1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
866 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
867 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
870 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
907 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
908 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
909 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
910 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
915 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
919 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
921 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
922 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
923 self.temporary_channel_id
926 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
930 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
931 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
932 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
936 /// Gets the channel's type
937 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
941 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
942 /// is_usable() returns true).
943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
944 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
945 self.short_channel_id
948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
949 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
950 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
955 self.outbound_scid_alias
958 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
959 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
960 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
961 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
962 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
965 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
966 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
967 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
968 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
971 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
972 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
973 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
976 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
977 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
979 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
983 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
986 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
987 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
990 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
991 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
994 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
996 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
999 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1003 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1005 self.counterparty_node_id
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1014 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1015 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1021 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1022 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1023 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1024 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1026 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1032 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1037 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1040 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1042 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1044 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1045 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1050 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.channel_value_satoshis
1054 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1055 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1058 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1059 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1062 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1063 _fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1064 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1066 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1067 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1068 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(_) => 5_000_000,
1072 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1073 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1074 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1077 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1078 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1079 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1082 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1083 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1084 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1087 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1088 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1089 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1092 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1093 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1094 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1097 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1098 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1099 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1102 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1103 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1104 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1105 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1106 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1109 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1111 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1112 self.prev_config = None;
1116 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1117 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1121 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1122 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1123 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1124 let did_channel_update =
1125 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1126 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1127 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1128 if did_channel_update {
1129 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1130 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1131 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1132 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1134 self.config.options = *config;
1138 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1139 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1140 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1143 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1144 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1145 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1146 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1147 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1149 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1150 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1151 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1152 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1153 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1154 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1155 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1157 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1158 where L::Target: Logger
1160 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1161 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1162 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1164 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1165 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1166 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1167 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1169 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1170 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1171 if match update_state {
1172 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1173 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1174 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1175 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1176 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1178 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1182 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1183 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1184 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1185 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1187 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1188 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1189 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1191 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1192 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1193 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1194 transaction_output_index: None
1199 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1200 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1201 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1202 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1203 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1206 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1208 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1209 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1210 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1212 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1213 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1217 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1220 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1222 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1223 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1224 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1226 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1227 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1234 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1235 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1236 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1237 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1238 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1243 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1244 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1246 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1248 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1249 if generated_by_local {
1250 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1251 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1260 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1262 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1263 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1264 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1265 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1271 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1272 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1273 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1279 preimages.push(preimage);
1283 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1284 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1286 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1288 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1289 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1291 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1292 if !generated_by_local {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1301 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1303 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1304 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1305 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1306 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1307 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1308 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1310 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1312 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1313 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1314 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1315 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1317 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1319 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1320 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1321 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1322 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1325 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1326 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1327 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1328 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1330 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1333 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1334 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1335 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1336 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1338 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1341 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1347 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1348 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1353 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1355 let channel_parameters =
1356 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1357 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1358 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1365 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1368 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1369 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1370 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1371 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1373 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1374 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1375 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1383 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1384 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1390 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1391 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1392 /// our counterparty!)
1393 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1394 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1395 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1396 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1397 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1398 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1399 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1401 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1405 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1406 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1407 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1408 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1409 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1410 //may see payments to it!
1411 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1412 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1413 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1415 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1418 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1419 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1420 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1421 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1422 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1425 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1426 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1429 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1433 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1434 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1435 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1436 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1437 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1438 // which are near the dust limit.
1439 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1440 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1441 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1442 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1443 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1445 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1446 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1448 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1451 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1452 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1453 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1456 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1457 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1459 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1460 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1461 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1462 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1463 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1464 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1465 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1468 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1471 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1472 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1473 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1475 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1476 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1477 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1478 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1479 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1480 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1482 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1483 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1489 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1490 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1492 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1493 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1494 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1495 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1496 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1497 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1498 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1501 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1504 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1505 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1506 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1508 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1509 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1510 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1511 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1512 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1513 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1516 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1521 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1522 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1523 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1524 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1525 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1526 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1528 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1529 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1531 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1538 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1539 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1540 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1541 /// corner case properly.
1542 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1543 -> AvailableBalances
1544 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1546 let context = &self;
1547 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1548 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1549 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1551 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1552 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1553 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1554 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1557 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1559 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1560 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1562 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1564 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1566 if context.is_outbound() {
1567 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1568 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1570 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1571 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1573 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1574 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1575 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1576 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1579 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1580 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1581 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1582 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1584 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1585 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1586 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1587 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1588 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1589 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1590 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1591 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1592 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1593 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1595 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1598 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1599 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1600 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1601 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1602 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1605 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1606 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1608 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1609 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1610 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1612 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1613 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1614 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1615 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1619 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1621 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1622 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1623 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1624 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1625 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1626 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1627 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1629 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1630 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1632 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1633 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1634 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1636 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1637 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1638 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1639 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1640 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1643 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1644 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1645 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1646 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1647 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1648 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1651 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1652 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1653 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1655 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1659 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1660 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1662 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1663 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1667 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1668 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1669 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1670 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1672 outbound_capacity_msat,
1673 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1674 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1679 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1680 let context = &self;
1681 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1684 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1685 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1687 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1688 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1690 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1691 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1693 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1694 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1695 let context = &self;
1696 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1698 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1701 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1702 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1704 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1705 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1707 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1708 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1710 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1711 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1715 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1716 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1722 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1723 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1724 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1727 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1728 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1729 included_htlcs += 1;
1732 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1733 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1737 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1738 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1739 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1740 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1741 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1742 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1747 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1749 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1750 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1756 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1760 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1761 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1762 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1765 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1766 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1768 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1769 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1770 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1772 total_pending_htlcs,
1773 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1775 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1777 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1781 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1783 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1788 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1789 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1791 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1792 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1794 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1795 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1797 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1798 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1799 let context = &self;
1800 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1802 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1805 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1806 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1808 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1809 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1811 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1812 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1815 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1820 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1826 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1827 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1828 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1829 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1830 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1831 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1834 included_htlcs += 1;
1837 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1838 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1841 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1842 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1844 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1845 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1846 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1851 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1852 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1853 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1857 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1859 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1860 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1862 total_pending_htlcs,
1863 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1864 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1865 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1867 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1871 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1873 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1878 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1879 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1880 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1881 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1887 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1888 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1889 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1890 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1891 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1892 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1893 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1894 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1895 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1896 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1897 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1899 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1900 // return them to fail the payment.
1901 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1902 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1903 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1905 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1906 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1911 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1912 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1913 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1914 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1915 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1916 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1917 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1918 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1919 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1920 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1921 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1922 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1923 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1928 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1929 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1930 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1934 // Internal utility functions for channels
1936 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1937 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1938 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1940 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1943 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1944 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1946 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1949 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1951 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1954 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1955 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1956 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1958 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1960 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1961 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1962 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1963 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1964 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1967 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1968 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1969 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1970 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1971 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1972 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1973 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1976 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1977 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1979 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1980 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1983 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1984 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1985 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1986 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1987 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1988 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1991 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1992 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1993 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1996 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1997 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1998 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1999 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2003 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2005 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2006 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2007 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2011 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2012 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2013 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2014 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2016 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2017 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2018 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2019 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2020 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2021 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2022 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2025 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2026 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2027 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2028 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2029 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2030 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2031 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2032 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2034 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2035 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2045 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2046 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2047 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2048 // outside of those situations will fail.
