1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
42 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
43 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
44 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
45 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
46 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
47 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
50 use crate::prelude::*;
51 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 use core::convert::TryInto;
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 enum InboundHTLCState {
107 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
108 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
109 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
110 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
111 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
112 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
113 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
114 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
115 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
116 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
117 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
118 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
119 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
120 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
121 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
123 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
127 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
128 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
129 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
130 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
131 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
132 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
133 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
134 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
135 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
139 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
141 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
142 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
143 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
144 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
145 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
147 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
148 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
150 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
151 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
152 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
153 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
154 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
155 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
156 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
157 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
160 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
164 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
165 state: InboundHTLCState,
168 enum OutboundHTLCState {
169 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
170 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
171 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
172 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
173 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
174 /// money back (though we won't), and,
175 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
176 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
177 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
178 /// we'll never get out of sync).
179 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
180 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
181 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
183 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
184 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
185 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
190 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
191 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
193 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
194 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
195 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
196 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
197 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
201 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
203 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
204 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
207 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
210 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
211 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
216 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
217 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
219 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
220 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
225 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
229 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
230 state: OutboundHTLCState,
232 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
235 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
236 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
237 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
241 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
243 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
244 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
245 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
248 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
253 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
257 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
258 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
259 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
260 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
261 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
262 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
263 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
265 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
266 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
267 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
268 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
269 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
270 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
271 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
273 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
274 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
275 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
280 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
281 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
282 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
284 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
285 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
287 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
288 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
289 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
290 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
291 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
292 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
293 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
294 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
295 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
297 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
298 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
299 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
300 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
301 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
302 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
303 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
304 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
305 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
306 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
307 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
308 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
309 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
310 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
311 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
312 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
314 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
315 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
316 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
317 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
318 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
319 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
320 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
321 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
323 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
324 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
325 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
326 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
328 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
330 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
332 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
333 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
334 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
335 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
339 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
343 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
345 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
346 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
347 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
348 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
349 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
351 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
352 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
354 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
356 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
357 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
359 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
360 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
361 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
362 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
363 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
364 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
366 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
367 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
369 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
370 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
371 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
372 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
373 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
375 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
376 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
378 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
379 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
381 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
382 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
383 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
384 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
390 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
391 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
393 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
394 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
395 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
400 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
401 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
403 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
404 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
405 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
410 macro_rules! secp_check {
411 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
419 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
420 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
421 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
422 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
423 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
424 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
425 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
426 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
428 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
430 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
432 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
436 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
438 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
439 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
440 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
442 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
443 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
445 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
446 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
447 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
448 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
449 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
451 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
452 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
456 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
462 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
465 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
466 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
468 holding_cell_msat: u64,
469 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
472 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
473 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
474 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
475 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
476 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
477 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
478 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
479 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
480 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
481 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
484 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
485 struct HTLCCandidate {
487 origin: HTLCInitiator,
491 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
499 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
501 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
503 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
504 htlc_value_msat: u64,
505 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
510 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
511 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
512 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
513 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
514 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
516 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
517 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
518 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
519 htlc_value_msat: u64,
521 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
522 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
526 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
527 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
528 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
529 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
530 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
531 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
532 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
533 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
534 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
535 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
536 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
539 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
541 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
542 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
543 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
544 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
545 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
549 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
550 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
551 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
552 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
553 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
554 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
555 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
558 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
560 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
561 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
562 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
563 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
564 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
565 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
566 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
567 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
570 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
571 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
572 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
573 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
574 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
575 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
576 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
577 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
578 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
579 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
580 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
581 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
582 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
584 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
586 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
587 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
588 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
589 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
591 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
592 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
593 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
594 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
596 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
597 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
598 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
599 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
600 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
602 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
603 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
604 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
605 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
607 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
608 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
609 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
611 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
612 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
613 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
614 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
615 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
617 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
618 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
621 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
622 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
624 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
625 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
626 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
627 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
629 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
630 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
632 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
633 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
637 (0, update, required),
640 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
641 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
642 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
643 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
644 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
648 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
649 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
650 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
652 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
654 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
655 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
656 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
660 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
662 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
664 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
669 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
670 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
671 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
672 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
673 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
675 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
676 /// in a timely manner.
677 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
680 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
681 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
682 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
684 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
685 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
686 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
687 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
691 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
692 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
693 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
695 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
696 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
697 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
698 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
700 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
704 /// The current channel ID.
705 channel_id: ChannelId,
706 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
707 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
708 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
711 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
712 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
714 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
715 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
716 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
719 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
721 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
723 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
724 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
726 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
728 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
729 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
730 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
732 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
733 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
734 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
736 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
737 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
738 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
739 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
740 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
741 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
743 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
744 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
745 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
746 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
747 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
748 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
750 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
752 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
753 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
754 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
756 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
757 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
758 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
759 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
760 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
761 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
762 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
764 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
765 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
766 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
768 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
769 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
770 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
771 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
772 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
773 /// outbound or inbound.
774 signer_pending_funding: bool,
776 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
778 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
779 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
780 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
781 // HTLCs with similar state.
782 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
783 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
784 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
785 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
786 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
787 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
788 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
789 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
790 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
793 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
794 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
795 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
797 update_time_counter: u32,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
801 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
803 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
804 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
806 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
807 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
809 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
810 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
811 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
812 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
814 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
815 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
817 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
821 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
822 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
823 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
824 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
825 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
827 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
828 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
830 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
831 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
832 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
834 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
835 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
836 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
837 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
838 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
839 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
840 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
841 channel_creation_height: u32,
843 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
848 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
851 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
853 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
860 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
861 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
864 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
868 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
871 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
874 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
875 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
877 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
879 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
880 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
881 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
883 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
884 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
885 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
887 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
889 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
891 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
892 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
893 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
894 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
896 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
897 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
898 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
900 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
901 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
902 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
904 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
905 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
906 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
907 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
911 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
913 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
914 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
915 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
916 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
917 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
919 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
920 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
922 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
923 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
924 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
925 /// unblock the state machine.
927 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
928 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
929 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
931 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
932 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
933 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
936 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
937 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
938 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
939 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
940 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
941 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
942 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
944 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
945 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
947 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
948 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
949 // the channel's funding UTXO.
951 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
952 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
953 // associated channel mapping.
955 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
956 // to store all of them.
957 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
959 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
960 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
961 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
962 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
963 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
965 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
966 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
968 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
969 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
971 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
972 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
973 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
975 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
976 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
977 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
980 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
982 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
983 self.update_time_counter
986 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
987 self.latest_monitor_update_id
990 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
991 self.config.announced_channel
994 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
998 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1001 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1004 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1005 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1006 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1009 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1012 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1013 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1016 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1017 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1018 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1019 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1022 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1024 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1025 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1027 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1030 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1033 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1034 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1035 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1036 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1037 self.channel_state &
1038 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1039 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1040 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1041 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1044 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1045 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1047 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1048 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1051 // Public utilities:
1053 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1057 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1059 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1060 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1061 self.temporary_channel_id
1064 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1068 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1069 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1070 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1074 /// Gets the channel's type
1075 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1079 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1081 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1082 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.short_channel_id
1086 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1087 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1088 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1091 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1092 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1093 self.outbound_scid_alias
1096 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1098 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1099 return &self.holder_signer
1102 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1103 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1104 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1105 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1106 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1107 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1110 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1111 /// get_funding_created.
