1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
504 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
505 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
508 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
509 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
512 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
513 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
514 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
517 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521 holder_signer: Signer,
522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
523 destination_script: Script,
525 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
526 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
527 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
537 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
538 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
539 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
540 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
541 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
546 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
547 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
550 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
551 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
552 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
560 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
561 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
562 // HTLCs with similar state.
563 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
564 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
565 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
566 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
567 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
568 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
569 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
574 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
575 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
576 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578 update_time_counter: u32,
580 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
581 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
584 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
588 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
591 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
592 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
593 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
596 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
603 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
604 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
605 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
606 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
607 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
610 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
611 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
612 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
613 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
616 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
617 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
618 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
619 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
620 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
621 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
622 channel_creation_height: u32,
624 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
627 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
632 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
637 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
642 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
645 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
650 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
661 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
672 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
673 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
674 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
677 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
678 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
681 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
682 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
685 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
686 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
687 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
689 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
691 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
694 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
695 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
696 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
697 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
700 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
703 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
704 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
705 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
706 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
707 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
708 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
712 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
715 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
716 // the channel's funding UTXO.
718 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
719 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
720 // associated channel mapping.
722 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
723 // to store all of them.
724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
727 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
728 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
729 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
730 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
733 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
735 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
736 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
737 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
739 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
740 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
741 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
742 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
743 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
895 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
896 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
897 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
898 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
905 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
906 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
907 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
908 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
909 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
910 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
911 // We've exhausted our options
914 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
915 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
918 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
919 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
920 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
921 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
923 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
924 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
925 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
926 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
927 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
930 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
932 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
936 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
937 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
938 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
939 outbound_scid_alias: u64
940 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
941 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
942 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
946 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
947 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
948 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
950 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
953 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
956 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
957 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
960 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
963 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
964 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
965 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
966 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
970 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
971 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
973 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
975 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
976 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
977 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
981 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
982 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
985 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
988 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
990 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
997 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
998 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
999 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1000 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1005 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1007 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1008 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1011 channel_value_satoshis,
1013 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1016 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1017 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1019 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1020 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1023 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_update_fee: None,
1027 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1028 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1030 update_time_counter: 1,
1032 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1034 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1035 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1036 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1037 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1048 closing_fee_limits: None,
1049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1051 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1053 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1054 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1055 short_channel_id: None,
1056 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1058 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1059 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1060 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1061 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1062 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1064 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1065 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1066 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1067 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1076 counterparty_parameters: None,
1077 funding_outpoint: None,
1078 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1079 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1081 funding_transaction: None,
1083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_node_id,
1087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1094 announcement_sigs: None,
1096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1104 outbound_scid_alias,
1106 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1109 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1462 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1468 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1469 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1470 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1471 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1472 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1474 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1475 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1476 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1477 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1478 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1479 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1480 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1482 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1483 where L::Target: Logger
1485 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1486 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1487 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1489 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1490 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1492 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1494 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1495 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1496 if match update_state {
1497 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1498 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1501 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1503 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1508 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1509 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1512 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1513 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1514 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1516 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1517 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1518 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1519 transaction_output_index: None
1524 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1526 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1527 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1528 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1531 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1533 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1538 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1541 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1542 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1547 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1552 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1574 if generated_by_local {
1575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1589 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1593 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1596 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1603 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1604 preimages.push(preimage);
1608 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1609 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1613 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1616 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1617 if !generated_by_local {
1618 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1627 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1628 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1629 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1630 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1631 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1632 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1633 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1637 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1638 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1639 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1640 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1650 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1651 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1652 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1658 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1659 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1660 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1661 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1666 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1667 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1672 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1673 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1678 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1680 let channel_parameters =
1681 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1682 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1683 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1691 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1694 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1695 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1696 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1697 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1699 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1700 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1701 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1709 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1710 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1716 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1717 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1718 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1719 // outside of those situations will fail.
1720 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1724 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1729 1 + // script length (0)
1733 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1734 2 + // witness marker and flag
1735 1 + // witness element count
1736 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1737 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1738 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1739 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1743 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1744 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1745 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1752 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1754 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1756 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1757 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1758 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1760 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1761 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1763 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1764 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1765 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1768 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1772 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1773 value_to_holder = 0;
1776 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1777 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1778 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1779 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1781 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1782 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1785 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1790 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1791 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1792 /// our counterparty!)
1793 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1794 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1795 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1796 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1797 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1798 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1799 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1801 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1805 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1806 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1807 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1808 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1810 //may see payments to it!
1811 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1812 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1813 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1815 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1819 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1820 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1821 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1822 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1825 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1828 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1829 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1831 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1833 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1834 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1835 where L::Target: Logger {
1836 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1837 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1838 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1839 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1840 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1842 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1843 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1847 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1849 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1850 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1853 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1857 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1859 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1860 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1861 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1863 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1864 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1865 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1866 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1867 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1869 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1870 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1871 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1873 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1880 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1884 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1888 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1890 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1891 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1892 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1896 // Now update local state:
1898 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1899 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1901 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1909 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1911 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1912 // do not not get into this branch.
1913 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 match pending_update {
1915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1916 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1917 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1918 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1925 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1926 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1928 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1929 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1930 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1937 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1945 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1948 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1949 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1958 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1961 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1963 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1969 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1970 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1973 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1979 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1980 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1985 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1986 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1987 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1988 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2357 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2358 }, channel_monitor))
2361 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2362 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2363 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2364 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2365 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2367 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2370 if !self.is_outbound() {
2371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2373 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2376 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2377 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2378 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2379 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2382 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2384 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2385 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2386 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2387 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2389 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2390 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2392 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2393 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2395 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2396 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2398 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2399 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2404 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2405 initial_commitment_tx,
2408 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2409 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2412 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2413 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2416 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2417 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2418 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2419 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2420 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2421 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2422 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2423 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2424 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2425 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2426 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2427 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2429 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2431 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2433 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2434 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2435 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2438 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2440 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2441 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2445 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2446 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2448 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2449 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2450 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2451 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2453 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2456 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2457 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2461 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2462 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2463 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2464 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2465 // when routing outbound payments.
