1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
18 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
20 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
21 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
23 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
25 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
26 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
27 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
28 use util::transaction_utils;
29 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
30 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
31 use util::errors::APIError;
32 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
35 use std::default::Default;
36 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
41 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
42 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
43 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
44 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
45 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
47 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
48 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
51 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
52 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
53 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
54 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
57 enum InboundHTLCState {
58 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
59 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
60 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
61 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
62 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
63 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
64 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
65 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
66 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
67 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
68 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
69 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
71 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
73 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
74 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
76 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
77 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
78 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
79 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
80 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
81 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
82 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
83 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
86 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
90 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
91 state: InboundHTLCState,
94 enum OutboundHTLCState {
95 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
96 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
97 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
98 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
99 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
100 /// money back (though we won't), and,
101 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
102 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
103 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
104 /// we'll never get out of sync).
105 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
106 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
107 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
109 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
110 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
111 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
112 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
113 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
114 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
115 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
116 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
117 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
118 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
119 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
120 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
121 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
122 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
123 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
126 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
130 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
131 state: OutboundHTLCState,
135 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
136 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
137 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
141 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
143 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
146 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
151 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
155 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
156 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
157 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
158 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
159 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
160 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
161 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
163 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
164 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
165 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
166 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
167 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
168 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
169 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
171 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
172 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
173 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
175 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
176 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
177 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
178 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
179 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
180 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
182 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
183 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
185 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
186 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
187 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
188 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
189 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
190 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
191 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
192 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
193 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
195 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
196 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
197 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
198 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
199 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
200 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
201 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
202 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
203 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
204 /// us their shutdown.
205 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
206 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
207 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
208 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
210 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
211 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
213 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
215 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
216 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
217 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
218 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
221 /// Status has been gossiped.
223 /// Status has been changed.
225 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
229 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
230 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
231 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
233 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
234 config: ChannelConfig,
238 channel_id: [u8; 32],
240 channel_outbound: bool,
241 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
242 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
244 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
247 local_keys: ChanSigner,
249 pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
250 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
251 destination_script: Script,
253 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
254 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
255 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
257 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
258 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
259 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
260 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
261 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
262 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
264 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
265 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
266 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
267 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
268 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
269 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
271 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
273 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
274 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
275 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
276 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
277 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
279 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
280 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
281 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
283 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
284 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
285 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
286 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
287 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
288 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
289 // commitment_signed.
290 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
291 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
292 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
293 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
294 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
295 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
296 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
297 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
298 update_time_counter: u32,
301 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
302 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
303 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
304 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
305 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
306 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
308 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
310 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
312 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
313 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
314 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
315 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
316 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
317 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
318 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
319 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
320 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
321 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
323 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
325 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
327 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
329 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
331 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
332 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
333 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
334 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
335 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
336 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
337 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
338 their_to_self_delay: u16,
339 our_to_self_delay: u16,
341 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
343 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
344 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
347 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
349 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
351 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
352 their_node_id: PublicKey,
354 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
356 /// Used exclusively to broadcast the latest local state, mostly a historical quirk that this
358 channel_monitor: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
359 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
361 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
366 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
367 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
368 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
369 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
370 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
371 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
372 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
375 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
377 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
379 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
381 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
383 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
385 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
387 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
388 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
389 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
390 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
391 Ignore(&'static str),
393 CloseDelayBroadcast {
395 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
399 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
400 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
402 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
403 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
404 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
409 macro_rules! secp_check {
410 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
413 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
418 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
419 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
420 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
421 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
424 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
426 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
427 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
428 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
429 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
432 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
433 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
437 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
438 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
441 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
443 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
444 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
447 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
450 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
451 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
455 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
456 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
457 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
460 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
464 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
466 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
467 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
468 channel_outbound: true,
469 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
470 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
472 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
474 local_keys: chan_keys,
475 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
476 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
478 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
479 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
480 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
482 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
483 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
484 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
485 pending_update_fee: None,
486 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
487 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
488 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
489 update_time_counter: 1,
491 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
493 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
494 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
495 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
496 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
497 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
499 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
500 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
501 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
502 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
504 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
507 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
508 short_channel_id: None,
509 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
510 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
512 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
513 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
514 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
515 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
516 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
517 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
518 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
519 their_to_self_delay: 0,
520 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
521 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
