4700 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4701 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4702 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4705 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4711 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4712 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4713 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4714 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4716 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4717 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4718 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4719 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4720 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4721 return Ok((None, None, None));
4724 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4725 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4726 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4728 return Ok((None, None, None));
4731 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4732 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4733 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4734 return Ok((None, None, None));
4737 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4739 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4740 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4741 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4742 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4744 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4745 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4747 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4748 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4750 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4751 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4752 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4753 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4755 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4756 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4757 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4761 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4767 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4768 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4770 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4771 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4774 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4775 /// within our expected timeframe.
4777 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4778 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4779 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4782 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4785 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4786 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4790 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4791 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4793 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4796 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4797 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4798 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4799 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4802 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4803 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4807 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4809 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4810 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4813 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4814 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4815 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4818 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4821 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4822 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4823 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4824 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4826 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4829 assert!(send_shutdown);
4830 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4831 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4832 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4834 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4835 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4837 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4842 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4844 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4845 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4847 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4848 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4849 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4850 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4851 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4852 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4853 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4855 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4857 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4858 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4860 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4861 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4862 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4863 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4867 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4868 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4869 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4870 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4871 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4872 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4875 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4882 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4883 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4885 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4888 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4889 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4891 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4893 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4894 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4895 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4896 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4897 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4898 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4899 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4900 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4901 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4903 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4904 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4907 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4911 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4912 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4913 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4914 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4916 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4919 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4922 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4925 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4929 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4933 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4934 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4935 return Ok((None, None, None));
4938 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4939 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4940 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4943 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4945 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4948 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4949 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4950 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4951 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4952 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4956 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4957 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4962 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4963 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4964 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4965 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4966 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4967 monitor_update: None,
4968 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4969 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4970 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4971 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4972 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4973 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4974 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4975 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4977 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4978 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4979 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4980 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4984 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4986 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4987 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4988 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4989 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4991 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4994 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4995 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4997 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4998 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4999 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5000 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5001 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
5002 monitor_update: None,
5003 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5004 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5005 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5006 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5007 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5008 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5009 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5010 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5012 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5013 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5014 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5015 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5020 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5021 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5022 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5023 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5025 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5026 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5027 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5029 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5031 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5038 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5039 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5042 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5043 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5045 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5046 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5049 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5050 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5051 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5052 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5053 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5055 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5057 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5059 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5060 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5063 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5064 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5065 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5066 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5067 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5068 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5069 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5070 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5075 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5076 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5077 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5078 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5084 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5085 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5086 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5087 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5089 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5095 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5096 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5097 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5098 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5099 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5100 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5101 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5103 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5104 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5107 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5109 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5110 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5116 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5117 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5118 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5119 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5120 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5121 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5122 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5124 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5125 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5132 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5133 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5136 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5137 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5140 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5141 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5145 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5146 &self.context.holder_signer
5150 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5152 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5153 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5154 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5155 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5156 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5157 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5159 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5169 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5170 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5174 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5175 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5176 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5177 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5180 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5181 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5182 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5183 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5186 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5187 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5188 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5189 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5190 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5191 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5194 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5195 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5196 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5197 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5198 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5199 if !release_monitor {
5200 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5209 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5210 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5213 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5214 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5215 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5217 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5218 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5220 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5221 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5223 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5224 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5225 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5228 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5229 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5230 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5231 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5232 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5233 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5235 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5236 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5237 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5239 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5240 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5241 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5242 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5243 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5244 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5250 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5251 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5252 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5253 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5256 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5257 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5258 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5261 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5262 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5263 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5266 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5267 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5268 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5269 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5270 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5273 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5274 self.context.channel_update_status
5277 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5278 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5279 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5282 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5284 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5285 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5286 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5290 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5291 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5292 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5295 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5299 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5300 // channel_ready yet.
5301 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5305 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5306 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5307 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5308 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5310 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5311 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5312 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5314 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5315 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5318 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5319 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5321 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5322 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5323 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5324 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5325 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5326 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5327 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5328 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5330 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5334 if need_commitment_update {
5335 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5336 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5337 let next_per_commitment_point =
5338 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5339 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5340 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5341 next_per_commitment_point,
5342 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5346 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5352 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5353 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5354 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5355 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5356 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5357 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5358 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5360 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5363 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5364 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5365 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5366 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5367 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5368 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5369 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5370 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5371 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5372 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5373 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5374 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5375 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5376 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5377 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5378 // channel and move on.
5379 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5380 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5382 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5383 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5384 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5386 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5387 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5388 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5389 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5390 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5391 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5392 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5393 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5398 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5399 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5400 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5401 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5402 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5405 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5406 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5407 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5408 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5409 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5410 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5413 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5414 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5415 // may have already happened for this block).
