1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
18 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
20 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
21 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
23 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
25 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
26 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
27 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
28 use util::transaction_utils;
29 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
30 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
31 use util::errors::APIError;
32 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
35 use std::default::Default;
36 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
40 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
41 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
43 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
47 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
50 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
51 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
52 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
53 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
56 enum InboundHTLCState {
57 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
58 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
59 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
60 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
61 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
62 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
63 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
64 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
65 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
66 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
67 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
68 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
70 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
72 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
73 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
75 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
76 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
77 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
78 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
79 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
80 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
81 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
82 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
85 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
89 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
90 state: InboundHTLCState,
93 enum OutboundHTLCState {
94 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
95 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
96 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
97 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
98 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
99 /// money back (though we won't), and,
100 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
101 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
102 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
103 /// we'll never get out of sync).
104 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
105 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
106 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
108 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
109 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
110 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
111 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
112 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
113 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
114 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
115 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
116 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
117 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
118 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
119 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
120 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
121 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
122 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
125 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
129 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
130 state: OutboundHTLCState,
134 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
135 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
136 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
145 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
155 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
156 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
157 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
158 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
159 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
160 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
162 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
163 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
164 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
165 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
166 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
167 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
168 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
170 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
171 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
172 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
174 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
175 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
176 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
177 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
178 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
179 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
181 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
182 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
184 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
185 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
186 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
187 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
188 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
189 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
190 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
191 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
192 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
194 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
195 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
196 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
197 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
198 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
199 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
200 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
201 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
202 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
203 /// us their shutdown.
204 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
205 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
206 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
207 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
209 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
210 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
212 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
214 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
215 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
216 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
217 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
220 /// Status has been gossiped.
222 /// Status has been changed.
224 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
228 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
229 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
230 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
232 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
233 config: ChannelConfig,
237 channel_id: [u8; 32],
239 channel_outbound: bool,
240 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
241 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
243 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
246 local_keys: ChanSigner,
248 pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
249 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
255 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
256 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
271 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
274 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
275 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
277 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
278 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
279 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
281 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
282 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
283 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
284 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
285 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
286 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
287 // commitment_signed.
288 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
289 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
290 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
291 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
292 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
293 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
294 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
295 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
296 channel_update_count: u32,
299 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
300 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
301 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
302 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
303 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
304 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
306 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
308 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
310 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
311 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
312 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
313 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
314 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
315 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
316 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
317 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
318 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
319 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
321 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
323 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
325 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
327 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
329 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
330 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
331 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
332 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
333 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
334 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
335 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
336 their_to_self_delay: u16,
337 our_to_self_delay: u16,
339 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
341 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
342 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
345 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
347 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
349 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
350 their_node_id: PublicKey,
352 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
354 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
355 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
357 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
362 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
363 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
364 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
365 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
366 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
367 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
368 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
371 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
373 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
375 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
377 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
379 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
381 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
383 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
384 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
385 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
386 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 Ignore(&'static str),
389 CloseDelayBroadcast {
391 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
395 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
396 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
398 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
399 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
400 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
405 macro_rules! secp_check {
406 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
409 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
414 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
415 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
416 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
417 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
420 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
422 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
423 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
424 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
425 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
428 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
429 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
432 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
437 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError> {
438 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
440 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
441 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
444 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
445 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
447 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
452 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
453 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
454 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
457 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
459 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
460 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
461 chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
462 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
463 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
467 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
469 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
470 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
471 channel_outbound: true,
473 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
475 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
477 local_keys: chan_keys,
478 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
479 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
480 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
481 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
483 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
484 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
485 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
486 pending_update_fee: None,
487 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
488 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
489 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
490 channel_update_count: 1,
492 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
494 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
495 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
496 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
497 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
498 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
500 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
502 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
503 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
505 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
508 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
509 short_channel_id: None,
510 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
511 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
513 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
514 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
515 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
516 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
517 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
518 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
519 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
520 their_to_self_delay: 0,
521 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
522 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
523 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
526 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
528 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
529 their_node_id: their_node_id,
531 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
533 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
534 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
536 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
542 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
543 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
546 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
552 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
553 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