522 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
525 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
527 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
528 their_node_id: their_node_id,
530 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
532 channel_monitor: None,
533 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
535 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
541 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
542 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
544 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
547 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
553 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
554 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
555 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
556 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
557 F::Target: FeeEstimator
559 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
560 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
561 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
562 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
563 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
564 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
565 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
567 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
568 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
570 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
574 // Check sanity of message fields:
575 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
578 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
581 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
584 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
587 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
590 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
593 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
595 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
598 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
601 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
605 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
606 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
609 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
612 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
615 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
618 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
621 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
624 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
628 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
630 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
631 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
632 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
636 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
637 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
639 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
641 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
642 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
643 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
646 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
649 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
653 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
654 // for full fee payment
655 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
656 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
660 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
661 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
662 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
666 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
667 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
668 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
669 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
670 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
672 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
673 } else if script.len() == 0 {
675 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
680 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
681 &OptionalField::Absent => {
682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
689 config: local_config,
691 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
692 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
693 channel_outbound: false,
694 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
696 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
698 local_keys: chan_keys,
699 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
700 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
702 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
703 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
704 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
706 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
707 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
708 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
709 pending_update_fee: None,
710 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
711 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
712 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
713 update_time_counter: 1,
715 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
717 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
718 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
719 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
720 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
721 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
725 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
726 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
728 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
731 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
732 short_channel_id: None,
733 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
734 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
736 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
737 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
738 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
739 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
740 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
741 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
742 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
743 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
744 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
745 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
746 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
747 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
749 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
750 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
752 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
753 their_node_id: their_node_id,
755 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
757 channel_monitor: None,
758 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
760 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
768 // Utilities to derive keys:
770 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
771 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
772 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
775 // Utilities to build transactions:
777 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
778 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
779 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
781 let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
782 if self.channel_outbound {
783 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
784 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
786 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
787 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
789 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
791 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
792 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
793 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
794 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
795 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
796 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
799 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
800 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
801 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
802 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
803 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
805 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
806 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
807 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
808 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
809 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
810 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
811 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
812 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
813 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
814 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
815 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
817 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
818 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
821 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
823 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
824 script_sig: Script::new(),
825 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
831 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
832 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
834 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
835 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
836 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
837 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
839 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
841 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
842 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
843 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
845 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
846 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
847 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
848 transaction_output_index: None
853 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
854 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
855 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
856 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
857 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
858 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
860 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
861 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
862 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
864 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
865 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
868 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
869 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
870 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
871 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
872 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
873 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
874 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
876 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
877 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
883 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
884 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
885 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
886 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
887 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
888 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
889 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
893 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
894 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
896 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
898 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
899 if generated_by_local {
900 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
901 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
910 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
911 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
912 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
913 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
914 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
915 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
916 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
920 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
921 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
923 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
925 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
926 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
928 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
929 if !generated_by_local {
930 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
938 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
939 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
940 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
941 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
942 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
943 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
944 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
945 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
947 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
949 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
950 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
951 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
952 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
954 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
956 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
957 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
958 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
959 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
962 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
963 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
964 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
966 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
969 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
970 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
972 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
973 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
975 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
976 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
977 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
978 value: value_to_a as u64
982 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
983 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
985 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
986 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
988 value: value_to_b as u64
992 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
993 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
994 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
995 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
996 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
997 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
999 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1000 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1001 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1002 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1003 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1006 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1007 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1008 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1009 outputs.push(out.0);
1010 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1011 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1012 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1015 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1016 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1020 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1023 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1027 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1028 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1029 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1033 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1034 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1038 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1040 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1042 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1043 script_sig: Script::new(),
1044 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1045 witness: Vec::new(),
1050 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1051 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1052 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1054 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1055 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1056 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1058 if value_to_self < 0 {
1059 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1060 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1061 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1062 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1063 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1066 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1067 txouts.push((TxOut {
1068 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1069 value: value_to_remote as u64
1073 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1074 txouts.push((TxOut {
1075 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1076 value: value_to_self as u64
1080 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1082 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1083 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1084 outputs.push(out.0);
1092 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1096 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1097 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1098 /// our counterparty!)
1099 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1100 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1101 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1102 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1103 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1104 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1105 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1107 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1111 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1112 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1113 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1114 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1115 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1116 //may see payments to it!