5416 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5417 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5418 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5419 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5422 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5423 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5424 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5425 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5433 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5434 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5435 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5436 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5438 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5439 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5442 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5444 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5445 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5446 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5447 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5449 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5452 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5455 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5456 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5457 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5458 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5460 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5463 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5464 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5465 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5467 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5468 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5470 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5471 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5472 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5480 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5482 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5483 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5484 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5486 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5487 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5490 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5491 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5492 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5493 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5494 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5495 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5496 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5497 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5500 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5501 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5502 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5503 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5505 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5506 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5507 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5509 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5510 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5511 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5512 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5514 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5515 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5516 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5517 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5518 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5519 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5520 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5523 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5524 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5526 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5529 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5530 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5531 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5532 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5533 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5534 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5535 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5536 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5537 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5538 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5539 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5540 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5541 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5542 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5543 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5544 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5545 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5551 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5556 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5557 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5559 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5560 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5561 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5562 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5564 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5567 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5569 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5570 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5571 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5572 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5573 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5574 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5576 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5580 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5581 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5582 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5583 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5584 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5585 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5587 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5588 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5591 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5592 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5593 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5594 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5595 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5601 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5602 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5603 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5604 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5606 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5609 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5613 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5617 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5618 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5622 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5626 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5627 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5630 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5634 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5636 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5641 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5642 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5643 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5645 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5650 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5652 None => return None,
5655 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5657 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5658 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5660 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5661 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5664 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5670 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5672 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5673 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5674 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5675 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5676 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5677 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5678 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5680 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5681 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5682 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5683 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5684 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5685 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5686 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5687 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5688 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5689 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5690 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5691 contents: announcement,
5694 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5699 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5703 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5704 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5705 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5706 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5707 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5708 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5709 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5710 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5712 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5714 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5716 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5717 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5719 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5721 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5722 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5725 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5726 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5727 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5728 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5731 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5734 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5735 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5736 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5737 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5738 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5739 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5742 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5744 Err(_) => return None,
5746 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5747 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5752 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5753 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5754 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5755 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5756 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5757 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5758 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5759 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5760 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5761 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5762 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5763 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5764 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5765 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5766 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5767 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5770 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5773 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5774 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5775 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5776 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5777 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5778 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5779 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5780 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5781 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5783 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5784 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5785 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5786 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5787 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5788 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5789 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5790 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5791 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5793 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5794 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5795 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5796 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5797 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5798 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5799 next_funding_txid: None,
5804 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5806 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5807 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5808 /// commitment update.
5810 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5811 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5812 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5813 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5814 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5815 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5816 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5819 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5820 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5821 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5823 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5824 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5829 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5830 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5832 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5834 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5835 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5837 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5838 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5839 /// regenerate them.
5841 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5842 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5844 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5845 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5846 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5847 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5848 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5849 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5850 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5851 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5853 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5854 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5855 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5859 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5860 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5861 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5864 if amount_msat == 0 {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5868 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5869 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5871 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5874 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5875 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5876 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5879 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5880 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5881 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5882 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5883 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5884 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5885 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5889 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
5890 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5891 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5892 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5893 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5894 else { "to peer" });
5896 if need_holding_cell {
5897 force_holding_cell = true;
5900 // Now update local state:
5901 if force_holding_cell {
5902 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5907 onion_routing_packet,
5914 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5915 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5917 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5919 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5925 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5926 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5927 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5931 onion_routing_packet,
5935 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5940 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5941 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5942 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5943 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5945 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5946 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5947 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5949 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5950 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5954 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5955 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5956 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5957 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5958 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5959 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5960 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5963 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5964 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5965 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5966 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5967 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5968 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5971 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5973 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5974 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5975 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5976 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5977 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5979 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5980 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5983 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5984 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5985 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5986 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5987 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5988 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5989 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5990 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5991 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5992 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5993 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5994 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5996 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5998 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6002 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6003 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6004 where L::Target: Logger
6006 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6007 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6008 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6012 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6013 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6014 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6015 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6016 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6017 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6018 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6019 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6020 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6021 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6022 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6028 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6031 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6032 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6033 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6034 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6035 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6036 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6038 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6039 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6040 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6042 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6043 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6044 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6047 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6048 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6052 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6053 &commitment_stats.tx,
6054 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6055 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6056 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6057 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6059 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6061 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6062 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6063 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6064 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6066 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6067 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6068 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6069 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6070 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6071 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6075 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6076 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6080 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6081 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6083 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6089 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6090 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6092 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6093 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6094 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6095 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6096 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6097 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6098 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6099 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6101 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6102 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6103 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6106 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6107 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6108 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6114 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6116 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6117 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6118 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6119 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6120 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6122 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6124 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6130 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6131 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6132 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6133 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6134 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6136 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6137 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6138 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6141 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6142 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6144 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6145 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6147 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6148 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6150 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6151 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6152 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6155 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6158 // use override shutdown script if provided
6159 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6160 Some(script) => script,
