1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
304 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
305 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
306 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
308 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
309 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
310 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
311 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
312 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
313 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
314 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
315 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
317 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
318 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
319 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
320 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
322 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
324 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
326 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
327 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
328 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
329 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
333 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
335 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
337 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
339 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
340 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
341 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
342 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
343 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
345 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
346 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
348 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
350 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
351 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
353 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
354 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
355 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
356 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
357 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
358 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
360 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
361 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
363 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
364 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
365 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
366 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
367 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
369 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
370 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
372 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
373 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
375 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
376 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
377 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
378 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
384 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
385 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
387 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
388 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
389 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
394 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
395 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
397 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
398 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
399 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
404 macro_rules! secp_check {
405 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
408 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
413 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
414 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
415 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
416 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
417 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
419 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
420 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
422 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
424 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
426 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
430 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
432 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
433 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
434 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
436 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
437 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
439 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
440 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
441 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
442 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
443 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
445 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
446 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
450 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
456 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
459 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
460 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
461 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
462 holding_cell_msat: u64,
463 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
466 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
467 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
468 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
469 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
470 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
471 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
472 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
473 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
474 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
475 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
478 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
479 struct HTLCCandidate {
481 origin: HTLCInitiator,
485 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
493 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
495 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
504 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
505 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
506 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
507 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
508 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
510 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
511 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
512 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
513 htlc_value_msat: u64,
515 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
516 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
520 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
521 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
526 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
527 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
528 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
529 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
530 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
533 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
534 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
535 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
536 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
537 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
538 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
539 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
540 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
543 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
545 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
546 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
547 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
548 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
549 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
550 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
551 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
552 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
556 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
557 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
558 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
559 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
560 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
561 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
562 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
563 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
564 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
565 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
566 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
567 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
568 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
569 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
570 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
573 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
574 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
575 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
577 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
578 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
579 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
580 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
582 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
583 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
584 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
585 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
586 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
588 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
589 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
590 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
591 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
593 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
594 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
595 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
597 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
598 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
599 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
600 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
601 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
603 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
604 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
607 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
608 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
610 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
611 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
612 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
613 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
615 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
616 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
618 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
619 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
622 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
623 (0, update, required),
626 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
627 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
628 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
630 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
634 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
635 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
636 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
638 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
640 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
641 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
646 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
648 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
649 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
655 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
656 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
657 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
658 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
659 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
661 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
662 /// in a timely manner.
663 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
666 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
667 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
668 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
670 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
671 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
672 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
673 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
677 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
678 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
679 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
681 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
682 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
683 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
684 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
686 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
690 /// The current channel ID.
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
693 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
694 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
697 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
698 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
700 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
701 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
702 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
704 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
705 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
706 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
707 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
710 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
712 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
714 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
715 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
716 destination_script: Script,
718 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
719 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
720 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
722 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
723 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
724 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
725 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
726 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
727 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
729 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
730 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
731 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
732 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
733 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
734 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
736 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
738 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
739 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
740 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
742 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
743 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
744 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
745 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
746 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
747 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
748 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
750 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
752 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
753 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
754 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
755 // HTLCs with similar state.
756 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
757 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
758 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
759 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
760 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
761 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
762 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
763 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
764 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
767 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
768 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
769 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
771 update_time_counter: u32,
773 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
774 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
775 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
778 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
780 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
781 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
783 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
784 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
785 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
786 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
788 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
789 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
791 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
793 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
796 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
797 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
798 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
799 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
800 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
801 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
802 channel_creation_height: u32,
804 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
807 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
814 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
822 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
825 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
827 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
830 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
834 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
835 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
838 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
840 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
841 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
842 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
844 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
845 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
846 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
848 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
850 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
852 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
853 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
854 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
855 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
857 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
858 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
859 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
861 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
862 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
863 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
865 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
866 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
867 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
868 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
869 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
870 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
875 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
876 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
877 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
878 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
880 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
881 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
883 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
884 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
885 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
886 /// unblock the state machine.
888 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
889 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
890 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
892 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
893 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
894 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
896 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
897 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
898 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
899 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
900 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
901 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
902 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
903 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
905 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
906 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
908 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
909 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
910 // the channel's funding UTXO.
912 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
913 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
914 // associated channel mapping.
916 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
917 // to store all of them.
918 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
920 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
921 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
922 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
923 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
924 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
926 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
927 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
930 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
932 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
933 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
934 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
936 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
937 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
938 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
941 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
942 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
943 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
944 self.update_time_counter
947 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
948 self.latest_monitor_update_id
951 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
952 self.config.announced_channel
955 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
956 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
959 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
960 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
961 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
962 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
965 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
966 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
967 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
970 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
972 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
973 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
974 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
977 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
978 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
979 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
980 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
985 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
994 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
995 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
996 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
997 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
999 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1000 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1001 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1002 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1005 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1006 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1008 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1009 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1012 // Public utilities:
1014 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1018 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1020 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1021 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1022 self.temporary_channel_id
1025 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1029 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1030 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1031 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1035 /// Gets the channel's type
1036 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1040 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1042 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1043 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1044 self.short_channel_id
1047 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1048 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1049 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1052 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1053 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1054 self.outbound_scid_alias
1057 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1058 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1059 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1060 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1061 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1062 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1065 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1066 /// get_funding_created.
1067 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1068 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1071 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1072 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1073 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1076 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1077 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1078 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1079 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1083 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1086 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1087 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1090 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1091 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1094 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1095 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1096 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1099 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1100 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1103 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1104 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1105 self.counterparty_node_id
1108 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1109 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1110 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1113 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1114 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1115 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1118 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1119 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1121 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1122 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1123 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1124 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1126 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1130 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1131 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1132 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1135 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1136 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1137 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1140 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1141 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1142 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1144 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1145 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1150 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1151 self.channel_value_satoshis
1154 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1155 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1158 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1159 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1162 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1163 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1166 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1167 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1168 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1169 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1170 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1172 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1176 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1177 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1178 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1181 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1182 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1183 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1186 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1187 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1188 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1191 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1192 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1193 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1196 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1197 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1198 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1201 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1202 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1203 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1206 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1207 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1208 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1209 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1210 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1213 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1215 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1216 self.prev_config = None;
1220 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1221 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1225 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1226 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1227 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1228 let did_channel_update =
1229 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1230 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1231 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1232 if did_channel_update {
1233 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1234 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1235 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1236 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1238 self.config.options = *config;
1242 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1243 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1244 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1245 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1246 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1249 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1250 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1251 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1252 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1253 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1255 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1256 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1257 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1258 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1259 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1260 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1261 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1263 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1264 where L::Target: Logger
1266 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1267 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1268 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1270 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1271 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1272 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1273 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1275 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1276 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1277 if match update_state {
1278 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1279 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1280 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1281 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1282 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1284 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1288 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1289 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1290 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1292 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1294 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1295 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1296 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1298 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1299 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1300 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1301 transaction_output_index: None
1306 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1307 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1308 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1309 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1310 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1313 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1315 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1316 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1317 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1323 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1324 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1327 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1329 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1330 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1331 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1340 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1341 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1342 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1343 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1344 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1350 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1351 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1353 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1355 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1356 if generated_by_local {
1357 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1358 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1367 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1369 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1370 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1371 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1372 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1373 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1378 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1379 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1380 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1381 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1385 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1386 preimages.push(preimage);
1390 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1391 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1393 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1396 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1398 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 if !generated_by_local {
1400 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1408 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1409 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1410 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1411 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1412 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1413 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1414 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1415 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1417 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1419 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1420 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1421 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1422 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1424 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1427 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1432 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1433 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1434 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1435 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1440 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1441 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1442 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1443 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1445 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1449 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1454 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1455 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1460 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1462 let channel_parameters =
1463 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1464 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1465 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1472 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1475 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1476 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1477 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1478 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1480 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1481 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1482 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1490 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1491 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1497 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1498 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1499 /// our counterparty!)