1117 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
1118 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1119 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1120 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1122 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1125 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1126 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1127 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1128 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1129 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1130 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1133 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1134 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1135 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1136 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1137 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1140 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1141 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1142 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1144 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1145 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1146 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1147 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1148 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1149 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1151 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1152 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1154 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1156 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1158 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1159 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1160 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1162 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1163 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1164 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1165 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1167 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1168 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1169 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1171 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1173 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1174 return Ok((None, None));
1177 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1178 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1185 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1189 // Now update local state:
1191 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1192 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1193 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1194 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1195 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1196 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1197 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1200 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1202 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1203 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1204 match pending_update {
1205 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1206 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1207 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1208 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1209 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1210 return Ok((None, None));
1213 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1214 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1215 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1216 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1217 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1218 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1219 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1225 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1226 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1227 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1229 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1233 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1234 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1236 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1237 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1239 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1240 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1243 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1244 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1245 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1246 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1247 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1250 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1251 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1252 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1253 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1254 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1255 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1256 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1257 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1258 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1260 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1261 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1262 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1264 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1265 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1269 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1270 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1271 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1273 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1274 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1275 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1276 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1277 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1279 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1281 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1282 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1283 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1285 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1286 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1287 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1289 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1290 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1291 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1295 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1302 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1306 // Now update local state:
1307 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1308 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1309 match pending_update {
1310 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1311 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1312 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1316 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1317 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1318 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1325 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1326 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1333 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1334 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1337 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1338 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1339 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1344 // Message handlers:
1346 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1347 // Check sanity of message fields:
1348 if !self.channel_outbound {
1349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1351 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1354 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1357 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1360 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1363 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1366 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1369 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1372 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1375 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1378 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1382 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1383 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1386 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1389 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1392 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1395 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1398 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1401 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1405 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1406 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1407 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1408 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1409 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1410 Some(script.clone())
1411 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1412 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1414 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1419 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1420 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1426 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1427 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1428 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1429 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1430 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1431 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1432 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1434 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1435 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1436 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1437 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
1438 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1439 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1442 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1443 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1445 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1446 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1448 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1453 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1454 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1456 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1457 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1458 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1460 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1461 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1463 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
1465 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1466 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1467 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1470 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1471 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
1474 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1475 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1478 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
1479 if self.channel_outbound {
1480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1482 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1483 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1484 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1488 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1489 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1490 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1491 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1494 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1495 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1497 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1500 self.funding_txo = None;
1505 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1507 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1508 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1509 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1510 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1512 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
1513 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
1514 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1515 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1516 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1517 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1518 self.logger.clone());
1520 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1521 channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()).unwrap();
1526 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
1527 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1529 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1530 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1531 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1532 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1534 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1535 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1536 signature: our_signature
1537 }, channel_monitor))
1540 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1541 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1542 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitorUpdate, (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> {
1543 if !self.channel_outbound {
1544 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?")));
1546 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1547 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!")));
1549 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1550 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1551 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1552 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1555 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1557 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1558 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1559 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1561 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1563 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1564 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
1565 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer")));
1568 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1569 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1570 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1571 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1572 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
1573 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: Vec::new(),
1576 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1577 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
1578 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1580 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1583 Err((Some(monitor_update),
1584 ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast")))
1588 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1589 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1593 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1595 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1596 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1597 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1598 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1599 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1600 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1601 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1602 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1603 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1604 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1605 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1606 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1607 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1610 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1616 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1617 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1621 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1622 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1623 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1624 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1625 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1627 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1630 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1632 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1633 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1634 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1635 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1638 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1639 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1640 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1641 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1642 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1646 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1649 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1650 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1651 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1652 /// corner case properly.
1653 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1654 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1655 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1656 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1659 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1663 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1664 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1666 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1669 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC"));
1672 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1676 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1677 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1680 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1681 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1684 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1685 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1686 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1687 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1688 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1689 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1690 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1691 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1692 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1693 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1694 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1696 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1699 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1700 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1701 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1704 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1707 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1710 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1714 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1716 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1717 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1718 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1722 // Now update local state:
1723 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1724 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1725 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1726 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1727 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1728 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1729 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1734 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1736 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1737 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1738 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1739 match check_preimage {
1741 Some(payment_hash) =>
1742 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1747 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1749 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1750 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1752 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1755 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1758 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1761 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1762 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1765 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1769 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1770 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1773 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1774 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1777 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1781 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1785 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1786 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1789 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1793 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1797 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
1798 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1799 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
1801 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1802 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
1804 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1805 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
1808 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1810 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1812 let mut update_fee = false;
1813 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1815 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1820 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1821 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1822 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1823 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1825 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1826 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1827 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1828 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
1829 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
1832 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1834 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1835 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1837 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1838 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
1842 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1843 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
1846 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1847 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1848 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1849 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1850 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1851 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1852 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1853 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
1854 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
1856 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1858 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1862 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1863 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1865 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1866 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1867 if !self.channel_outbound {
1868 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1869 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1870 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1871 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1872 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1873 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1874 need_our_commitment = true;
1875 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1880 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1882 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1883 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1884 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1885 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1886 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
1887 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
1890 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1892 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1893 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1894 Some(forward_info.clone())
1896 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1897 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1898 need_our_commitment = true;
1901 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1902 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1903 Some(fail_reason.take())
1905 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1906 need_our_commitment = true;
1910 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1911 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1912 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1913 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1915 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1916 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1917 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1918 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1919 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1920 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1921 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1922 // includes the right HTLCs.
1923 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1924 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1925 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1926 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1927 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1928 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1930 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1931 // re-send the message on restoration)
1932 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
1935 let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1936 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1937 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1938 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1939 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1940 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1941 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1942 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1943 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1945 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1946 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1947 } else { (None, None) };
1949 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1950 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1951 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1952 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1953 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1956 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1957 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1958 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
1959 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1960 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1961 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1963 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1964 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
1965 updates: Vec::new(),
1968 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1969 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1970 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1971 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1972 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1974 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1975 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1976 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1977 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1978 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1979 // to rebalance channels.