2466 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2470 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2472 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2473 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2474 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2475 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2476 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2477 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2478 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2479 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2480 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2482 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2483 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2484 let expected_point =
2485 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2486 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2488 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2489 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2490 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2491 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2492 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2493 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2495 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2496 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2497 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2498 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2499 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2501 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2509 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2510 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2512 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2514 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2517 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2518 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2519 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2520 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2526 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2527 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2528 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2529 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2530 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2531 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2532 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2533 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2534 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2537 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2540 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2541 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2542 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2544 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2545 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2546 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2547 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2549 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2551 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2552 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2558 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2559 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2560 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2561 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2562 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2563 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2564 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2565 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2566 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2569 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2572 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2573 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2574 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2576 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2577 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2578 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2579 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2580 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2581 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2583 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2584 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2588 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2589 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2590 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2591 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2592 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2593 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2594 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2596 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2597 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2599 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2606 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2607 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2608 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2609 /// corner case properly.
2610 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2611 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2612 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2614 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2615 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2617 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2620 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2622 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2623 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2624 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2627 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2628 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2629 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2630 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2632 outbound_capacity_msat,
2633 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2634 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2635 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2641 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2642 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2645 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2646 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2647 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2648 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2649 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2650 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2653 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2654 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2656 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2657 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2660 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2661 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2662 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2664 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2665 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2667 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2670 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2671 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2673 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2674 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2676 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2677 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2679 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2680 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2685 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2691 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2692 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2693 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2696 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2697 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2698 included_htlcs += 1;
2701 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2702 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2706 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2707 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2708 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2709 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2710 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2711 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2716 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2718 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2719 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2724 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2725 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2729 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2730 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2734 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2735 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2737 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2738 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2739 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2741 total_pending_htlcs,
2742 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2743 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2744 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2747 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2748 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2750 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2752 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2757 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2758 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2759 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2761 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2762 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2764 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2767 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2768 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2770 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2773 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2774 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2776 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2777 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2781 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2782 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2788 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2789 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2790 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2791 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2792 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2796 included_htlcs += 1;
2799 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2803 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2804 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2806 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2807 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2808 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2813 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2814 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2818 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2819 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2821 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2822 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2824 total_pending_htlcs,
2825 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2829 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2830 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2831 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2833 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2835 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2840 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2841 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2842 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2843 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2844 if local_sent_shutdown {
2845 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2847 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2848 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2849 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2855 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2858 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2861 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2865 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2866 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2867 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2870 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2873 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2874 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2875 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2876 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2877 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2878 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2879 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2880 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2881 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2882 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2883 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2885 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2886 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2887 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2888 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2889 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2890 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2894 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2897 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2898 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2899 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2901 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2902 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2903 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2904 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2905 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2906 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2907 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2911 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2912 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2913 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2914 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2915 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2916 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2917 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2921 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2922 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2923 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2924 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2925 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2929 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2930 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2931 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2932 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2933 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2935 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2939 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2943 if !self.is_outbound() {
2944 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2945 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2946 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2947 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2948 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2949 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2950 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2951 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2952 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2953 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2954 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2955 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2956 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2957 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2958 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2961 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2962 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2963 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2964 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2968 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2971 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2972 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2975 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2976 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2977 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2981 // Now update local state:
2982 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2983 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2984 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2985 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2986 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2987 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2988 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2993 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2995 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2996 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2997 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2998 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2999 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3000 None => fail_reason.into(),
3001 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3002 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3003 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3006 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3010 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3012 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3013 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3015 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3021 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3024 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3032 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3035 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3036 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3043 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3047 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3055 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3059 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3060 where L::Target: Logger
3062 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3072 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3074 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3076 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3077 let commitment_txid = {
3078 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3079 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3080 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3083 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3084 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3085 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3086 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3091 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3093 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3094 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3095 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3096 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3099 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3100 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3101 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3107 if self.is_outbound() {
3108 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3109 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3110 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3111 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3112 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3113 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3114 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3115 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3116 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3117 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3123 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3127 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3128 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3129 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3130 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3131 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3132 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3133 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3135 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3136 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3137 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3139 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3140 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3141 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3144 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3146 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3150 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3151 commitment_stats.tx,
3153 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3154 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3155 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3158 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3161 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3162 let mut need_commitment = false;
3163 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3164 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3165 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3166 need_commitment = true;
3170 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3171 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3172 Some(forward_info.clone())
3174 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3175 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3176 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3177 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3178 need_commitment = true;
3181 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3182 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3183 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3184 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3185 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3186 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3187 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3188 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3189 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3190 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3191 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3192 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3193 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3194 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3196 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3198 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3199 need_commitment = true;
3203 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3204 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3205 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3206 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3207 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3208 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3213 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3214 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3215 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3216 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3218 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3219 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3220 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3221 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3222 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3223 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3224 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3225 // includes the right HTLCs.
3226 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3227 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3228 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3229 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3230 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3231 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3233 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3234 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3235 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3236 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3239 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3240 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3241 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3242 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3243 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3244 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3245 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3246 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3247 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3251 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3252 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3253 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3254 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3255 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3258 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3259 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3260 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3261 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3262 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3263 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3264 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3265 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3268 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3269 /// for our counterparty.
3270 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3271 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3272 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3273 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3274 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3276 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3277 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3278 updates: Vec::new(),
3281 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3282 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3283 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3284 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3285 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3286 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3287 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3288 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3289 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3290 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3291 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3292 // to rebalance channels.
3293 match &htlc_update {
3294 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3295 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3296 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3299 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3300 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3302 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3303 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3304 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3305 // into the holding cell without ever being
3306 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3307 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3308 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3311 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3317 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3318 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3319 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3320 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3321 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3322 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3323 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3324 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3325 (msg, monitor_update)
3326 } else { unreachable!() };
3327 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3328 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3331 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3332 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3333 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3334 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3335 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3336 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3337 // for a full revocation before failing.