1500 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1501 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1502 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1503 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1504 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1505 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1506 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1508 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1512 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1513 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1514 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1515 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1516 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1517 //may see payments to it!
1518 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1519 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1520 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1522 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1525 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1526 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1527 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1528 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1529 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1532 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1533 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1536 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1540 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1541 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1542 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1543 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1544 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1545 // which are near the dust limit.
1546 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1547 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1548 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1549 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1550 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1552 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1558 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1559 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1560 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1563 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1564 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1566 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1567 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1568 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1569 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1570 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1571 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1575 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1578 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1579 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1580 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1582 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1583 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1584 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1585 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1586 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1587 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1590 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1596 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1597 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1599 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1600 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1601 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1602 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1603 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1604 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1608 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1611 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1612 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1613 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1615 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1616 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1618 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1620 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1623 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1627 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1628 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1629 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1630 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1631 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1632 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1633 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1636 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1645 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1646 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1647 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1648 /// corner case properly.
1649 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1650 -> AvailableBalances
1651 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1653 let context = &self;
1654 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1655 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1656 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1659 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1661 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1663 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1665 if context.is_outbound() {
1666 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1667 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1669 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1670 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1672 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1673 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1674 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1675 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1678 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1679 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1680 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1681 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1683 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1684 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1685 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1686 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1687 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1688 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1689 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1690 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1691 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1692 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1694 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1697 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1698 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1699 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1700 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1701 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1704 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1705 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1707 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1708 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1709 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1711 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1712 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1713 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1714 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1718 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1720 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1721 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1722 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1723 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1724 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1725 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1726 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1728 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1729 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1731 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1732 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1733 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1735 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1736 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1737 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1738 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1739 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1742 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1743 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1744 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1745 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1746 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1747 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1750 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1751 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1752 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1754 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1758 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1759 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1761 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1762 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1766 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1767 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1768 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1769 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1771 outbound_capacity_msat,
1772 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1773 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1777 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1778 let context = &self;
1779 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1782 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1783 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1785 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1786 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1788 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1789 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1791 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1792 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1793 let context = &self;
1794 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1796 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1799 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1800 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1802 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1803 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1805 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1808 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1809 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1813 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1814 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1820 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1821 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1822 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1825 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1826 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1827 included_htlcs += 1;
1830 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1831 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1836 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1837 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1838 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1839 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1840 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1845 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1848 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1853 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1854 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1858 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1859 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1863 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1864 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1866 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1867 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1868 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1870 total_pending_htlcs,
1871 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1875 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1876 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1877 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1879 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1881 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1886 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1887 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1889 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1890 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1892 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1893 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1895 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1896 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1897 let context = &self;
1898 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1900 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1903 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1909 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1910 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1912 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1918 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1924 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1925 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1926 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1927 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1928 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1929 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1932 included_htlcs += 1;
1935 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1936 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1940 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1942 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1943 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1944 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1949 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1950 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1951 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1955 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1957 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1958 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1960 total_pending_htlcs,
1961 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1962 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1963 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1965 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1966 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1967 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1969 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1971 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1976 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1977 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1978 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1979 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1986 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1988 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1989 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
1992 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1994 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
1995 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
1996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2000 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2001 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2002 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2005 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2007 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2008 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2011 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2012 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2013 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2014 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2015 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2016 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2017 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2018 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2019 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2020 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2021 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2023 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2024 // return them to fail the payment.
2025 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2026 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2027 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2029 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2030 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2035 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2036 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2037 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2038 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2039 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2040 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2041 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2042 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2044 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2045 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2046 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2047 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2051 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2053 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2054 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2055 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2059 // Internal utility functions for channels
2061 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2062 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2063 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2065 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2067 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2068 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2069 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2071 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2074 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2076 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2079 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2080 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2083 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2085 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2086 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2087 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2088 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2089 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2092 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2093 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2094 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2095 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2096 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2097 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2098 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2101 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2102 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2104 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2105 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2108 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2109 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2110 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2111 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2112 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2113 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2116 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2117 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2118 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2119 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2122 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2123 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2125 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2126 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2127 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2131 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2132 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2133 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2135 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2136 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2137 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2138 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2140 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2141 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2142 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2143 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2144 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2145 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2146 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2147 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2148 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2149 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2154 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2155 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2156 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2157 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2158 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2159 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2161 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2183 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2184 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2185 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2186 // outside of those situations will fail.
2187 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2191 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2196 1 + // script length (0)
2200 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2201 2 + // witness marker and flag
2202 1 + // witness element count
2203 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2204 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2205 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2206 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2207 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2208 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2210 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2211 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2212 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2218 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2219 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2220 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2221 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2223 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2224 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2225 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2227 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2228 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2229 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2230 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2231 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2232 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2235 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2236 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2239 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2240 value_to_holder = 0;
2243 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2244 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2245 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2246 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2248 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2249 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2252 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2253 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2256 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2259 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2260 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2262 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2264 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2265 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2266 where L::Target: Logger {
2267 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2268 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2269 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2270 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2271 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2272 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2273 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2274 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2278 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2279 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2280 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2281 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2283 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2284 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2286 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2288 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2289 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2290 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2292 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2293 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2294 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2295 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2296 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2297 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2298 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2300 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2301 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2302 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2304 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2305 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2307 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2310 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2311 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2315 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2319 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2321 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2322 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2323 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2324 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2327 // Now update local state:
2329 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2330 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2331 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2332 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2333 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2334 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2335 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2339 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2340 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2341 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2342 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2343 // do not not get into this branch.
2344 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2345 match pending_update {
2346 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2347 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2348 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2349 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2351 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2352 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2355 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2356 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2357 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2358 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2359 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2360 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2361 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2367 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2368 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2369 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2372 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2373 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2375 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2376 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2379 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2380 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2382 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2383 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2385 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2386 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2389 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2392 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2393 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2394 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2395 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2400 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2401 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2402 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2403 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2404 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2405 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2406 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2407 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2408 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2409 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2410 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2411 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2412 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2413 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2414 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2416 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2417 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2418 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2419 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2420 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2423 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2424 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2425 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2432 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2434 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2438 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2439 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2440 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2441 /// before we fail backwards.
2443 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2444 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2445 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2446 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2447 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2448 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2449 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2452 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2453 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2454 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2455 /// before we fail backwards.
2457 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2458 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2459 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2460 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2461 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2462 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2463 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2465 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2467 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2468 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2469 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2471 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2472 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2473 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2475 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2476 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2477 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2479 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2484 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2485 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2491 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2493 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2494 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2495 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2499 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2500 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2501 force_holding_cell = true;
2504 // Now update local state:
2505 if force_holding_cell {
2506 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2507 match pending_update {
2508 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2509 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2510 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2511 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2515 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2516 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2517 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2524 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2525 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2526 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2532 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2534 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2535 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2538 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2539 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2540 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2545 // Message handlers:
2547 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2548 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2549 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2550 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2551 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2555 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2558 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2561 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2562 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2563 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2564 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2567 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2569 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2570 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2571 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2572 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2574 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2575 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2577 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2578 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2580 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2581 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2582 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2583 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2584 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2589 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2590 initial_commitment_tx,
2593 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2594 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2597 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2598 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2601 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2602 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2603 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2604 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2605 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2606 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2607 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2608 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2609 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2610 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2611 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2612 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2614 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2616 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2617 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2618 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2619 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2620 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2621 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2622 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2624 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2625 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2626 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2628 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2630 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2631 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2633 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2635 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2636 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2640 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2641 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2642 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2643 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2644 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2645 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2646 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2649 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2650 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2652 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2653 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2654 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2655 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2657 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2660 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2661 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2662 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2665 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2666 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2667 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2668 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2669 // when routing outbound payments.