1112 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1113 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1116 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1117 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1118 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1119 if conf_height > 0 {
1126 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1127 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1128 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1131 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1132 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1133 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1134 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1138 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1141 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1142 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1145 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1146 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1149 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1150 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1151 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1154 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1155 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1159 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1160 self.counterparty_node_id
1163 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1164 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1165 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1168 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1169 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1170 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1173 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1174 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1176 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1177 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1178 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1179 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1181 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1185 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1186 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1187 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1190 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1191 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1192 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1195 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1196 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1197 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1199 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1200 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1205 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1206 self.channel_value_satoshis
1209 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1210 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1213 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1214 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1217 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1218 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1219 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1221 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1222 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1223 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1224 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1225 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1227 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1231 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1232 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1233 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1236 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1237 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1238 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1241 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1242 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1243 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1246 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1247 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1248 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1251 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1252 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1253 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1256 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1257 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1258 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1261 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1262 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1263 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1264 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1265 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1268 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1270 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1271 self.prev_config = None;
1275 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1276 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1280 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1281 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1282 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1283 let did_channel_update =
1284 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1285 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1286 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1287 if did_channel_update {
1288 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1289 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1290 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1291 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1293 self.config.options = *config;
1297 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1298 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1299 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1300 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1301 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1304 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1305 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1306 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1307 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1308 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1310 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1311 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1312 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1313 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1314 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1315 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1316 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1318 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1319 where L::Target: Logger
1321 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1322 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1323 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1325 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1326 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1327 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1328 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1330 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1331 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1332 if match update_state {
1333 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1334 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1335 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1336 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1337 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1339 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1343 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1344 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1345 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1347 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1349 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1350 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1351 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1353 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1354 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1355 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1356 transaction_output_index: None
1361 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1362 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1363 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1364 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1365 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1368 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1370 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1371 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1372 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1374 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1375 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1378 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1379 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1382 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1384 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1385 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1386 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1388 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1389 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1395 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1396 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1397 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1398 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1399 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1400 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1401 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1405 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1406 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1408 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1410 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1411 if generated_by_local {
1412 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1413 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1422 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1424 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1425 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1426 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1427 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1428 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1429 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1430 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1433 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1434 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1435 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1436 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1440 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1441 preimages.push(preimage);
1445 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1446 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1448 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1450 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1451 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1453 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1454 if !generated_by_local {
1455 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1463 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1464 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1465 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1466 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1467 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1468 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1469 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1470 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1472 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1474 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1475 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1476 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1477 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1479 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1481 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1482 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1483 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1484 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1487 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1488 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1489 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1490 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1492 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1495 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1496 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1497 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1498 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1500 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1503 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1504 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1509 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1510 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1515 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1517 let channel_parameters =
1518 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1519 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1520 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1527 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1530 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1531 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1532 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1533 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1535 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1536 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1537 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1545 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1546 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1552 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1553 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1554 /// our counterparty!)
1555 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1556 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1557 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1558 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1559 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1560 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1561 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1563 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1567 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1568 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1569 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1570 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1571 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1572 //may see payments to it!
1573 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1574 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1575 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1577 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1580 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1581 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1582 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1583 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1584 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1587 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1588 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1591 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1595 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1596 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1597 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1598 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1599 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1600 // which are near the dust limit.
1601 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1602 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1603 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1604 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1605 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1607 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1608 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1610 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1613 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1614 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1615 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1618 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1619 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1621 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1622 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1623 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1624 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1625 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1627 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1630 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1633 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1634 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1635 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1637 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1638 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1640 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1641 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1642 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1644 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1645 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1651 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1652 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1654 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1655 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1656 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1657 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1658 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1659 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1660 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1663 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1666 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1667 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1668 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1670 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1671 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1672 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1673 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1675 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1677 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1678 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1682 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1683 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1684 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1685 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1686 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1687 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1688 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1690 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1691 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1693 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1700 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1701 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1702 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1703 /// corner case properly.
1704 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1705 -> AvailableBalances
1706 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1708 let context = &self;
1709 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1710 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1711 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1713 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1714 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1715 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1716 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1719 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1721 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1722 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1724 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1726 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1728 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1729 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1733 if context.is_outbound() {
1734 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1735 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1737 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1738 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1740 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1741 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1742 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1743 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1746 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1747 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1748 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1749 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1750 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1752 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1755 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1756 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1757 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1758 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1759 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1760 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1761 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1762 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1763 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1764 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1765 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1767 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1770 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1771 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1772 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1773 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1774 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1777 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1778 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1780 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1781 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1782 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1784 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1785 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1786 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1787 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1791 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1793 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1794 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1795 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1796 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1797 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1798 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1799 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1801 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1802 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1804 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1805 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1806 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1808 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1809 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1810 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1811 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1812 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1815 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1816 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1817 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1818 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1819 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1820 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1823 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1824 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1825 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1827 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1831 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1832 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1834 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1835 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1839 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1840 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1841 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1842 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1844 outbound_capacity_msat,
1845 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1846 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1851 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1852 let context = &self;
1853 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1856 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1857 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1859 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1860 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1862 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1863 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1865 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1866 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1867 let context = &self;
1868 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1870 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1873 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1874 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1876 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1877 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1879 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1880 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1882 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1887 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1888 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1894 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1895 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1896 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1899 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1900 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1901 included_htlcs += 1;
1904 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1909 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1910 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1911 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1912 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1913 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1914 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1919 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1921 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1922 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1927 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1928 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1932 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1933 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1937 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1938 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1940 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1941 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1942 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1944 total_pending_htlcs,
1945 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1946 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1947 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1949 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1950 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1951 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1953 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1955 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1960 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1961 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1963 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1964 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1966 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1967 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1969 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1970 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1971 let context = &self;
1972 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1974 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1977 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1978 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1980 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1981 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1983 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1984 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1986 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1987 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1991 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1992 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1998 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1999 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2000 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2001 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2002 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2003 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2006 included_htlcs += 1;
2009 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2010 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2013 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2014 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2016 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2017 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2018 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2023 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2024 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2025 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2028 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2029 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2031 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2032 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2034 total_pending_htlcs,
2035 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2036 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2037 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2039 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2040 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2041 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2043 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2045 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2050 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2051 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2052 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2053 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2060 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2062 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2063 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2066 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2068 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2069 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2074 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2075 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2076 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2079 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2081 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2082 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2085 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2086 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2087 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2088 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2089 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2090 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2091 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2092 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2093 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2094 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2095 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2097 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2098 // return them to fail the payment.
2099 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2100 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2101 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2103 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2104 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2109 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2110 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2111 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2112 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2113 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2114 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2115 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2116 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2117 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2118 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2119 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2120 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2125 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2127 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2128 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2131 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2132 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2136 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2137 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2138 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2139 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2140 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2141 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2142 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2143 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2144 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2146 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2150 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2152 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2155 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2156 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2157 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2158 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2161 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2163 next_local_nonce: None,
2167 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2168 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2169 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2170 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2172 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2173 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2174 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2175 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2177 match &self.holder_signer {
2178 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2179 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2180 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2181 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2182 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2185 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2189 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2190 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2191 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2192 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2193 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2194 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2197 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2198 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2200 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2206 // Internal utility functions for channels
2208 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2209 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2210 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2212 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2214 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2215 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2216 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2218 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2221 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2223 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2226 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2227 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2228 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2230 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2232 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2233 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2234 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2235 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2236 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2239 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2240 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2241 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2242 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2243 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2244 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2245 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2248 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2249 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2251 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2252 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2255 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2256 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2257 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2258 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2259 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2260 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2263 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2264 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2265 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2266 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2270 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2272 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2273 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2274 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2278 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2279 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2280 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2282 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2283 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2284 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2285 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2287 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2288 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2290 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2292 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2293 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2294 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2295 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2297 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2298 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2308 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2309 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2310 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2311 // outside of those situations will fail.
2312 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2316 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2321 1 + // script length (0)
2325 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2326 2 + // witness marker and flag
2327 1 + // witness element count
2328 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2329 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2330 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2331 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2332 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2333 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2335 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2336 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2337 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2343 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2344 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2345 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2346 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2348 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2349 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2350 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2352 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2353 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2354 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2355 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2356 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2357 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2360 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2361 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2364 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2365 value_to_holder = 0;
2368 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2369 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2370 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2371 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2373 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2374 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2377 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2378 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2381 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2384 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2385 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2387 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2389 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2390 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2391 where L::Target: Logger {
2392 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2393 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2394 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2395 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2396 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2397 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2398 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2399 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2403 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2404 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2405 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2406 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2408 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2409 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2411 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2413 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2414 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2415 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2417 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2418 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2419 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2420 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2421 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2422 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2423 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2425 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2426 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2427 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2429 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2430 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2432 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2435 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2436 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2440 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2444 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2446 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2447 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2448 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2449 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2452 // Now update local state:
2454 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2455 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2456 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2457 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2458 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2459 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2460 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2464 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2465 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2466 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2467 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2468 // do not not get into this branch.
2469 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2470 match pending_update {
2471 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2472 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2473 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2474 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2476 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2477 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2481 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2482 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2483 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2484 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2485 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2486 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2492 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2493 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2494 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2496 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2497 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2498 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2500 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2501 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2504 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2505 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2507 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2508 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2510 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2511 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2514 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2517 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2518 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2519 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2520 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2525 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2526 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2527 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2528 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2529 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2530 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2531 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2532 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2533 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2534 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2535 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2536 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2537 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2538 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2539 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2541 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2542 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2543 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2544 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2545 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2548 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2549 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2550 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2556 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2557 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2559 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2563 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2564 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2565 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2566 /// before we fail backwards.