2049 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2053 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2058 1 + // script length (0)
2062 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2063 2 + // witness marker and flag
2064 1 + // witness element count
2065 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2066 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2067 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2068 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2069 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2070 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2072 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2080 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2081 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2082 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2083 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2085 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2086 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2087 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2089 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2090 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2091 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2092 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2093 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2094 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2097 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2098 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2101 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_holder = 0;
2105 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2106 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2107 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2108 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2110 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2111 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2114 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2115 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2118 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2121 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2122 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2124 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2126 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2127 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2128 where L::Target: Logger {
2129 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2130 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2131 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2132 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2133 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2134 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2135 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2136 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2140 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2141 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2142 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2143 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2145 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2146 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2148 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2150 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2152 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2153 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2154 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2156 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2157 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2158 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2159 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2160 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2162 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2163 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2164 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2166 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2167 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2169 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2172 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2173 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2177 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2181 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2182 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2183 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2184 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2185 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2186 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2189 // Now update local state:
2191 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2192 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2194 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2195 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2196 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2197 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2201 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2202 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2203 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2204 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2205 // do not not get into this branch.
2206 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2207 match pending_update {
2208 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2209 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2210 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2211 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2212 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2213 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2214 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2217 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2218 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2219 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2220 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2221 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2222 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2223 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2229 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2230 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2231 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2234 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2235 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2241 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2242 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2244 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2245 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2247 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2248 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2251 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2254 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2255 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2256 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2257 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2262 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2263 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2264 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2265 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2266 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2267 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2268 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2269 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2270 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2271 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2272 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2273 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2274 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2275 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2276 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2278 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2279 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2280 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2281 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2282 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2285 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2286 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2287 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2293 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2294 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2296 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2300 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2301 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2302 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2303 /// before we fail backwards.
2305 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2306 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2307 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2308 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2309 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2310 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2311 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2314 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2315 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2316 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2317 /// before we fail backwards.
2319 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2320 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2321 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2322 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2323 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2324 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2325 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2327 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2329 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2330 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2331 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2333 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2334 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2335 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2337 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2338 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2339 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2341 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2346 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2347 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2353 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2355 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2356 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2357 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2361 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2362 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2363 force_holding_cell = true;
2366 // Now update local state:
2367 if force_holding_cell {
2368 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2369 match pending_update {
2370 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2371 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2372 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2373 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2377 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2378 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2379 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2380 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2386 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2387 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2388 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2394 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2396 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2397 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2400 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2401 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2402 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2407 // Message handlers:
2409 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2410 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2411 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2412 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2413 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2415 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2418 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2421 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2424 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2425 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2426 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2427 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2430 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2432 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2433 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2434 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2435 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2437 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2438 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2440 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2441 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2443 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2444 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2445 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2446 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2447 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2452 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2453 initial_commitment_tx,
2456 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2457 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2460 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2461 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2464 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2465 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2466 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2467 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2468 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2469 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2470 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2471 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2472 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2473 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2474 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2475 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2477 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2479 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2481 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2482 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2483 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2484 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2486 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2488 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2489 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2493 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2494 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2496 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2497 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2498 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2499 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2501 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2504 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2505 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2509 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2510 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2511 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2512 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2513 // when routing outbound payments.
2514 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2518 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2520 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2521 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2522 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2523 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2524 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2525 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2526 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2527 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2528 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2530 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2531 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2532 let expected_point =
2533 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2534 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2536 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2537 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2538 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2539 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2540 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2541 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2543 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2544 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2545 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2546 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2547 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2549 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2550 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2557 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2558 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2560 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2562 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2565 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2566 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2567 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2568 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2569 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2570 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2572 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2573 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2574 if local_sent_shutdown {
2575 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2577 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2578 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2579 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2582 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2585 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2588 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2591 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2595 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2596 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2597 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2600 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2603 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2604 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2605 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2606 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2607 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2608 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2609 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2610 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2611 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2612 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2613 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2615 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2616 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2617 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2618 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2619 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2620 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2624 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2625 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2628 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2629 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2630 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2632 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2633 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2634 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2635 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2636 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2637 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2638 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2642 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2643 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2644 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2645 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2646 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2647 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2648 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2652 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2653 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2654 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2655 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2656 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2660 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2661 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2662 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2663 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2664 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2666 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2667 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2670 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2671 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2674 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2675 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2676 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2677 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2678 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2679 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2680 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2681 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2682 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2683 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2684 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2685 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2686 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2687 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2688 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2689 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2692 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2693 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2694 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2695 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2696 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2699 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2702 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2706 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2707 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2708 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2712 // Now update local state:
2713 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2714 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2715 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2716 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2717 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2718 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2719 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2724 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2726 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2727 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2728 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2729 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2730 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2731 None => fail_reason.into(),
2732 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2733 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2734 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2737 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2743 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2744 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2746 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2752 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2755 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2756 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2759 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2763 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2766 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2767 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2774 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2778 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2779 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2782 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2786 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2790 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2791 where L::Target: Logger
2793 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2796 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2799 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2803 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2805 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2807 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2808 let commitment_txid = {
2809 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2810 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2811 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2813 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2814 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2815 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2816 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2817 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2822 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2824 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2825 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2826 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2827 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2830 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2831 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2832 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2836 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2838 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2839 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2840 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2841 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2842 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2843 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2844 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2845 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2846 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2847 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2848 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2854 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2858 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2859 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2860 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2861 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2862 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2863 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2864 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2865 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2866 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2867 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2868 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2869 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2870 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2873 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2874 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2875 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2876 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2877 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2878 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2879 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2881 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2882 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2883 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2884 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2885 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2886 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2887 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2890 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2891 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2894 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2896 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2897 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2898 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2901 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2904 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2905 commitment_stats.tx,
2907 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2908 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2909 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2912 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2913 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2915 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2916 let mut need_commitment = false;
2917 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2918 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2919 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2920 need_commitment = true;
2924 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2925 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2926 Some(forward_info.clone())
2928 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2929 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2930 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2931 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2932 need_commitment = true;
2935 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2936 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2937 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2938 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2939 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2940 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2941 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2942 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2943 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2944 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2945 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2946 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2947 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2948 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2950 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2952 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2953 need_commitment = true;
2957 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2958 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2959 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2960 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2961 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2962 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2964 nondust_htlc_sources,
2968 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2969 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2970 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2971 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2973 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2974 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2975 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2976 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2977 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2978 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2979 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2980 // includes the right HTLCs.
2981 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2982 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2983 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2984 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2985 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2986 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2988 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2989 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2990 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2993 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2994 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2995 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2996 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2997 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2998 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2999 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3000 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3001 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3005 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3006 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3007 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3008 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3011 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3012 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3013 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3014 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3015 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3016 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3017 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3019 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3020 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3021 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3022 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3025 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3026 /// for our counterparty.