3338 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3341 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3343 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3350 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3351 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3353 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3354 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3359 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3360 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3361 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3362 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3363 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3365 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3366 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3367 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3370 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3371 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3377 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3378 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3379 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3380 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3381 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3382 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3383 where L::Target: Logger,
3385 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3388 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3391 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3395 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3397 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3398 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3403 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3404 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3405 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3406 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3407 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3408 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3409 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3410 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3416 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3417 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3420 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3421 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3423 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3425 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3426 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3427 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3428 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3429 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3430 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3431 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3432 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3436 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3437 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3438 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3439 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3440 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3441 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3442 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3443 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3445 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3446 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3449 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3450 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3451 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3452 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3453 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3454 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3455 let mut require_commitment = false;
3456 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3459 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3460 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3461 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3463 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3464 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3465 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3467 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3468 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3473 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3474 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3475 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3476 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3477 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3479 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3480 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3481 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3486 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3487 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3489 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3493 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3494 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3496 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3497 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3498 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3499 require_commitment = true;
3500 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3501 match forward_info {
3502 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3503 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3504 require_commitment = true;
3506 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3507 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3508 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3510 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3511 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3512 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3516 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3517 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3518 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3519 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3525 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3526 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3527 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3528 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3530 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3531 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3532 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3533 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3534 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3535 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3536 require_commitment = true;
3540 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3542 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3543 match update_state {
3544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3545 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3546 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3547 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3548 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3550 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3551 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3552 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3553 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3554 require_commitment = true;
3555 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3556 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3561 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3562 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3563 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3564 if require_commitment {
3565 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3566 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3567 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3568 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3569 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3570 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3571 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3572 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3573 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3575 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3576 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3577 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3578 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3579 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3580 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3583 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3584 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3585 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3586 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3587 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3588 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3589 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3591 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3592 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3593 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3595 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3596 if require_commitment {
3597 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3599 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3600 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3601 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3602 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3604 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3605 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3606 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3607 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3608 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3610 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3611 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3613 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3619 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3620 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3621 /// commitment update.
3622 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3623 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3624 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3627 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3628 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3629 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3630 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3632 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3633 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3634 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3635 if !self.is_outbound() {
3636 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3638 if !self.is_usable() {
3639 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3641 if !self.is_live() {
3642 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3645 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3646 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3647 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3648 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3649 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3650 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3651 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3652 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3653 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3654 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3658 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3659 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3660 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3661 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3662 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3665 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3666 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3670 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3671 force_holding_cell = true;
3674 if force_holding_cell {
3675 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3679 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3680 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3682 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3683 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3688 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3689 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3691 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3693 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3694 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3695 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3696 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3700 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3701 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3702 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3706 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3707 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3710 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3711 // will be retransmitted.
3712 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3713 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3714 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3716 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3717 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3719 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3720 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3721 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3722 // this HTLC accordingly
3723 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3726 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3727 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3728 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3729 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3732 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3733 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3734 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3735 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3736 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3737 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3742 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3744 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3745 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3746 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3747 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3751 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3752 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3753 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3754 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3755 // the update upon reconnection.
3756 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3760 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3761 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3764 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3765 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3766 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3767 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3768 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3769 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3770 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3772 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3773 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3774 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3775 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3776 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3777 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3778 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3780 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3781 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3782 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3783 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3784 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3785 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3786 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3789 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3790 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3791 /// to the remote side.
3792 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3793 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3794 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3795 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3798 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3800 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3801 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3802 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3804 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3805 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3806 // first received the funding_signed.
3807 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3808 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3809 self.funding_transaction.take()
3811 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3812 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3813 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3814 funding_broadcastable = None;
3817 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3818 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3819 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3820 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3821 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3822 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3823 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3824 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3825 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3826 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3827 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3828 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3829 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3830 next_per_commitment_point,
3831 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3835 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3837 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3838 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3839 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3841 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3844 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3845 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3846 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3847 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3848 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3849 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3853 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3854 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3856 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3857 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3860 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3861 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3862 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3863 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3864 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3865 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3866 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3867 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3868 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3872 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3873 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3875 if self.is_outbound() {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3878 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3881 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3882 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3884 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3885 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3886 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3887 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3888 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3889 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3890 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3891 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3892 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3893 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3894 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3896 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3898 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3900 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3906 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3907 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3908 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3909 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3910 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3911 per_commitment_secret,
3912 next_per_commitment_point,
3914 next_local_nonce: None,
3918 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3919 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3920 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3921 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3922 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3924 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3925 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3926 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3927 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3928 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3929 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3930 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3931 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3932 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3937 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3938 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3940 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3941 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3942 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3943 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3944 reason: err_packet.clone()
3947 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3948 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3949 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3950 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3951 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3952 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3955 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3956 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3957 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3958 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3959 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3966 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3967 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3968 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3969 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3973 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3974 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3975 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3976 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3977 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3978 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3982 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3983 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3985 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3986 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3987 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3988 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3989 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3990 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3991 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3992 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3995 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3997 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3998 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3999 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4000 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4004 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4005 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4010 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4011 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4012 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4013 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4014 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4015 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4018 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4019 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4020 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4021 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4022 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4025 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4026 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4027 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4028 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4029 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4030 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4031 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4032 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4035 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4039 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4040 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4041 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4042 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4044 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4048 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4049 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4050 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4052 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4053 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4054 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4055 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4056 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4060 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4062 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4063 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4064 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4065 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4069 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4070 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4071 channel_ready: None,
4072 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4073 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4074 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4078 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4079 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4080 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4081 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4082 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4083 next_per_commitment_point,
4084 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4086 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4087 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4088 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4092 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4093 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4094 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4096 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4097 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4098 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4101 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4107 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4108 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4109 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4110 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4111 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4113 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4114 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4115 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4116 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4117 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4118 next_per_commitment_point,
4119 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4123 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4124 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4125 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4127 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4130 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4131 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4132 raa: required_revoke,
4133 commitment_update: None,
4134 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4136 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4137 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4138 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4140 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4143 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4144 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4145 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4146 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4147 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4148 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4151 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4152 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4153 raa: required_revoke,