6162 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6163 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6164 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6165 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6169 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6170 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6172 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6177 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6178 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6179 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6180 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6182 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6183 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6184 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6185 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6186 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6187 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6188 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6190 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6192 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6193 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6195 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6196 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6197 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6200 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6201 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6202 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6203 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6204 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6206 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6207 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6214 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6215 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6217 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6220 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6221 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6222 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6224 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6225 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6229 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6233 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6234 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6235 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6236 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6239 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6240 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6241 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6242 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6243 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6244 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6245 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6246 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6248 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6249 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6250 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6251 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6253 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6254 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6256 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6257 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6259 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6260 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6263 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6264 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6266 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6267 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6268 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6269 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6270 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6273 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6274 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6276 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6277 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6279 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6281 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6283 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6284 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6285 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6286 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6289 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6290 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6292 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6293 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6294 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6295 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6299 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6300 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6301 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6305 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6306 Ok(script) => script,
6307 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6310 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6313 context: ChannelContext {
6316 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6317 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6318 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6319 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6324 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6326 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6327 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6328 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6329 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6331 channel_value_satoshis,
6333 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6335 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6336 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6339 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6340 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6343 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6344 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6345 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6346 pending_update_fee: None,
6347 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6348 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6349 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6350 update_time_counter: 1,
6352 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6354 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6355 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6356 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6357 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6358 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6359 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6361 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6362 signer_pending_funding: false,
6364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6365 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6366 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6367 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6369 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6370 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6371 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6372 closing_fee_limits: None,
6373 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6375 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6376 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6377 short_channel_id: None,
6378 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6380 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6381 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6382 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6383 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6384 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6385 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6386 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6387 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6388 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6389 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6390 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6391 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6393 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6395 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6396 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6397 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6398 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6399 counterparty_parameters: None,
6400 funding_outpoint: None,
6401 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6403 funding_transaction: None,
6404 is_batch_funding: None,
6406 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6407 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6408 counterparty_node_id,
6410 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6412 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6414 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6415 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6417 announcement_sigs: None,
6419 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6420 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6421 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6422 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6424 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6425 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6427 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6428 outbound_scid_alias,
6430 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6431 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6433 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6434 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6439 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6441 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6445 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6446 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6447 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6448 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6449 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6450 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6451 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6452 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6453 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6455 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6460 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6461 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6462 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6465 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6466 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6467 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6468 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6471 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6473 next_local_nonce: None,
6477 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6478 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6479 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6480 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6481 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6482 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6483 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6484 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6485 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6486 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6487 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6490 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6491 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6493 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6495 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6496 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6497 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6498 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6501 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6502 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6504 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6506 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6507 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6509 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6510 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6511 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6512 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6513 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6514 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6517 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6518 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6520 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6521 if funding_created.is_none() {
6522 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6523 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6525 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6526 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6527 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6528 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6536 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6537 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6538 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6539 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6540 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6541 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6542 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6543 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6544 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6545 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6548 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6549 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6550 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6551 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6552 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6553 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6559 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6560 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6561 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6562 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6563 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6564 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6566 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6568 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6570 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6571 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6576 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6577 // We've exhausted our options
6580 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6581 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6584 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6585 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6586 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6587 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6589 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6590 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6591 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6592 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6593 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6594 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6596 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6598 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6599 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6602 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6603 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6604 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6606 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6607 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6610 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6611 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6614 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6615 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6618 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
6620 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6621 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6622 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6623 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6624 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6625 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6626 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6627 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6628 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6629 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6630 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
6631 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6632 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6633 first_per_commitment_point,
6634 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6635 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6636 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6637 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6639 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6641 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6642 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6647 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6648 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6650 // Check sanity of message fields:
6651 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6654 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6657 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6660 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6663 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6666 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6668 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6670 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6671 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6674 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6675 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
6678 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6681 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6685 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6686 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6689 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6690 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6692 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6695 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6698 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6699 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6701 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6704 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
6708 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
6709 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6712 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6713 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6715 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6716 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6719 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6720 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6723 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6724 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6725 &Some(ref script) => {
6726 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6727 if script.len() == 0 {
6730 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6731 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6733 Some(script.clone())
6736 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6743 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
6744 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6745 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6746 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
6747 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
6749 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6750 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
6752 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
6755 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6756 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
6757 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
6758 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
6759 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6760 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
6763 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6764 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
6765 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6768 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
6769 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6771 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6772 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6774 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6779 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6780 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6781 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6782 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6783 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6787 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6788 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6790 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6791 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6793 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6794 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6795 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6796 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6799 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6801 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6802 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6803 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6804 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6806 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6807 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6809 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6810 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6812 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6813 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6814 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6815 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6816 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6817 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6821 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6822 initial_commitment_tx,
6825 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6826 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6830 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6831 if validated.is_err() {
6832 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6835 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6836 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6837 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6838 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6839 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6840 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6841 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6842 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6843 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6844 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6845 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6846 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6848 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
6849 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6850 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6851 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6852 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6853 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6854 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6855 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6857 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6858 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6859 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6861 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6863 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6864 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6866 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6868 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6870 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6871 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6872 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6875 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6877 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6878 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6879 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6880 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6881 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6886 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6887 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6888 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6889 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6892 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6893 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6894 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6895 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6896 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6897 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6898 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
6899 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6903 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6904 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6905 // `static_remote_key`.
6906 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6909 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6910 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6913 let announced_channel = if (msg.common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6914 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6917 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6919 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6920 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6927 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6928 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6929 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6930 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6931 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6932 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6933 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6934 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6935 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6936 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6937 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6940 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6941 let announced_channel = if (msg.common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6943 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6944 // support this channel type.