1980 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1981 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1983 match &htlc_update {
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1985 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1986 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1989 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1990 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1993 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2000 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2001 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
2002 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2003 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2004 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2005 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2009 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2011 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2016 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2017 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2018 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2020 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2022 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2029 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2030 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
2031 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2032 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2038 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2039 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2042 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2043 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2044 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2045 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2048 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2049 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2050 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2051 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2052 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2058 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2059 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2060 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2061 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2062 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2064 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2066 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2068 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2069 update_fee: update_fee,
2071 }, monitor_update)))
2080 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2081 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2082 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2083 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2084 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2085 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
2086 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2088 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2094 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2098 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2099 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2104 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2105 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2106 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2107 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2108 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2109 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2110 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2111 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
2115 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2116 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
2117 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2118 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2119 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2120 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2121 idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2122 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2125 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2127 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2128 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2129 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2130 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2131 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2132 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2133 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2134 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2136 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2137 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2138 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2139 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2140 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2141 let mut require_commitment = false;
2142 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2145 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2146 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2147 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2148 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2150 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2151 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2152 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2153 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2154 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2155 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2160 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2161 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2162 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2163 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2164 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2166 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2167 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2172 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2173 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2174 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2176 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2177 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2181 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2182 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2184 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2185 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2186 require_commitment = true;
2187 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2188 match forward_info {
2189 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2190 require_commitment = true;
2192 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2193 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2194 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2196 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2197 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2198 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2202 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2203 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2204 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2210 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2211 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2212 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2213 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2215 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2216 Some(fail_reason.take())
2218 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2219 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2220 require_commitment = true;
2224 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2226 if self.channel_outbound {
2227 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2228 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2231 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2232 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2233 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2234 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2235 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2236 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2237 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2238 require_commitment = true;
2239 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2244 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2245 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2246 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2247 if require_commitment {
2248 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2249 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2250 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2251 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2252 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2253 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2254 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2255 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2256 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2258 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2259 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2260 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
2263 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2264 Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
2265 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2266 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2267 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2269 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2270 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2271 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2274 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2275 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2276 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2277 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2279 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2282 if require_commitment {
2283 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2285 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2286 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2287 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2288 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2290 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2291 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2292 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2297 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2299 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
2306 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2307 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2308 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2309 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2310 if !self.channel_outbound {
2311 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2313 if !self.is_usable() {
2314 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2316 if !self.is_live() {
2317 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2320 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2321 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2325 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2326 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2328 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2329 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2330 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2334 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
2335 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2336 Some(update_fee) => {
2337 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2338 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2344 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2345 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2346 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2347 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2348 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2350 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2351 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2353 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2354 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2355 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2356 return outbound_drops;
2358 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2359 // will be retransmitted.
2360 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2362 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2363 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2365 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2366 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2367 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2368 // this HTLC accordingly
2369 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2372 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2373 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2374 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2375 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2378 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2379 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2380 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2381 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2382 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2383 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2388 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2390 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2391 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2392 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2393 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2394 // the update upon reconnection.
2395 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2399 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2401 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2402 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2405 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2408 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2409 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2413 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2414 /// updates are partially paused.
2415 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2416 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2417 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2418 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2419 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2420 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2421 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2422 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2423 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2424 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2425 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2426 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2427 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2430 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2431 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2432 /// to the remote side.
2433 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2434 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2435 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2437 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2439 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2440 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2441 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2442 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2443 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2444 // monitor was persisted.