4154 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4155 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4159 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4163 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4164 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4165 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4166 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4168 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4170 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4172 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4173 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4174 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4175 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4176 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4177 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4179 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4180 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4181 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4182 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4183 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4185 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4186 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4187 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4188 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4191 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4192 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4193 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4194 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4195 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4196 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4197 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4198 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4199 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4200 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4201 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4202 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4203 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4204 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4205 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4207 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4210 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4211 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4214 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4215 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4216 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4217 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4218 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4219 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4220 self.channel_state &
4221 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4222 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4223 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4224 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4227 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4228 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4229 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4230 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4231 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4232 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4235 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4241 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4242 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4243 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4244 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4246 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4247 return Ok((None, None));
4250 if !self.is_outbound() {
4251 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4252 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4254 return Ok((None, None));
4257 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4259 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4260 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4261 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4262 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4264 let sig = self.holder_signer
4265 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4266 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4268 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4269 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4270 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4271 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4273 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4274 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4275 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4280 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4281 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4282 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4283 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4285 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4288 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4289 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4290 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4291 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4294 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4295 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4299 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4301 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4305 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4306 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4310 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4313 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4314 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4315 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4316 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4318 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4321 assert!(send_shutdown);
4322 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4323 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4326 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4331 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4333 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4334 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4336 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4337 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4338 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4339 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4340 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4341 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4344 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4345 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4346 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4348 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4349 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4350 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4355 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4356 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4357 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4358 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4359 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4360 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4362 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4363 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4370 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4371 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4373 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4376 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4377 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4379 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4381 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4382 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4383 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4384 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4385 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4386 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4387 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4391 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4392 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4395 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4399 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4400 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4401 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4402 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4404 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4407 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4410 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4413 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4417 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4421 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4422 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4423 return Ok((None, None));
4426 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4427 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4428 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4431 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4433 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4436 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4437 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4438 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4439 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4440 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4444 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4445 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4450 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4451 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4452 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4453 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4454 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4455 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4456 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4460 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4462 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4463 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4464 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4465 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4467 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4470 let sig = self.holder_signer
4471 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4472 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4474 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4475 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4476 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4477 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4481 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4482 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4483 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4484 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4486 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4487 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4488 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4494 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4495 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4498 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4501 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4505 if !self.is_outbound() {
4506 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4507 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4508 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4509 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4511 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4513 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4515 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4516 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4519 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4520 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4521 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4522 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4523 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4524 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4525 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4526 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4533 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4534 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4540 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4542 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4543 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4545 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4551 // Public utilities:
4553 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4557 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4561 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4562 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4563 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4567 /// Gets the channel's type
4568 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4572 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4573 /// is_usable() returns true).
4574 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4575 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4576 self.short_channel_id
4579 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4580 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4581 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4584 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4585 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4586 self.outbound_scid_alias
4588 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4589 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4590 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4591 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4592 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4595 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4596 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4597 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4598 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4601 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4602 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4603 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4606 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4607 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4608 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4609 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4613 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4616 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4617 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4620 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4621 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4624 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4625 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4626 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4629 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4630 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4633 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4634 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4635 self.counterparty_node_id
4638 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4639 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4640 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4643 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4644 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4645 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4648 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4649 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4651 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4652 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4653 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4654 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4656 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4660 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4661 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4662 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4665 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4666 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4667 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4670 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4671 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4672 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4674 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4675 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4680 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4681 self.channel_value_satoshis
4684 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4685 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4688 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4689 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4692 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4693 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4696 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4697 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4698 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4701 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4702 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4703 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4706 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4707 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4708 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4711 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4712 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4713 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4714 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4715 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4718 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4720 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4721 self.prev_config = None;
4725 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4726 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4730 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4731 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4732 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4733 let did_channel_update =
4734 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4735 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4736 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4737 if did_channel_update {
4738 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4739 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4740 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4741 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4743 self.config.options = *config;
4747 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4748 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4749 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4750 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4751 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4752 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4753 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4755 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4756 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4759 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4761 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4762 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4768 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4769 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4770 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4771 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4772 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4773 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4774 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4776 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4777 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4784 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4788 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4789 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4790 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4791 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4792 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4793 // which are near the dust limit.
4794 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4795 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4796 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4797 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4798 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4800 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4801 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4803 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4806 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4807 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4810 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4811 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4814 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4815 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4819 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4824 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4826 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4827 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4828 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4829 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4830 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4831 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4833 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4835 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4843 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4844 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4848 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4849 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4850 self.update_time_counter
4853 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4854 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4857 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4858 self.config.announced_channel
4861 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4862 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4865 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4866 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4867 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4868 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4871 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4872 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4873 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4876 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4877 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4878 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4879 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4880 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4883 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4884 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4885 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4886 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4887 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4890 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4891 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4892 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4893 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4896 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4897 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4900 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4901 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4902 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4905 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4906 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4907 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4909 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4910 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4911 if self.channel_state &
4912 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4913 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4914 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4915 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4916 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4919 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4920 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4921 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4922 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4923 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4924 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4926 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4927 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4928 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4930 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4931 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4932 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4933 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4934 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4935 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4941 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4942 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4943 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4946 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4947 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4948 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4951 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4952 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4953 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4956 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4957 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4958 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4959 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4960 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4961 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4966 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4967 self.channel_update_status
4970 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4971 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4972 self.channel_update_status = status;
4975 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4977 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4978 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4979 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4983 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4984 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4985 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4988 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4992 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4993 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4994 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4996 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4997 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4998 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5000 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5001 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5004 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5005 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5006 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5007 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5008 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5009 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5010 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5011 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5012 self.channel_state);
5014 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5018 if need_commitment_update {
5019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5020 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5021 let next_per_commitment_point =
5022 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5023 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5024 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5025 next_per_commitment_point,
5026 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5030 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5036 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5037 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5038 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5039 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5040 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5041 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5042 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5044 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5047 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5048 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5049 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5050 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5051 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5052 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5053 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5054 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5055 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5056 if self.is_outbound() {
5057 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5058 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5059 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5060 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5061 // channel and move on.
5062 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5063 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5065 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5066 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5067 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5069 if self.is_outbound() {
5070 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5071 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5072 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5073 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5074 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5075 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5079 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5080 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5081 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5082 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5083 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5087 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5088 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5089 // may have already happened for this block).