3027 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3028 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3029 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3030 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3032 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3033 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3034 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3035 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3037 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3038 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3039 updates: Vec::new(),
3042 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3043 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3044 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3045 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3046 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3047 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3048 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3049 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3050 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3051 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3052 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3053 // to rebalance channels.
3054 match &htlc_update {
3055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3056 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3057 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3059 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3060 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3062 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3065 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3066 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3067 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3068 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3069 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3070 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3071 // into the holding cell without ever being
3072 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3073 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3074 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3077 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3083 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3084 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3085 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3086 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3087 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3088 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3089 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3090 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3091 (msg, monitor_update)
3092 } else { unreachable!() };
3093 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3094 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3096 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3097 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3098 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3099 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3100 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3101 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3102 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3103 // for a full revocation before failing.
3104 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3109 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3116 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3117 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3119 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3120 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3125 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3126 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3127 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3128 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3129 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3131 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3132 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3133 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3135 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3136 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3142 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3143 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3144 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3145 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3146 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3147 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3148 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3149 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3150 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3152 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3155 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3158 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3162 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3164 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3165 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3170 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3171 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3172 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3173 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3174 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3175 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3176 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3177 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3181 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3183 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3184 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3187 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3188 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3190 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3192 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3193 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3195 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3196 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3197 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3198 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3199 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3203 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3204 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3205 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3206 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3207 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3208 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3209 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3210 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3211 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3213 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3214 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3217 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3218 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3219 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3220 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3221 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3222 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3223 let mut require_commitment = false;
3224 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3227 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3228 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3229 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3231 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3232 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3233 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3234 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3235 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3236 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3241 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3242 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3243 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3244 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3245 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3247 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3248 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3249 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3254 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3255 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3257 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3261 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3262 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3264 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3265 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3266 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3267 require_commitment = true;
3268 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3269 match forward_info {
3270 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3271 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3272 require_commitment = true;
3274 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3276 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3278 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3279 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3280 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3284 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3285 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3286 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3287 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3293 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3294 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3298 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3300 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3301 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3302 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3303 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3304 require_commitment = true;
3308 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3310 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3311 match update_state {
3312 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3313 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3315 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3316 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3318 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3319 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3320 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3321 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3322 require_commitment = true;
3323 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3324 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3329 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3330 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3331 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3332 if require_commitment {
3333 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3334 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3335 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3336 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3337 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3338 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3339 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3340 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3341 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3343 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3344 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3345 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3346 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3347 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3350 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3351 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3352 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3353 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3354 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3355 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3357 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3358 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3360 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3361 if require_commitment {
3362 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3364 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3365 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3366 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3367 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3369 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3370 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3371 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3372 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3374 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3375 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3376 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3382 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3383 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3384 /// commitment update.
3385 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3386 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3387 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3389 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3390 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3393 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3394 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3395 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3396 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3398 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3399 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3400 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3401 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3402 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3403 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3404 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3406 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3407 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3409 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3410 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3412 if !self.context.is_live() {
3413 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3416 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3417 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3418 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3419 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3420 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3421 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3422 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3423 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3424 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3429 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3430 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3431 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3432 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3433 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3434 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3437 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3438 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3442 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3443 force_holding_cell = true;
3446 if force_holding_cell {
3447 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3451 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3452 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3454 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3455 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3460 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3461 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3463 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3465 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3466 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3467 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3468 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3472 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3473 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3474 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3478 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3479 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3482 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3483 // will be retransmitted.
3484 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3485 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3486 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3488 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3489 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3491 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3492 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3493 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3494 // this HTLC accordingly
3495 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3498 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3499 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3500 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3501 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3504 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3505 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3506 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3507 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3508 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3509 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3514 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3516 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3517 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3518 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3519 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3523 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3524 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3525 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3526 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3527 // the update upon reconnection.
3528 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3532 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3534 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3535 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3538 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3539 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3540 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3541 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3542 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3543 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3544 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3546 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3547 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3548 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3549 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3550 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3551 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3552 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3554 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3555 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3556 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3557 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3558 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3559 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3560 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3563 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3564 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3565 /// to the remote side.
3566 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3567 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3568 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3569 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3572 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3574 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3575 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3577 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3578 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3579 // first received the funding_signed.
3580 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3581 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3582 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3584 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3585 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3586 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3587 funding_broadcastable = None;
3590 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3591 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3592 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3593 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3594 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3595 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3596 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3597 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3598 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3599 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3600 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3601 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3602 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3603 next_per_commitment_point,
3604 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3608 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3610 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3611 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3612 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3613 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3614 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3615 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3617 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3618 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3619 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3620 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3621 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3622 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3626 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3627 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3629 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3630 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3631 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3634 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3635 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3636 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3637 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3638 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3639 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3640 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3641 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3642 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3646 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3647 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3649 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3652 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3655 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3656 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3658 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3659 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3660 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3661 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3662 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3663 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3664 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3665 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3666 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3667 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3668 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3669 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3671 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3673 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3675 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3681 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3682 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3683 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3684 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3685 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3686 per_commitment_secret,
3687 next_per_commitment_point,
3689 next_local_nonce: None,
3693 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3694 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3695 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3696 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3697 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3699 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3700 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3701 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3702 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3703 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3704 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3705 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3706 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3707 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3708 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3713 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3714 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3716 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3717 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3719 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3720 reason: err_packet.clone()
3723 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3724 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3725 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3726 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3727 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3728 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3731 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3732 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3733 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3734 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3735 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3742 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3743 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3744 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3745 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3749 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3750 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3751 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3752 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3753 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3754 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3758 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3759 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3761 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3762 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3763 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3764 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3765 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3766 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3767 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3768 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3771 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3773 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3774 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3775 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3776 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3777 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3780 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3781 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3785 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3786 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3787 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3788 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3789 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3792 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3793 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3794 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3795 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3796 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3799 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3800 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3801 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3802 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3803 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3804 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3805 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3806 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3810 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3811 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3812 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3813 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3815 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3819 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3820 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3821 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3822 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3824 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3825 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3826 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3827 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3828 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3832 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3834 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3835 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3836 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3837 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3838 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3841 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3842 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3843 channel_ready: None,
3844 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3845 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3846 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3850 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3851 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3852 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3853 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3854 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3855 next_per_commitment_point,
3856 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3858 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3859 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3860 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3864 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3865 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3866 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3868 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3869 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3870 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3873 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3879 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3880 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3881 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3882 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3883 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3884 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3885 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3887 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3889 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3890 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3891 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3892 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3893 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3894 next_per_commitment_point,
3895 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3899 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3900 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3901 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3903 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3906 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3907 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3908 raa: required_revoke,
3909 commitment_update: None,
3910 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3912 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3913 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3914 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3916 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3919 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3920 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3921 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3922 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3923 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3924 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3927 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3928 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3929 raa: required_revoke,
3930 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3931 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3935 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3939 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3940 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3941 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3942 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3944 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3946 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3948 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3949 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3950 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3951 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3952 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3953 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3955 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3956 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3957 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3958 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3959 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3961 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3962 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3963 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3964 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3967 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3968 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3969 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3970 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3971 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3972 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3973 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3974 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3975 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3976 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3977 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3978 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3979 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3980 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3981 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3983 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3986 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3987 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3990 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3991 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3992 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3993 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3994 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3995 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3996 self.context.channel_state &
3997 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3998 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3999 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4000 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4003 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4004 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4005 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4006 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4007 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4008 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4011 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4017 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4018 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4019 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4020 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4022 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4023 return Ok((None, None));
4026 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4027 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4028 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4030 return Ok((None, None));
4033 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4035 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4036 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4037 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4038 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4040 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4041 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4042 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4044 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4045 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4046 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4047 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4049 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4050 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4051 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4056 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4057 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4059 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4060 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4063 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4064 /// within our expected timeframe.