2670 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2674 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2676 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2677 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2679 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2680 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2682 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2683 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2684 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2685 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2686 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2687 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2688 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2689 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2690 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2692 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2693 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2694 let expected_point =
2695 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2696 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2698 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2699 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2700 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2701 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2702 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2703 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2705 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2706 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2707 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2708 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2709 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2711 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2719 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2720 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2722 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2724 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2727 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2728 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2729 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2730 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2731 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2732 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2734 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2735 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2736 if local_sent_shutdown {
2737 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2739 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2740 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2741 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2744 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2747 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2750 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2753 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2757 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2758 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2759 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2762 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2765 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2766 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2767 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2768 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2769 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2770 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2771 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2772 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2773 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2774 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2775 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2777 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2778 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2779 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2780 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2781 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2782 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2786 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2787 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2790 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2791 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2792 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2794 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2795 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2796 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2797 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2798 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2799 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2800 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2804 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2805 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2806 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2807 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2808 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2809 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2810 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2814 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2815 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2816 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2817 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2818 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2822 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2823 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2824 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2825 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2826 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2828 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2832 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2836 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2837 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2838 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2839 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2840 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2841 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2842 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2843 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2844 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2846 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2847 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2848 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2849 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2850 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2851 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2854 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2855 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2856 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2857 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2861 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2864 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2868 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2869 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2870 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2874 // Now update local state:
2875 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2876 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2877 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2878 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2879 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2880 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2881 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2886 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2888 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2889 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2890 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2891 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2892 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2893 None => fail_reason.into(),
2894 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2895 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2896 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2899 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2903 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2905 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2906 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2908 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2914 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2917 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2918 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2921 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2925 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2928 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2929 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2932 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2936 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2940 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2941 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2944 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2948 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2952 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2953 where L::Target: Logger
2955 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2958 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2961 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2965 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2967 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2969 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2970 let commitment_txid = {
2971 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2972 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2973 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2975 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2976 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2977 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2978 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2979 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2984 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2986 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2987 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2988 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2989 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2992 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2993 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2994 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2998 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3000 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3001 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3002 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3003 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3004 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3005 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3006 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3007 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3008 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3009 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3010 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3016 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3020 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3021 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3022 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3023 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3024 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3025 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3026 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3027 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3028 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3029 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3030 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3031 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3032 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3035 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3036 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3037 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3038 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3039 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3040 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3041 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3043 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3044 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3045 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3046 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3047 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3048 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3049 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3052 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3053 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3056 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3058 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3059 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3060 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3063 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3066 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3067 commitment_stats.tx,
3069 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3070 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3071 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3074 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3075 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3077 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3078 let mut need_commitment = false;
3079 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3080 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3081 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3082 need_commitment = true;
3086 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3087 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3088 Some(forward_info.clone())
3090 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3091 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3092 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3094 need_commitment = true;
3097 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3098 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3099 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3100 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3101 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3102 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3103 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3104 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3105 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3106 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3107 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3108 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3109 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3110 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3112 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3114 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3115 need_commitment = true;
3119 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3120 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3121 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3122 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3123 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3124 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3126 nondust_htlc_sources,
3130 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3131 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3132 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3133 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3135 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3136 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3137 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3138 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3139 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3140 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3141 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3142 // includes the right HTLCs.
3143 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3144 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3145 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3146 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3147 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3148 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3150 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3151 &self.context.channel_id);
3152 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3155 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3156 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3157 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3158 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3159 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3160 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3161 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3162 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3163 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3167 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3168 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3169 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3170 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3173 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3174 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3175 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3176 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3177 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3178 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3181 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3182 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3183 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3184 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3187 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3188 /// for our counterparty.
3189 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3190 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3191 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3192 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3194 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3195 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3196 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3197 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3199 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3200 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3201 updates: Vec::new(),
3204 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3205 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3206 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3207 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3208 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3209 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3210 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3211 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3212 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3213 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3214 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3215 // to rebalance channels.
3216 match &htlc_update {
3217 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3218 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3219 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3221 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3222 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3224 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3227 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3228 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3229 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3230 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3231 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3232 // into the holding cell without ever being
3233 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3234 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3235 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3238 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3244 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3245 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3246 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3247 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3248 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3249 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3250 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3251 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3252 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3253 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3254 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3255 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3257 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3258 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3259 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3260 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3261 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3262 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3263 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3264 // for a full revocation before failing.
3265 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3266 update_fail_count += 1;
3269 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3271 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3278 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3279 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3281 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3282 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3287 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3288 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3289 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3290 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3291 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3293 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3294 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3295 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3297 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3298 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3304 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3305 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3306 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3307 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3308 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3309 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3310 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3311 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3314 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3317 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3320 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3324 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3326 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3327 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3332 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3333 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3334 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3335 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3336 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3337 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3338 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3339 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3343 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3345 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3346 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3349 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3350 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3351 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3352 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3354 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3358 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3359 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3360 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3361 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3362 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3363 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3364 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3365 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3369 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3370 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3371 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3372 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3373 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3374 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3375 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3376 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3377 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3379 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3380 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3383 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3384 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3385 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3386 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3388 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3389 let mut require_commitment = false;
3390 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3393 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3394 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3395 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3397 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3398 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3399 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3400 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3401 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3402 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3407 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3408 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3409 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3410 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3411 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3413 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3414 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3415 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3420 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3421 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3423 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3427 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3428 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3430 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3431 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3432 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3433 require_commitment = true;
3434 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3435 match forward_info {
3436 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3437 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3438 require_commitment = true;
3440 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3441 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3442 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3444 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3445 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3446 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3450 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3451 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3452 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3453 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3459 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3460 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3461 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3462 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3464 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3466 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3467 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3468 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3469 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3470 require_commitment = true;
3474 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3476 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3477 match update_state {
3478 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3479 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3480 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3481 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3482 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3484 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3485 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3486 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3487 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3488 require_commitment = true;
3489 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3490 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3495 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3496 let release_state_str =
3497 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3498 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3499 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3500 if !release_monitor {
3501 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3502 update: monitor_update,
3504 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3506 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3511 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3512 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3513 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3514 if require_commitment {
3515 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3516 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3517 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3518 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3519 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3520 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3521 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3523 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3525 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3527 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3528 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3529 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3532 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3533 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3534 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3535 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3536 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3537 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3539 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3540 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3542 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3543 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3545 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3546 if require_commitment {
3547 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3549 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3550 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3551 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3552 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3555 &self.context.channel_id(),
3556 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3559 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3560 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3562 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3563 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3565 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3566 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3572 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3573 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3574 /// commitment update.
3575 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3576 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3577 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3579 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3580 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3583 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3584 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3585 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3586 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3588 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3589 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3590 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3591 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3592 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3593 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3596 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3597 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3599 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3600 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3602 if !self.context.is_live() {
3603 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3606 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3607 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3608 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3609 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3610 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3611 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3612 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3613 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3614 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3615 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3619 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3620 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3621 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3622 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3623 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3624 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3627 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3632 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3633 force_holding_cell = true;
3636 if force_holding_cell {
3637 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3641 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3642 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3644 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3645 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3650 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3651 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3653 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3655 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3656 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3657 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3658 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3662 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3663 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3664 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3668 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3669 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3672 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3673 // will be retransmitted.
3674 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3675 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3676 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3678 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3679 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3681 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3682 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3683 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3684 // this HTLC accordingly
3685 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3688 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3689 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3690 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3691 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3694 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3695 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3696 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3697 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3698 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3699 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3704 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3706 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3707 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3708 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3709 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3713 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3714 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3715 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3716 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3717 // the update upon reconnection.
3718 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3722 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3724 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3725 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3729 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3730 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3731 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3732 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3733 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3734 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3735 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3737 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3738 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3739 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3740 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3741 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3742 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3743 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3745 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3746 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3747 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3748 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3749 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3750 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3751 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3754 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3755 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3756 /// to the remote side.
3757 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3758 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3759 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3760 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3763 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3765 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3766 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3768 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3769 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3770 // first received the funding_signed.