554 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> {
555 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
556 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
557 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
558 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
559 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
560 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
561 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
563 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
564 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
566 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
570 // Check sanity of message fields:
571 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
574 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
577 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
580 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
583 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
586 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
589 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
591 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
594 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
597 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
601 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
602 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
603 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
605 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
608 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
611 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
614 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
617 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
620 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
624 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
626 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
627 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
628 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
632 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
633 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
635 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
637 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
638 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
639 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
642 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
645 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
649 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
650 // for full fee payment
651 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
652 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
656 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
657 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
658 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
662 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
663 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
664 chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
665 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
666 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
668 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
669 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
670 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
671 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
672 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
674 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
675 } else if script.len() == 0 {
677 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
682 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
683 &OptionalField::Absent => {
684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
691 config: local_config,
693 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
694 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
695 channel_outbound: false,
698 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
700 local_keys: chan_keys,
701 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
702 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
703 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
704 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
706 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
707 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
708 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
709 pending_update_fee: None,
710 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
711 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
712 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
713 channel_update_count: 1,
715 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
717 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
718 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
719 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
720 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
721 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
725 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
726 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
728 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
731 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
732 short_channel_id: None,
733 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
734 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
736 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
737 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
738 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
739 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
740 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
741 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
742 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
743 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
744 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
745 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
746 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
747 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
749 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
750 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
752 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
753 their_node_id: their_node_id,
755 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
757 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
758 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
760 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
768 // Utilities to derive keys:
770 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
771 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
772 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
775 // Utilities to build transactions:
777 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
778 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
779 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
781 let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
782 if self.channel_outbound {
783 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
784 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
786 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
787 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
789 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
791 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
792 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
793 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
794 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
795 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
796 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
799 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
800 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
801 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
802 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
803 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
805 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
806 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
807 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
808 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
809 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
810 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
811 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
812 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
813 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
814 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
815 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
817 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
818 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
821 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
823 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
824 script_sig: Script::new(),
825 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
831 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
832 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
834 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
835 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
836 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
837 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
839 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
841 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
842 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
843 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
845 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
846 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
847 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
848 transaction_output_index: None
853 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
854 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
855 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
856 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
857 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
858 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
860 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
861 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
862 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
864 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
865 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
868 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
869 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
870 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
871 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
872 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
873 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
874 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
876 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
877 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
883 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
884 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
885 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
886 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
887 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
888 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
889 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
893 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
894 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
896 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
898 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
899 if generated_by_local {
900 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
901 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
910 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
911 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
912 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
913 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
914 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
915 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
916 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
920 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
921 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
923 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
925 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
926 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
928 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
929 if !generated_by_local {
930 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
938 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
939 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
940 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
941 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
942 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
943 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
944 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
945 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
947 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
949 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
950 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
951 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
952 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
954 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
956 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
957 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
958 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
959 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
962 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
963 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
964 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
966 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
969 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
970 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
972 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
973 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
975 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
976 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
977 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
978 value: value_to_a as u64
982 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
983 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
985 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
986 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
988 value: value_to_b as u64
992 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
993 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
994 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
995 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
996 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
997 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
999 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1000 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1001 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1002 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1003 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1006 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1007 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1008 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1009 outputs.push(out.0);
1010 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1011 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1012 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1015 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1016 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1020 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1023 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1027 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1028 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1029 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1033 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1034 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1038 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1040 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1042 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1043 script_sig: Script::new(),
1044 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1045 witness: Vec::new(),
1050 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1051 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1052 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1054 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1055 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1056 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1058 if value_to_self < 0 {
1059 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1060 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1061 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1062 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1063 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1066 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1067 txouts.push((TxOut {
1068 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1069 value: value_to_remote as u64
1073 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1074 txouts.push((TxOut {
1075 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1076 value: value_to_self as u64
1080 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1082 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1083 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1084 outputs.push(out.0);
1092 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1096 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1097 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1098 /// our counterparty!)
1099 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1100 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1101 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1102 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1103 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1104 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1105 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1107 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1111 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1112 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1113 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1114 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1115 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1116 //may see payments to it!