4066 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4067 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4068 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4071 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4074 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4075 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4078 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4079 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4080 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4081 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4083 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4086 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4087 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4088 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4089 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4092 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4093 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4097 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4099 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4100 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4103 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4104 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4108 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4111 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4112 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4113 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4114 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4116 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4119 assert!(send_shutdown);
4120 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4121 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4122 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4124 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4127 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4132 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4134 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4135 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4137 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4139 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4140 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4141 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4142 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4145 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4146 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4148 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4149 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4150 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4151 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4155 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4156 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4157 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4158 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4159 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4160 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4162 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4163 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4170 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4171 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4173 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4176 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4177 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4179 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4181 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4182 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4183 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4184 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4185 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4186 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4187 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4188 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4189 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4191 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4192 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4195 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4199 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4200 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4201 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4202 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4204 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4207 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4210 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4213 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4217 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4221 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4222 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4223 return Ok((None, None));
4226 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4227 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4228 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4231 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4233 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4236 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4237 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4238 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4239 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4240 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4244 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4245 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4250 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4251 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4252 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4253 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4254 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4255 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4256 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4260 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4262 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4263 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4264 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4265 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4267 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4270 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4271 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4272 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4274 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4275 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4276 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4277 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4281 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4282 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4283 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4284 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4286 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4287 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4288 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4294 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4295 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4298 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4301 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4305 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4306 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4307 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4308 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4309 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4311 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4313 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4315 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4316 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4319 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4320 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4321 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4322 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4323 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4324 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4325 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4326 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4331 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4332 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4333 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4334 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4340 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4341 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4342 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4343 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4345 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4351 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4352 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4353 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4354 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4355 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4356 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4357 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4359 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4360 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4363 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4365 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4366 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4372 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4373 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4374 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4375 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4376 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4377 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4378 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4380 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4381 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4388 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4389 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4392 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4393 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4396 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4397 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4401 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4402 &self.context.holder_signer
4406 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4408 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4409 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4410 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4411 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4412 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4413 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4415 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4417 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4425 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4426 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4430 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4431 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4432 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4433 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4436 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4437 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4438 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4439 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4442 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4443 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4444 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4445 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4446 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4447 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4450 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4451 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4452 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4453 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4454 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4455 if !release_monitor {
4456 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4465 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4466 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4469 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4470 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4471 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4473 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4474 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4475 if self.context.channel_state &
4476 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4477 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4478 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4479 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4480 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4483 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4484 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4485 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4486 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4487 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4488 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4490 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4491 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4492 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4494 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4495 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4496 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4497 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4498 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4499 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4505 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4506 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4507 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4510 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4511 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4512 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4515 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4516 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4517 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4520 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4521 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4522 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4523 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4524 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4525 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4530 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4531 self.context.channel_update_status
4534 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4535 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4536 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4539 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4541 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4542 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4543 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4547 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4548 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4549 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4552 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4556 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4557 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4558 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4560 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4561 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4562 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4564 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4565 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4568 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4569 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4570 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4571 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4572 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4573 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4574 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4575 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4576 self.context.channel_state);
4578 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4582 if need_commitment_update {
4583 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4584 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4585 let next_per_commitment_point =
4586 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4587 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4588 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4589 next_per_commitment_point,
4590 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4594 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4600 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4601 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4602 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4603 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4604 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4605 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4606 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4608 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4611 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4612 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4613 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4614 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4615 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4616 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4617 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4618 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4619 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4620 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4621 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4622 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4623 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4624 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4625 // channel and move on.
4626 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4627 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4629 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4630 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4631 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4633 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4634 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4635 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4636 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4637 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4638 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4639 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4643 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4644 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4645 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4646 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4647 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4651 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4652 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4653 // may have already happened for this block).
4654 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4655 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4656 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4657 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4660 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4661 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4662 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4663 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4671 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4672 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4673 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4674 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4676 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4677 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4680 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4682 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4683 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4684 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4685 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4687 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4690 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4693 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4694 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4695 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4696 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4698 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4701 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4702 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4703 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4705 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4706 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4708 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4709 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4710 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4718 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4720 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4721 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4722 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4724 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4725 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4728 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4729 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4730 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4731 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4732 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4733 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4734 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4735 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4736 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4739 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4740 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4741 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4742 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4744 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4745 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4746 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4748 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4749 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4750 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4751 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4753 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4754 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4755 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4756 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4757 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4758 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4759 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4762 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4763 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4765 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4768 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4769 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4770 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4771 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4772 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4773 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4774 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4775 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4776 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4777 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4778 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4779 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4780 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4781 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4782 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4783 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4784 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4790 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4795 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4796 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4798 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4799 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4800 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4801 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4803 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4806 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4807 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4808 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4809 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4810 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4811 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4813 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4814 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4817 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4818 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4819 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4820 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4822 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4823 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4825 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4826 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4827 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4828 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4829 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4830 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4836 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4837 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4838 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4839 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4841 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4844 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4848 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4852 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4853 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4857 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4861 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4862 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4865 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4869 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4871 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4876 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4878 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4883 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4885 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4887 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4888 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4889 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4893 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4895 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4896 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4897 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4898 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4899 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4900 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4901 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4903 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4904 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4905 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4906 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4907 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4908 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4909 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4910 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4911 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4912 contents: announcement,
4915 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4919 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4920 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4921 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4922 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4923 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4924 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4925 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4926 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4928 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4930 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4932 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4933 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4935 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4937 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4938 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4941 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4942 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4943 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4944 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4947 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4950 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4951 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4952 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4953 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4954 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4955 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4958 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4960 Err(_) => return None,
4962 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4963 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4968 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4969 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4970 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4971 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4972 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4973 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4974 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4975 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4976 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4977 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4978 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4979 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4980 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4981 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4982 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4983 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4986 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4989 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4990 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4991 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4992 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4993 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4994 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4995 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4996 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4997 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4999 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5000 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5001 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5002 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5003 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5004 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5005 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5006 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5007 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5009 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5010 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5011 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5012 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5013 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5014 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5015 next_funding_txid: None,
5020 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5022 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5023 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5024 /// commitment update.
5026 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5027 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5028 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5029 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5030 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5031 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5032 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5035 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5036 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5037 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5039 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5040 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5045 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5046 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5048 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5050 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5051 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5053 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5054 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5055 /// regenerate them.