3771 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3772 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3773 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3775 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3776 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3777 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3778 funding_broadcastable = None;
3781 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3782 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3783 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3784 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3785 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3786 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3787 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3788 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3789 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3790 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3791 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3792 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3793 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3794 next_per_commitment_point,
3795 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3799 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3801 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3802 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3803 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3804 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3805 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3808 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3809 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3810 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3811 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3812 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3813 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3817 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3818 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3820 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3821 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3822 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3825 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3826 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3827 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3828 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3829 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3830 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3831 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3832 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3833 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3837 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3838 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3840 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3843 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3846 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3847 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3849 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3850 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3851 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3852 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3853 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3854 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3855 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3856 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3857 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3858 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3859 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3860 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3862 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3864 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3866 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3872 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3873 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3874 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3875 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3876 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3877 per_commitment_secret,
3878 next_per_commitment_point,
3880 next_local_nonce: None,
3884 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3885 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3886 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3887 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3888 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3890 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3891 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3892 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3893 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3894 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3895 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3896 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3897 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3898 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3899 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3904 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3905 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3907 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3908 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3909 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3910 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3911 reason: err_packet.clone()
3914 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3915 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3916 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3917 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3918 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3919 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3922 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3923 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3924 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3925 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3926 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3933 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3934 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3935 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3936 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3940 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3941 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3942 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3943 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3944 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3945 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3949 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3950 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3951 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3952 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3953 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3954 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3955 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3960 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3961 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3963 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3964 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3965 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3966 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3967 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3968 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3969 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3970 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3973 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3975 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3976 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3977 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3978 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3982 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3983 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3987 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3988 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3989 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3990 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3991 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3994 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3995 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3996 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3997 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3998 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4001 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4002 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4003 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4004 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4005 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4006 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4007 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4008 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4012 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4013 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4014 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4015 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4017 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4021 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4022 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4023 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4024 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4026 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4028 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4030 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4031 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4032 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4033 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4034 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4037 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4038 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4039 channel_ready: None,
4040 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4041 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4042 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4046 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4047 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4048 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4049 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4051 next_per_commitment_point,
4052 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4054 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4055 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4056 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4060 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4061 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4062 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4064 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4065 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4069 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4075 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4076 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4077 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4078 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4079 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4080 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4081 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4083 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4085 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4086 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4087 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4088 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4089 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4090 next_per_commitment_point,
4091 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4095 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4096 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4097 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4099 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4102 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4103 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4104 raa: required_revoke,
4105 commitment_update: None,
4106 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4108 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4109 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4110 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4115 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4116 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4117 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4118 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4119 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4120 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4123 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4124 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4125 raa: required_revoke,
4126 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4127 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4131 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4135 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4136 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4137 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4138 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4140 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4142 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4144 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4145 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4146 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4147 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4148 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4149 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4151 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4152 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4153 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4154 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4155 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4157 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4158 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4159 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4160 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4163 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4164 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4165 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4166 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4167 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4168 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4169 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4170 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4171 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4172 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4173 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4174 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4175 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4176 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4177 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4179 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4182 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4183 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4186 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4187 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4188 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4189 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4190 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4191 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4194 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4195 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4196 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4197 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4198 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4199 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4202 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4208 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4209 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4210 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4211 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4213 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4214 return Ok((None, None));
4217 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4218 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4219 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4221 return Ok((None, None));
4224 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4226 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4227 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4228 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4229 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4231 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4232 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4234 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4235 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4237 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4238 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4239 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4240 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4242 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4243 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4244 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4251 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4252 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4254 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4255 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4258 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4259 /// within our expected timeframe.
4261 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4262 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4263 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4266 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4269 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4270 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4274 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4275 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4277 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4280 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4281 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4282 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4283 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4286 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4287 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4291 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4293 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4297 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4298 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4302 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4305 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4306 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4307 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4308 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4310 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4313 assert!(send_shutdown);
4314 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4315 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4316 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4318 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4321 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4326 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4328 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4329 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4331 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4332 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4333 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4334 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4335 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4336 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4339 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4340 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4342 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4343 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4344 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4345 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4349 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4350 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4351 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4352 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4353 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4354 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4357 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4364 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4365 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4367 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4370 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4371 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4373 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4375 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4376 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4377 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4378 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4379 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4380 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4381 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4382 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4383 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4393 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4394 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4395 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4396 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4398 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4401 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4404 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4407 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4411 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4415 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4416 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4417 return Ok((None, None));
4420 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4421 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4422 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4425 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4427 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4430 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4431 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4432 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4433 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4434 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4438 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4439 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4444 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4445 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4446 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4447 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4448 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4449 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4450 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4454 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4456 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4457 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4458 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4459 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4461 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4464 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4465 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4467 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4470 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4472 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4473 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4477 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4478 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4479 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4480 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4482 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4483 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4484 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4492 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4493 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4496 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4499 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4503 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4504 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4505 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4506 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4507 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4509 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4511 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4513 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4514 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4517 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4518 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4519 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4524 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4529 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4531 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4538 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4540 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4543 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4549 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4550 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4551 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4552 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4553 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4554 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4555 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4557 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4558 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4561 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4563 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4564 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4570 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4571 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4572 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4573 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4574 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4575 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4576 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4578 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4579 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4586 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4587 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4590 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4591 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4594 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4595 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4599 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4600 &self.context.holder_signer
4604 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4606 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4607 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4608 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4609 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4610 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4611 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4613 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4623 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4624 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4628 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4630 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4631 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4634 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4635 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4636 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4637 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4640 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4641 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4642 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4643 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4644 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4645 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4648 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4649 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4650 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4651 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4652 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4653 if !release_monitor {
4654 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4663 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4664 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4667 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4668 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4669 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4671 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4672 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4673 if self.context.channel_state &
4674 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4675 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4676 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4677 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4678 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4681 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4682 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4683 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4684 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4685 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4686 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4688 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4689 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4690 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4692 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4693 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4694 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4695 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4696 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4697 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4703 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4704 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4705 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4708 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4709 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4710 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4713 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4714 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4715 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4718 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4719 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4720 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4721 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4722 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4723 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4728 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4729 self.context.channel_update_status
4732 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4733 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4734 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4737 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4739 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4740 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4741 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4745 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4746 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4747 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4750 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4754 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4755 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4756 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4757 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4758 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4760 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4761 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4762 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4764 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4765 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4768 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4769 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4770 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4771 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4772 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4773 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4774 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4775 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4776 self.context.channel_state);
4778 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4782 if need_commitment_update {
4783 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4784 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4785 let next_per_commitment_point =
4786 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4787 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4788 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4789 next_per_commitment_point,
4790 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4794 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4800 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4801 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4802 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4803 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4804 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4805 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4806 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4811 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4812 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4813 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4814 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4815 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4816 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4817 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4818 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4819 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4820 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4821 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4822 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4823 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4824 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4825 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4826 // channel and move on.
4827 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4828 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4830 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4831 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4832 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4834 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4835 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4836 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4837 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4838 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4839 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4840 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4841 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4846 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4847 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4848 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4849 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4850 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4853 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4854 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4855 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4856 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4857 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4858 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4861 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4862 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4863 // may have already happened for this block).