2445 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2446 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2447 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2448 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2449 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2450 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2451 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2452 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2456 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2457 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2458 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2459 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2461 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2462 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2463 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2464 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2467 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2468 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2470 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2471 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2474 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2475 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2476 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2477 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2478 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2479 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2480 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2481 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2482 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2485 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2486 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2488 if self.channel_outbound {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2491 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2494 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2495 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2496 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2500 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2501 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2502 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2503 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2504 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2505 per_commitment_secret,
2506 next_per_commitment_point,
2510 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2511 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2512 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2513 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2514 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2516 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2517 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2518 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2519 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2520 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2521 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2522 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2523 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2524 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2529 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2530 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2532 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2533 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2534 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2535 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2536 reason: err_packet.clone()
2539 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2540 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2541 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2542 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2543 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2544 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2547 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2548 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2549 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2550 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2551 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2558 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2559 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2560 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2561 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2563 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2567 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2568 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2569 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2570 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2571 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2572 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2573 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2577 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2578 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2582 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2583 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2584 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2585 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2588 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2589 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2590 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2591 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2592 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
2593 their_current_per_commitment_point: data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point
2596 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2597 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast {
2598 msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting",
2599 update: monitor_update
2603 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2607 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2608 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2609 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2611 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2612 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2613 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2614 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2618 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2619 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2620 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2621 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2622 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2625 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2626 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2629 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2630 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2631 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2632 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2633 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2634 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2635 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2638 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2639 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2640 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2642 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2643 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2644 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2647 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2653 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2654 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2655 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2656 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2657 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2659 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2660 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2661 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2662 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2663 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2664 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2665 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2669 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2670 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2671 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2673 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2676 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2677 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2678 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2679 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2681 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2682 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2683 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2684 Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2685 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2688 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2690 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2691 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2692 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2694 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2697 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2698 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2699 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2702 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2708 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2709 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2711 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2712 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2713 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2717 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2718 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2719 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2721 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2722 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2724 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2725 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2726 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2728 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2730 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2731 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2732 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2733 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2734 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2738 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2739 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2741 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2744 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2745 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2746 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2747 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2750 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2751 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2755 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2757 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2758 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2759 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2763 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2764 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2768 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2769 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2773 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2776 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2778 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2779 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2781 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2782 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2783 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2784 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2785 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2786 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2788 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2789 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2795 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2796 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2797 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2799 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2802 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2803 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2804 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2808 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2809 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2811 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2814 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2815 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2816 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2817 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2819 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2821 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2822 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2823 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2824 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2825 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2827 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2828 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2830 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2831 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2833 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2836 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
2837 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2839 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2842 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2845 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2848 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2852 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2853 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2854 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2857 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2859 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2861 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2864 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2865 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2866 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2867 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2868 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2872 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2873 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2874 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2875 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2876 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2877 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2881 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2882 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2883 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2884 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2885 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2886 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2887 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2888 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2889 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2890 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2891 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2897 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2898 if self.channel_outbound {
2899 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2900 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2901 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2902 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2906 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2909 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2910 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2911 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2912 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2916 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2920 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2921 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2923 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2925 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2926 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2928 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2929 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2930 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2932 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2935 // Public utilities:
2937 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2941 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2942 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2943 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2947 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2948 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
2949 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2950 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2952 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap()
2955 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2956 /// is_usable() returns true).
2957 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2958 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2959 self.short_channel_id
2962 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2963 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2964 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2968 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2969 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2974 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2975 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2978 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2979 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2980 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2983 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2984 self.channel_value_satoshis
2987 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2988 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2992 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2996 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2997 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3000 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3001 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3004 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3005 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3009 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3014 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3016 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3017 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3018 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3019 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3020 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3021 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3023 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3025 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3033 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3037 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3038 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3039 self.update_time_counter
3042 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3043 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3046 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3047 self.config.announced_channel
3050 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3051 self.channel_outbound
3054 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3056 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3057 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3059 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3060 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3062 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3063 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3065 if self.channel_outbound {
3066 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3067 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3070 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3071 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3076 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3077 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3078 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3081 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3083 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3084 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3085 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3088 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3089 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3090 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3091 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3092 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3095 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3096 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3097 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3098 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3101 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3102 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3103 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
3106 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3107 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3108 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3109 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3110 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3111 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3116 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3117 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3120 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3121 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3124 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3125 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3128 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3129 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3132 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3133 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3136 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
3137 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
3138 /// the channel_monitor.
3139 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
3140 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
3141 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3142 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3143 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3144 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3145 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3146 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3149 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3150 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3151 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3152 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3153 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3154 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3155 if self.channel_outbound {
3156 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3157 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3158 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3159 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3160 // channel and move on.