5057 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5058 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5060 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5061 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5062 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5063 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5064 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5065 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5066 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5068 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5069 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5071 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5072 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5073 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5076 if amount_msat == 0 {
5077 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5080 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5081 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5082 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5083 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5086 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5087 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5088 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5091 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5092 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5093 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5094 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5095 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5096 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5097 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5098 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5101 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5102 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5103 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5104 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5105 else { "to peer" });
5107 if need_holding_cell {
5108 force_holding_cell = true;
5111 // Now update local state:
5112 if force_holding_cell {
5113 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5118 onion_routing_packet,
5124 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5125 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5127 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5129 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5134 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5135 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5136 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5140 onion_routing_packet,
5143 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5148 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5149 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5150 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5151 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5153 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5154 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5155 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5157 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5158 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5162 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5163 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5164 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5165 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5166 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5167 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5168 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5171 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5172 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5173 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5174 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5175 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5176 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5179 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5181 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5182 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5183 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5185 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5186 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5190 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5191 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5192 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5193 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5194 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5195 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5196 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5199 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5203 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5204 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5205 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5206 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5210 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5211 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5212 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5213 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5214 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5215 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5216 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5217 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5218 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5219 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5220 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5226 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5229 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5230 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5231 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5232 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5234 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5236 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5237 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5238 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5239 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5242 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5243 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5247 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5248 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5250 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5252 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5253 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5254 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5255 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5257 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5258 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5259 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5260 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5261 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5262 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5266 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5267 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5271 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5272 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5275 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5276 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5278 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5279 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5280 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5281 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5282 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5283 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5284 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5285 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5287 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5288 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5289 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5292 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5293 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5294 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5300 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5301 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5304 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5305 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5306 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5307 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5313 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5314 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5316 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5317 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5318 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5319 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5320 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5321 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5322 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5323 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5324 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5327 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5328 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5329 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5331 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5332 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5335 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5336 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5338 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5339 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5340 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5343 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5344 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5345 let mut chan_closed = false;
5346 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5350 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5352 None if !chan_closed => {
5353 // use override shutdown script if provided
5354 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5355 Some(script) => script,
5357 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5358 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5359 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5360 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5364 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5365 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5367 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5373 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5374 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5375 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5376 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5378 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5380 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5382 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5383 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5384 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5385 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5386 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5387 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5390 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5391 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5393 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5394 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5395 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5398 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5399 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5400 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5401 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5402 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5404 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5405 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5412 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5413 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5415 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5418 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5419 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5420 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5422 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5423 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5427 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5431 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5432 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5433 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5436 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5437 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5438 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5439 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5440 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5441 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5442 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5443 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5444 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5446 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5447 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5448 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5449 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5451 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5452 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5454 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5457 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5458 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5459 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5461 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5462 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5464 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5465 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5466 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5467 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5471 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5472 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5474 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5476 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5477 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5478 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5482 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5483 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5485 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5486 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5487 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5488 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5492 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5493 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5494 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5498 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5499 Ok(script) => script,
5500 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5503 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5506 context: ChannelContext {
5509 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5510 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5511 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5512 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5517 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5519 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5520 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5521 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5522 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5524 channel_value_satoshis,
5526 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5529 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5532 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5533 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5536 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5537 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5538 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5539 pending_update_fee: None,
5540 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5541 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5542 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5543 update_time_counter: 1,
5545 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5547 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5548 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5549 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5550 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5551 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5552 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5554 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5555 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5556 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5557 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5559 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5560 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5561 closing_fee_limits: None,
5562 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5564 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5566 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5567 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5568 short_channel_id: None,
5569 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5571 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5572 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5573 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5574 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5575 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5576 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5577 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5578 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5579 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5580 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5581 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5582 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5584 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5586 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5587 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5588 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5589 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5590 counterparty_parameters: None,
5591 funding_outpoint: None,
5592 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5594 funding_transaction: None,
5596 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5597 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5598 counterparty_node_id,
5600 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5602 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5604 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5605 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5607 announcement_sigs: None,
5609 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5610 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5611 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5612 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5614 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5615 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5617 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5618 outbound_scid_alias,
5620 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5621 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5623 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5624 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5629 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5634 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5635 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5636 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5637 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5638 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5639 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5642 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5643 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5644 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5645 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5646 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5647 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5648 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5649 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5650 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5651 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5652 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5654 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5655 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5657 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5658 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5659 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5660 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5663 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5664 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5666 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5669 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5670 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5671 return Err((self, e));
5675 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5677 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5679 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5680 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5681 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5683 let channel = Channel {
5684 context: self.context,
5687 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5688 temporary_channel_id,
5689 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5690 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5693 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5695 next_local_nonce: None,
5699 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5700 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5701 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5702 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5703 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5704 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5705 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5706 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5707 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5708 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5711 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5712 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5713 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5714 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5715 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5716 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5722 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5723 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5724 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5725 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5726 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5727 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5728 // We've exhausted our options
5731 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5732 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5735 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5736 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5737 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5738 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5740 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5741 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5742 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5743 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5744 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5746 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5748 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5749 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5752 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5753 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5754 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5756 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5757 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5760 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5761 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5764 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5765 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5769 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5770 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5771 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5772 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5773 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5774 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5775 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5776 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5777 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5778 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5779 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5780 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5781 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5782 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5783 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5784 first_per_commitment_point,
5785 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5786 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5787 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5788 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5790 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5795 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5796 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5798 // Check sanity of message fields:
5799 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5802 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5805 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5808 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5811 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5814 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5815 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5816 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5818 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5819 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5822 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5823 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5826 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5829 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5833 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5834 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5837 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5840 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5843 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5846 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5849 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5850 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5852 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5856 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5857 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5860 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5861 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5863 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5864 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5867 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5868 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5871 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5872 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5873 &Some(ref script) => {
5874 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5875 if script.len() == 0 {
5878 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5881 Some(script.clone())
5884 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5891 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5892 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5893 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5894 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5895 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5897 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5898 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5900 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5903 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5904 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5905 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5906 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5907 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5908 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5911 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5912 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5913 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5916 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5917 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5919 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5920 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5926 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5927 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5928 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5931 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5932 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5933 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5934 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5935 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5936 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5937 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5938 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5939 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5940 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5941 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5945 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5947 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5948 // support this channel type.
5949 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5950 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5951 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5954 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5955 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5956 // `static_remote_key`.