5090 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5091 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5092 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5093 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5096 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5097 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5098 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5099 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5107 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5108 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5109 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5110 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5112 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5113 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5116 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5118 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5119 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5120 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5121 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5123 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5126 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5129 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5130 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5131 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5132 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5134 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5137 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5138 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5139 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5141 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5142 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5144 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5145 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5146 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5154 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5156 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5157 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5158 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5160 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5161 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5164 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5165 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5166 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5167 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5168 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5169 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5170 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5171 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5172 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5175 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5176 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5177 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5178 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5180 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5181 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5182 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5184 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5185 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5186 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5187 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5189 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5190 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5191 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5192 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5193 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5194 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5195 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5198 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5199 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5201 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5204 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5205 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5206 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5207 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5208 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5209 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5210 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5211 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5212 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5213 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5214 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5215 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5216 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5217 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5218 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5219 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5220 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5226 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5231 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5232 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5234 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5235 if !self.is_outbound() {
5236 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5238 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5239 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5242 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5243 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5246 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5247 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5251 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5252 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5253 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5254 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5255 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5256 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5257 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5258 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5259 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5260 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5261 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5262 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5263 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5264 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5265 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5266 first_per_commitment_point,
5267 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5268 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5269 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5270 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5272 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5276 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5277 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5280 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5281 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5282 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5283 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5286 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5287 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5289 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5290 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5291 if self.is_outbound() {
5292 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5294 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5295 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5297 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5298 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5300 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5301 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5304 self.user_id = user_id;
5305 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5307 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5310 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5311 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5312 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5314 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5315 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5316 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5317 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5319 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5320 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5321 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5322 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5323 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5324 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5325 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5326 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5327 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5328 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5329 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5330 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5331 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5332 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5333 first_per_commitment_point,
5334 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5335 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5336 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5338 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5340 next_local_nonce: None,
5344 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5345 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5347 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5349 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5350 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5353 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5354 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5355 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5356 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5357 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5358 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5361 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5362 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5363 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5364 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5365 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5366 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5367 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5368 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5369 if !self.is_outbound() {
5370 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5372 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5373 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5375 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5376 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5377 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5378 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5381 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5382 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5384 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5387 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5388 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5393 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5395 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5397 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5398 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5399 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5401 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5402 temporary_channel_id,
5403 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5404 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5407 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5409 next_local_nonce: None,
5413 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5414 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5415 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5416 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5418 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5421 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5422 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5423 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5424 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5425 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5426 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5428 if !self.is_usable() {
5429 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5432 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5433 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5434 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5435 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5437 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5438 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5440 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5441 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5442 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5443 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5444 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5445 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5451 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5452 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5453 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5454 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5456 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5459 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5463 if !self.is_usable() {
5467 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5468 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5472 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5476 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5477 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5480 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5484 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5486 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5491 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5493 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5498 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5500 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5501 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5502 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5503 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5504 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5508 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5510 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5511 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5512 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5513 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5514 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5515 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5516 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5518 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5520 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5521 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5522 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5523 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5524 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5525 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5526 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5527 contents: announcement,
5530 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5534 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5535 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5536 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5537 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5538 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5539 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5540 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5541 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5543 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5545 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5547 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5548 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5550 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5552 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5553 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5556 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5557 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5558 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5559 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5562 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5565 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5566 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5567 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5568 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5569 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5570 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5573 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5575 Err(_) => return None,
5577 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5578 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5583 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5584 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5585 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5586 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5587 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5588 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5589 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5590 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5591 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5592 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5593 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5594 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5595 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5596 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5597 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5598 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5599 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5600 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5601 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5604 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5605 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5606 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5607 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5610 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5611 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5612 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5613 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5614 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5615 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5616 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5617 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5619 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5620 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5621 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5622 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5623 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5624 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5625 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5626 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5627 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5629 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5635 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5637 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5638 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5639 /// commitment update.
5641 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5642 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5643 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5644 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5646 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5647 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5649 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5650 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5655 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5656 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5658 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5660 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5661 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5663 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5664 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5665 /// regenerate them.
5667 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5668 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5670 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5671 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5672 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5673 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5674 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5675 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5677 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5678 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5679 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5682 if amount_msat == 0 {
5683 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5686 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5687 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5690 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5691 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5692 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5693 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5694 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5695 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5696 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5700 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5701 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5702 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5703 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5705 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5706 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5707 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5710 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5711 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5712 if !self.is_outbound() {
5713 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5714 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5715 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5716 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5717 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5718 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5722 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5725 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5726 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5727 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5729 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5730 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5731 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5732 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5733 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5734 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5738 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5739 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5740 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5741 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5742 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5743 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5747 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5748 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5749 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5752 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5753 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5754 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5755 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5757 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5758 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5761 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5762 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5763 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5764 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5765 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5768 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5769 force_holding_cell = true;
5772 // Now update local state:
5773 if force_holding_cell {
5774 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5779 onion_routing_packet,
5784 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5785 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5787 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5789 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5793 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5794 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5795 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5799 onion_routing_packet,
5801 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5806 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5807 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5808 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5809 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5811 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5812 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5813 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5815 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5816 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5820 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5821 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5822 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5823 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5824 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5825 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5826 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5829 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5830 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5831 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5832 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5833 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5834 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5837 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5839 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5840 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5841 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5843 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5844 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5847 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5848 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5849 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5850 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5851 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5852 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5853 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5854 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5857 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5861 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5862 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5863 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5864 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5866 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5868 if !self.is_outbound() {
5869 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5870 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5871 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5872 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5873 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5874 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5875 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5876 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5877 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5878 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5884 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5887 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5888 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5889 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5890 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5892 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5894 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5895 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5896 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5897 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5900 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5901 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5905 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5906 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5908 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5910 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5911 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5912 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5913 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5915 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5916 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5917 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5918 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5919 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5920 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5924 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5925 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5929 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5930 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5933 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5934 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5936 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5937 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5938 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5939 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5940 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5943 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5944 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5945 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5946 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5952 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5953 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5954 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5957 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5958 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5961 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5962 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5963 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5964 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5970 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5971 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5973 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5974 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5975 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5976 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5977 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5978 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5979 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5980 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5984 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5985 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5988 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5989 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5992 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5994 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5997 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5998 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5999 let mut chan_closed = false;
6000 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6004 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6006 None if !chan_closed => {
6007 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6008 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6009 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6011 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6017 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6018 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6019 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6020 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6022 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6024 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6026 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6027 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6028 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6029 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6030 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6031 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6034 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6035 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6036 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6038 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6039 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6040 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6043 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6044 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6045 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6046 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6047 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6049 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6050 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6057 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6058 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6060 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6063 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6064 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6065 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6066 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6067 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6068 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6069 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6070 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6071 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6072 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6073 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6075 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6076 // return them to fail the payment.