3161 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3162 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3164 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3165 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3166 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3167 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3168 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3171 if self.channel_outbound {
3172 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3173 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3174 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3175 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3176 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3177 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3181 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3182 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3183 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3184 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3189 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3190 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3191 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3192 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3193 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3195 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3196 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3197 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3198 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3200 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3201 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3202 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3204 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3205 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3206 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3208 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3209 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3211 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3212 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3215 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3217 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3218 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3219 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3220 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3221 if need_commitment_update {
3222 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3223 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3224 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3225 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3226 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3227 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3230 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3240 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3241 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3242 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3243 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3244 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3245 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3246 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3250 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3251 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3253 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3254 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3255 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3260 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3261 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3263 pub fn get_open_channel<F: Deref>(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &F) -> msgs::OpenChannel
3264 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3266 if !self.channel_outbound {
3267 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3269 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3270 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3273 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3274 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3277 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3280 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3281 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3282 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3283 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3284 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3285 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3286 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3287 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3288 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3289 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3290 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3291 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3292 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3293 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3294 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3295 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3296 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3297 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3298 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3302 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3303 if self.channel_outbound {
3304 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3306 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3307 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3309 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3310 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3313 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3315 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3316 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3317 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3318 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3319 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3320 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3321 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3322 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3323 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3324 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3325 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3326 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3327 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3328 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3329 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3330 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3334 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3335 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3336 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3337 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3338 Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3339 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3342 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3343 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3344 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3345 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3346 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3347 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3348 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3349 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
3350 if !self.channel_outbound {
3351 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3353 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3354 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3356 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3357 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3358 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3359 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3362 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3363 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3366 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3367 self.funding_txo = None;
3372 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3374 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3376 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
3377 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3378 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3379 macro_rules! create_monitor {
3381 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
3382 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
3383 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
3384 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3385 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
3386 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
3387 self.logger.clone());
3389 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3394 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
3395 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
3397 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3398 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3399 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3401 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3402 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3403 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3404 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3405 signature: our_signature
3406 }, channel_monitor))
3409 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3410 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3411 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3412 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3413 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3415 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3416 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3417 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3418 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3421 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3422 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3424 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3425 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3428 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3429 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3431 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3432 features: ChannelFeatures::supported(),
3433 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3434 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3435 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3436 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3437 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3438 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3439 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3442 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3443 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3448 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3449 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3450 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3451 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3452 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3453 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3454 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3455 log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3456 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3457 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3458 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
3461 log_info!(self, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3462 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3463 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3464 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
3467 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3468 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3469 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3470 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3471 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3472 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3473 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3474 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3476 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3477 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3478 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3479 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3480 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3481 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3482 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3483 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3484 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3486 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3492 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3494 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3495 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3496 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3497 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3498 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3499 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3500 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3501 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3502 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3503 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3506 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3507 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3510 if amount_msat == 0 {
3511 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
3514 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3518 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3519 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3520 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3521 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3522 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3523 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3524 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3528 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3529 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3530 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3532 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3533 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3534 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3537 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3538 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3539 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
3543 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3545 // Now update local state:
3546 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3547 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3548 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3549 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3550 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3552 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3557 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3558 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3559 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3560 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3561 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3562 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3566 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3567 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3568 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3569 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3570 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3571 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3572 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3574 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3579 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3580 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3581 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3582 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3583 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3584 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3585 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3587 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3588 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3590 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3591 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3593 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3594 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3596 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3597 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3598 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3599 have_updates = true;
3601 if have_updates { break; }
3603 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3604 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3605 have_updates = true;
3607 if have_updates { break; }
3610 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3612 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3614 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3615 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3616 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3617 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3619 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3620 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3621 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3623 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3627 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3628 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3629 Some(fail_reason.take())
3631 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3634 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3636 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3637 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3638 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3639 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3640 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3641 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3643 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3646 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3647 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3648 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3649 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3650 unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
3651 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3652 commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3653 their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3656 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
3657 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3658 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3661 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3662 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3663 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3664 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3665 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3666 if self.channel_outbound {
3667 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3671 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3672 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3673 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3676 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3677 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3681 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3682 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3684 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3686 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3687 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3688 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3689 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3691 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3692 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3693 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3694 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3695 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3696 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3700 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3701 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3704 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3707 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3708 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3709 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3711 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
3712 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3713 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3714 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3715 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3721 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3722 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3723 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3724 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3725 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3726 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3729 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3730 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3731 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3733 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3734 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3737 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3738 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3739 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3742 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3744 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3745 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3746 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3748 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3750 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3752 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3753 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3754 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3755 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3756 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3758 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3759 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3766 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3767 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3768 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3769 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3772 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3773 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3774 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3775 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3776 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3777 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3778 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3780 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3781 // return them to fail the payment.