6945 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6947 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6948 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6949 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6950 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6951 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
6952 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
6953 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
6954 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6955 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
6958 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6962 // Check sanity of message fields:
6963 if msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis)));
6966 if msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis)));
6969 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis {
6970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis)));
6972 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6973 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6976 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis {
6977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis)));
6979 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6980 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6982 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
6984 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6985 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
6988 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6991 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6995 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6996 if msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6999 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7002 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7005 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7008 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7011 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7014 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7018 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7020 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7021 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7026 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7027 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7028 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7029 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7032 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7036 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7037 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7039 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
7040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7043 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7044 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7045 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7046 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7050 let funders_amount_msat = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7051 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7052 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7056 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7057 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7058 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7059 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7063 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7064 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7065 &Some(ref script) => {
7066 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7067 if script.len() == 0 {
7070 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7073 Some(script.clone())
7076 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7083 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7084 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7085 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7086 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7090 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7091 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7096 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7097 Ok(script) => script,
7098 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7101 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7102 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7104 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7107 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7111 context: ChannelContext {
7114 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7115 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7117 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7122 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7124 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id),
7125 channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7126 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7127 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7129 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7132 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7134 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7135 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7138 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7139 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7140 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7142 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7143 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7144 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7145 pending_update_fee: None,
7146 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7147 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7148 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7149 update_time_counter: 1,
7151 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7153 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7154 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7155 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7156 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7157 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7158 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7160 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7161 signer_pending_funding: false,
7163 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7164 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7165 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7166 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7168 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7169 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7170 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7171 closing_fee_limits: None,
7172 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7174 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7175 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7176 short_channel_id: None,
7177 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7179 feerate_per_kw: msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7180 channel_value_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7181 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
7182 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7183 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7184 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7185 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7186 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7187 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
7188 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7189 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
7190 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7193 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7195 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7196 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7197 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7198 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7199 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7200 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7201 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7203 funding_outpoint: None,
7204 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7206 funding_transaction: None,
7207 is_batch_funding: None,
7209 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
7210 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7211 counterparty_node_id,
7213 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7215 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7217 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7218 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7220 announcement_sigs: None,
7222 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7223 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7224 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7225 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7227 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7228 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7230 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7231 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7233 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7234 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7237 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7242 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7244 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7250 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7251 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7253 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7254 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7255 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7256 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7259 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7260 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7262 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7264 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7265 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7268 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7271 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7272 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7273 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7275 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7276 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7277 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7278 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7280 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7281 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7282 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7283 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7284 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7285 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7286 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7287 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7288 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7289 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7290 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7291 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7292 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7293 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7294 first_per_commitment_point,
7295 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7296 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7297 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7299 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7301 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7303 next_local_nonce: None,
7307 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7308 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7310 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7312 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7313 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7316 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7317 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7319 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7320 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7321 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7322 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7323 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7324 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7325 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7326 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7327 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7328 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7329 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7331 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7334 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7335 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7336 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7340 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7341 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7344 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7345 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7347 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7348 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7350 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7352 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7353 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7354 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7355 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7358 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7359 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7360 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7361 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7362 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7364 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7366 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7367 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7368 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7371 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7372 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7373 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7377 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7378 initial_commitment_tx,
7381 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7382 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7385 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7386 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7389 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7391 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7392 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7393 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7394 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7396 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7398 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7399 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7400 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7401 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7402 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7403 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7404 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7405 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7406 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7407 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7408 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7410 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7411 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7412 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7413 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7414 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7415 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7416 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7418 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7419 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7421 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7422 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7423 let mut channel = Channel {
7424 context: self.context,
7426 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7427 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7429 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7433 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7434 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7442 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7443 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7444 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7445 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7446 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7448 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7449 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7450 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7451 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7457 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7458 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7459 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7460 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7461 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7462 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7467 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7468 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7469 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7470 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7472 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7473 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7474 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7475 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7480 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7481 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7482 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7483 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7484 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7490 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7491 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7492 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7495 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7497 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7498 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7499 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7500 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7501 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7503 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7504 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7505 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7506 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7508 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7510 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7511 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7512 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7514 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7516 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7518 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7520 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7522 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7523 // deserialized from that format.
7524 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7525 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7526 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7528 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7530 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7531 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7532 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7534 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7535 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7536 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7537 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7540 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7541 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7542 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7545 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7546 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7547 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7548 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7550 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7551 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7553 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7555 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7557 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7559 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7562 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7564 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7569 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7570 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7571 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7573 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7574 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7575 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7576 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7577 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7578 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7579 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7581 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7583 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7585 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7588 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7589 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7590 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7593 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7595 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7596 preimages.push(preimage);
7598 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7599 reason.write(writer)?;
7601 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7603 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7604 preimages.push(preimage);
7606 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7607 reason.write(writer)?;
7610 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7611 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7614 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7615 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7616 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7617 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7618 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7619 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7621 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7622 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7623 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7626 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7627 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7628 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7629 source.write(writer)?;
7630 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7632 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7633 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7635 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7637 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7638 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7640 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7642 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7643 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7645 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7646 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7648 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7649 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7650 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7652 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7654 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7655 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7660 match self.context.resend_order {
7661 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7662 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7665 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7666 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7667 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7669 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7670 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7671 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7672 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7675 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7676 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7677 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7678 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7679 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7682 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7683 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7684 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7685 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7687 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7688 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7689 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7691 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7693 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7694 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7695 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7696 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7698 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7699 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7700 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7701 // consider the stale state on reload.