4864 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4865 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4866 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4867 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4870 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4871 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4872 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4873 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4881 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4882 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4883 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4884 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4886 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4887 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4890 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4892 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4893 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4894 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4895 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4897 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4900 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4903 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4904 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4905 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4906 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4908 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4911 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4912 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4913 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4915 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4916 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4918 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4919 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4920 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4928 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4930 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4931 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4932 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4934 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4935 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4938 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4939 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4940 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4941 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4942 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4943 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4944 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4945 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4946 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4949 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4950 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4951 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4952 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4954 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4955 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4956 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4958 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4959 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4960 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4961 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4963 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4964 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4965 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4966 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4967 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4968 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4969 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4972 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4973 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4975 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4978 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4979 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4980 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4981 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4982 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4983 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4984 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4985 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4986 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4987 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4988 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4989 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4990 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4991 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4992 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4993 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4994 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5000 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5005 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5006 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5008 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5009 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5010 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5011 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5013 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5016 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5018 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5019 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5020 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5021 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5022 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5023 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5025 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5026 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5029 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5030 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5031 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5032 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5033 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5034 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5036 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5037 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5040 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5041 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5042 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5043 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5044 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5050 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5051 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5052 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5053 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5055 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5058 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5062 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5066 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5067 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5071 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5075 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5076 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5079 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5083 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5085 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5090 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5091 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5092 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5094 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5099 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5101 None => return None,
5104 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5106 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5107 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5109 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5110 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5116 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5118 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5119 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5120 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5121 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5122 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5123 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5124 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5126 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5127 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5128 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5129 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5130 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5131 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5132 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5133 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5134 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5135 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5136 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5137 contents: announcement,
5142 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5146 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5147 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5148 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5149 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5150 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5151 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5152 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5153 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5155 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5157 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5159 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5160 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5162 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5164 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5165 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5168 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5169 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5170 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5171 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5174 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5177 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5178 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5179 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5180 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5181 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5182 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5185 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5187 Err(_) => return None,
5189 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5190 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5195 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5196 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5197 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5198 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5199 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5200 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5201 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5202 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5203 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5204 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5205 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5206 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5207 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5208 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5209 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5210 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5213 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5216 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5217 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5218 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5219 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5220 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5221 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5222 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5223 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5224 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5226 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5227 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5228 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5229 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5230 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5231 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5232 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5233 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5234 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5236 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5237 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5238 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5239 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5240 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5241 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5242 next_funding_txid: None,
5247 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5249 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5250 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5251 /// commitment update.
5253 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5254 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5255 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5256 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5257 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5258 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5259 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5262 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5263 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5264 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5266 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5267 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5272 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5273 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5275 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5277 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5278 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5280 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5281 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5282 /// regenerate them.
5284 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5285 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5287 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5288 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5289 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5290 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5291 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5292 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5293 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5295 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5296 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5298 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5299 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5300 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5303 if amount_msat == 0 {
5304 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5307 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5308 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5310 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5313 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5314 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5315 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5318 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5319 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5320 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5321 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5322 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5323 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5324 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5325 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5328 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5329 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5330 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5331 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5332 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5333 else { "to peer" });
5335 if need_holding_cell {
5336 force_holding_cell = true;
5339 // Now update local state:
5340 if force_holding_cell {
5341 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5346 onion_routing_packet,
5352 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5353 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5355 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5357 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5362 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5363 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5364 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5368 onion_routing_packet,
5371 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5376 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5377 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5378 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5379 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5381 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5382 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5383 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5385 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5386 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5390 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5391 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5392 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5393 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5394 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5395 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5396 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5399 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5400 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5401 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5402 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5403 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5404 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5407 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5409 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5410 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5411 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5412 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5413 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5415 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5416 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5419 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5420 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5421 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5422 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5423 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5424 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5425 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5426 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5427 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5428 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5429 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5432 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5436 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5437 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5438 where L::Target: Logger
5440 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5441 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5442 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5446 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5447 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5448 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5449 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5450 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5451 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5452 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5453 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5454 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5455 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5456 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5462 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5465 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5466 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5467 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5468 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5469 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5470 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5472 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5473 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5474 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5476 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5477 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5478 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5481 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5482 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5486 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5487 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5489 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5491 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5492 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5493 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5494 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5496 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5497 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5498 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5499 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5500 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5501 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5505 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5506 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5510 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5511 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5516 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5517 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5519 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5520 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5521 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5522 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5523 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5524 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5525 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5526 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5528 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5529 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5530 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5533 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5534 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5535 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5541 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5542 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5543 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5544 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5545 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5551 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5552 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5554 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5556 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5557 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5558 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5560 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5561 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5562 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5565 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5566 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5569 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5570 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5573 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5576 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5577 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5578 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5581 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5582 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5583 let mut chan_closed = false;
5584 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5588 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5590 None if !chan_closed => {
5591 // use override shutdown script if provided
5592 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5593 Some(script) => script,
5595 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5596 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5597 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5598 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5602 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5603 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5605 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5611 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5612 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5613 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5614 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5616 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5618 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5620 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5621 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5622 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5623 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5624 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5625 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5628 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5629 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5631 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5632 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5633 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5636 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5637 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5638 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5639 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5640 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5643 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5650 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5651 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5653 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5656 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5657 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5658 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5660 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5661 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5665 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5669 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5670 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5671 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5672 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5675 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5676 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5677 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5678 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5679 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5680 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5681 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5682 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5684 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5685 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5686 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5687 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5689 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5692 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5695 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5696 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5697 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5699 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5700 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5702 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5703 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5704 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5705 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5709 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5710 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5712 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5713 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5715 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5717 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5719 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5720 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5721 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5725 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5726 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5728 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5729 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5730 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5731 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5735 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5736 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5737 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5741 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5742 Ok(script) => script,
5743 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5746 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5749 context: ChannelContext {
5752 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5753 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5754 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5755 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5760 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5762 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5763 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5764 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5765 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5767 channel_value_satoshis,
5769 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5771 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5772 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5775 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5776 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5779 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5780 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5781 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5782 pending_update_fee: None,
5783 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5784 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5785 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5786 update_time_counter: 1,
5788 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5790 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5791 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5792 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5793 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5794 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5795 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5800 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5802 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5803 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5804 closing_fee_limits: None,
5805 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5807 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5808 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5809 short_channel_id: None,
5810 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5812 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5813 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5814 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5815 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5816 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5817 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5818 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5819 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5820 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5821 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5822 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5823 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5825 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5827 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5828 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5829 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5830 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5831 counterparty_parameters: None,
5832 funding_outpoint: None,
5833 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5835 funding_transaction: None,
5836 is_batch_funding: None,
5838 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5839 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5840 counterparty_node_id,
5842 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5844 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5846 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5847 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5849 announcement_sigs: None,
5851 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5852 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5853 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5854 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5856 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5857 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5859 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5860 outbound_scid_alias,
5862 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5863 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5865 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5866 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5871 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5873 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5877 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5878 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5879 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5880 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5881 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5882 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5883 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5884 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5885 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5890 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5891 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5892 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5893 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5894 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5895 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5896 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5897 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5898 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5899 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5900 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5902 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5903 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5905 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5906 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5907 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5908 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5911 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5912 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5914 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5917 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5918 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5919 return Err((self, e));
5923 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5925 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5927 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5928 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5930 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5931 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5932 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5933 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5934 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5935 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5938 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5939 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5941 let channel = Channel {
5942 context: self.context,
5945 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5946 temporary_channel_id,
5947 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5948 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5951 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5953 next_local_nonce: None,
5957 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5958 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5959 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5960 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5961 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5962 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5963 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5964 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5965 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5966 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5969 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5970 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5971 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5972 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5973 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5974 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5980 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5981 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5982 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5983 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5984 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5985 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5987 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5989 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5990 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5991 // We've exhausted our options
5994 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5995 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5998 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5999 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6000 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6001 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6003 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6004 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6005 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6006 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6007 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6008 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6010 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6012 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6013 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6016 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6017 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6018 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6020 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6021 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6024 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6025 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6028 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6029 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6033 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6034 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6035 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6036 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6037 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6038 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6039 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6040 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6041 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6042 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6043 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6044 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6045 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6046 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6047 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6048 first_per_commitment_point,
6049 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6050 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6051 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6052 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6054 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6059 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6060 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6062 // Check sanity of message fields:
6063 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6066 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6069 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6072 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6075 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6078 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6080 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6082 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6083 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6086 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6087 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6090 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6093 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6097 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6098 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6101 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6104 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6107 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6110 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6113 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6116 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6120 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6121 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6124 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6125 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6127 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6128 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6131 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6132 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6135 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6136 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6137 &Some(ref script) => {
6138 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6139 if script.len() == 0 {
6142 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6145 Some(script.clone())
6148 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6155 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6156 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6157 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6158 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6159 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6161 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6162 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6164 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6167 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6168 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6169 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6170 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6171 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6172 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6175 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6176 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6177 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6180 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6181 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6183 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6184 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6190 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6191 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6192 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6193 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6196 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6197 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6198 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6199 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6200 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6201 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6202 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6203 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6204 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6205 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6206 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6209 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6211 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6212 // support this channel type.