1117 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
1118 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1119 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1120 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1122 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1125 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1126 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1127 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1128 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1129 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1130 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1133 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1134 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1135 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1136 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1137 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1140 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1141 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1142 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1143 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1144 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1145 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1146 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1148 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1149 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1151 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1153 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1155 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1156 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1157 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1159 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1160 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1161 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1162 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1164 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1165 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1166 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1168 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1170 return Ok((None, None));
1173 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1174 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1181 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1185 // Now update local state:
1187 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1188 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1189 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1190 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1191 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1192 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1193 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1196 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1198 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1199 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1200 match pending_update {
1201 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1202 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1203 return Ok((None, None));
1206 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1207 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1208 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1209 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1210 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1211 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1217 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1218 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1219 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1221 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1225 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1226 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1228 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1229 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1231 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1232 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1235 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1236 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1237 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1238 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1239 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1242 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1243 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1244 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1245 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1246 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1247 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1248 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1249 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1250 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1252 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1253 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1254 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1256 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1257 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1261 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1262 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1263 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1264 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1265 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1266 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1268 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1270 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1271 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1272 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1274 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1275 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1276 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1278 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1279 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1283 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1290 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1294 // Now update local state:
1295 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1296 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1297 match pending_update {
1298 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1299 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1303 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1304 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1311 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1312 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1319 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1320 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1323 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1324 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1325 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1330 // Message handlers:
1332 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1333 // Check sanity of message fields:
1334 if !self.channel_outbound {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1337 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1340 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1343 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1346 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1349 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1352 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1355 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1358 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1361 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1364 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1368 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1369 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1372 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1375 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1378 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1381 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1384 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1387 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1391 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1392 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1393 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1394 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1395 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1396 Some(script.clone())
1397 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1398 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1400 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1405 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1406 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1412 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1413 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1414 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1415 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1416 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1417 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1418 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1420 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1421 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1422 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1423 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
1424 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1425 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1428 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1429 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1431 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1432 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1434 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1439 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1440 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1442 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1443 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1444 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1446 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1447 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1449 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
1451 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1452 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1453 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1454 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1456 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1457 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
1460 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1461 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1464 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
1465 if self.channel_outbound {
1466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1468 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1469 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1470 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1474 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1475 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1476 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1477 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1480 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1481 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1483 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1486 self.funding_txo = None;
1491 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1492 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1493 self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor());
1495 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1496 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1498 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1500 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1501 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()).unwrap();
1502 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1503 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1504 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1505 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1507 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1508 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1509 signature: our_signature
1510 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1513 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1514 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1515 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitorUpdate, (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> {
1516 if !self.channel_outbound {
1517 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?")));
1519 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1520 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!")));
1522 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1523 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1524 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1525 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1528 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1530 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1531 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1532 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1534 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1536 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1537 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
1538 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer")));
1541 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1542 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1543 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1544 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1545 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
1546 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: Vec::new(),
1549 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1550 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
1551 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1553 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1556 Err((Some(monitor_update),
1557 ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast")))
1561 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1562 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1566 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1568 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1569 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1570 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1571 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1572 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1573 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1574 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1575 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1576 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1577 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1578 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1579 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1580 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1583 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1589 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1590 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1594 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1595 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1596 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1597 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1598 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1600 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1603 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1605 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1606 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1607 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1612 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1613 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1614 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1615 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1619 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1622 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1623 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1624 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1625 /// corner case properly.
1626 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1627 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1628 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1629 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1632 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1633 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1636 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1639 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1642 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1646 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1647 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1650 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1651 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1654 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1655 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1656 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1657 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1658 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1659 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1660 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1661 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1662 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1663 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1664 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1666 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1667 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1668 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1669 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1670 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1671 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1677 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1680 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1684 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1686 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1687 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1688 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1692 // Now update local state:
1693 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1694 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1695 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1696 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1697 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1698 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1699 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1704 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1706 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1707 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1708 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1709 match check_preimage {
1711 Some(payment_hash) =>
1712 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1713 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1717 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1718 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1719 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1720 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1722 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1725 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1728 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1731 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1732 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1735 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1739 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1740 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1743 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1744 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1747 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1751 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1755 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1756 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1759 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1763 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1767 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> {
1768 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1769 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
1771 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1772 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
1774 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1775 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
1778 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1780 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1782 let mut update_fee = false;
1783 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1785 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1790 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1791 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1792 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1793 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1795 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1796 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1797 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1798 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
1799 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
1802 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1804 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1805 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1807 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1808 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
1812 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1813 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
1816 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1817 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1818 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1819 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1820 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1821 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1822 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1823 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
1824 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
1826 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1828 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1832 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1833 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1835 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1836 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1837 if !self.channel_outbound {
1838 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1839 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1840 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1841 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1842 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1843 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1844 need_our_commitment = true;
1845 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1850 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1852 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1853 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1854 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1855 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1856 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
1857 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
1860 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1862 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1863 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1864 Some(forward_info.clone())
1866 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1867 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1868 need_our_commitment = true;
1871 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1872 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1873 Some(fail_reason.take())
1875 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1876 need_our_commitment = true;
1880 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1881 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1882 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1883 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1885 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1886 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1887 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1888 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1889 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1890 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1891 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1892 // includes the right HTLCs.