2568 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2569 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2570 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2571 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2572 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2573 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2574 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2577 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2578 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2579 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2580 /// before we fail backwards.
2582 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2583 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2584 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2585 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2586 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2587 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2588 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2590 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2592 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2593 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2594 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2596 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2597 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2598 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2600 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2601 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2602 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2604 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2609 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2616 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2617 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2618 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2619 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2620 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2624 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2625 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2626 force_holding_cell = true;
2629 // Now update local state:
2630 if force_holding_cell {
2631 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2632 match pending_update {
2633 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2634 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2636 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2640 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2641 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2642 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2643 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2649 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2650 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2651 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2657 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2659 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2660 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2663 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2664 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2665 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2670 // Message handlers:
2672 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2673 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2674 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2675 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2676 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2680 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2683 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2686 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2687 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2688 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2689 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2692 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2694 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2695 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2696 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2697 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2699 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2700 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2702 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2703 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2705 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2706 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2707 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2708 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2709 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2714 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2715 initial_commitment_tx,
2718 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2719 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2722 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2723 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2726 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2727 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2728 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2729 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2730 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2731 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2732 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2733 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2734 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2735 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2736 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2737 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2739 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2741 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2742 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2743 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2744 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2745 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2746 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2747 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2749 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2750 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2751 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2753 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2755 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2756 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2758 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2760 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2761 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2765 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2766 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2767 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2768 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2769 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2770 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2771 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2774 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2775 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2777 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2778 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2779 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2780 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2785 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2786 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2787 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2790 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2791 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2792 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2793 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2794 // when routing outbound payments.
2795 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2799 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2801 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2802 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2804 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2805 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2807 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2808 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2809 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2810 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2811 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2812 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2813 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2814 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2815 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2817 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2818 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2819 let expected_point =
2820 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2821 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2823 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2824 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2825 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2826 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2827 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2828 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2830 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2831 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2832 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2833 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2834 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2836 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2844 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2845 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2847 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2849 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2852 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2853 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2854 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2855 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2856 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2857 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2859 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2860 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2861 if local_sent_shutdown {
2862 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2864 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2865 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2866 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2869 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2872 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2875 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2878 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2882 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2883 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2884 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2887 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2891 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2892 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2893 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2894 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2895 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2896 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2897 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2898 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2899 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2900 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2901 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2903 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2904 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2905 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2906 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2907 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2908 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2912 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2913 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2916 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2917 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2918 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2920 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2921 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2922 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2923 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2924 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2925 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2926 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2930 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2931 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2932 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2933 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2934 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2935 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2936 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2940 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2941 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2942 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2943 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2944 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2948 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2949 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2951 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2952 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2953 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2955 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2956 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2960 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2963 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2968 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2969 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2973 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2974 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2975 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2976 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2977 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2978 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2979 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2980 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2981 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2983 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2984 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2985 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2986 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2987 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2990 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2991 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2992 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2993 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2997 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3000 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3004 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3005 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3006 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3010 // Now update local state:
3011 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3012 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3013 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3014 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3015 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3016 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3017 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3022 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3024 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3025 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3026 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3027 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3028 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3029 None => fail_reason.into(),
3030 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3031 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3032 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3035 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3039 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3041 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3042 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3044 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3050 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3053 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3054 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3057 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3061 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3064 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3065 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3068 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3072 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3076 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3077 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3080 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3084 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3088 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3089 where L::Target: Logger
3091 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3094 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3097 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3101 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3103 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3105 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3106 let commitment_txid = {
3107 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3108 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3109 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3111 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3112 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3113 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3114 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3115 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3120 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3122 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3123 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3124 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3125 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3128 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3129 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3130 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3134 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3136 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3137 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3138 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3139 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3140 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3141 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3142 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3143 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3144 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3145 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3146 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3152 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3156 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3157 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3158 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3159 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3160 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3161 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3162 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3163 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3164 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3165 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3166 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3167 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3168 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3171 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3172 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3173 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3174 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3175 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3176 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3177 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3179 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3180 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3181 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3182 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3183 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3184 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3185 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3188 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3189 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3192 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3194 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3195 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3196 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3199 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3202 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3203 commitment_stats.tx,
3205 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3206 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3207 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3210 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3211 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3213 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3214 let mut need_commitment = false;
3215 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3216 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3217 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3218 need_commitment = true;
3222 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3223 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3224 Some(forward_info.clone())
3226 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3227 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3228 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3229 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3230 need_commitment = true;
3233 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3234 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3235 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3236 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3237 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3238 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3239 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3240 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3241 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3242 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3243 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3244 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3245 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3246 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3248 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3250 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3251 need_commitment = true;
3255 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3256 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3257 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3258 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3259 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3260 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3262 nondust_htlc_sources,
3266 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3267 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3268 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3269 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3270 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3272 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3273 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3274 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3275 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3276 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3277 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3278 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3279 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3280 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3281 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3282 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3283 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3284 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3285 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3287 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3288 &self.context.channel_id);
3289 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3292 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3293 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3294 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3295 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3296 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3297 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3298 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3299 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3304 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3305 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3306 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3307 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3310 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3311 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3312 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3313 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3314 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3315 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3316 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3318 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3319 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3320 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3321 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3324 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3325 /// for our counterparty.
3326 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3327 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3328 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3329 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3331 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3332 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3333 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3334 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3336 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3337 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3338 updates: Vec::new(),
3341 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3342 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3343 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3344 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3345 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3346 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3347 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3348 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3349 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3350 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3351 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3352 // to rebalance channels.
3353 match &htlc_update {
3354 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3355 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3356 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3358 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3359 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3361 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3364 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3365 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3366 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3367 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3368 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3369 // into the holding cell without ever being
3370 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3371 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3372 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3375 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3382 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3383 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3384 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3385 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3386 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3387 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3388 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3389 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3390 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3391 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3392 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3394 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3395 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3396 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3397 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3398 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3399 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3400 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3401 // for a full revocation before failing.
3402 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3403 update_fail_count += 1;
3406 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3408 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3415 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3416 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3418 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3419 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3424 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3425 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3426 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3427 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3428 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3430 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3431 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3432 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3434 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3435 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3441 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3442 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3443 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3444 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3445 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3446 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3447 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3448 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3449 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3451 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3454 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3457 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3461 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3463 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3464 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3469 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3470 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3471 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3472 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3473 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3474 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3475 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3476 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3482 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3483 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3486 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3487 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3488 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3489 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3491 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3493 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3497 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3498 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3499 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3500 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3501 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3502 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3503 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3504 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3508 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3509 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3510 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3511 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3512 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3513 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3514 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3515 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3516 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3518 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3519 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3522 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3523 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3524 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3525 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3526 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3527 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3528 let mut require_commitment = false;
3529 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3532 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3533 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3534 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3535 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3537 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3538 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3539 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3540 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3541 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3542 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3544 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3548 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3549 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3550 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3551 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3552 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3554 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3555 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3556 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3561 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3562 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3564 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3568 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3569 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3571 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3572 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3573 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3574 require_commitment = true;
3575 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3576 match forward_info {
3577 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3578 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3579 require_commitment = true;
3581 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3582 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3583 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3585 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3586 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3587 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3591 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3592 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3593 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3594 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3600 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3601 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3602 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3603 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3604 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3606 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3607 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3608 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3609 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3610 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3611 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3612 require_commitment = true;
3616 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3618 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3619 match update_state {
3620 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3621 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3622 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3623 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3624 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3625 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3627 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3628 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3629 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3630 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3631 require_commitment = true;
3632 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3633 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3638 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3639 let release_state_str =
3640 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3641 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3642 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3643 if !release_monitor {
3644 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3645 update: monitor_update,
3647 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3649 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3654 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3655 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3656 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3657 if require_commitment {
3658 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3659 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3660 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3661 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3663 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3664 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3665 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3666 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3667 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3669 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3670 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3671 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3672 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3673 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3676 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3677 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3678 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3679 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3680 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3681 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3683 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3684 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3686 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3687 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3689 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3690 if require_commitment {
3691 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3693 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3694 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3695 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3696 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3698 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3699 &self.context.channel_id(),
3700 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3703 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3704 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3706 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3707 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3709 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3710 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3716 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3717 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3718 /// commitment update.