7704 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7705 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7706 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7708 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7709 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7710 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7712 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7713 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7715 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7716 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7717 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7719 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7720 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7722 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7725 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7726 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7727 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7729 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7732 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7733 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7735 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7736 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7737 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7739 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7741 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7743 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7746 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7748 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7749 htlc.write(writer)?;
7752 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7753 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7754 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7756 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7757 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7759 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7760 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7761 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7762 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7763 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7764 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7765 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7767 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7768 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7769 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7770 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7771 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7773 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7774 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7776 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7777 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7778 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7779 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7781 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7783 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7784 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7785 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7786 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7787 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7788 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7789 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7791 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7792 (2, chan_type, option),
7793 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7794 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7795 (5, self.context.config, required),
7796 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7797 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7798 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7799 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7800 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7801 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7802 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7803 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7804 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7805 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7806 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7807 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7808 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7809 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7810 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7811 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7812 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7813 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7814 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7815 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7816 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7817 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7824 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7825 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7827 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7828 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7830 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7831 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7832 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7834 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7835 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7836 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7837 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7839 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7841 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7842 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7843 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7844 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7848 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7851 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7852 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7853 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7855 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7857 let mut keys_data = None;
7859 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7860 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7861 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7862 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7863 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7864 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7865 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7866 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7867 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7868 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7872 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7873 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7874 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7877 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7880 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7883 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7885 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7886 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7887 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7889 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7890 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7891 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7892 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7893 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7894 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7895 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7896 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7897 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7902 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7903 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7904 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7905 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7906 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7907 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7908 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7909 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7910 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7911 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7912 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7913 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7915 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7916 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7919 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7923 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7924 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7926 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7929 blinding_point: None,
7933 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7935 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7936 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7937 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7938 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7939 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7940 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7941 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7942 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7943 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7944 blinding_point: None,
7946 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7947 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7948 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7950 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7951 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7952 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7954 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7958 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7959 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7960 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7961 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7964 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7966 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7968 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7970 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7971 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7974 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7975 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7976 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7977 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7980 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7982 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7984 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7986 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7987 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7990 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7991 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7992 // consider the stale state on reload.
7993 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7996 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7997 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7998 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8000 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8003 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8004 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8005 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8007 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8008 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8009 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8010 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8012 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8013 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8015 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8016 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8018 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8019 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8020 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8022 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8024 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8025 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8027 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8028 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8031 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8033 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8034 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8035 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8036 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8038 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8041 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8042 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8044 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8046 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8047 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8049 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8050 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8052 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8054 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8055 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8058 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8059 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8060 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8064 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8065 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8066 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8068 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8074 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8075 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8076 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8077 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8078 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8079 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8080 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8081 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8082 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8083 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8085 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8086 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8087 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8088 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8089 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8090 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8091 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8093 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8094 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8095 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8096 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8098 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8100 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8101 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8103 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8105 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8106 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8108 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8110 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8111 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8112 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8113 (2, channel_type, option),
8114 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8115 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8116 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8117 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8118 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8119 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8120 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8121 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8122 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8123 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8124 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8125 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8126 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8127 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8128 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8129 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8130 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8131 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8132 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8133 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8134 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8135 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8136 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8137 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8138 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8141 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8142 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8143 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8144 // required channel parameters.
8145 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8146 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8148 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8150 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8151 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8152 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8153 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8156 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8157 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8158 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8160 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8161 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8163 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8164 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8169 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8170 if iter.next().is_some() {
8171 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8175 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8176 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8177 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8178 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8179 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8182 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8183 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8184 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8186 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8187 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8189 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8190 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8191 // separate u64 values.