6077 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6078 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6079 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6081 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6082 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6087 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6088 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6089 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6090 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6091 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6092 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6093 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6094 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6095 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6096 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6097 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6098 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6099 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6104 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6105 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6106 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6109 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6110 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6111 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6113 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6114 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6118 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6122 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6123 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6131 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6132 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6133 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6134 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6135 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6137 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6138 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6139 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6140 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6146 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6147 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6148 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6149 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6150 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6151 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6156 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6157 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6158 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6159 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6161 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6162 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6163 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6164 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6169 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6170 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6171 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6172 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6173 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6174 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6179 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6181 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6184 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6186 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6187 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6188 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6189 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6190 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6192 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6193 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6194 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6195 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6197 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6198 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6199 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6201 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6203 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6204 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6205 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6206 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6207 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6208 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6210 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6211 // deserialized from that format.
6212 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6213 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6214 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6216 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6218 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6219 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6220 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6222 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6223 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6224 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6225 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6228 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6229 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6230 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6233 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6234 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6235 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6236 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6238 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6239 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6241 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6243 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6245 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6247 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6250 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6252 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6257 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6259 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6260 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6261 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6262 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6263 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6264 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6265 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6267 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6269 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6271 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6274 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6275 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6276 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6279 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6281 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6282 preimages.push(preimage);
6284 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6285 reason.write(writer)?;
6287 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6289 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6290 preimages.push(preimage);
6292 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6293 reason.write(writer)?;
6298 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6299 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6303 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6304 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6305 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6306 source.write(writer)?;
6307 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6309 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6311 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6312 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6314 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6316 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6317 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6322 match self.resend_order {
6323 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6324 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6327 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6328 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6329 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6331 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6332 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6333 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6334 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6337 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6338 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6339 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6340 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6341 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6344 if self.is_outbound() {
6345 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6346 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6347 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6349 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6350 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6351 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6353 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6355 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6356 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6357 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6358 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6360 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6361 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6362 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6363 // consider the stale state on reload.
6366 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6367 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6368 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6370 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6371 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6372 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6374 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6375 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6377 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6378 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6379 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6381 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6382 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6384 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6387 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6388 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6389 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6391 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6394 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6395 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6397 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6398 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6399 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6401 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6403 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6405 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6408 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6410 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6411 htlc.write(writer)?;
6414 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6415 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6416 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6418 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6419 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6421 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6422 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6423 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6424 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6425 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6426 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6427 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6429 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6430 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6431 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6432 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6433 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6435 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6437 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6438 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6439 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6440 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6442 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6443 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6444 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6445 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6446 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6447 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6448 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6450 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6451 (2, chan_type, option),
6452 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6453 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6454 (5, self.config, required),
6455 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6456 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6457 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6458 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6459 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6460 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6461 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6462 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6463 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6464 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6465 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6466 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6473 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6474 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6476 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6477 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6479 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6480 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6481 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6483 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6484 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6485 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6486 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6490 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6491 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6497 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let mut keys_data = None;
6508 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6509 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6510 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6512 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6513 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6514 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6515 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6516 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6517 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6521 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6522 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6523 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6526 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6530 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6532 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6534 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6535 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6536 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6537 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6538 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6539 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6540 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6541 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6542 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6543 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6544 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6545 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6550 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6552 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6553 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6554 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6555 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6556 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6557 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6558 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6559 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6560 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6561 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6563 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6567 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6571 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6572 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6574 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6579 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6580 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6581 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6582 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6583 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6584 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6585 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6586 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6587 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6588 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6591 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6594 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6595 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6596 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6598 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6602 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6603 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6604 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6605 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6608 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6614 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6615 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6618 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6620 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6621 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6624 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6628 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6630 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6634 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6635 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6636 // consider the stale state on reload.
6637 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6640 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6647 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6656 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6657 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6659 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6660 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6668 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6669 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6671 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6672 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6677 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6678 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6679 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6680 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6682 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6685 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6693 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6699 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6700 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6702 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6703 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6704 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6708 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6709 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6710 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6712 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6718 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6719 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6720 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6721 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6722 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6723 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6724 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6725 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6726 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6727 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6729 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6730 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6731 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6732 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6733 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6734 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6736 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6737 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6739 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6740 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6741 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6742 (2, channel_type, option),
6743 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6744 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6745 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6746 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6747 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6748 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6749 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6750 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6751 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6752 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6753 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6754 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6755 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6756 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6757 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6760 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6761 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6762 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6763 // required channel parameters.
6764 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6765 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6766 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6768 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6770 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6771 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6772 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6773 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6776 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6777 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6778 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6780 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6781 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6783 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6784 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6789 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6790 if iter.next().is_some() {
6791 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6795 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6796 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6797 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6798 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6799 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6802 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6803 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6805 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6806 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6807 // separate u64 values.