6213 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6214 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6218 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6219 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6220 // `static_remote_key`.
6221 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6224 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6225 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6228 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6231 channel_type.clone()
6233 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6234 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6240 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6241 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6242 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6243 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6244 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6245 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6246 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6247 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6248 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6251 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6255 // Check sanity of message fields:
6256 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6259 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6262 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6265 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6266 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6269 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6272 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6275 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6277 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6278 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6281 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6284 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6288 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6289 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6292 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6295 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6298 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6301 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6304 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6307 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6311 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6313 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6314 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6319 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6320 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6321 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6322 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6325 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6328 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6329 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6330 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6332 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6336 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6337 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6338 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6339 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6340 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6344 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6345 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6346 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6347 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6351 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6352 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6353 &Some(ref script) => {
6354 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6355 if script.len() == 0 {
6358 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6361 Some(script.clone())
6364 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6371 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6372 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6373 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6374 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6378 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6379 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6380 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6384 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6385 Ok(script) => script,
6386 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6389 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6390 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6392 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6395 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6399 context: ChannelContext {
6402 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6403 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6405 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6410 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6412 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6413 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6414 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6415 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6418 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6420 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6421 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6424 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6425 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6426 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6428 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6429 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6430 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6431 pending_update_fee: None,
6432 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6433 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6434 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6435 update_time_counter: 1,
6437 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6439 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6440 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6441 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6442 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6443 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6444 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6446 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6447 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6448 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6449 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6451 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6452 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6453 closing_fee_limits: None,
6454 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6456 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6457 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6458 short_channel_id: None,
6459 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6461 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6462 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6463 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6464 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6465 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6466 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6467 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6468 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6469 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6470 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6471 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6472 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6475 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6477 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6478 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6479 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6480 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6481 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6482 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6483 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6485 funding_outpoint: None,
6486 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6488 funding_transaction: None,
6489 is_batch_funding: None,
6491 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6492 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6493 counterparty_node_id,
6495 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6497 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6499 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6500 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6502 announcement_sigs: None,
6504 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6505 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6506 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6507 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6509 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6510 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6512 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6513 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6515 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6516 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6518 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6519 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6524 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6526 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6532 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6533 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6535 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6536 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6537 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6538 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6540 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6541 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6543 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6544 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6547 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6550 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6551 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6552 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6554 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6555 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6556 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6557 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6559 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6560 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6561 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6562 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6563 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6564 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6565 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6566 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6567 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6568 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6569 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6570 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6571 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6572 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6573 first_per_commitment_point,
6574 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6575 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6576 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6578 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6580 next_local_nonce: None,
6584 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6585 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6587 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6589 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6590 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6593 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6594 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6596 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6597 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6599 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6600 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6601 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6602 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6603 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6604 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6605 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6606 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6607 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6610 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6611 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6613 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6614 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6615 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6616 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6618 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6619 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6620 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6621 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6622 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6624 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6625 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6630 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6631 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6632 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6636 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6637 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6639 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6640 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6641 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6643 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6645 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6646 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6647 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6648 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6651 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6652 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6653 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6654 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6655 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6657 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6659 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6660 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6661 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6664 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6665 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6666 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6670 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6671 initial_commitment_tx,
6674 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6675 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6678 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6679 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6682 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6684 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6685 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6686 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6687 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6688 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6689 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6690 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6691 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6692 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6693 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6694 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6696 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6698 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6699 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6700 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6701 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6702 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6703 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6705 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6706 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6707 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6708 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6710 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6712 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6713 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6714 let mut channel = Channel {
6715 context: self.context,
6717 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6718 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6719 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6721 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6725 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6726 }, channel_monitor))
6730 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6731 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6733 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6739 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6741 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6742 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6743 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6745 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6746 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6747 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6748 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6754 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6755 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6756 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6757 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6758 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6759 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6764 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6765 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6766 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6767 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6769 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6770 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6771 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6772 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6777 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6778 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6779 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6780 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6781 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6782 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6787 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6788 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6789 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6792 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6794 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6795 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6796 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6797 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6798 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6800 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6801 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6802 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6803 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6805 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6806 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6807 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6809 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6811 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6812 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6813 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6814 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6815 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6816 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6817 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6819 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6820 // deserialized from that format.
6821 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6822 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6823 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6825 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6828 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6829 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6831 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6832 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6833 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6834 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6837 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6838 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6839 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6842 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6843 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6844 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6845 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6847 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6848 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6850 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6852 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6854 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6856 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6859 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6861 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6866 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6867 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6869 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6870 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6871 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6872 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6873 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6874 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6875 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6877 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6879 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6881 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6884 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6885 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6886 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6889 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6891 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6892 preimages.push(preimage);
6894 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6895 reason.write(writer)?;
6897 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6899 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6900 preimages.push(preimage);
6902 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6903 reason.write(writer)?;
6906 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6907 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6908 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6910 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6911 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6912 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6916 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6917 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6918 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6920 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6921 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6925 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6926 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6927 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6928 source.write(writer)?;
6929 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6931 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6932 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6933 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6935 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6936 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6938 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6940 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6941 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6943 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6945 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6946 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6951 match self.context.resend_order {
6952 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6953 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6956 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6957 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6958 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6960 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6961 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6962 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6963 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6966 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6967 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6968 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6969 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6970 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6973 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6974 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6975 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6976 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6978 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6979 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6980 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6982 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6984 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6985 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6986 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6987 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6989 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6990 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6991 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6992 // consider the stale state on reload.
6995 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6996 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6999 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7000 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7001 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7003 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7004 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7006 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7007 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7008 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7010 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7011 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7013 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7016 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7017 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7018 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7020 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7023 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7024 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7026 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7027 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7028 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7030 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7032 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7034 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7036 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7037 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7039 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7040 htlc.write(writer)?;
7043 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7044 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7045 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7047 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7048 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7050 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7051 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7052 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7053 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7054 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7055 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7056 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7058 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7059 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7060 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7061 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7062 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7064 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7065 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7067 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7068 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7069 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7070 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7072 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7074 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7075 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7076 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7077 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7078 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7079 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7080 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7082 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7083 (2, chan_type, option),
7084 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7085 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7086 (5, self.context.config, required),
7087 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7088 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7089 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7090 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7091 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7092 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7093 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7094 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7095 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7096 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7097 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7098 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7099 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7100 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7101 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7102 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7103 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7104 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7105 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7112 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7113 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7115 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7116 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7118 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7119 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7120 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7122 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7123 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7124 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7125 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7129 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7130 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7136 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7145 let mut keys_data = None;
7147 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7148 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7149 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7151 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7152 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7153 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7154 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7155 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7156 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7160 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7161 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7162 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7165 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7174 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7175 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7176 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7177 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7178 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7179 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7180 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7181 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7182 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7183 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7184 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7185 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7190 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7192 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7193 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7194 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7195 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7196 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7197 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7198 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7199 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7200 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7201 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7203 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7207 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7211 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7214 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7216 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7220 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7222 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7223 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7224 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7225 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7226 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7227 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7228 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7229 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7230 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7232 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7233 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7234 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7236 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7237 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7238 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7240 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7244 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7245 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7246 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7247 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7250 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7251 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7252 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7254 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7255 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7256 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7257 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7260 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7261 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7262 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7263 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7266 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7271 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7272 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7275 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7276 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7277 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7278 // consider the stale state on reload.