8192 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8194 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8196 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8197 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8198 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8199 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8201 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8202 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8204 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8205 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8206 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8207 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8208 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8211 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8212 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8214 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8215 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8216 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8217 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8219 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8220 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8222 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8223 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8224 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8225 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8226 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8229 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8230 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8233 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8234 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8235 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8236 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8237 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8238 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8241 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8242 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8243 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8245 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8250 context: ChannelContext {
8253 config: config.unwrap(),
8257 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8258 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8259 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8262 temporary_channel_id,
8264 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8266 channel_value_satoshis,
8268 latest_monitor_update_id,
8270 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8271 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8274 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8275 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8278 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8279 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8280 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8281 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8285 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8286 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8287 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8288 monitor_pending_forwards,
8289 monitor_pending_failures,
8290 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8292 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8293 signer_pending_funding: false,
8296 holding_cell_update_fee,
8297 next_holder_htlc_id,
8298 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8299 update_time_counter,
8302 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8303 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8304 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8305 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8307 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8308 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8309 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8310 closing_fee_limits: None,
8311 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8313 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8314 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8316 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8318 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8319 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8320 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8321 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8322 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8323 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8324 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8325 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8326 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8329 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8331 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8332 funding_transaction,
8335 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8336 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8337 counterparty_node_id,
8339 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8343 channel_update_status,
8344 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8348 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8349 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8351 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8353 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8354 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8356 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8357 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8358 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8360 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8361 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8364 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8366 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8369 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8378 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8379 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8380 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8381 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8382 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8383 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8384 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8385 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8386 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8387 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8388 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8389 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8390 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8391 use crate::ln::msgs;
8392 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8393 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8394 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8395 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8396 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8397 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8398 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8399 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8400 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8401 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8402 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8403 use crate::util::test_utils;
8404 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8405 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8406 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8407 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8408 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8409 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8410 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8411 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8412 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8413 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8414 use crate::prelude::*;
8417 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8418 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8419 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8420 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8422 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8423 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8424 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8425 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8428 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8431 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8432 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8438 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8439 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8440 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8441 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8445 signer: InMemorySigner,
8448 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8449 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8452 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8453 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8455 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8457 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8458 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8461 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8465 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8467 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8469 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8470 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8471 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8474 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8475 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8476 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8477 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8481 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8482 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8483 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8487 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8488 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8489 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8490 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8493 let seed = [42; 32];
8494 let network = Network::Testnet;
8495 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8496 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8497 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8500 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8501 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8502 let config = UserConfig::default();
8503 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8504 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8505 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8507 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8508 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8512 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8513 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8515 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8516 let original_fee = 253;
8517 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8518 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8519 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8520 let seed = [42; 32];
8521 let network = Network::Testnet;
8522 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8524 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8525 let config = UserConfig::default();
8526 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8528 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8529 // same as the old fee.
8530 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8531 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8532 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
8536 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8537 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8538 // dust limits are used.
8539 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8541 let seed = [42; 32];
8542 let network = Network::Testnet;
8543 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8544 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8545 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8547 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8548 // they have different dust limits.
8550 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8551 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8552 let config = UserConfig::default();
8553 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8555 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8556 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8557 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8558 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8559 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8561 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8562 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8563 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8564 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8565 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8567 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8568 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8569 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8570 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8572 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8573 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8574 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8576 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8577 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8578 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8580 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8581 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8582 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8584 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8585 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8586 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8587 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8590 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8592 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8593 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8594 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8595 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8596 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8597 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8598 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8599 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8600 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8602 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8603 blinding_point: None,
8606 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8607 // the dust limit check.
8608 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8609 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8610 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8611 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8613 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8614 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8615 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8616 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8617 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8618 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8619 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8623 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8624 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8625 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8626 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8627 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8628 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8630 let seed = [42; 32];
8631 let network = Network::Testnet;
8632 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8634 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8635 let config = UserConfig::default();
8636 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8638 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8639 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8641 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8642 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8643 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8644 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8645 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8646 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8648 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8649 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8650 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8651 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8652 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8654 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8656 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8657 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8658 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8659 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8660 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8662 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8663 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8664 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8665 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8666 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8670 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8671 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8672 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8673 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8674 let seed = [42; 32];
8675 let network = Network::Testnet;
8676 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8677 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8678 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8680 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8682 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8683 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8684 let config = UserConfig::default();
8685 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8687 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8688 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8689 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8690 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8692 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8693 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8694 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8696 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8697 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8698 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8699 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8701 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8702 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8703 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8705 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8706 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8707 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8709 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8710 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8711 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8712 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8713 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8714 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8715 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8717 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8719 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8720 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8721 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8722 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8723 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8727 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8728 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8729 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8730 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8731 let seed = [42; 32];
8732 let network = Network::Testnet;
8733 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8734 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8735 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8737 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8738 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8739 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8740 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8741 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8742 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8743 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8744 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8746 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8747 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8748 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8749 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8750 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8751 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8753 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8754 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8755 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8756 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8758 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8760 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8761 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8762 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8763 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8764 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8765 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8767 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8768 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8769 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8770 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8772 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8773 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8774 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8775 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8776 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8778 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8779 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8781 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8782 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8783 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8785 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8786 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8787 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8788 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8789 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8791 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8792 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8794 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8795 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8796 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8800 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8802 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8803 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8804 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8806 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8807 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8808 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8809 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8811 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8812 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8813 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8815 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8817 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8818 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8821 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8822 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8823 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8825 let seed = [42; 32];
8826 let network = Network::Testnet;