1893 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1894 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1895 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1896 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1897 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1898 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1900 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1901 // re-send the message on restoration)
1902 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
1905 let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1906 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1907 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1908 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1909 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1910 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1911 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1912 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1913 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1915 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1916 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1917 } else { (None, None) };
1919 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1920 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1921 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1922 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1923 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1926 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1927 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1928 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
1929 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1930 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1931 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1933 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1934 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
1935 updates: Vec::new(),
1938 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1939 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1940 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1941 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1942 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1944 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1945 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1946 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1947 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1948 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1949 // to rebalance channels.
1950 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1951 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1953 match &htlc_update {
1954 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1955 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1956 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1959 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1960 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1963 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1970 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1971 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1972 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
1973 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
1974 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
1979 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1981 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1986 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1987 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1988 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1990 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1992 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1999 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2000 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
2001 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2002 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2008 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2009 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2012 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2013 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2014 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2015 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2018 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2019 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2020 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2021 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2022 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2028 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2029 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2030 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2031 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2032 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2034 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2036 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2038 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2039 update_fee: update_fee,
2041 }, monitor_update)))
2050 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2051 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2052 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2053 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2054 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2055 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
2056 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2059 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2062 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2066 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2067 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2072 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2073 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2074 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2075 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2076 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2077 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2078 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2079 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
2083 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2084 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
2085 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2086 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2087 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2088 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2089 idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2090 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2093 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2095 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2096 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2097 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2098 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2099 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2100 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2101 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2102 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2104 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2105 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2106 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2107 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2108 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2109 let mut require_commitment = false;
2110 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2113 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2114 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2115 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2116 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2118 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2119 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2120 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2121 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2122 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2123 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2128 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2129 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2130 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2131 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2132 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2134 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2135 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2140 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2141 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2142 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2144 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2145 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2149 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2150 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2152 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2153 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2154 require_commitment = true;
2155 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2156 match forward_info {
2157 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2158 require_commitment = true;
2160 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2161 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2162 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2164 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2165 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2166 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2170 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2171 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2172 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2178 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2179 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2180 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2181 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2183 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2184 Some(fail_reason.take())
2186 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2187 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2188 require_commitment = true;
2192 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2194 if self.channel_outbound {
2195 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2196 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2199 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2200 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2201 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2202 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2203 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2204 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2205 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2206 require_commitment = true;
2207 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2212 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2213 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2214 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2215 if require_commitment {
2216 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2217 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2218 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2219 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2220 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2221 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2222 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2223 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2224 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2226 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2227 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2228 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
2231 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2232 Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
2233 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2234 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2235 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2237 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2238 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2239 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2242 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2243 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2244 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2245 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2247 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2250 if require_commitment {
2251 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2253 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2254 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2255 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2256 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2258 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2259 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2260 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2262 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2265 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2267 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
2274 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2275 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2276 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2277 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2278 if !self.channel_outbound {
2279 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2281 if !self.is_usable() {
2282 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2284 if !self.is_live() {
2285 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2288 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2289 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2293 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2294 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2296 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2297 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2298 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2302 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
2303 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2304 Some(update_fee) => {
2305 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2306 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2312 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2313 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2314 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2315 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2316 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2318 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2319 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2321 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2322 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2323 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2324 return outbound_drops;
2326 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2327 // will be retransmitted.
2328 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2330 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2331 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2333 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2334 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2335 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2336 // this HTLC accordingly
2337 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2340 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2341 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2342 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2343 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2346 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2347 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2348 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2349 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2350 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2351 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2356 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2358 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2359 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2360 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2361 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2362 // the update upon reconnection.
2363 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2367 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2370 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2373 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2376 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2377 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2381 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2382 /// updates are partially paused.
2383 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2384 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2385 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2386 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2387 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2388 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2389 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2390 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2391 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2392 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2393 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2394 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2395 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2398 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2399 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2400 /// to the remote side.
2401 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2402 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2403 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2405 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2407 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2408 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2409 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2410 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2411 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2412 // monitor was persisted.