7279 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7282 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7283 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7284 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7289 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7295 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7298 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7299 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7301 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7302 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7310 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7311 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7313 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7314 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7319 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7320 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7321 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7322 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7324 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7327 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7341 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7342 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7344 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7346 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7350 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7351 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7352 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7354 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7360 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7361 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7362 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7363 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7364 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7365 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7366 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7367 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7368 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7369 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7371 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7372 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7373 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7374 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7375 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7376 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7377 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7379 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7380 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7381 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7382 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7384 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7386 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7387 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7389 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7391 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7392 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7393 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7394 (2, channel_type, option),
7395 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7396 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7397 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7398 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7399 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7400 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7401 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7402 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7403 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7404 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7405 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7406 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7407 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7408 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7409 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7410 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7411 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7412 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7413 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7414 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7415 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7416 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7419 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7420 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7421 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7422 // required channel parameters.
7423 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7424 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7425 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7427 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7429 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7430 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7431 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7432 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7435 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7436 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7437 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7439 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7440 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7442 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7443 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7448 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7449 if iter.next().is_some() {
7450 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7454 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7455 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7456 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7457 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7458 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7461 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7462 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7463 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7465 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7466 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7468 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7469 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7470 // separate u64 values.
7471 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7473 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7475 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7476 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7477 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7478 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7480 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7481 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7483 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7484 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7485 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7486 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7487 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7490 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7491 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7495 context: ChannelContext {
7498 config: config.unwrap(),
7502 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7503 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7504 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7507 temporary_channel_id,
7509 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7511 channel_value_satoshis,
7513 latest_monitor_update_id,
7515 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7516 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7519 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7520 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7523 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7524 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7525 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7526 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7530 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7531 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7532 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7533 monitor_pending_forwards,
7534 monitor_pending_failures,
7535 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7538 holding_cell_update_fee,
7539 next_holder_htlc_id,
7540 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7541 update_time_counter,
7544 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7545 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7546 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7547 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7549 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7550 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7551 closing_fee_limits: None,
7552 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7554 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7555 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7557 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7559 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7560 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7561 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7562 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7563 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7564 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7565 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7566 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7567 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7570 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7572 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7573 funding_transaction,
7576 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7577 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7578 counterparty_node_id,
7580 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7584 channel_update_status,
7585 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7589 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7590 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7591 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7592 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7594 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7595 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7597 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7598 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7599 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7601 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7602 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7604 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7605 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7607 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7610 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7619 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7620 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7621 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7622 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7623 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7625 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7626 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7627 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7628 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7629 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7630 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7631 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7632 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7633 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7634 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7635 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7636 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7637 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7638 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7639 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7640 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7641 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7642 use crate::util::test_utils;
7643 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7644 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7645 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7646 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7647 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7648 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7649 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7650 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7651 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7652 use crate::prelude::*;
7654 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7657 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7658 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7664 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7665 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7666 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7667 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7671 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7672 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7673 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7674 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7675 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7676 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7677 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7678 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7682 signer: InMemorySigner,
7685 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7686 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7689 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7690 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7692 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7693 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7696 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7700 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7702 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7704 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7705 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7706 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7709 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7710 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7711 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7712 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7716 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7717 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7718 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7722 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7723 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7724 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7725 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7727 let seed = [42; 32];
7728 let network = Network::Testnet;
7729 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7730 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7731 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7734 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7735 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7736 let config = UserConfig::default();
7737 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7738 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7739 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7741 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7742 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7746 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7747 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7749 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7750 let original_fee = 253;
7751 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7752 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7753 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7754 let seed = [42; 32];
7755 let network = Network::Testnet;
7756 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7758 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7759 let config = UserConfig::default();
7760 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7762 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7763 // same as the old fee.
7764 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7765 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7766 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7770 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7771 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7772 // dust limits are used.
7773 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7774 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7775 let seed = [42; 32];
7776 let network = Network::Testnet;
7777 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7778 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7779 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7781 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7782 // they have different dust limits.
7784 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7785 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7786 let config = UserConfig::default();
7787 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7789 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7790 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7791 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7792 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7793 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7795 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7796 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7797 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7798 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7799 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7801 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7802 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7803 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7804 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7806 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7807 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7808 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7810 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7811 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7813 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7814 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7815 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7817 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7818 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7819 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7820 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7823 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7825 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7826 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7827 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7828 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7829 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7830 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7831 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7832 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7833 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7835 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7838 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7839 // the dust limit check.
7840 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7841 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7842 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7843 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7845 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7846 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7847 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7848 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7849 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7850 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7851 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7855 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7856 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7857 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7858 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7859 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7860 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7862 let seed = [42; 32];
7863 let network = Network::Testnet;
7864 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7866 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7867 let config = UserConfig::default();
7868 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7870 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7871 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7873 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7874 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7875 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7876 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7877 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7878 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7880 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7881 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7882 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7883 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7884 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7886 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7888 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7889 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7890 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7891 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7892 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7894 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7895 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7896 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7897 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7898 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7902 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7903 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7904 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7906 let seed = [42; 32];
7907 let network = Network::Testnet;
7908 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7909 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7910 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7912 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7914 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7915 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7916 let config = UserConfig::default();
7917 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7919 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7920 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7921 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7922 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7924 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7925 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7926 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7928 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7929 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7930 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7931 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7933 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7934 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7935 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7937 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7938 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7940 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7941 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7942 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7943 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7944 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7945 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7946 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7948 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7950 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7951 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7952 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7953 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7954 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7958 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7959 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7960 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7961 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7962 let seed = [42; 32];
7963 let network = Network::Testnet;
7964 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7965 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7966 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7968 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7969 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7970 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7971 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7972 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7973 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7974 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7975 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7977 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7978 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7979 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7980 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7981 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7982 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7984 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7985 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7986 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7987 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7989 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7991 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7992 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7993 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7994 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7995 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7996 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7998 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7999 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8000 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8001 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8003 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8004 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8005 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8006 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8007 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8009 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8010 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8012 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8013 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8014 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8016 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8017 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8018 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8019 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8020 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8022 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8023 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8025 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8026 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8027 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8031 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8033 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8034 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8035 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8037 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8038 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8039 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8040 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8042 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8043 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8044 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8046 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8048 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8049 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8052 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8053 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8054 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8056 let seed = [42; 32];
8057 let network = Network::Testnet;
8058 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8059 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8060 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8063 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8064 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8065 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8067 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8068 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8070 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8071 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8072 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8074 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8075 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8077 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8079 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8080 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8082 // Channel Negotiations failed
8083 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8084 assert!(result.is_err());
8089 fn channel_update() {
8090 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8091 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8092 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8093 let seed = [42; 32];
8094 let network = Network::Testnet;
8095 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8096 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8097 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8099 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8100 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8101 let config = UserConfig::default();
8102 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8104 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8105 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8106 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8107 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8108 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8110 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8111 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8112 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8113 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8114 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8116 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8117 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8118 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8119 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8121 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8122 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8123 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8125 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8126 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8128 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8129 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8130 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8132 short_channel_id: 0,
8135 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8136 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8137 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8139 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8140 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8142 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8144 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8146 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8147 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8148 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8149 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8151 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8152 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8153 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8155 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8159 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8161 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8162 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8163 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8164 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8165 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8166 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8167 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8168 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8169 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8170 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8171 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8172 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8173 use crate::sync::Arc;
8175 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8176 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8177 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8178 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8180 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8182 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8183 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8184 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8185 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8186 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8188 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8189 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8195 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8196 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8197 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8199 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8200 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8201 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8202 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8203 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8204 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8206 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8208 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8209 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8210 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8211 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8212 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8213 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8215 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8216 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8217 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8218 selected_contest_delay: 144
8220 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8221 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8223 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8224 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8226 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8227 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8229 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8230 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8232 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8233 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8234 // build_commitment_transaction.