5957 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5960 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5961 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5964 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5967 channel_type.clone()
5969 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5970 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5976 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5977 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5978 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5979 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5980 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5981 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5982 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5983 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5984 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5987 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5991 // Check sanity of message fields:
5992 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5995 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5998 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6001 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6002 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6005 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6008 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6011 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6013 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6014 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6017 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6020 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6024 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6025 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6028 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6031 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6034 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6037 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6040 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6043 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6047 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6049 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6050 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6055 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6056 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6057 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6058 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6061 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6064 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6065 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6066 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6068 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6072 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6073 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6074 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6075 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6076 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6080 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6081 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6082 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6083 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6087 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6088 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6089 &Some(ref script) => {
6090 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6091 if script.len() == 0 {
6094 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6097 Some(script.clone())
6100 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6107 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6108 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6109 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6110 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6114 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6115 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6120 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6121 Ok(script) => script,
6122 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6125 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6126 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6129 context: ChannelContext {
6132 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6133 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6135 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6140 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6142 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6143 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6144 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6145 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6148 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6151 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6154 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6155 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6156 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6158 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6159 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6160 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6161 pending_update_fee: None,
6162 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6163 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6164 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6165 update_time_counter: 1,
6167 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6169 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6170 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6171 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6172 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6173 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6174 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6176 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6177 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6178 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6179 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6181 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6182 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6183 closing_fee_limits: None,
6184 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6186 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6188 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6189 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6190 short_channel_id: None,
6191 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6193 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6194 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6195 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6196 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6197 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6198 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6199 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6200 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6201 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6202 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6203 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6204 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6205 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6207 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6209 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6210 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6211 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6212 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6213 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6214 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6215 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6217 funding_outpoint: None,
6218 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6220 funding_transaction: None,
6222 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6223 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6224 counterparty_node_id,
6226 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6228 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6230 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6231 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6233 announcement_sigs: None,
6235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6236 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6238 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6240 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6241 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6243 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6244 outbound_scid_alias,
6246 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6247 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6250 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6255 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6262 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6263 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6266 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6267 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6268 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6269 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6272 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6273 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6275 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6276 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6277 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6278 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6280 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6281 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6283 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6284 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6286 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6287 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6290 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6291 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6293 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6296 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6297 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6298 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6300 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6301 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6302 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6303 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6305 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6306 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6307 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6308 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6309 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6310 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6311 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6312 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6313 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6314 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6315 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6316 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6317 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6318 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6319 first_per_commitment_point,
6320 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6321 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6322 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6324 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6326 next_local_nonce: None,
6330 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6331 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6333 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6335 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6336 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6339 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6340 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6342 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6343 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6345 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6346 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6347 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6348 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6349 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6350 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6351 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6352 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6353 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6356 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6357 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6359 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6360 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6361 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6362 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6364 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6365 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6367 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6368 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6371 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6372 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6373 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6375 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6378 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6379 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6381 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6382 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6383 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6385 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6387 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6388 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6390 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6391 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6392 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6393 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6396 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6397 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6398 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6399 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6400 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6402 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6404 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6405 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6406 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6409 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6410 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6411 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6415 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6416 initial_commitment_tx,
6419 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6420 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6423 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6424 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6427 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6429 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6430 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6431 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6432 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6433 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6434 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6435 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6436 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6437 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6438 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6439 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6441 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6443 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6445 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6446 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6447 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6448 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6450 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6452 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6453 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6454 let mut channel = Channel {
6455 context: self.context,
6457 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6458 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6459 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6461 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6465 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6466 }, channel_monitor))
6470 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6471 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6473 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6479 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6480 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6481 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6482 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6483 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6485 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6486 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6487 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6488 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6494 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6495 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6496 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6497 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6498 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6499 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6504 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6505 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6506 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6507 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6509 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6510 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6511 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6512 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6517 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6518 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6519 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6520 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6521 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6527 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6528 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6529 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6532 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6534 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6535 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6536 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6537 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6538 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6540 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6541 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6542 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6543 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6545 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6546 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6547 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6549 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6551 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6552 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6553 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6554 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6555 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6556 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6558 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6559 // deserialized from that format.
6560 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6561 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6562 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6564 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6566 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6567 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6568 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6570 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6571 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6572 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6573 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6576 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6577 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6578 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6581 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6582 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6583 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6584 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6586 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6587 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6589 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6591 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6593 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6595 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6598 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6600 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6605 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6606 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6608 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6609 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6610 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6611 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6612 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6613 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6614 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6616 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6618 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6620 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6623 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6624 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6625 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6628 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6630 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6631 preimages.push(preimage);
6633 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6634 reason.write(writer)?;
6636 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6638 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6639 preimages.push(preimage);
6641 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6642 reason.write(writer)?;
6645 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6646 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6647 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6649 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6650 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6651 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6655 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6656 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6657 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6659 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6660 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6664 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6665 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6666 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6667 source.write(writer)?;
6668 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6670 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6671 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6672 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6674 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6675 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6677 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6679 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6680 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6682 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6684 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6685 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6690 match self.context.resend_order {
6691 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6692 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6695 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6696 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6697 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6699 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6700 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6701 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6702 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6705 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6706 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6707 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6708 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6709 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6712 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6713 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6714 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6715 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6717 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6718 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6719 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6721 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6724 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6728 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6729 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6730 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6731 // consider the stale state on reload.
6734 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6735 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6742 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6743 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6745 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6746 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6747 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6749 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6750 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6752 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6755 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6756 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6757 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6759 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6762 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6763 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6765 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6766 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6767 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6769 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6771 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6773 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6776 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6777 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6778 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6779 htlc.write(writer)?;
6782 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6783 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6784 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6786 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6787 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6789 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6790 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6791 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6792 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6793 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6794 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6795 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6797 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6798 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6799 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6800 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6801 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6803 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6804 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6806 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6807 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6808 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6809 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6811 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6813 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6814 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6815 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6816 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6817 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6818 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6819 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6821 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6822 (2, chan_type, option),
6823 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6824 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6825 (5, self.context.config, required),
6826 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6827 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6828 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6829 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6830 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6831 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6832 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6833 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6834 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6835 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6836 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6837 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6838 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6839 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6840 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6841 (33, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6842 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6843 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6850 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6851 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6854 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6856 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6857 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6858 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6860 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6861 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6862 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6863 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6867 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6868 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6874 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let mut keys_data = None;
6885 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6886 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6887 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6889 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6890 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6891 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6892 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6893 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6894 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6898 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6899 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6900 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6903 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6912 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6913 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6914 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6915 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6917 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6918 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6919 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6920 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6921 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6922 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6923 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6928 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6930 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6931 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6932 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6935 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6936 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6937 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6938 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6939 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6941 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6945 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6949 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6952 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6954 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6958 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6960 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6961 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6962 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6963 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6964 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6965 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6966 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6967 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6968 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6970 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6971 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6972 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6974 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6975 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6976 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6978 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6982 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6983 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6984 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6988 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6994 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6995 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6998 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7000 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7001 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7004 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7014 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7015 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7016 // consider the stale state on reload.
7017 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7020 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7027 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7036 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7037 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7039 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7040 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7048 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7049 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7051 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7052 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7057 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7058 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7059 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7060 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7062 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7065 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7079 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7080 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7082 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7083 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7084 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7088 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7089 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7090 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7092 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7098 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7099 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7100 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7101 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7102 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7103 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7104 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7105 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7106 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7107 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7109 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7110 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7111 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7112 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7113 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7114 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7115 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7117 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7118 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7119 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7120 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7122 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7124 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7125 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7127 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7128 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7129 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7130 (2, channel_type, option),
7131 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7132 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7133 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7134 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7135 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7136 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7137 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7138 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7139 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7140 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7141 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7142 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7143 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7144 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7145 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7146 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7147 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7148 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7149 (33, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7150 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7151 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7154 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7155 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7156 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7157 // required channel parameters.