3719 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3720 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3721 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3723 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3724 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3727 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3728 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3729 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3730 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3732 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3733 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3734 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3735 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3736 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3737 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3738 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3740 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3741 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3743 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3744 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3746 if !self.context.is_live() {
3747 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3750 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3751 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3752 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3753 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3754 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3755 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3756 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3757 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3758 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3759 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3763 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3764 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3765 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3766 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3767 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3768 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3771 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3772 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3776 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3777 force_holding_cell = true;
3780 if force_holding_cell {
3781 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3785 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3786 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3788 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3794 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3795 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3797 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3799 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3800 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3801 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3802 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3806 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3807 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3808 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3812 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3813 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3816 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3817 // will be retransmitted.
3818 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3819 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3820 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3822 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3823 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3825 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3826 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3827 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3828 // this HTLC accordingly
3829 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3832 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3833 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3834 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3835 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3838 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3839 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3840 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3841 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3842 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3843 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3848 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3850 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3851 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3852 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3853 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3857 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3858 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3859 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3860 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3861 // the update upon reconnection.
3862 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3866 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3868 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3869 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3873 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3874 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3875 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3876 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3877 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3878 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3879 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3881 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3882 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3883 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3884 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3885 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3886 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3887 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3890 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3891 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3892 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3893 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3894 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3895 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3898 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3899 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3900 /// to the remote side.
3901 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3902 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3903 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3904 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3907 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3909 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3910 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3912 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3913 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3914 // first received the funding_signed.
3915 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3916 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3917 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3919 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3920 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3921 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3922 funding_broadcastable = None;
3925 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3926 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3927 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3928 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3929 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3930 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3931 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3932 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3933 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3934 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3935 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3936 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3937 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3938 next_per_commitment_point,
3939 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3943 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3945 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3946 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3947 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3948 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3949 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3950 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3952 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3953 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3954 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3955 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3956 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3957 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3961 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3962 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3964 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3965 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3967 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3968 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3971 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3972 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3973 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3974 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3975 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3976 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3977 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3978 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3979 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3983 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3984 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3986 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3989 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3992 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3994 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3995 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3996 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3997 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3998 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3999 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4000 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4001 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4002 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4003 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4005 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4007 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4009 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4015 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4018 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4019 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4020 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4022 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4023 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4025 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4026 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4028 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4029 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4032 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4033 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4034 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4035 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4036 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4038 SignerResumeUpdates {
4046 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4047 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4048 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4049 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4051 per_commitment_secret,
4052 next_per_commitment_point,
4054 next_local_nonce: None,
4058 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4059 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4060 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4061 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4062 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4063 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4065 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4066 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4067 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4068 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4069 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4070 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4071 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4072 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4073 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4074 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4079 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4080 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4082 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4083 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4084 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4085 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4086 reason: err_packet.clone()
4089 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4090 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4091 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4092 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4093 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4094 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4097 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4098 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4099 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4100 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4101 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4108 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4109 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4110 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4111 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4115 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4116 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4117 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4118 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4119 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4120 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4121 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4125 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4126 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4127 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4131 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4132 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4137 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4138 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4139 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4140 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4141 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4142 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4143 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4148 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4149 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4151 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4152 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4153 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4154 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4155 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4156 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4157 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4158 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4161 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4163 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4164 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4165 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4166 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4170 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4171 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4175 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4176 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4177 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4178 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4179 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4182 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4183 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4184 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4185 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4186 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4189 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4190 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4191 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4192 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4193 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4194 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4195 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4196 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4200 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4201 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4202 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4203 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4205 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4209 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4210 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4211 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4212 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4214 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4216 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4218 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4219 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4220 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4221 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4222 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4225 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4226 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4227 channel_ready: None,
4228 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4229 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4230 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4234 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4235 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4236 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4237 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4238 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4239 next_per_commitment_point,
4240 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4242 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4243 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4244 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4248 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4249 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4250 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4252 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4253 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4254 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4257 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4263 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4264 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4265 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4266 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4267 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4268 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4269 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4271 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4273 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4274 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4275 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4276 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4277 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4278 next_per_commitment_point,
4279 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4283 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4284 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4285 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4287 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4290 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4291 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4292 raa: required_revoke,
4293 commitment_update: None,
4294 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4296 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4297 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4298 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4300 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4303 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4304 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4305 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4306 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4307 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4308 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4311 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4312 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4313 raa: required_revoke,
4314 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4315 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4319 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4323 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4324 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4325 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4326 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4328 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4330 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4332 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4333 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4334 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4335 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4336 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4337 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4338 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4339 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4341 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4342 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4343 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4344 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4345 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4347 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4348 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4349 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4350 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4353 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4354 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4355 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4356 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4357 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4358 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4359 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4360 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4361 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4362 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4363 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4364 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4365 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4366 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4367 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4369 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4372 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4373 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4376 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4377 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4378 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4379 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4380 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4381 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4384 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4385 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4386 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4387 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4388 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4389 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4392 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4398 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4399 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4400 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4401 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4403 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4404 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4405 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4406 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4407 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4408 return Ok((None, None, None));
4411 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4412 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4413 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4415 return Ok((None, None, None));
4418 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4419 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4420 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4421 return Ok((None, None, None));
4424 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4426 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4427 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4428 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4429 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4431 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4432 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4434 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4435 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4437 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4438 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4439 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4440 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4442 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4443 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4444 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4448 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4453 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4454 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4456 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4457 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4460 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4461 /// within our expected timeframe.
4463 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4464 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4465 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4468 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4471 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4472 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4476 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4477 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4479 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4482 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4483 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4484 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4485 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4488 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4489 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4493 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4495 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4496 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4499 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4500 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4504 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4507 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4508 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4509 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4510 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4512 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4515 assert!(send_shutdown);
4516 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4517 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4518 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4520 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4523 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4528 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4530 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4531 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4533 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4535 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4536 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4537 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4538 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4541 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4542 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4544 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4545 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4546 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4547 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4551 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4552 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4553 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4554 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4555 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4556 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4558 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4559 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4566 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4567 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4569 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4572 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4573 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4575 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4577 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4578 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4579 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4580 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4581 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4582 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4583 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4584 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4585 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4587 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4588 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4591 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4595 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4596 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4597 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4598 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4600 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4603 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4606 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4609 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4613 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4617 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4618 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4619 return Ok((None, None, None));
4622 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4623 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4624 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4627 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4629 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4632 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4633 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4634 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4635 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4636 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4640 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4641 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4646 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4647 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4648 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4649 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4650 monitor_update: None,
4651 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4652 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4654 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4655 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4656 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4657 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4661 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4663 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4664 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4665 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4666 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4668 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4671 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4672 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4674 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4675 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4676 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4677 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4678 monitor_update: None,
4679 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4680 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4682 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4683 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4684 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4685 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4690 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4691 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4692 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4693 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4695 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4696 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4697 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4699 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4701 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4707 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4708 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4711 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4712 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4714 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4715 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4718 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4719 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4720 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4721 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4722 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4724 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4726 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4728 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4729 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4732 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4733 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4734 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4735 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4736 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4737 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4738 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4739 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4744 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4745 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4746 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4747 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4749 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4753 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4754 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4755 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4756 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4758 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4764 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4765 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4766 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4767 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4768 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4769 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4770 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4772 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4773 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4776 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4778 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4779 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4785 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4786 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4787 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4788 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4789 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4790 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4791 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4793 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4794 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4801 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4802 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4805 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4806 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4809 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4810 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4814 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
4815 &self.context.holder_signer
4819 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4821 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4822 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4823 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4824 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4825 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4826 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4828 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4830 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4838 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4839 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4843 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4844 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4845 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4846 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4849 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4850 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4851 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4852 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4855 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4856 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4857 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4858 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4859 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4860 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4863 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4864 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4865 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4866 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4867 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4868 if !release_monitor {
4869 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4878 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4879 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4882 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4883 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4884 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4886 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4887 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4888 if self.context.channel_state &
4889 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4890 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4891 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4892 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4893 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4896 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4897 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4898 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4899 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4900 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4901 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4903 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4904 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4905 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4907 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4908 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4909 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4910 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4911 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4912 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4918 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4919 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4920 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4923 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4924 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4925 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4928 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4929 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4930 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4933 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4934 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4935 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4936 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4937 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4938 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4943 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4944 self.context.channel_update_status
4947 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4948 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4949 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4952 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4954 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4955 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4956 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4960 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4961 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4962 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4965 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4969 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4970 // channel_ready yet.