8235 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8236 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8237 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8238 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8239 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8241 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8242 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8243 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8244 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8248 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8249 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8250 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8251 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8255 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8256 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8257 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8259 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8260 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8262 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8263 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8265 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8267 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8268 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8269 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8270 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8271 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8272 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8273 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8275 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8276 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8277 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8278 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8280 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8281 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8282 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8284 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8286 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8287 commitment_tx.clone(),
8288 counterparty_signature,
8289 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8290 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8291 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8293 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8294 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8296 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8297 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8298 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8300 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8301 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8304 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8305 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8307 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8308 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8309 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8310 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8311 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8312 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8313 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8314 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8316 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8319 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8320 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8321 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8325 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8328 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8329 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8330 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8332 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8333 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8334 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8335 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8336 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8337 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8338 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8339 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8341 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8345 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8346 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8347 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8348 "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", {});
8350 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8351 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8353 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8354 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8355 "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", {});
8357 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8358 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8359 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8360 "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", {});
8362 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8363 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8365 amount_msat: 1000000,
8367 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8368 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8370 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8373 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8374 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8376 amount_msat: 2000000,
8378 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8379 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8381 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8384 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8385 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8387 amount_msat: 2000000,
8389 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8390 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8391 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8392 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8394 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8397 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8398 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8400 amount_msat: 3000000,
8402 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8403 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8404 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8405 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8407 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8410 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8411 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8413 amount_msat: 4000000,
8415 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8416 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8418 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8422 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8423 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8424 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8426 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8427 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8428 "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", {
8431 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8432 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8433 "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" },
8436 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8437 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8438 "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" },
8441 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8442 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8443 "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" },
8446 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8447 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8448 "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" },
8451 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8452 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8453 "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" }
8456 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8457 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8458 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8460 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8461 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8462 "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", {
8465 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8466 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8467 "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" },
8470 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8471 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8472 "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" },
8475 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8476 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8477 "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" },
8480 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8481 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8482 "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" },
8485 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8486 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8487 "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" }
8490 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8491 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8492 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8494 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8495 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8496 "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", {
8499 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8500 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8501 "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" },
8504 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8505 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8506 "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" },
8509 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8510 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8511 "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" },
8514 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8515 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8516 "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" }
8519 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8520 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8521 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8522 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8524 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8525 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8526 "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", {
8529 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8530 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8531 "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" },
8534 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8535 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8536 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8539 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8540 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8541 "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" },
8544 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8545 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8546 "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" }
8549 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8550 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8551 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8552 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8554 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8555 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8556 "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", {
8559 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8560 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8561 "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" },
8564 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8565 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8566 "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" },
8569 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8570 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8571 "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" },
8574 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8575 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8576 "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" }
8579 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8580 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8581 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8583 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8584 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8585 "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", {
8588 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8589 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8590 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8593 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8594 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8595 "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" },
8598 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8599 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8600 "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" }
8603 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8607 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8608 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8609 "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", {
8612 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8613 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8614 "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" },
8617 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8618 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8619 "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" },
8622 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8623 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8624 "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" }
8627 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8628 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8629 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8631 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8632 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8633 "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", {
8636 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8637 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8638 "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" },
8641 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8642 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8643 "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" }
8646 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8647 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8648 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8649 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8650 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8651 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8653 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8654 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8655 "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", {
8658 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8659 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8660 "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" },
8663 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8664 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8665 "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" }
8668 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8671 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8672 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8674 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8675 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8676 "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", {
8679 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8680 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8681 "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" },
8684 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8685 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8686 "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" }
8689 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8690 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8691 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8693 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8694 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8695 "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", {
8698 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8699 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8700 "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" }
8703 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8704 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8705 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8706 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8707 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8709 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8710 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8711 "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", {
8714 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8715 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8716 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8719 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8720 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8721 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8722 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8723 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8725 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8726 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8727 "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", {
8730 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8731 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8732 "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" }
8735 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8736 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8737 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8738 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8740 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8741 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8742 "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", {});
8744 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8745 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8746 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8747 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8748 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8750 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8751 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8752 "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", {});
8754 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8755 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8756 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8757 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8758 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8760 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8761 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8762 "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", {});
8764 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8765 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8766 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8768 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8769 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8770 "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", {});
8772 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8773 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8774 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8775 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8776 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8778 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8779 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8780 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8782 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8783 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8784 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8785 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8786 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8788 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8789 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8790 "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", {});
8792 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8793 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8794 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8795 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8796 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8797 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8799 amount_msat: 2000000,
8801 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8802 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8804 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8807 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8808 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8809 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8811 amount_msat: 5000001,
8813 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8814 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8815 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8816 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8818 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8821 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8822 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8824 amount_msat: 5000000,
8826 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8827 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8828 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8829 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8831 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8835 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8836 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8837 "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", {
8840 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8841 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8842 "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" },
8844 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8845 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8846 "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" },
8848 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8849 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8850 "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" }
8853 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8854 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8855 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8856 "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", {
8859 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8860 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8861 "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" },
8863 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8864 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8865 "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" },
8867 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8868 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8869 "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" }
8874 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8875 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8877 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8878 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8879 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8880 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8882 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8883 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8884 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8886 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8887 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8889 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8890 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8892 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8893 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8894 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8898 fn test_key_derivation() {
8899 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8902 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8903 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8905 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8906 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8908 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8909 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8911 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8912 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8914 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8915 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8917 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8918 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8920 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8921 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8925 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8926 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8927 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8928 let seed = [42; 32];
8929 let network = Network::Testnet;
8930 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8931 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8933 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8934 let config = UserConfig::default();
8935 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8936 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8938 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8939 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8941 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8942 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8943 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8944 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8945 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8946 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8947 assert!(res.is_ok());
8951 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8952 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8953 // resulting `channel_type`.
8954 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8955 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8956 let network = Network::Testnet;
8957 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8958 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8960 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8961 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8963 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8964 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8966 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8967 // need to signal it.
8968 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8969 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8970 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8973 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8975 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8976 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8977 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8979 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8980 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8981 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8984 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8985 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8986 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8987 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8988 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8991 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8992 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8996 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8997 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8998 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9000 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9001 let network = Network::Testnet;
9002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9003 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9005 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9006 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9008 let config = UserConfig::default();
9010 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9011 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9012 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9013 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9014 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9016 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9017 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9018 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9021 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9022 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9023 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9025 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9026 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9027 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9028 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9029 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9030 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9032 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9036 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9037 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9039 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9040 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9041 let network = Network::Testnet;
9042 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9043 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9045 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9046 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9048 let config = UserConfig::default();
9050 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9051 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9052 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9053 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9054 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9055 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9056 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9057 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9059 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9060 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9061 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9062 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9063 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9064 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9067 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9068 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9070 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9071 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9072 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9073 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9075 assert!(res.is_err());
9077 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9078 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9079 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9081 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9082 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9083 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9086 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9088 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9089 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9090 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9091 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9094 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9095 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9097 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9098 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9100 assert!(res.is_err());
9104 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9105 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9106 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9107 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9108 let seed = [42; 32];
9109 let network = Network::Testnet;
9110 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9111 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
9112 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9114 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9115 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9116 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9117 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9119 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9120 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9121 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9126 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9135 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9136 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9137 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9142 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9143 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9149 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9152 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9153 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9154 &accept_channel_msg,
9155 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9156 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9159 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9160 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9161 let tx = Transaction {
9163 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9167 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9170 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9173 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9174 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9179 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9180 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9181 &funding_created_msg,
9185 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9186 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9194 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9195 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9196 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9197 &funding_signed_msg,
9202 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9209 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9210 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9211 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9212 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9214 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9215 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9216 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9219 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9220 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9221 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9229 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9230 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9231 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9232 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9235 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9236 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9238 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9239 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9240 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9242 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());