7158 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7159 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7160 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7162 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7164 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7165 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7166 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7167 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7170 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7171 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7172 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7174 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7175 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7177 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7178 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7183 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7184 if iter.next().is_some() {
7185 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7189 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7190 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7191 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7192 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7193 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7196 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7197 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7198 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7200 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7201 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7203 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7204 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7205 // separate u64 values.
7206 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7208 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7210 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7211 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7212 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7213 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7215 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7216 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7218 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7219 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7220 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7221 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7222 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7225 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7226 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7230 context: ChannelContext {
7233 config: config.unwrap(),
7237 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7238 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7239 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7242 temporary_channel_id,
7244 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7246 channel_value_satoshis,
7248 latest_monitor_update_id,
7251 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7254 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7255 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7258 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7259 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7260 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7261 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7265 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7266 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7267 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7268 monitor_pending_forwards,
7269 monitor_pending_failures,
7270 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7273 holding_cell_update_fee,
7274 next_holder_htlc_id,
7275 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7276 update_time_counter,
7279 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7280 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7281 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7282 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7284 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7285 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7286 closing_fee_limits: None,
7287 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7289 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7291 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7292 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7294 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7296 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7297 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7298 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7299 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7300 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7301 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7302 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7303 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7304 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7307 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7309 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7310 funding_transaction,
7312 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7313 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7314 counterparty_node_id,
7316 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7320 channel_update_status,
7321 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7325 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7326 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7327 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7328 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7330 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7331 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7333 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7334 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7335 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7337 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7338 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7340 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7341 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7343 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7346 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7355 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7356 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7357 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7358 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7359 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7361 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7362 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7363 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7364 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7365 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7366 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7367 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7368 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7369 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7370 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7371 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7372 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7373 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7374 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7375 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7376 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7377 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7378 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7379 use crate::util::test_utils;
7380 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7381 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7382 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7383 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7384 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7385 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7386 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7387 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7388 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7389 use crate::prelude::*;
7391 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7394 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7395 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7401 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7402 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7403 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7404 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7408 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7409 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7410 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7411 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7412 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7413 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7414 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7418 signer: InMemorySigner,
7421 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7422 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7425 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7426 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7428 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7429 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7432 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7436 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7438 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7439 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7440 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7441 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7442 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7445 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7446 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7447 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7448 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7452 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7453 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7454 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7458 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7459 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7460 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7461 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7463 let seed = [42; 32];
7464 let network = Network::Testnet;
7465 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7466 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7467 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7470 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7471 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let config = UserConfig::default();
7473 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7474 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7475 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7477 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7478 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7482 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7483 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7485 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7486 let original_fee = 253;
7487 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7488 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7489 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7490 let seed = [42; 32];
7491 let network = Network::Testnet;
7492 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7494 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7495 let config = UserConfig::default();
7496 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7498 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7499 // same as the old fee.
7500 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7501 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7502 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7506 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7507 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7508 // dust limits are used.
7509 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7510 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7511 let seed = [42; 32];
7512 let network = Network::Testnet;
7513 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7514 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7515 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7517 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7518 // they have different dust limits.
7520 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7521 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7522 let config = UserConfig::default();
7523 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7525 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7526 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7527 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7528 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7529 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7531 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7532 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7533 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7534 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7535 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7537 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7538 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7539 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7540 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7542 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7543 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7544 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7546 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7547 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7549 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7550 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7551 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7553 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7554 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7555 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7556 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7559 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7561 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7562 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7563 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7564 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7565 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7566 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7567 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7568 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7569 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7571 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7574 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7575 // the dust limit check.
7576 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7577 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7578 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7579 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7581 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7582 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7583 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7584 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7585 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7586 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7587 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7591 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7592 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7593 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7594 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7595 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7596 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7598 let seed = [42; 32];
7599 let network = Network::Testnet;
7600 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7602 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let config = UserConfig::default();
7604 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7606 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7607 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7609 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7610 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7611 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7612 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7613 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7614 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7616 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7617 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7618 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7619 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7620 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7622 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7624 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7625 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7626 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7627 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7628 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7630 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7631 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7632 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7633 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7634 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7638 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7639 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7640 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7641 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7642 let seed = [42; 32];
7643 let network = Network::Testnet;
7644 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7645 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7646 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7648 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7650 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7651 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7652 let config = UserConfig::default();
7653 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7655 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7656 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7657 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7658 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7660 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7661 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7662 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7664 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7665 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7666 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7667 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7669 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7670 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7671 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7673 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7674 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7676 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7677 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7678 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7679 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7680 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7681 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7682 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7684 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7686 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7687 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7688 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7689 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7690 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7694 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7695 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7696 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7697 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7698 let seed = [42; 32];
7699 let network = Network::Testnet;
7700 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7701 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7702 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7704 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7705 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7706 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7707 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7708 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7709 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7710 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7711 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7713 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7714 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7715 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7716 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7717 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7718 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7720 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7721 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7722 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7723 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7725 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7727 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7728 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7729 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7730 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7731 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7732 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7734 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7735 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7736 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7737 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7739 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7740 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7741 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7742 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7743 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7745 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7746 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7748 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7749 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7750 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7752 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7753 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7754 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7755 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7756 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7758 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7759 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7761 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7762 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7763 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7767 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7769 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7770 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7771 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7773 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7774 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7775 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7776 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7778 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7779 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7780 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7782 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7784 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7785 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7788 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7789 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7790 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7792 let seed = [42; 32];
7793 let network = Network::Testnet;
7794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7795 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7796 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7799 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7800 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7801 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7803 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7804 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7806 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7807 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7808 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7810 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7811 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7813 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7815 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7816 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7818 // Channel Negotiations failed
7819 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7820 assert!(result.is_err());
7825 fn channel_update() {
7826 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7827 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7828 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7829 let seed = [42; 32];
7830 let network = Network::Testnet;
7831 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7832 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7833 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7835 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7836 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7837 let config = UserConfig::default();
7838 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7840 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7841 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7842 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7843 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7844 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7846 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7847 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7848 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7849 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7850 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7852 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7853 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7854 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7855 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7857 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7858 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7859 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7861 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7862 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7864 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7865 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7866 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7868 short_channel_id: 0,
7871 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7872 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7873 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7875 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7876 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7878 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7880 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7882 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7883 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7884 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7885 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7887 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7888 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7889 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7891 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7895 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7897 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7898 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7899 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7900 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7901 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7902 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7903 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7904 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7905 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7906 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7907 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7908 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7909 use crate::sync::Arc;
7911 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7912 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7913 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7914 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7916 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7918 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7919 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7920 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7921 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7922 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7924 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7925 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7931 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7932 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7933 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7935 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7936 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7937 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7938 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7939 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7940 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7942 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7944 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7945 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7946 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7947 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7948 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7949 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7951 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7952 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7953 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7954 selected_contest_delay: 144
7956 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7957 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7959 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7960 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7962 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7963 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7965 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7966 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7968 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7969 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7970 // build_commitment_transaction.