3782 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3783 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3785 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3786 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3792 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3793 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3794 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3798 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3799 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3800 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3801 (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3802 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3803 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3804 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3808 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3809 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3811 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3812 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3814 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3816 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3818 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3820 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3821 err_code.write(writer)?;
3823 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3825 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3832 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3833 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3834 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3835 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3836 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3837 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3843 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3844 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3845 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3846 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3848 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3849 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3851 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3852 self.config.write(writer)?;
3854 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3855 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3856 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3857 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3859 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
3861 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3862 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3863 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
3865 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3866 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3867 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3869 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3870 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3871 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3872 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3875 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3876 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3877 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
3880 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3881 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3882 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3883 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3885 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
3886 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3888 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3890 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3892 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3894 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3897 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3899 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3904 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3905 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3906 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3907 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3908 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3909 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3910 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3912 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3914 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3916 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3919 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3921 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3923 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3925 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3927 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3929 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3934 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3935 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3937 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3939 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3940 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3941 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3942 source.write(writer)?;
3943 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3945 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3947 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3948 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3950 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3952 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3953 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3958 match self.resend_order {
3959 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3960 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3963 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3964 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3965 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3967 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3968 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3969 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3970 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3973 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3974 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3975 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3976 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3977 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3980 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
3981 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
3983 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3984 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3985 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
3986 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3988 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3989 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
3991 feerate.write(writer)?;
3995 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3998 self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
3999 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4000 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4002 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4003 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4005 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4006 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4007 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4008 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4009 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4010 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4011 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4012 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4013 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4014 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4016 self.their_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
4017 self.their_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4019 self.their_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4020 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
4022 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4024 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4026 self.channel_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().write_for_disk(writer)?;
4031 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4032 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4033 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4034 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4035 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4036 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4039 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4040 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4042 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4043 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4044 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
4045 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4047 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4049 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4050 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4051 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4053 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4054 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4055 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4057 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4058 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4059 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4060 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4061 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4062 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4063 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4064 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4065 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4066 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4067 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4068 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4069 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4070 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4075 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4076 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4077 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4078 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4079 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4080 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4081 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4082 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4083 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4084 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4085 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4086 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4087 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4088 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4089 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4090 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4095 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4096 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4097 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4098 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4099 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4100 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4101 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4102 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4103 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4104 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4106 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4107 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4108 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4110 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4111 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4112 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4114 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4118 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4119 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4120 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4121 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4124 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4125 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4126 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4128 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4129 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4130 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4131 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4134 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4135 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4136 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4137 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4140 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4141 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4143 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4144 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4145 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4146 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4148 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4150 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4151 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4154 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4155 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4156 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4158 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4159 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4161 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4162 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4163 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4164 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4165 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4166 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4167 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4168 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4169 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4170 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4172 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4173 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4175 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4176 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4178 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4179 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4181 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
4182 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
4183 // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
4184 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
4185 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4195 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4196 channel_value_satoshis,
4198 latest_monitor_update_id,
4204 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
4205 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
4208 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4209 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4210 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4214 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4215 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4216 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4217 monitor_pending_forwards,
4218 monitor_pending_failures,
4221 holding_cell_update_fee,
4223 next_remote_htlc_id,
4224 update_time_counter,
4227 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4228 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4229 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4230 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4232 last_sent_closing_fee,
4235 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4237 last_block_connected,
4238 funding_tx_confirmations,
4240 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4241 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4242 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4243 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4244 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4245 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4246 their_to_self_delay,
4248 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4252 their_cur_commitment_point,
4254 their_prev_commitment_point,
4257 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4259 channel_monitor: Some(channel_monitor),
4262 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4271 use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
4272 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4273 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4274 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4275 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
4276 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4277 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4278 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4279 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4281 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4282 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4283 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4284 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4285 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4287 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4288 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4289 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4290 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4291 use util::config::UserConfig;
4292 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4293 use util::test_utils;
4294 use util::logger::Logger;
4295 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4296 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4297 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4298 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4299 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4300 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4302 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
4304 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4307 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4308 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4314 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4315 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4316 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4320 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4322 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4323 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4325 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4326 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4327 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4328 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4329 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4330 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4333 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4334 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4335 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4336 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4339 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4340 self.chan_keys.clone()
4342 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4343 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4346 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4347 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4351 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4352 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4353 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4354 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4355 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4356 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4357 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4358 let network = Network::Testnet;
4359 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network, logger.clone() as Arc<Logger>);
4361 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4363 // Create Node A's channel
4364 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4365 let config = UserConfig::default();
4366 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap();
4368 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4369 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), &&feeest);
4370 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4371 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::supported(), &open_channel_msg, 7, logger, &config).unwrap();
4373 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4374 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4375 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::supported()).unwrap();
4377 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4378 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4379 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4380 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4382 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
4383 let (funding_created_msg, _) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint).unwrap();
4384 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg).unwrap();
4386 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4387 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg);
4389 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4390 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4391 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
4392 let expected_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_b_chan.build_local_commitment_secret(node_b_chan.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1));
4393 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
4394 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4395 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { my_current_per_commitment_point, .. }) => {
4396 assert_eq!(expected_commitment_point, my_current_per_commitment_point);
4401 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4403 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
4404 let expected_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_a_chan.build_local_commitment_secret(node_a_chan.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1));
4405 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
4406 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4407 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { my_current_per_commitment_point, .. }) => {
4408 assert_eq!(expected_commitment_point, my_current_per_commitment_point);
4415 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4416 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4417 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4418 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4421 let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4423 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4424 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4425 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4426 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4429 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4430 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4434 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4435 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4436 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys };
4438 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4439 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4440 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4441 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4442 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4443 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4445 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4446 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4448 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4449 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4450 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4451 payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4452 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4453 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4456 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4457 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4459 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4460 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4462 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4463 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4465 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4466 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4467 // build_commitment_transaction.