4971 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4975 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4976 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4977 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4978 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4979 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4981 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4982 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4983 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4985 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4986 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4989 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4990 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4991 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4992 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4993 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4994 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4995 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4996 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4997 self.context.channel_state);
4999 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5003 if need_commitment_update {
5004 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5005 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5006 let next_per_commitment_point =
5007 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5008 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5009 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5010 next_per_commitment_point,
5011 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5015 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5021 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5022 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5023 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5024 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5025 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5026 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5027 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5029 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5032 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5033 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5034 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5035 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5036 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5037 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5038 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5039 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5040 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5041 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5042 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5043 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5044 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5045 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5046 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5047 // channel and move on.
5048 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5049 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5051 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5052 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5053 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5055 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5056 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5057 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5058 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5059 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5060 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5061 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5062 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5067 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5068 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5069 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5070 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5071 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5074 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5075 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5076 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5077 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5078 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5079 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5082 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5083 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5084 // may have already happened for this block).
5085 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5086 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5087 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5088 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5091 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5092 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5093 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5094 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5102 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5103 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5104 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5105 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5107 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5108 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5111 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5113 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5114 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5115 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5116 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5118 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5121 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5124 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5125 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5126 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5127 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5129 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5132 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5133 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5134 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5136 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5137 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5140 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5141 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5149 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5151 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5152 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5153 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5155 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5156 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5159 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5160 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5161 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5162 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5163 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5164 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5165 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5166 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5167 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5170 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5171 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5172 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5173 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5175 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5176 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5177 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5179 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5180 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5181 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5182 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5184 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5185 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5186 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5187 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5188 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5189 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5190 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5193 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5194 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5196 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5199 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5200 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5201 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5202 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5203 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5204 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5205 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5206 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5207 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5208 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5209 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5210 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5211 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5212 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5213 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5214 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5215 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5221 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5226 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5227 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5229 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5230 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5231 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5232 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5234 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5237 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5239 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5240 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5241 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5242 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5243 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5244 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5246 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5247 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5250 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5251 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5252 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5253 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5254 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5255 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5257 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5258 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5261 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5262 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5263 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5264 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5265 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5271 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5272 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5273 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5274 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5276 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5279 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5283 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5287 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5288 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5292 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5296 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5297 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5300 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5304 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5306 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5311 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5312 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5313 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5315 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5320 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5322 None => return None,
5325 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5327 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5328 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5330 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5331 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5334 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5339 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5341 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5342 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5343 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5344 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5345 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5346 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5347 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5349 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5350 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5351 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5352 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5353 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5354 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5355 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5356 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5357 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5358 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5359 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5360 contents: announcement,
5363 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5367 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5371 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5372 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5373 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5374 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5375 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5376 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5377 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5378 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5380 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5382 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5383 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5384 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5385 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5387 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5389 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5390 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5393 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5394 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5395 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5396 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5399 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5402 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5403 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5404 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5405 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5406 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5407 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5410 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5412 Err(_) => return None,
5414 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5415 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5420 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5421 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5422 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5423 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5424 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5425 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5426 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5427 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5428 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5429 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5430 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5431 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5432 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5433 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5434 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5435 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5438 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5441 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5442 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5443 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5444 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5445 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5446 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5447 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5448 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5449 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5451 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5452 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5453 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5454 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5455 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5456 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5457 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5458 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5459 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5461 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5462 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5463 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5464 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5465 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5466 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5467 next_funding_txid: None,
5472 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5474 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5475 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5476 /// commitment update.
5478 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5479 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5480 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5481 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5483 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5484 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5487 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5488 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5489 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5491 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5492 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5497 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5498 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5500 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5502 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5503 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5505 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5506 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5507 /// regenerate them.
5509 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5510 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5512 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5513 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5514 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5515 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5516 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5517 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5518 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5520 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5521 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5523 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5524 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5528 if amount_msat == 0 {
5529 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5532 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5533 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5534 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5535 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5538 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5539 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5540 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5543 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5544 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5545 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5546 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5547 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5548 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5549 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5550 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5553 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5554 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5555 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5556 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5557 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5558 else { "to peer" });
5560 if need_holding_cell {
5561 force_holding_cell = true;
5564 // Now update local state:
5565 if force_holding_cell {
5566 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5571 onion_routing_packet,
5577 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5578 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5580 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5582 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5587 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5588 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5589 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5593 onion_routing_packet,
5596 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5601 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5602 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5603 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5604 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5606 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5607 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5608 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5610 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5611 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5615 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5616 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5617 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5618 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5619 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5620 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5621 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5624 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5625 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5626 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5627 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5628 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5629 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5632 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5634 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5635 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5636 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5637 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5638 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5640 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5641 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5644 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5645 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5646 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5647 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5648 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5649 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5650 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5651 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5652 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5653 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5654 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5657 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5661 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5662 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5663 where L::Target: Logger
5665 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5666 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5667 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5669 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5671 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5672 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5673 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5674 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5675 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5676 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5677 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5678 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5679 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5680 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5681 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5687 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5690 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5691 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5692 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5693 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5695 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5697 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5698 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5699 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5701 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5702 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5703 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5706 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5707 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5711 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5712 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5714 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5716 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5717 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5718 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5719 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5721 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5722 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5723 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5724 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5725 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5726 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5730 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5735 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5736 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5738 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5743 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5744 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5746 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5747 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5748 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5749 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5750 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5751 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5752 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5753 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5755 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5756 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5757 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5760 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5761 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5762 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5768 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5770 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5771 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5772 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5773 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5774 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5776 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5778 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5784 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5785 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5787 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5788 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5789 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5790 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5791 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5793 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5794 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5795 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5798 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5799 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5800 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5802 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5803 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5806 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5809 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5810 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5811 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5814 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5815 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5816 let mut chan_closed = false;
5817 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5821 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5823 None if !chan_closed => {
5824 // use override shutdown script if provided
5825 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5826 Some(script) => script,
5828 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5829 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5830 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5831 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5835 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5836 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5838 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5844 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5845 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5846 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5847 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5848 monitor_update: None,
5849 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5850 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5852 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5853 Some(shutdown_result)
5855 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5858 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5860 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5861 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5862 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5863 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5864 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5865 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5868 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5869 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5871 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5872 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5873 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5876 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5877 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5878 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5879 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5880 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5882 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5883 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5890 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5891 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5893 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5896 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5897 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5898 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5900 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5901 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5905 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5909 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5910 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5911 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5912 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5915 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5916 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5917 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5918 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5919 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5920 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5921 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5922 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5924 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5925 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5926 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5927 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5929 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5930 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5932 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5935 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5936 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5939 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5942 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5943 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5944 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5945 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5949 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5950 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5952 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5953 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5955 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5957 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5959 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5960 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5961 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5965 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5966 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5968 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5969 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5970 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5971 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5975 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5976 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5977 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5981 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
5982 Ok(script) => script,
5983 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5986 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5989 context: ChannelContext {
5992 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5993 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5994 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5995 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6000 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6002 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6003 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6004 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6005 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6007 channel_value_satoshis,
6009 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6011 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6012 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6015 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6016 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6019 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6020 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6021 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6022 pending_update_fee: None,
6023 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6024 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6025 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6026 update_time_counter: 1,
6028 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6030 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6031 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6032 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6033 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6034 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6035 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6037 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6038 signer_pending_funding: false,
6040 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6041 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6043 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6045 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6046 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6047 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6048 closing_fee_limits: None,
6049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6051 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6052 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6053 short_channel_id: None,
6054 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6056 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6057 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6058 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6059 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6060 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6061 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6062 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6063 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6064 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6065 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6066 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6067 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6069 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6071 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6072 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6073 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6074 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6075 counterparty_parameters: None,
6076 funding_outpoint: None,
6077 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6079 funding_transaction: None,
6080 is_batch_funding: None,
6082 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6083 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6084 counterparty_node_id,
6086 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6088 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6090 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6091 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6093 announcement_sigs: None,
6095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6096 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6098 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6100 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6101 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6104 outbound_scid_alias,
6106 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6107 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6109 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6110 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6115 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6117 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6121 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6122 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6123 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6124 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6125 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6126 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6127 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6128 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6129 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6130 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6131 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6133 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6134 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6136 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6137 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6138 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6139 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6142 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6143 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6145 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6147 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6148 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6150 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6151 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6152 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6153 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6154 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6155 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6158 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6159 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6161 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6162 if funding_created.is_none() {
6163 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6164 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6165 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6169 let channel = Channel {
6170 context: self.context,
6173 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6176 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6177 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6178 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6179 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6180 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6181 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6182 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6183 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6184 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6185 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6188 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6189 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6190 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6191 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6192 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6193 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6199 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6200 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6201 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6202 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6203 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6204 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6206 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6208 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6209 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6210 // We've exhausted our options
6213 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6214 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6217 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6218 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6219 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6220 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6222 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6223 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6224 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6225 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6226 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6227 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6229 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6231 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6232 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6235 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6236 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6237 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6239 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6240 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6243 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6244 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6247 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6248 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6252 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6253 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6254 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6255 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6256 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6257 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6258 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6259 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6260 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6261 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6262 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6263 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6264 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6265 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6266 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6267 first_per_commitment_point,
6268 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6269 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6270 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6271 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6273 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6278 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6279 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6281 // Check sanity of message fields:
6282 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6285 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6288 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6294 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6297 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6299 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6301 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6302 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6305 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6306 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6309 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6312 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6316 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6317 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6320 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6323 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6326 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6329 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6332 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6335 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6339 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6340 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6343 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6344 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6346 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6347 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6350 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6351 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6354 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6355 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6356 &Some(ref script) => {
6357 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6358 if script.len() == 0 {
6361 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6364 Some(script.clone())
6367 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6374 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6375 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6376 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6377 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6378 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6380 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6381 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6383 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6386 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6387 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6388 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6389 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6390 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6391 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6394 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6395 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6396 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6399 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6400 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6402 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6403 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6409 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6410 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6411 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6412 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6415 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6416 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6417 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6418 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6419 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6420 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6421 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6422 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6423 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6424 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6428 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6430 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6431 // support this channel type.