2413 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2414 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2415 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2416 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2417 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2418 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2419 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2420 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2424 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2425 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2426 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2427 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2429 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2430 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2431 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2432 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2435 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2436 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2438 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2439 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2442 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2443 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2444 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2445 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2446 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2447 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2448 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2449 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2450 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2453 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2454 if self.channel_outbound {
2455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2457 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2460 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2461 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2462 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2466 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2467 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2468 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2469 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2470 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2471 per_commitment_secret,
2472 next_per_commitment_point,
2476 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2477 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2478 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2479 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2480 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2482 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2483 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2484 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2485 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2486 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2487 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2488 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2489 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2490 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2495 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2496 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2498 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2499 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2500 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2501 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2502 reason: err_packet.clone()
2505 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2506 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2507 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2508 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2509 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2510 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2513 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2514 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2515 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2516 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2517 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2524 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2525 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2526 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2527 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2529 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2533 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2534 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2535 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2536 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2537 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2538 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2539 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2543 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2544 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2548 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2549 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2550 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2551 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2554 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2555 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2556 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2557 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2558 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
2559 their_current_per_commitment_point: data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point
2562 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2563 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast {
2564 msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting",
2565 update: monitor_update
2569 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2573 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2574 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2575 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2577 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2578 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2579 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2580 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2584 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2585 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2586 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2587 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2588 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2591 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2592 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2595 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2596 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2597 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2598 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2599 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2600 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2601 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2604 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2605 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2606 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2608 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2609 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2610 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2613 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2619 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2620 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2621 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2622 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2623 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2625 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2626 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2627 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2628 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2629 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2630 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2631 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2635 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2636 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2637 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2639 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2643 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2644 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2645 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2647 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2648 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2649 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2650 Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2651 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2654 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2656 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2657 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2658 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2660 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2663 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2664 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2665 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2668 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2674 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2675 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2676 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2677 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2681 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2682 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2683 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2685 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2686 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2688 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2689 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2690 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2692 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2694 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2695 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2696 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2697 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2698 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2702 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
2703 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2706 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2707 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2708 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2709 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2712 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2713 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2717 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2719 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2720 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2721 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2725 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2726 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2730 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2731 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2735 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2738 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2740 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2741 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2743 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2744 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2745 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2746 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2747 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2748 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2751 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2757 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2758 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2759 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2761 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2764 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2765 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2766 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2770 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2771 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2773 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2776 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2777 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2778 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2779 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2781 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2783 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2784 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2785 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2786 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2787 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2789 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2790 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2792 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2793 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2795 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2798 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
2799 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2802 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2805 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2808 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2812 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2813 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2814 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2817 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2819 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2821 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2824 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2825 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2826 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2827 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2828 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2832 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2833 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2834 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2835 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2836 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2837 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2841 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2842 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2843 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2844 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2845 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2846 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2847 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2848 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2849 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2850 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2851 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2857 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2858 if self.channel_outbound {
2859 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2860 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2861 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2862 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2866 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2869 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2870 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2871 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2872 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2876 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2880 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2881 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2882 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2883 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2885 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2886 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2888 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2889 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2890 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2892 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2895 // Public utilities:
2897 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2901 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2902 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2903 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2907 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2908 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
2909 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2910 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2912 &mut self.channel_monitor
2915 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2916 /// is_usable() returns true).
2917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2918 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2919 self.short_channel_id
2922 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2923 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2924 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2928 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2929 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2933 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2934 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2935 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2938 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2939 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2940 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2943 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2944 self.channel_value_satoshis
2947 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2948 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2952 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2956 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2957 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2960 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2961 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2964 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2965 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2969 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
2974 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2976 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2977 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2978 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2979 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2980 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2981 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2983 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2985 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2993 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2998 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2999 self.channel_update_count
3002 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3003 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3006 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3007 self.config.announced_channel
3010 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3011 self.channel_outbound
3014 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3015 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3016 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
3017 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3018 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3020 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3021 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3023 if self.channel_outbound {
3024 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3025 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3028 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3029 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3034 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3035 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3036 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3039 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3041 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3042 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3043 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3046 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3047 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3049 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3050 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3053 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3055 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3056 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3059 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3060 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3061 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
3064 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3065 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3066 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3067 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3068 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3069 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3074 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3075 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3078 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3079 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3082 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3083 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3086 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3087 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3090 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3091 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3094 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
3095 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
3096 /// the channel_monitor.
3097 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
3098 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
3099 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3100 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3101 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3102 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3103 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3104 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3107 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3108 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3109 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3110 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3111 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3112 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3113 if self.channel_outbound {
3114 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3115 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3116 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3117 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3118 // channel and move on.