6808 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6813 config: config.unwrap(),
6817 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6818 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6819 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6823 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6825 channel_value_satoshis,
6827 latest_monitor_update_id,
6830 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6833 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6834 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6837 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6838 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6839 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6843 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6844 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6845 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6846 monitor_pending_forwards,
6847 monitor_pending_failures,
6848 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6851 holding_cell_update_fee,
6852 next_holder_htlc_id,
6853 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6854 update_time_counter,
6857 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6858 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6859 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6860 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6862 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6863 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6864 closing_fee_limits: None,
6865 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6867 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6869 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6870 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6872 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6874 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6875 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6876 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6877 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6878 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6879 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6880 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6881 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6882 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6885 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6887 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6888 funding_transaction,
6890 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6891 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6892 counterparty_node_id,
6894 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6898 channel_update_status,
6899 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6903 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6904 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6906 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6908 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6910 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6911 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6912 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6914 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6917 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6919 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6922 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6930 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6931 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6932 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6933 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6934 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6936 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6937 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6939 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6940 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6941 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6942 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6943 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6944 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6945 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6946 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6947 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6948 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6949 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6950 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6951 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6952 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6953 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6954 use crate::util::test_utils;
6955 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6956 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6957 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6958 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6959 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6960 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6961 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6962 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6963 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6964 use crate::prelude::*;
6966 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6969 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6970 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6976 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6977 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6978 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6979 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6983 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6984 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6985 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6986 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6987 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6988 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6989 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6993 signer: InMemorySigner,
6996 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6997 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7000 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7001 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7003 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7004 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7007 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7011 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7013 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7014 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7015 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7016 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7017 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7020 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7022 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7023 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7027 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7028 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7029 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7033 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7034 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7035 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7036 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7038 let seed = [42; 32];
7039 let network = Network::Testnet;
7040 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7041 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7042 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7046 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7047 let config = UserConfig::default();
7048 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7049 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7050 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7052 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7053 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7057 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7058 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7060 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7061 let original_fee = 253;
7062 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7063 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7064 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7065 let seed = [42; 32];
7066 let network = Network::Testnet;
7067 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7069 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7070 let config = UserConfig::default();
7071 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7073 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7074 // same as the old fee.
7075 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7076 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7077 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7081 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7082 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7083 // dust limits are used.
7084 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7086 let seed = [42; 32];
7087 let network = Network::Testnet;
7088 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7089 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7091 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7092 // they have different dust limits.
7094 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7095 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7096 let config = UserConfig::default();
7097 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7099 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7100 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7101 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7102 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7103 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7105 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7106 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7107 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7108 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7109 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7111 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7112 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7113 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7115 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7116 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7117 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7118 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7121 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7123 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7124 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7125 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7126 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7127 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7129 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7130 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7131 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7132 payment_secret: None,
7136 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7137 // the dust limit check.
7138 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7139 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7140 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7141 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7143 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7144 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7145 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7146 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7147 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7148 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7149 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7153 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7154 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7155 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7156 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7157 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7158 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7160 let seed = [42; 32];
7161 let network = Network::Testnet;
7162 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7164 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7165 let config = UserConfig::default();
7166 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7168 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7169 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7171 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7172 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7173 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7174 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7175 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7176 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7178 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7179 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7180 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7181 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7182 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7184 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7186 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7187 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7188 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7189 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7190 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7192 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7193 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7194 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7195 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7196 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7200 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7201 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7202 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7204 let seed = [42; 32];
7205 let network = Network::Testnet;
7206 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7207 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7208 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7210 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7212 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7213 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7214 let config = UserConfig::default();
7215 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7217 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7218 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7219 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7220 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7222 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7223 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7224 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7226 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7227 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7228 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7229 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7231 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7232 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7233 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7235 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7236 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7238 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7239 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7240 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7241 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7242 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7243 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7244 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7245 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7246 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7251 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7253 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7254 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7255 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7256 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7257 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7258 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7259 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7266 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7267 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7268 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7269 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7270 let seed = [42; 32];
7271 let network = Network::Testnet;
7272 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7273 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7274 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7276 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7277 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7278 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7279 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7280 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7281 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7282 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7283 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7285 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7286 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7287 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7288 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7289 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7290 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7292 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7293 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7294 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7295 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7297 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7299 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7300 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7301 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7302 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7303 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7304 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7306 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7307 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7308 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7309 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7311 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7312 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7313 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7314 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7315 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7317 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7318 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7320 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7321 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7322 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7324 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7325 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7326 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7327 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7328 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7330 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7331 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7333 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7334 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7335 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7339 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7341 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7342 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7343 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7345 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7346 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7347 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7348 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7350 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7351 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7352 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7354 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7356 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7357 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7360 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7361 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7362 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7363 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7364 let seed = [42; 32];
7365 let network = Network::Testnet;
7366 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7367 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7368 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7371 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7372 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7373 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7375 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7376 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7378 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7379 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7380 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7382 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7383 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7385 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7387 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7388 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7390 // Channel Negotiations failed
7391 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7392 assert!(result.is_err());
7397 fn channel_update() {
7398 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7399 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7400 let seed = [42; 32];
7401 let network = Network::Testnet;
7402 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7403 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7405 // Create a channel.
7406 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7407 let config = UserConfig::default();
7408 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7409 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7410 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7411 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7413 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7414 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7415 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7417 short_channel_id: 0,
7420 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7421 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7422 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7424 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7425 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7427 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7429 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7431 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7432 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7433 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7434 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7436 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7437 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7438 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7440 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7444 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7446 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7447 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7448 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7449 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7450 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7451 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7452 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7453 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7454 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7455 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7456 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7457 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7458 use crate::sync::Arc;
7460 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7461 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7462 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7463 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7465 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7467 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7468 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7469 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7470 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7471 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7473 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7474 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7479 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7480 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7481 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7483 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7484 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7485 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7486 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7487 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7488 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7490 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7492 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7493 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7494 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7495 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7496 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7497 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7499 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7500 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7501 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7502 selected_contest_delay: 144
7504 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7505 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7507 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7508 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7510 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7511 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7513 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7514 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7516 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7517 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7518 // build_commitment_transaction.