6432 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6433 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6437 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6438 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6439 // `static_remote_key`.
6440 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6443 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6444 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6447 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6450 channel_type.clone()
6452 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6453 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6459 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6460 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6461 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6462 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6463 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6464 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6465 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6466 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6467 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6470 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6471 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6474 // Check sanity of message fields:
6475 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6476 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6478 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6479 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6481 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6482 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6484 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6485 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6488 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6489 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6491 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6494 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6496 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6497 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6500 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6501 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6503 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6504 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6507 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6508 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6511 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6514 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6517 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6520 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6523 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6526 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6530 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6532 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6533 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6538 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6539 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6540 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6541 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6542 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6544 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6545 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6547 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6548 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6549 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6551 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6555 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6556 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6557 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6558 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6562 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6563 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6564 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6568 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6569 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6570 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6571 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6575 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6576 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6577 &Some(ref script) => {
6578 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6579 if script.len() == 0 {
6582 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6585 Some(script.clone())
6588 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6595 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6596 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6597 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6598 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6602 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6603 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6608 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6609 Ok(script) => script,
6610 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6613 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6614 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6616 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6619 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6623 context: ChannelContext {
6626 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6627 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6629 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6634 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6636 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6637 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6638 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6639 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6642 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6644 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6645 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6648 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6649 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6650 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6652 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6653 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6654 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6655 pending_update_fee: None,
6656 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6657 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6658 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6659 update_time_counter: 1,
6661 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6663 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6664 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6665 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6666 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6667 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6668 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6670 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6671 signer_pending_funding: false,
6673 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6674 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6675 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6676 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6678 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6679 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6680 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6681 closing_fee_limits: None,
6682 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6684 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6685 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6686 short_channel_id: None,
6687 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6689 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6690 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6691 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6692 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6693 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6694 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6695 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6696 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6697 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6698 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6699 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6700 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6703 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6705 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6706 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6707 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6708 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6709 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6710 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6711 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6713 funding_outpoint: None,
6714 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6716 funding_transaction: None,
6717 is_batch_funding: None,
6719 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6720 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6721 counterparty_node_id,
6723 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6725 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6727 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6728 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6730 announcement_sigs: None,
6732 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6733 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6734 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6735 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6737 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6738 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6741 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6743 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6744 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6747 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6752 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6754 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6760 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6761 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6763 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6764 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6765 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6766 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6768 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6769 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6771 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6772 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6775 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6778 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6779 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6780 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6782 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6783 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6784 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6785 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6787 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6788 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6789 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6790 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6791 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6792 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6793 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6794 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6795 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6796 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6797 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6798 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6799 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6800 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6801 first_per_commitment_point,
6802 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6803 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6804 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6806 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6808 next_local_nonce: None,
6812 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6813 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6815 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6817 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6818 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6821 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6822 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6824 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6825 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6826 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6827 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6828 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6829 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6830 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6831 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6832 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6833 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6834 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6836 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6839 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6840 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6841 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6845 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6846 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6848 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6849 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6850 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6852 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6854 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6855 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6856 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6857 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6860 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6861 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6862 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6863 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6864 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6866 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6868 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6869 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6870 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6873 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6874 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6875 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6879 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6880 initial_commitment_tx,
6883 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6884 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6887 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6888 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6891 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6893 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6894 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6895 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6896 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6898 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6900 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6901 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6902 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6903 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6904 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6905 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6906 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6907 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6908 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6909 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6910 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6912 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6914 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6915 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6916 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6917 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6918 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6919 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6921 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6922 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6924 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6925 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6926 let mut channel = Channel {
6927 context: self.context,
6929 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6930 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6932 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6936 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6937 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6939 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6945 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6947 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6948 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6949 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6951 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6952 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6953 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6954 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6960 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6961 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6962 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6963 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6964 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6970 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6971 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6972 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6973 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6975 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6976 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6977 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6978 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6983 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6984 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6985 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6986 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6987 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6988 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6993 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6994 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6995 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6998 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7000 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7001 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7002 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7003 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7004 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7006 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7007 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7008 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7009 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7011 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7012 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7013 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7015 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7017 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7018 // deserialized from that format.
7019 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7020 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7021 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7023 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7025 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7026 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7027 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7029 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7030 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7031 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7032 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7035 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7036 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7037 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7040 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7041 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7042 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7043 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7045 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7046 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7048 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7050 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7052 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7054 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7057 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7059 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7064 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7065 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7067 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7068 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7069 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7070 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7071 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7072 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7073 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7075 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7077 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7079 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7082 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7083 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7084 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7087 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7089 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7090 preimages.push(preimage);
7092 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7093 reason.write(writer)?;
7095 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7097 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7098 preimages.push(preimage);
7100 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7101 reason.write(writer)?;
7104 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7105 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7106 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7108 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7109 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7110 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7114 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7115 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7116 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7118 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7119 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7123 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7124 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7125 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7126 source.write(writer)?;
7127 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7129 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7130 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7131 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7133 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7134 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7136 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7138 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7139 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7141 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7143 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7144 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7149 match self.context.resend_order {
7150 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7151 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7154 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7155 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7158 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7159 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7160 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7161 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7164 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7165 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7166 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7167 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7168 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7171 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7172 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7173 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7174 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7176 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7177 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7178 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7180 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7182 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7183 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7184 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7185 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7187 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7188 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7189 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7190 // consider the stale state on reload.
7193 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7194 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7195 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7197 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7198 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7199 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7201 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7202 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7204 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7205 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7206 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7208 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7209 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7211 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7214 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7215 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7216 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7218 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7221 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7222 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7224 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7225 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7226 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7228 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7230 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7232 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7235 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7237 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7238 htlc.write(writer)?;
7241 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7242 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7243 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7245 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7246 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7248 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7249 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7250 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7251 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7252 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7253 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7254 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7256 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7257 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7258 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7259 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7260 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7262 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7263 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7265 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7266 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7267 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7268 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7270 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7272 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7273 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7274 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7275 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7276 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7277 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7278 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7280 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7281 (2, chan_type, option),
7282 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7283 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7284 (5, self.context.config, required),
7285 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7286 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7287 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7288 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7289 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7290 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7291 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7292 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7293 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7294 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7295 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7296 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7297 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7298 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7299 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7300 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7301 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7302 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7303 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7310 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7311 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7313 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7314 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7316 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7317 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7318 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7320 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7321 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7322 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7323 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7327 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7328 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7334 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7337 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let mut keys_data = None;
7345 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7346 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7347 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7349 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7350 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7351 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7352 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7353 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7354 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7358 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7359 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7360 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7363 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7372 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7373 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7374 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7375 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7376 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7378 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7379 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7380 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7381 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7382 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7388 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7390 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7391 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7392 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7393 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7394 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7395 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7396 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7397 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7398 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7399 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7401 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7405 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7406 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7409 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7414 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7418 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7420 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7421 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7422 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7423 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7424 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7425 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7426 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7427 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7428 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7430 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7431 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7432 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7434 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7435 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7436 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7438 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7442 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7443 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7444 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7448 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7454 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7455 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7458 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7460 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7461 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7464 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7474 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7475 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7476 // consider the stale state on reload.