3119 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3120 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3122 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3123 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3124 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3125 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3126 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3129 if self.channel_outbound {
3130 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3131 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3132 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3133 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3134 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3135 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3139 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3140 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3141 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3142 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3147 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3148 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3149 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3150 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3151 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3152 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3153 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3155 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3156 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3157 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3159 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3160 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3161 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3163 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3164 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3166 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3167 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3170 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3172 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3173 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3174 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3175 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3176 if need_commitment_update {
3177 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3178 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3179 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3180 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3181 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3182 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3185 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3195 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3196 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3197 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3198 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3199 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3200 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3201 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3205 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3206 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3208 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3209 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3213 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3214 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3216 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3217 if !self.channel_outbound {
3218 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3220 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3221 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3224 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3225 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3228 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3231 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3232 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3233 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3234 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3235 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3236 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3237 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3238 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3239 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3240 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3241 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3242 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3243 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3244 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3245 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3246 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3247 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3248 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3249 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3253 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3254 if self.channel_outbound {
3255 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3257 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3258 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3260 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3261 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3264 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3266 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3267 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3268 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3269 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3270 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3271 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3272 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3273 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3274 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3275 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3276 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3277 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3278 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3279 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3280 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3281 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3285 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3286 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3287 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3288 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3289 Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3290 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3293 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3294 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3295 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3296 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3297 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3298 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3299 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3300 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
3301 if !self.channel_outbound {
3302 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3304 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3305 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3307 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3308 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3309 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3310 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3313 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3314 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3317 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3318 self.funding_txo = None;
3323 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
3324 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3325 self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor());
3327 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3328 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3329 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3331 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3332 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3333 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3334 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3335 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3337 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3338 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3339 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3340 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3341 signature: our_signature
3342 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3345 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3346 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3347 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3348 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3349 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3351 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3352 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3353 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3354 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3357 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3358 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3360 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3361 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3364 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3365 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3367 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3368 features: ChannelFeatures::supported(),
3369 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3370 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3371 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3372 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3373 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3374 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3375 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3378 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3379 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3384 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3385 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3386 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3387 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3388 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3389 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3390 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3391 log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3392 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3393 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3394 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
3397 log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
3398 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3399 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3400 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
3403 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3404 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3405 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3406 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3407 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3408 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3409 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3410 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3412 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3413 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3414 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3415 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3416 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3417 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3418 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3419 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3420 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3422 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3428 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3430 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3431 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3432 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3433 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3434 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3435 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3436 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3437 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3438 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3439 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3442 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3443 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3445 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3446 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3449 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3450 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3451 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3452 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3453 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3454 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3455 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3459 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3460 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3463 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3464 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3465 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3468 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3469 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3470 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3471 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
3474 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3476 // Now update local state:
3477 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3478 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3479 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3480 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3481 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3483 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3488 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3489 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3490 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3491 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3492 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3493 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3497 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3498 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3499 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3500 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3501 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3502 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3503 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3505 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3510 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3511 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3512 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3513 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3514 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3515 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3516 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3518 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3519 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3521 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3522 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3524 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3525 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3527 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3528 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3529 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3530 have_updates = true;
3532 if have_updates { break; }
3534 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3535 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3536 have_updates = true;
3538 if have_updates { break; }
3541 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3543 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3545 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3546 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3547 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3548 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3550 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3551 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3552 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3554 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3558 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3559 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3560 Some(fail_reason.take())
3562 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3565 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3567 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3568 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3569 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3570 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3571 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3572 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3574 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3577 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3578 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3579 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3580 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3581 unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
3582 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3583 commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3584 their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3587 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
3588 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3589 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3592 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3593 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3594 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3595 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3596 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3597 if self.channel_outbound {
3598 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3602 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3603 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3604 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3607 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3608 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3612 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3613 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3615 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3617 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3618 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3619 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3620 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3622 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3623 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3624 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3625 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3626 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3627 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3631 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3632 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3635 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3638 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3639 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3640 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3642 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
3643 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3644 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3645 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3646 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3652 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3653 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3654 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3655 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3656 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3657 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3660 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3661 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3664 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3665 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3668 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3669 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3670 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3673 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3675 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3676 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3677 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3679 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3681 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3683 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3684 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3685 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3686 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3687 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3689 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3690 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3697 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3698 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3699 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3700 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3703 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3704 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3705 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3706 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3707 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3708 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3709 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3711 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3712 // return them to fail the payment.