4468 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4469 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4470 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4471 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4472 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4474 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4476 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4478 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4479 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4481 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4482 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4483 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4487 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4488 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4489 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4490 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4492 let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
4493 localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
4495 assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],
4496 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4500 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4501 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4502 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4504 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4505 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4506 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4507 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4508 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4510 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4513 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4514 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4515 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4519 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4522 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key, &keys.per_commitment_point, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key(), &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4523 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4524 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4529 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4530 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4532 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4533 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4534 "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");
4537 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4538 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4540 amount_msat: 1000000,
4542 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4543 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4545 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4548 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4549 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4551 amount_msat: 2000000,
4553 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4554 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4556 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4559 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4560 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4562 amount_msat: 2000000,
4564 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4565 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4566 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4568 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4571 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4572 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4574 amount_msat: 3000000,
4576 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4577 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4578 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4580 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4583 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4584 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4586 amount_msat: 4000000,
4588 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4589 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4591 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4596 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4597 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4598 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4600 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4601 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4602 "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");
4604 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4606 test_htlc_output!(0,
4607 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4608 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4609 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219700000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a60147304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000");
4611 test_htlc_output!(1,
4612 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4613 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4614 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219701000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b01483045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4616 test_htlc_output!(2,
4617 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4618 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4619 "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");
4621 test_htlc_output!(3,
4622 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4623 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4624 "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");
4626 test_htlc_output!(4,
4627 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4628 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4629 "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");
4633 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4634 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4635 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4637 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4638 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4639 "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");
4641 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4643 test_htlc_output!(0,
4644 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4645 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4646 "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");
4648 test_htlc_output!(1,
4649 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4650 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4651 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b00147304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4653 test_htlc_output!(2,
4654 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4655 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4656 "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");
4658 test_htlc_output!(3,
4659 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4660 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4661 "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");
4663 test_htlc_output!(4,
4664 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4665 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4666 "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");
4670 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4671 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4672 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4674 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4675 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4676 "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");
4678 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4680 test_htlc_output!(0,
4681 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4682 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4683 "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");
4685 test_htlc_output!(1,
4686 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4687 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4688 "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");
4690 test_htlc_output!(2,
4691 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4692 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4693 "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");
4695 test_htlc_output!(3,
4696 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4697 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4698 "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");
4702 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4703 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4704 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4706 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4707 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4708 "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");
4710 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4712 test_htlc_output!(0,
4713 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4714 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4715 "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");
4717 test_htlc_output!(1,
4718 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4719 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4720 "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");
4722 test_htlc_output!(2,
4723 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4724 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4725 "02000000000101ca94a9ad516ebc0c4bdd7b6254871babfa978d5accafb554214137d398bfcf6a020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef180147304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4727 test_htlc_output!(3,
4728 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4729 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4730 "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");
4734 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4735 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4736 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4738 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4739 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4740 "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");
4742 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4744 test_htlc_output!(0,
4745 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4746 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4747 "0200000000010140a83ce364747ff277f4d7595d8d15f708418798922c40bc2b056aca5485a2180000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f89101483045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4749 test_htlc_output!(1,
4750 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4751 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4752 "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");
4754 test_htlc_output!(2,
4755 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4756 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4757 "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");
4761 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4762 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4763 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4765 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4766 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4767 "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");
4769 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4771 test_htlc_output!(0,
4772 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4773 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4774 "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");
4776 test_htlc_output!(1,
4777 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4778 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4779 "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");
4781 test_htlc_output!(2,
4782 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4783 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4784 "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");
4788 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4789 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4790 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4792 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4793 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4794 "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");
4796 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4798 test_htlc_output!(0,
4799 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4800 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4801 "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");
4803 test_htlc_output!(1,
4804 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4805 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4806 "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");
4810 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4811 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4812 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4814 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4815 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4816 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431106f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b001483045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c101475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4818 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4820 test_htlc_output!(0,
4821 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4822 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4823 "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");
4825 test_htlc_output!(1,
4826 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4827 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4828 "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");
4832 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4833 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4834 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4836 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4837 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4838 "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");
4840 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4842 test_htlc_output!(0,
4843 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4844 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4845 "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");
4849 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4853 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4854 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4855 "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");
4857 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4859 test_htlc_output!(0,
4860 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4861 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4862 "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");
4866 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4867 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4868 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4870 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4871 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4872 "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");
4874 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4878 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4879 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4880 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4882 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4883 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4884 "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");
4886 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4890 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4891 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4892 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4894 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4895 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4896 "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");
4898 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4902 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4903 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4904 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4906 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4907 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4908 "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");
4910 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4915 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4916 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4918 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4919 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4920 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4921 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4923 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4924 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4925 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4928 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4931 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4933 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4935 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4939 fn test_key_derivation() {
4940 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4941 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4943 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4944 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4946 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4947 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4949 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4950 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4952 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4953 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4955 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4956 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4958 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4959 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4961 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4962 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());