7477 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7480 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7481 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7487 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7496 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7497 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7499 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7500 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7506 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7508 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7509 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7511 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7512 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7517 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7518 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7519 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7520 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7525 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7526 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7530 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7533 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7536 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7538 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7539 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7540 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7542 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7543 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7544 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7548 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7549 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7550 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7552 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7558 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7559 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7560 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7561 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7562 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7563 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7564 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7565 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7566 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7567 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7569 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7570 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7571 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7572 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7573 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7574 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7575 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7577 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7578 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7579 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7580 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7582 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7584 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7585 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7587 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7589 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7590 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7591 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7592 (2, channel_type, option),
7593 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7594 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7595 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7596 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7597 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7598 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7599 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7600 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7601 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7602 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7603 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7604 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7605 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7606 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7607 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7608 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7609 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7610 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7611 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7612 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7613 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7614 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7617 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7618 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7619 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7620 // required channel parameters.
7621 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7622 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7623 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7625 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7627 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7628 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7629 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7630 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7633 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7634 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7635 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7638 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7640 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7641 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7646 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7647 if iter.next().is_some() {
7648 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7652 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7653 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7654 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7655 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7656 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7659 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7660 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7661 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7663 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7664 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7666 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7667 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7668 // separate u64 values.
7669 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7671 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7673 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7674 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7675 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7676 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7678 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7679 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7681 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7682 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7683 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7684 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7685 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7688 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7689 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7693 context: ChannelContext {
7696 config: config.unwrap(),
7700 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7701 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7702 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7705 temporary_channel_id,
7707 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7709 channel_value_satoshis,
7711 latest_monitor_update_id,
7713 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7714 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7717 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7718 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7721 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7722 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7723 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7724 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7728 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7729 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7730 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7731 monitor_pending_forwards,
7732 monitor_pending_failures,
7733 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7735 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7736 signer_pending_funding: false,
7739 holding_cell_update_fee,
7740 next_holder_htlc_id,
7741 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7742 update_time_counter,
7745 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7746 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7747 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7748 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7750 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7751 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7752 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7753 closing_fee_limits: None,
7754 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7756 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7757 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7759 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7761 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7762 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7763 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7764 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7765 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7766 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7767 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7768 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7769 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7772 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7774 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7775 funding_transaction,
7778 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7779 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7780 counterparty_node_id,
7782 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7786 channel_update_status,
7787 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7792 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7794 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7796 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7797 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7799 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7800 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7801 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7803 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7804 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7806 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7807 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7809 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7812 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7821 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7822 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7823 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7824 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7825 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7826 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7827 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7828 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7829 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7830 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7831 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7832 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7833 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7834 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7835 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7836 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7837 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7838 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7839 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7840 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7841 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7842 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7843 use crate::util::test_utils;
7844 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7845 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7846 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7847 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7848 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7849 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7850 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7851 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7852 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7853 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7854 use crate::prelude::*;
7856 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7859 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7860 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7866 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7867 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7868 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7869 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7873 signer: InMemorySigner,
7876 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7877 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7880 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7881 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
7883 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
7885 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7886 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7889 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
7893 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7895 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7896 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7897 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7898 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7899 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7902 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7903 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7904 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7905 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7909 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7910 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7911 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7915 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7916 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7917 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7918 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7921 let seed = [42; 32];
7922 let network = Network::Testnet;
7923 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7924 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7925 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7928 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7929 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7930 let config = UserConfig::default();
7931 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7932 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7933 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7935 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7936 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7940 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7941 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7943 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7944 let original_fee = 253;
7945 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7946 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7948 let seed = [42; 32];
7949 let network = Network::Testnet;
7950 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7952 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7953 let config = UserConfig::default();
7954 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7956 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7957 // same as the old fee.
7958 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7959 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7960 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7964 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7965 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7966 // dust limits are used.
7967 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7969 let seed = [42; 32];
7970 let network = Network::Testnet;
7971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7973 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7975 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7976 // they have different dust limits.
7978 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7980 let config = UserConfig::default();
7981 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7983 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7984 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7985 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7986 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7987 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7989 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7990 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7991 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7992 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7993 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7995 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7996 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7997 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7998 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8000 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8001 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8002 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8004 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8005 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8007 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8008 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8009 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8011 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8012 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8013 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8014 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8017 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8019 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8020 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8021 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8022 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8023 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8024 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8025 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8026 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8027 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8029 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8032 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8033 // the dust limit check.
8034 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8035 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8036 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8037 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8039 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8040 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8041 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8042 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8043 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8044 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8045 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8049 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8050 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8051 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8052 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8053 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8054 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8056 let seed = [42; 32];
8057 let network = Network::Testnet;
8058 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8060 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8061 let config = UserConfig::default();
8062 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8064 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8065 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8067 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8068 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8069 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8070 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8071 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8072 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8074 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8075 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8076 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8077 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8078 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8080 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8082 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8083 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8084 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8085 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8086 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8088 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8089 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8090 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8091 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8092 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8096 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8097 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8098 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8099 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8100 let seed = [42; 32];
8101 let network = Network::Testnet;
8102 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8103 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8104 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8106 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8108 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8109 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8110 let config = UserConfig::default();
8111 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8113 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8114 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8115 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8116 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8118 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8119 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8120 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8122 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8123 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8124 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8125 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8127 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8128 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8129 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8131 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8132 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8134 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8135 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8136 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8137 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8138 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8139 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8140 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8142 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8144 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8145 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8146 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8147 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8148 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8152 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8153 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8154 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8155 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8156 let seed = [42; 32];
8157 let network = Network::Testnet;
8158 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8159 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8160 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8162 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8163 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8164 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8165 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8166 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8167 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8168 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8169 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8171 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8172 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8173 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8174 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8175 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8176 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8178 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8179 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8180 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8181 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8183 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8185 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8186 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8187 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8188 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8189 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8190 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8192 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8193 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8194 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8195 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8197 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8198 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8199 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8200 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8201 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8203 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8204 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8206 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8207 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8208 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8210 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8211 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8212 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8213 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8214 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8216 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8217 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8219 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8220 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8221 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8225 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8227 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8228 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8229 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8231 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8232 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8233 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8234 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8236 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8237 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8238 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8240 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8242 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8243 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8246 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8247 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8248 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8249 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8250 let seed = [42; 32];
8251 let network = Network::Testnet;
8252 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8253 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8254 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8257 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8258 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8259 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8261 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8262 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8264 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8265 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8266 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8268 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8269 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8271 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8273 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8274 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8276 // Channel Negotiations failed
8277 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8278 assert!(result.is_err());
8283 fn channel_update() {
8284 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8285 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8286 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8287 let seed = [42; 32];
8288 let network = Network::Testnet;
8289 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8290 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8291 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8293 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8294 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8295 let config = UserConfig::default();
8296 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8298 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8299 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8300 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8301 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8302 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8304 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8305 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8306 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8307 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8308 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8310 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8311 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8312 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8313 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8315 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8316 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8317 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8319 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8320 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8322 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8323 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8324 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8326 short_channel_id: 0,
8329 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8330 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8331 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8333 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8334 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8336 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8338 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8340 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8341 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8342 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8343 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8345 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8346 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8347 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8349 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8352 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8355 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8357 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8358 use bitcoin::sighash;
8359 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8360 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8361 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8362 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8363 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8364 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8365 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8366 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8367 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8368 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8369 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8370 use crate::sync::Arc;
8371 use core::str::FromStr;
8372 use hex::DisplayHex;
8374 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8375 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8376 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8377 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8379 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8381 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8382 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8383 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8384 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8385 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8387 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8388 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8394 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8395 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8396 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8398 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8399 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8400 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8401 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8402 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8403 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8405 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8407 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8408 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8409 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8410 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8411 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8412 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8414 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8415 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8416 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8417 selected_contest_delay: 144
8419 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8420 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8422 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8423 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8425 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8426 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8428 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8429 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8431 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8432 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8433 // build_commitment_transaction.