3713 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3714 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3716 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3717 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3723 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3724 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3725 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3729 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3730 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3731 (self.channel_monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3735 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3736 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3738 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3739 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3741 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3743 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3745 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3747 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3748 err_code.write(writer)?;
3750 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3752 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3759 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3760 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3761 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3762 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3763 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3764 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3765 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3770 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3771 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3772 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3773 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3775 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3776 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3778 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3779 self.config.write(writer)?;
3781 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3782 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3783 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3784 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3786 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
3788 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3789 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3791 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3792 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3793 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3795 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3796 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3797 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3798 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3801 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3802 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3803 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
3806 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3807 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3808 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3809 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3811 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
3812 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3814 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3816 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3818 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3820 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3823 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3825 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3830 macro_rules! write_option {
3833 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3842 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3843 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3844 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3845 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3846 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3847 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3848 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3850 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3852 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3854 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3857 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3859 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3861 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3863 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3865 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3867 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3872 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3873 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3875 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3877 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3878 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3879 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3880 source.write(writer)?;
3881 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3885 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3886 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3888 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3890 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3891 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3896 match self.resend_order {
3897 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3898 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3901 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3902 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3903 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3905 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3906 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3907 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3908 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3911 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3912 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3913 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3914 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3915 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3918 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3919 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3921 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3922 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3923 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3924 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3926 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3927 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
3929 feerate.write(writer)?;
3933 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3936 write_option!(self.funding_txo);
3937 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3938 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3940 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3941 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3943 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3944 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3945 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3946 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3947 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3948 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3949 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3950 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3951 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3952 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3954 write_option!(self.their_pubkeys);
3955 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3957 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3958 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3960 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3962 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
3964 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3969 impl<R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3970 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3971 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3972 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3973 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3974 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3977 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3978 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3980 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3981 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3982 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3983 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3985 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3987 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3988 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3990 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3991 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3992 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3994 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3995 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3996 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3997 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3998 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3999 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4000 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4001 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4002 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4003 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4004 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4005 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4006 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4007 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4012 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4013 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4014 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4015 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4016 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4017 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4018 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4019 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4020 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4021 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4022 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4023 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4024 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4025 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4026 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4027 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4032 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4033 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4034 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4035 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4036 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4037 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4038 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4039 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4040 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4041 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4043 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4044 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4045 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4047 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4048 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4049 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4051 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4055 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4056 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4057 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4058 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4061 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4062 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4063 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4065 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4066 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4067 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4068 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4071 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4072 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4073 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4074 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4077 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4078 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4080 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4081 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4082 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
4083 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4085 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4087 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4088 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4091 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4092 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4093 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4095 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4096 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4098 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4099 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4100 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4101 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4102 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4103 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4104 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4105 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4106 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4107 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4109 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4110 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4112 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4113 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4115 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4116 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4118 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
4119 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
4120 // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
4121 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
4122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4132 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4133 channel_value_satoshis,
4135 latest_monitor_update_id,
4140 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
4141 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
4144 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4145 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4146 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4150 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4151 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4152 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4153 monitor_pending_forwards,
4154 monitor_pending_failures,
4157 holding_cell_update_fee,
4159 next_remote_htlc_id,
4160 channel_update_count,
4163 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4164 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4165 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4166 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4168 last_sent_closing_fee,
4171 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4173 last_block_connected,
4174 funding_tx_confirmations,
4176 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4177 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4178 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4179 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4180 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4181 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4182 their_to_self_delay,
4184 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4188 their_cur_commitment_point,
4190 their_prev_commitment_point,
4193 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4198 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4207 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4208 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4209 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4210 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
4211 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4212 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4214 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4215 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4216 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4218 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4219 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4220 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4221 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4222 use util::config::UserConfig;
4223 use util::test_utils;
4224 use util::logger::Logger;
4225 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4226 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4227 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4228 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4229 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4230 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4233 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4236 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4237 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4243 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4244 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4245 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4249 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4251 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4252 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4254 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4255 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4257 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4258 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4259 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4262 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4264 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4265 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4268 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4269 self.chan_keys.clone()
4271 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4272 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4275 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4276 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4280 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4281 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4282 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4283 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4286 let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4288 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4289 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4290 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4291 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4292 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4294 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4295 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4299 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4300 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4301 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4303 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4304 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4305 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4306 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4307 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4308 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4310 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4311 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4313 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4314 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4315 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4316 payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4317 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4318 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4321 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4322 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4324 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4325 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4327 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4328 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4330 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4331 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4332 // build_commitment_transaction.