7519 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7520 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7521 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7522 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7523 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7525 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7526 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7527 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7528 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7532 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7533 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7534 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7535 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7539 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7540 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7541 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7543 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7544 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7546 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7547 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7549 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7551 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7552 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7553 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7554 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7555 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7556 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7557 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7559 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7560 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7561 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7562 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7564 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7565 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7566 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7568 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7570 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7571 commitment_tx.clone(),
7572 counterparty_signature,
7573 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7574 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7575 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7577 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7578 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7580 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7581 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7582 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7584 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7585 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7588 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7589 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7591 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7592 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7593 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7594 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7595 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7596 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7597 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7598 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7600 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7603 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7604 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7605 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7609 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7612 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7613 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7614 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7616 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7617 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7618 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7619 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7620 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7621 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7622 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7623 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7625 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7629 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7630 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7631 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7632 "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", {});
7634 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7635 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7637 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7638 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7639 "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", {});
7641 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7642 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7643 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7644 "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", {});
7646 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7647 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7649 amount_msat: 1000000,
7651 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7652 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7654 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7657 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7658 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7660 amount_msat: 2000000,
7662 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7663 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7665 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7668 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7669 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7671 amount_msat: 2000000,
7673 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7674 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7675 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7677 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7680 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7681 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7683 amount_msat: 3000000,
7685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7686 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7687 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7689 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7692 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7693 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7695 amount_msat: 4000000,
7697 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7698 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7700 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7704 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7705 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7706 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7708 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7709 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7710 "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", {
7713 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7714 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7715 "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" },
7718 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7719 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7720 "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" },
7723 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7724 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7725 "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" },
7728 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7729 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7730 "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" },
7733 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7734 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7735 "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" }
7738 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7739 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7740 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7742 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7743 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7744 "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", {
7747 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7748 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7749 "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" },
7752 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7753 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7754 "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" },
7757 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7758 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7759 "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" },
7762 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7763 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7764 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7767 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7768 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7769 "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" }
7772 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7773 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7774 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7776 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7777 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7778 "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", {
7781 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7782 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7783 "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" },
7786 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7787 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7788 "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" },
7791 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7792 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7793 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7796 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7797 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7798 "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" }
7801 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7802 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7803 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7804 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7806 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7807 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7808 "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", {
7811 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7812 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7813 "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" },
7816 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7817 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7818 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7821 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7822 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7823 "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" },
7826 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7827 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7828 "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" }
7831 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7833 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7834 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7836 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7837 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7838 "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", {
7841 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7842 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7843 "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" },
7846 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7847 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7848 "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" },
7851 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7852 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7853 "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" },
7856 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7857 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7858 "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" }
7861 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7863 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7865 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7866 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7867 "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", {
7870 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7871 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7872 "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" },
7875 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7876 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7877 "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" },
7880 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7881 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7882 "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" }
7885 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7886 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7887 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7889 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7890 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7891 "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", {
7894 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7895 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7896 "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" },
7899 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7900 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7901 "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" },
7904 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7905 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7906 "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" }
7909 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7910 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7911 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7913 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7914 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7915 "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", {
7918 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7919 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7920 "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" },
7923 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7924 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7925 "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" }
7928 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7929 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7930 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7931 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7933 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7934 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7935 "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", {
7938 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7939 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7940 "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" },
7943 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7944 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7945 "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" }
7948 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7949 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7950 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7951 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7953 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7954 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7955 "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", {
7958 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7959 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7960 "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" },
7963 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7964 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7965 "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" }
7968 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7969 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7970 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7972 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7973 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7974 "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", {
7977 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7978 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7979 "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" }
7982 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7983 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7984 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7985 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7987 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7988 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7989 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7992 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7993 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7994 "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" }
7997 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7998 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7999 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8000 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8002 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8003 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8004 "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", {
8007 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8008 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8009 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8012 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8013 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8014 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8015 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8017 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8018 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8019 "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", {});
8021 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8022 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8023 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8024 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8026 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8027 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8028 "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", {});
8030 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8031 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8032 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8033 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8035 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8036 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8037 "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", {});
8039 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8040 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8041 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8043 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8044 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8045 "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", {});
8047 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8048 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8049 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8050 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8052 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8053 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8054 "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", {});
8056 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8057 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8058 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8059 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8061 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8062 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8063 "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", {});
8065 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8066 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8067 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8068 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8069 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8070 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8072 amount_msat: 2000000,
8074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8075 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8077 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8080 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8081 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8084 amount_msat: 5000001,
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8093 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8094 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8096 amount_msat: 5000000,
8098 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8099 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8100 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8102 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8106 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8107 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8108 "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", {
8111 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8112 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8113 "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" },
8115 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8116 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8117 "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" },
8119 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8120 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8121 "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" }
8124 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8125 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8126 "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", {
8129 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8130 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8131 "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" },
8133 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8134 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8135 "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" },
8137 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8138 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8139 "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" }
8144 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8145 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8147 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8148 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8149 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8150 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8152 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8153 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8154 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8156 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8157 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8159 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8160 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8162 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8163 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8164 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8168 fn test_key_derivation() {
8169 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8170 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8172 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8173 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8175 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8176 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8178 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8179 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8181 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8182 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8184 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8185 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8187 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8188 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8190 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8191 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8195 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8196 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8197 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8198 let seed = [42; 32];
8199 let network = Network::Testnet;
8200 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8201 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8203 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8204 let config = UserConfig::default();
8205 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8206 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8208 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8209 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8211 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8212 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8213 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8214 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8215 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8216 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8217 assert!(res.is_ok());
8222 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8223 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8224 // resulting `channel_type`.
8225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8226 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8227 let network = Network::Testnet;
8228 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8229 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8231 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8232 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8234 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8235 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8237 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8238 // need to signal it.
8239 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8240 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8241 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8244 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8246 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8247 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8248 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8250 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8251 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8252 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8255 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8256 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8257 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8258 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8259 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8262 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8263 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8268 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8269 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8270 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8271 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8272 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8273 let network = Network::Testnet;
8274 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8275 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8277 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8278 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8280 let config = UserConfig::default();
8282 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8283 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8284 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8285 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8286 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8288 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8289 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8290 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8293 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8294 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8295 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8297 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8298 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8299 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8300 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8301 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8302 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8304 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8309 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8310 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8312 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8313 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8314 let network = Network::Testnet;
8315 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8316 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8318 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8319 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8321 let config = UserConfig::default();
8323 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8324 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8325 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8326 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8327 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8328 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8329 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8330 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8332 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8333 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8334 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8335 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8336 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8337 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8340 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8341 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8343 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8344 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8345 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8346 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8348 assert!(res.is_err());
8350 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8351 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8352 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8354 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8355 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8356 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8359 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8361 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8362 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8363 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8364 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8367 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8368 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8370 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8371 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8373 assert!(res.is_err());