8827 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8828 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8829 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8832 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8833 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8834 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8836 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8837 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8839 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8840 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8841 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8843 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8844 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8846 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8848 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8849 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8851 // Channel Negotiations failed
8852 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8853 assert!(result.is_err());
8858 fn channel_update() {
8859 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8862 let seed = [42; 32];
8863 let network = Network::Testnet;
8864 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8865 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8866 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8868 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8869 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8870 let config = UserConfig::default();
8871 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8873 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8874 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8875 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8876 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8877 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8879 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8880 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8881 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8882 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8883 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8885 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8886 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8887 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8888 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8890 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8891 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8892 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8894 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8895 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8896 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8898 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8899 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8900 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8902 short_channel_id: 0,
8905 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8906 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8907 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8909 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8910 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8912 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8914 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8916 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8917 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8918 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8919 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8921 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8922 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8923 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8925 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8928 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8932 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8933 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8935 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8936 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8938 let seed = [42; 32];
8939 let network = Network::Testnet;
8940 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8941 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8943 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8944 let config = UserConfig::default();
8945 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8946 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8947 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
8949 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8950 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8951 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
8953 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
8954 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8955 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
8957 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8958 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
8959 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
8960 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
8961 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
8964 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8966 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8967 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8968 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8969 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8973 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8974 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8975 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8977 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8980 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8982 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8983 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8984 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8985 blinding_point: None,
8987 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8988 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8990 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8993 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8996 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8998 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9001 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9002 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9003 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9005 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9006 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9009 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9010 blinding_point: None,
9012 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9013 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9016 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9017 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9019 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9020 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9022 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9025 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9026 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9027 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9028 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9029 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9030 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9031 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9032 } = &mut dummy_add {
9033 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9034 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9036 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9037 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9038 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9040 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9043 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9045 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9046 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9047 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9048 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9049 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9050 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9051 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9052 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9055 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9057 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9058 use bitcoin::sighash;
9059 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9060 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9061 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9062 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9063 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9064 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9065 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9066 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9067 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9068 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9069 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9070 use crate::sync::Arc;
9071 use core::str::FromStr;
9072 use hex::DisplayHex;
9074 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9075 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9076 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9079 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9081 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9082 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9083 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9084 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9085 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9087 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9088 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9094 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9095 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9096 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9098 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9099 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9100 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9101 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9102 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9103 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9105 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9107 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9108 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9109 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9110 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9111 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9112 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9114 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9115 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9116 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9117 selected_contest_delay: 144
9119 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9120 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9122 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9123 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9125 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9126 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9128 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9129 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9131 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9132 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9133 // build_commitment_transaction.
9134 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9135 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9136 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9137 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9138 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9140 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9141 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9142 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9143 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9147 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9148 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9149 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9150 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9154 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9155 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9156 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9158 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9159 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9161 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9162 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9164 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9166 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9167 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9168 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9169 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9170 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9171 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9172 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9174 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9175 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9176 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9177 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9179 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9180 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9181 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9183 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9185 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9186 commitment_tx.clone(),
9187 counterparty_signature,
9188 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9189 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9190 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9192 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9193 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9195 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9196 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9197 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9199 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9200 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9203 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9204 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9206 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9207 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9208 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9209 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9210 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9211 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9212 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9213 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9215 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9218 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9219 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9220 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9224 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9227 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9228 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9229 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9230 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9231 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9232 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9234 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9235 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9236 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9237 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9239 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9240 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9241 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9242 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9243 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9245 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9246 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9247 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9248 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9249 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9250 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9252 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9256 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9257 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9258 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9259 "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", {});
9261 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9262 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9264 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9265 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9266 "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", {});
9268 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9269 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9270 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9271 "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", {});
9273 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9274 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9276 amount_msat: 1000000,
9278 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9279 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9281 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9284 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9285 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9287 amount_msat: 2000000,
9289 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9290 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9292 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9295 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9296 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9298 amount_msat: 2000000,
9300 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9301 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9302 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9303 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9304 blinding_point: None,
9306 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9309 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9310 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9312 amount_msat: 3000000,
9314 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9315 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9316 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9317 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9318 blinding_point: None,
9320 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9323 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9324 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9326 amount_msat: 4000000,
9328 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9329 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9331 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9335 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9336 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9337 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9339 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9340 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9341 "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", {
9344 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9345 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9346 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9349 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9350 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9351 "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" },
9354 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9355 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9356 "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" },
9359 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9360 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9361 "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" },
9364 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9365 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9366 "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" }
9369 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9370 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9371 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9373 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9374 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9375 "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", {
9378 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9379 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9380 "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" },
9383 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9384 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9385 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9388 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9389 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9390 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9393 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9394 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9395 "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" },
9398 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9399 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9400 "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" }
9403 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9404 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9405 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9407 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9408 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9409 "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", {
9412 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9413 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9414 "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" },
9417 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9418 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9419 "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" },
9422 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9423 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9424 "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" },
9427 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9428 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9429 "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" }
9432 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9433 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9434 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9435 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9437 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9438 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9439 "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", {
9442 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9443 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9444 "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" },
9447 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9448 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9449 "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" },
9452 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9453 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9454 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
9457 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9458 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9459 "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" }
9462 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9464 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9465 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9467 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9468 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9469 "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", {
9472 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9473 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9474 "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" },