4333 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4334 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4335 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4336 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4337 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4339 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4341 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4343 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4344 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4346 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4347 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4348 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4352 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4353 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4354 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4355 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4357 let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
4358 localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
4360 assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],
4361 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4365 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4366 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4367 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4369 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4370 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4371 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4372 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4373 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4375 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4378 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4379 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4380 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4384 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4387 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key, &keys.per_commitment_point, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key(), &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4388 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4389 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4394 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4395 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4397 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4398 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4399 "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");
4402 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4403 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4405 amount_msat: 1000000,
4407 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4408 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4410 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4413 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4414 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4416 amount_msat: 2000000,
4418 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4419 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4421 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4424 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4425 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4427 amount_msat: 2000000,
4429 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4430 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4431 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4433 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4436 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4437 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4439 amount_msat: 3000000,
4441 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4442 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4443 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4445 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4448 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4449 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4451 amount_msat: 4000000,
4453 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4454 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4456 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4461 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4462 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4463 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4465 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4466 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4467 "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");
4469 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4471 test_htlc_output!(0,
4472 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4473 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4474 "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");
4476 test_htlc_output!(1,
4477 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4478 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4479 "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");
4481 test_htlc_output!(2,
4482 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4483 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4484 "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");
4486 test_htlc_output!(3,
4487 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4488 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4489 "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");
4491 test_htlc_output!(4,
4492 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4493 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4494 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219704000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d014730440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4498 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4499 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4500 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4502 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4503 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4504 "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");
4506 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4508 test_htlc_output!(0,
4509 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4510 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4511 "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");
4513 test_htlc_output!(1,
4514 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4515 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4516 "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");
4518 test_htlc_output!(2,
4519 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4520 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4521 "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");
4523 test_htlc_output!(3,
4524 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4525 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4526 "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");
4528 test_htlc_output!(4,
4529 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4530 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4531 "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");
4535 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4536 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4537 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4539 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4540 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4541 "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");
4543 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4545 test_htlc_output!(0,
4546 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4547 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4548 "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");
4550 test_htlc_output!(1,
4551 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4552 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4553 "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");
4555 test_htlc_output!(2,
4556 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4557 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4558 "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");
4560 test_htlc_output!(3,
4561 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4562 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4563 "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");
4567 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4568 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4569 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4571 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4572 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4573 "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");
4575 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4577 test_htlc_output!(0,
4578 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4579 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4580 "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");
4582 test_htlc_output!(1,
4583 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4584 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4585 "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");
4587 test_htlc_output!(2,
4588 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4589 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4590 "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");
4592 test_htlc_output!(3,
4593 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4594 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4595 "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");
4599 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4600 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4601 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4603 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4604 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4605 "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");
4607 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4609 test_htlc_output!(0,
4610 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4611 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4612 "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");
4614 test_htlc_output!(1,
4615 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4616 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4617 "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");
4619 test_htlc_output!(2,
4620 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4621 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4622 "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");
4626 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4627 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4628 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4630 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4631 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4632 "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");
4634 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4636 test_htlc_output!(0,
4637 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4638 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4639 "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");
4641 test_htlc_output!(1,
4642 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4643 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4644 "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");
4646 test_htlc_output!(2,
4647 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4648 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4649 "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");
4653 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4654 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4655 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4657 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4658 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4659 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de843110b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a54290147304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb792429801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4661 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4663 test_htlc_output!(0,
4664 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4665 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4666 "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");
4668 test_htlc_output!(1,
4669 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4670 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4671 "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");
4675 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4676 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4677 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4679 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4680 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4681 "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");
4683 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4685 test_htlc_output!(0,
4686 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4687 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4688 "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");
4690 test_htlc_output!(1,
4691 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4692 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4693 "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");
4697 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4698 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4699 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4701 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4702 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4703 "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");
4705 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4707 test_htlc_output!(0,
4708 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4709 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4710 "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");
4714 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4715 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4716 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4718 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4719 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4720 "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");
4722 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4724 test_htlc_output!(0,
4725 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4726 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4727 "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");
4731 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4732 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4733 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4735 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4736 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4737 "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");
4739 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4743 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4744 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4745 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4747 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4748 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4749 "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");
4751 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4755 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4756 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4757 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4759 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4760 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4761 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431100400473044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b101473044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4763 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4767 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4771 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4772 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4773 "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");
4775 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4780 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4781 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4783 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4784 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4785 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4786 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4788 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4790 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4792 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4793 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4795 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4796 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4798 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4799 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4800 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4804 fn test_key_derivation() {
4805 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4808 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4809 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4811 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4812 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4814 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4815 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4817 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4818 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4820 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4821 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4823 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4824 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4826 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4827 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());