8434 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8435 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8436 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8437 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8438 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8440 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8441 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8442 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8443 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8447 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8448 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8449 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8450 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8454 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8455 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8456 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8458 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8459 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8461 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8462 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8464 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8466 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8467 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8468 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8469 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8470 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8471 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8472 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8474 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8475 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8476 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8477 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8479 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8480 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8481 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8483 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8485 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8486 commitment_tx.clone(),
8487 counterparty_signature,
8488 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8489 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8490 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8492 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8493 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8495 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8496 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8497 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8499 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8500 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8503 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8504 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8506 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8507 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8508 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8509 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8510 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8511 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8512 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8513 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8515 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8518 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8519 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8520 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8524 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8527 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8528 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8529 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8530 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8531 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8532 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8534 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8535 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8536 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8537 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8539 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8540 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8541 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8542 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8543 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8545 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8546 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8547 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8548 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8549 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8550 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8552 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8556 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8557 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8558 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8559 "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", {});
8561 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8562 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8564 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8565 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8566 "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", {});
8568 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8569 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8570 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8571 "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", {});
8573 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8574 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8576 amount_msat: 1000000,
8578 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8579 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8581 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8584 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8585 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8587 amount_msat: 2000000,
8589 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8590 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8592 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8595 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8596 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8598 amount_msat: 2000000,
8600 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8601 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8602 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8603 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8605 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8608 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8609 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8611 amount_msat: 3000000,
8613 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8614 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8615 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8616 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8618 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8621 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8622 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8624 amount_msat: 4000000,
8626 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8627 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8629 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8633 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8634 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8635 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8637 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8638 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8639 "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", {
8642 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8643 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8644 "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" },
8647 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8648 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8649 "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" },
8652 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8653 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8654 "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" },
8657 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8658 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8659 "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" },
8662 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8663 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8664 "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" }
8667 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8668 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8669 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8671 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8672 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8673 "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", {
8676 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8677 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8678 "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" },
8681 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8682 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8683 "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" },
8686 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8687 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8688 "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" },
8691 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8692 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8693 "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" },
8696 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8697 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8698 "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" }
8701 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8702 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8703 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8705 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8706 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8707 "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", {
8710 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8711 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8712 "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" },
8715 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8716 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8717 "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" },
8720 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8721 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8722 "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" },
8725 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8726 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8727 "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" }
8730 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8731 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8732 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8733 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8735 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8736 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8737 "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", {
8740 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8741 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8742 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8745 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8746 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8747 "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" },
8750 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8751 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8752 "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" },
8755 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8756 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8757 "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" }
8760 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8761 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8762 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8763 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8765 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8766 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8767 "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", {
8770 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8771 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8772 "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" },
8775 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8776 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8777 "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" },
8780 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8781 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8782 "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" },
8785 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8786 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8787 "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" }
8790 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8791 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8792 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8794 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8795 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8796 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8799 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8800 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8801 "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" },
8804 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8805 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8806 "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" },
8809 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8810 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8811 "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" }
8814 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8815 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8816 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8818 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8819 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8820 "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", {
8823 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8824 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8825 "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" },
8828 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8829 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8830 "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" },
8833 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8834 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8835 "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" }
8838 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8839 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8840 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8842 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8843 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8844 "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", {
8847 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8848 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8849 "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" },
8852 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8853 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8854 "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" }
8857 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8858 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8859 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8860 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8861 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8862 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8864 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8865 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8866 "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", {
8869 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8870 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8871 "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" },
8874 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8875 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8876 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8879 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8880 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8881 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8882 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8883 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8885 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8886 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8887 "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", {
8890 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8891 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8892 "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" },
8895 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8896 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8897 "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" }
8900 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8901 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8902 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8904 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8905 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8906 "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", {
8909 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8910 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8911 "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" }
8914 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8915 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8916 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8917 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8918 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8920 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8921 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8922 "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", {
8925 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8926 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8927 "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" }
8930 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8931 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8932 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8933 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8934 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8936 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8937 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8938 "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", {
8941 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8942 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8943 "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" }
8946 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8947 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8948 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8949 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8951 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8952 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8953 "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", {});
8955 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8956 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8957 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8958 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8959 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8961 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8962 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8963 "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", {});
8965 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8966 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8967 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8968 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8969 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8971 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8972 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8973 "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", {});
8975 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8976 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8977 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8979 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8980 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8981 "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", {});
8983 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8984 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8985 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8986 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8987 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8989 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8990 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8991 "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", {});
8993 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8994 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8995 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8996 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8997 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8999 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9000 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9001 "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", {});
9003 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9004 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9005 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9006 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9007 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9008 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9010 amount_msat: 2000000,
9012 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9013 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9015 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9018 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9019 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9020 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9022 amount_msat: 5000001,
9024 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9025 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9026 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9027 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9029 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9032 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9033 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9035 amount_msat: 5000000,
9037 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9038 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9039 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9040 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9042 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9046 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9047 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9048 "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", {
9051 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9052 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9053 "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" },
9055 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9056 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9057 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
9059 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9060 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9061 "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" }
9064 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9065 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9066 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9067 "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", {
9070 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9071 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9072 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9074 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9075 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9076 "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" },
9078 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9079 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9080 "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" }
9085 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9086 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9088 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9089 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9090 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9091 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9093 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9094 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9095 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9097 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9098 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9100 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9101 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9103 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9104 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9105 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9109 fn test_key_derivation() {
9110 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9111 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9113 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9114 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9116 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9117 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9119 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9120 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9122 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9123 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9125 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9126 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9128 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9129 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9133 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9134 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9136 let seed = [42; 32];
9137 let network = Network::Testnet;
9138 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9139 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9141 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9142 let config = UserConfig::default();
9143 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9144 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9146 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9147 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9149 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9150 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9151 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9152 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9153 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9154 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9155 assert!(res.is_ok());
9159 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9160 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9161 // resulting `channel_type`.
9162 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9163 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9164 let network = Network::Testnet;
9165 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9166 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9168 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9169 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9171 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9172 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9174 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9175 // need to signal it.
9176 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9177 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9178 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9179 &config, 0, 42, None
9181 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9183 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9184 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9185 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9187 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9188 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9189 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9193 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9194 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9195 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9196 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9197 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9200 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9201 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9205 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9206 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9207 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9209 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9210 let network = Network::Testnet;
9211 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9212 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9214 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9215 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9217 let config = UserConfig::default();
9219 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9220 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9221 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9222 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9223 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9225 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9226 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9227 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9231 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9232 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9233 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9235 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9236 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9237 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9238 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9239 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9240 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9242 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9246 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9247 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9249 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9250 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9251 let network = Network::Testnet;
9252 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9253 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9255 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9256 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9258 let config = UserConfig::default();
9260 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9261 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9262 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9263 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9264 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9265 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9266 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9267 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9269 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9270 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9271 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9272 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9273 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9274 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9278 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9279 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9281 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9282 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9283 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9284 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9286 assert!(res.is_err());
9288 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9289 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9290 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9292 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9293 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9294 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9297 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9299 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9300 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9301 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9302 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9305 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9306 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9308 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9309 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9311 assert!(res.is_err());
9315 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9316 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9317 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9318 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9319 let seed = [42; 32];
9320 let network = Network::Testnet;
9321 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9322 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9323 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9325 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9326 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9327 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9328 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9330 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9331 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9332 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9337 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9347 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9348 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9349 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9354 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9355 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9361 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9364 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9365 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9366 &accept_channel_msg,
9367 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9368 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9371 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9372 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9373 let tx = Transaction {
9375 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9379 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9382 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9385 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9386 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9391 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9392 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9393 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9397 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9398 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9406 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9407 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9408 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9409 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9414 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9421 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9422 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9423 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9424 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9426 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9427 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9428 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9431 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9432 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9433 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9441 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9442 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9443 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9444 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9447 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9448 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9450 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9451 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9452 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9454 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());