9477 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9478 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9479 "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" },
9482 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9483 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9484 "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" },
9487 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9488 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9489 "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" }
9492 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9493 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9494 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9496 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9497 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9498 "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", {
9501 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9502 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9503 "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" },
9506 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9507 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9508 "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" },
9511 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9512 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9513 "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" }
9516 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9517 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9518 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9520 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9521 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9522 "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", {
9525 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9526 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9527 "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" },
9530 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9531 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9532 "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" },
9535 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9536 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9537 "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" }
9540 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9542 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9544 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9545 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9546 "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", {
9549 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9550 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9551 "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" },
9554 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9555 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9556 "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" }
9559 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9560 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9561 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9562 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9563 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9564 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9566 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9567 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9568 "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", {
9571 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9572 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9573 "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" },
9576 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9577 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9578 "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" }
9581 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9582 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9583 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9584 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9585 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9587 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9588 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9589 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9592 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9593 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9594 "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" },
9597 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9598 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9599 "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" }
9602 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9603 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9604 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9606 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9607 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9608 "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", {
9611 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9612 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9613 "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" }
9616 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9617 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9618 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9619 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9620 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9622 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9623 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9624 "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", {
9627 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9628 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9629 "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" }
9632 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9633 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9634 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9635 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9636 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9638 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9639 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9640 "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", {
9643 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9644 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9645 "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" }
9648 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9649 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9650 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9651 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9653 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9654 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9655 "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", {});
9657 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9658 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9659 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9660 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9661 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9663 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9664 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9665 "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", {});
9667 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9668 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9669 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9670 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9671 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9673 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9674 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9675 "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", {});
9677 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9678 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9679 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9681 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9682 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9683 "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", {});
9685 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9686 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9687 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9688 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9689 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9691 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9692 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9693 "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", {});
9695 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9696 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9697 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9698 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9699 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9701 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9702 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9703 "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", {});
9705 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9706 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9707 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9708 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9709 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9710 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9712 amount_msat: 2000000,
9714 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9715 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9717 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9720 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9721 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9722 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9724 amount_msat: 5000001,
9726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9727 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9728 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9729 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9730 blinding_point: None,
9732 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9735 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9736 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9738 amount_msat: 5000000,
9740 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9741 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9742 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9743 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9744 blinding_point: None,
9746 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9750 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9751 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9752 "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", {
9755 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9756 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9757 "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" },
9759 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9760 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9761 "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" },
9763 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9764 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9765 "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" }
9768 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9769 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9770 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9771 "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", {
9774 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9775 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9776 "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" },
9778 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9779 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9780 "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" },
9782 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9783 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9784 "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" }
9789 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9790 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9792 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9793 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9794 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9795 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9797 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9798 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9799 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9801 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9802 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9804 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9805 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9807 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9808 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9809 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9813 fn test_key_derivation() {
9814 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9815 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9817 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9818 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9820 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9821 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9823 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9824 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9826 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9827 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9829 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9830 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9832 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9833 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9837 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9838 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9840 let seed = [42; 32];
9841 let network = Network::Testnet;
9842 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9843 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9845 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9846 let config = UserConfig::default();
9847 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9848 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9850 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9851 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9853 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9854 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9855 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9856 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9857 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9858 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9859 assert!(res.is_ok());
9863 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9864 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9865 // resulting `channel_type`.
9866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9867 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9868 let network = Network::Testnet;
9869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9870 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9872 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9873 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9875 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9876 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9878 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9879 // need to signal it.
9880 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9882 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9883 &config, 0, 42, None
9885 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9887 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9888 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9889 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9891 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9892 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9893 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9897 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9898 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9899 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9900 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9901 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9904 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9905 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9909 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9910 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9911 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9912 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9913 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9914 let network = Network::Testnet;
9915 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9916 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9918 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9919 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9921 let config = UserConfig::default();
9923 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9924 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9925 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9926 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9927 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9929 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9930 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9931 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9935 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9936 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9937 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
9939 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9940 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9941 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9942 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9943 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9944 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9946 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9950 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9951 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9953 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9954 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9955 let network = Network::Testnet;
9956 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9957 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9959 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9960 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9962 let config = UserConfig::default();
9964 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9965 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9966 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9967 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9968 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9969 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9970 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9971 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9973 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9974 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9975 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9976 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9977 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9978 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9982 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9983 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9985 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9986 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9987 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9988 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9990 assert!(res.is_err());
9992 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9993 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9994 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9996 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9997 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9998 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10001 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10003 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10004 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10005 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10006 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10009 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10010 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10012 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10013 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10015 assert!(res.is_err());
10019 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10020 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10021 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10022 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10023 let seed = [42; 32];
10024 let network = Network::Testnet;
10025 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10026 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10027 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10029 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10030 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10031 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10032 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10034 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10035 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10036 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10041 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10051 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10052 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10053 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10058 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10059 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10065 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10068 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10069 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10070 &accept_channel_msg,
10071 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10072 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10075 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10076 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10077 let tx = Transaction {
10079 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10083 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10086 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10089 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10090 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10091 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10092 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10093 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10094 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10098 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10099 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10107 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10108 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10109 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10110 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10112 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10113 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10120 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10121 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10122 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10123 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10124 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10126 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10127 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10128 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10136 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10137 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10140 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10141 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10142 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10143 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());