7971 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7972 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7973 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7974 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7975 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7977 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7978 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7979 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7980 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7984 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7985 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7986 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7987 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7991 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7992 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7993 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7995 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7996 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7998 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7999 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8001 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8003 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8004 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8005 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8006 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8007 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8008 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8009 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8011 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8012 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8013 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8014 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8016 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8017 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8018 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8020 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8022 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8023 commitment_tx.clone(),
8024 counterparty_signature,
8025 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8026 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8027 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8029 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8030 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8032 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8033 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8034 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8036 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8037 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8040 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8041 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8043 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8044 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8045 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8046 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8047 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8048 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8049 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8050 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8052 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8055 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8056 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8057 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8061 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8064 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8065 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8066 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8068 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8069 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8070 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8071 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8072 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8073 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8074 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8075 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8077 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8081 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8082 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8083 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8084 "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", {});
8086 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8087 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8089 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8090 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8091 "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", {});
8093 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8094 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8095 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8096 "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", {});
8098 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8099 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8101 amount_msat: 1000000,
8103 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8104 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8106 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8109 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8110 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8112 amount_msat: 2000000,
8114 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8115 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8117 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8120 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8121 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8123 amount_msat: 2000000,
8125 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8126 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8127 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8128 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8130 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8133 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8134 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8136 amount_msat: 3000000,
8138 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8139 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8140 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8141 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8143 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8146 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8147 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8149 amount_msat: 4000000,
8151 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8152 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8154 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8158 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8159 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8160 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8162 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8163 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8164 "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", {
8167 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8168 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8169 "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" },
8172 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8173 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8174 "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" },
8177 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8178 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8179 "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" },
8182 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8183 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8184 "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" },
8187 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8188 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8189 "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" }
8192 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8193 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8194 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8196 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8197 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8198 "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", {
8201 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8202 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8203 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8206 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8207 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8208 "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" },
8211 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8212 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8213 "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" },
8216 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8217 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8218 "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" },
8221 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8222 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8223 "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" }
8226 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8227 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8228 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8230 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8231 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8232 "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", {
8235 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8236 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8237 "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" },
8240 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8241 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8242 "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" },
8245 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8246 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8247 "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" },
8250 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8251 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8252 "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" }
8255 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8256 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8257 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8258 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8260 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8261 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8262 "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", {
8265 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8266 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8267 "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" },
8270 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8271 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8272 "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" },
8275 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8276 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8277 "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" },
8280 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8281 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8282 "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" }
8285 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8286 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8287 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8288 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8290 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8291 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8292 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8295 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8296 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8297 "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" },
8300 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8301 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8302 "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" },
8305 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8306 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8307 "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" },
8310 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8311 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8312 "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" }
8315 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8316 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8317 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8319 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8320 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8321 "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", {
8324 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8325 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8326 "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" },
8329 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8330 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8331 "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" },
8334 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8335 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8336 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8339 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8340 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8341 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8343 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8344 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8345 "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", {
8348 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8349 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8350 "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" },
8353 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8354 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8355 "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" },
8358 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8359 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8360 "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" }
8363 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8364 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8365 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8367 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8368 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8369 "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", {
8372 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8373 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8374 "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" },
8377 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8378 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8379 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8382 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8383 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8384 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8385 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8386 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8387 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8389 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8390 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8391 "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", {
8394 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8395 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8396 "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" },
8399 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8400 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8401 "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" }
8404 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8405 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8406 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8407 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8408 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8410 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8411 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8412 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8415 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8416 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8421 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8422 "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" }
8425 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8429 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8430 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8431 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8434 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8435 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8436 "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" }
8439 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8440 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8441 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8442 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8443 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8445 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8446 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8447 "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", {
8450 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8451 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8452 "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" }
8455 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8458 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8459 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8461 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8462 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8463 "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", {
8466 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8467 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8468 "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" }
8471 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8474 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8476 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8477 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8478 "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", {});
8480 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8481 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8482 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8483 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8484 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8486 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8487 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8488 "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", {});
8490 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8491 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8492 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8493 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8494 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8496 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8497 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8498 "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", {});
8500 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8501 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8502 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8504 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8505 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8506 "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", {});
8508 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8509 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8510 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8511 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8512 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8514 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8515 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8516 "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", {});
8518 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8519 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8520 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8521 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8522 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8524 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8525 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8526 "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", {});
8528 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8529 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8530 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8531 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8532 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8533 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8535 amount_msat: 2000000,
8537 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8538 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8540 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8543 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8544 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8545 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8547 amount_msat: 5000001,
8549 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8550 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8551 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8552 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8554 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8557 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8558 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8560 amount_msat: 5000000,
8562 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8563 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8564 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8565 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8567 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8571 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8572 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8573 "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", {
8576 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8577 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8578 "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" },
8580 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8581 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8582 "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" },
8584 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8585 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8586 "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" }
8589 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8590 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8592 "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", {
8595 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8596 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8597 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8599 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8600 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8601 "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" },
8603 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8604 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8605 "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" }
8610 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8611 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8613 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8614 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8615 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8616 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8618 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8619 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8620 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8622 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8623 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8625 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8626 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8628 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8629 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8630 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8634 fn test_key_derivation() {
8635 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8638 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8639 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8641 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8642 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8644 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8645 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8647 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8648 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8650 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8651 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8653 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8654 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8656 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8657 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8661 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8662 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8664 let seed = [42; 32];
8665 let network = Network::Testnet;
8666 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8667 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8669 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let config = UserConfig::default();
8671 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8672 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8674 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8675 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8677 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8678 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8679 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8680 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8681 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8682 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8683 assert!(res.is_ok());
8687 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8688 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8689 // resulting `channel_type`.
8690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8691 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8692 let network = Network::Testnet;
8693 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8694 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8696 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8697 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8699 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8700 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8702 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8703 // need to signal it.
8704 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8705 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8706 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8709 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8711 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8712 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8713 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8715 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8716 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8717 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8720 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8721 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8722 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8723 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8724 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8727 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8728 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8732 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8733 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8734 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8735 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8736 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8737 let network = Network::Testnet;
8738 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8739 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8741 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8742 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8744 let config = UserConfig::default();
8746 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8747 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8748 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8749 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8750 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8752 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8753 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8754 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8757 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8758 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8759 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8761 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8762 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8763 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8764 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8765 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8766 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8768 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8772 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8773 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8775 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8776 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8777 let network = Network::Testnet;
8778 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8779 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8781 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8782 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8784 let config = UserConfig::default();
8786 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8787 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8788 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8789 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8790 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8791 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8792 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8793 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8795 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8796 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8797 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8798 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8799 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8800 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8803 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8804 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8806 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8807 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8808 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8809 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8811 assert!(res.is_err());
8813 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8814 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8815 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8817 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8818 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8819 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8822 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8824 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8825 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8826 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8827 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8830 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8831 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8833 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8834 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8836 assert!(res.is_err());