1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
70 pub balance_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
72 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
74 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
81 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
83 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
85 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
86 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
87 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
88 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
89 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
90 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
92 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
96 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
97 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
98 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
99 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
102 enum InboundHTLCState {
103 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
104 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
105 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
106 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
107 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
108 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
109 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
110 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
111 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
112 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
113 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
114 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
115 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
116 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
117 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
119 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
123 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
124 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
127 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
128 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
129 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
130 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
131 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
132 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
134 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
135 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
136 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
137 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
138 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
139 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
140 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
141 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
143 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
144 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
146 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
147 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
148 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
149 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
150 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
151 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
152 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
153 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
156 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
160 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
161 state: InboundHTLCState,
164 enum OutboundHTLCState {
165 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
166 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
167 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
168 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
169 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
170 /// money back (though we won't), and,
171 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
172 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
173 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
174 /// we'll never get out of sync).
175 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
176 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
177 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
179 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
180 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
181 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
182 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
183 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
184 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
185 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
186 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
187 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
192 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
193 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
197 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
199 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
200 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
203 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
204 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
206 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
207 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
212 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
213 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
221 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
225 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
226 state: OutboundHTLCState,
228 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
231 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
232 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
233 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
237 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
239 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
241 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
244 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
249 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
254 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
255 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
256 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
257 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
258 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
259 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
261 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
262 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
263 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
264 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
265 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
266 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
267 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
269 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
270 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
271 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
276 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
277 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
278 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
280 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
281 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
283 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
284 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
285 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
286 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
287 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
288 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
289 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
290 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
291 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
293 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
294 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
295 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
296 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
297 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
298 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
299 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
300 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
301 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
302 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
303 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
304 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
306 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
307 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
308 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
310 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
311 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
312 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
313 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
314 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
315 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
316 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
317 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
319 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
320 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
322 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
324 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
326 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
328 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
329 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
331 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
335 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
337 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
341 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
342 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
343 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
344 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
345 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
347 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
348 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
350 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
352 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
353 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
355 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
356 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
357 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
358 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
359 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
360 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
362 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
363 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
365 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
366 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
367 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
368 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
369 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
371 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
372 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
374 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
375 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
377 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
378 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
379 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
380 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
386 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
387 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
389 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
390 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
396 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
397 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
399 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
400 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
406 macro_rules! secp_check {
407 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
410 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
415 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
416 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
417 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
418 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
419 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
420 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
422 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
424 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
426 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
428 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
432 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
434 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
435 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
436 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
438 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
439 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
441 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
442 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
443 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
444 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
445 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
447 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
448 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
452 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
458 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
461 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
462 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
463 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 holding_cell_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
468 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
469 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
470 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
471 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
472 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
473 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
474 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
475 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
476 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
480 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
481 struct HTLCCandidate {
483 origin: HTLCInitiator,
487 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
495 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
497 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
499 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
500 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
506 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
507 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
508 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
509 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
510 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
512 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
513 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
514 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
515 htlc_value_msat: u64,
517 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
518 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
522 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
523 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
524 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
525 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
526 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
527 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
528 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
529 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
530 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
531 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
532 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
535 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
536 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
537 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
538 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
541 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
542 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
545 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
547 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
548 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
549 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
550 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
551 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
552 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
553 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
554 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
558 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
559 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
560 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
561 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
562 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
563 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
564 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
565 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
566 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
567 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
568 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
569 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
570 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
571 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
572 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
574 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
575 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
576 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
577 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
579 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
580 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
581 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
582 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
584 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
585 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
586 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
587 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
588 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
590 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
591 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
592 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
593 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
595 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
596 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
597 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
599 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
600 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
601 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
602 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
603 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
605 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
606 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
609 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
610 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
612 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
613 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
614 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
615 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
617 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
618 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
620 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
621 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
625 (0, update, required),
628 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
629 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
630 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
631 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
632 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
636 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
638 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
640 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
643 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
648 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
650 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
651 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
657 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
658 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
659 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
660 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
661 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
663 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
664 /// in a timely manner.
665 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
668 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
670 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
672 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
673 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
674 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
679 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
680 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
681 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
683 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
684 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
685 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
686 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
688 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
692 /// The current channel ID.
693 channel_id: ChannelId,
694 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
695 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
696 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
699 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
700 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
702 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
703 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
704 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
706 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
707 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
708 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
709 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
714 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
716 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
717 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
718 destination_script: Script,
720 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
721 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
722 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
724 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
725 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
727 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
728 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
729 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
731 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
732 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
733 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
734 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
735 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
736 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
744 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
745 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
746 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
747 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
748 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
749 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
750 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
752 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
754 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
755 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
756 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
757 // HTLCs with similar state.
758 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
759 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
760 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
761 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
762 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
763 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
764 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
765 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
766 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
769 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
770 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
771 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
773 update_time_counter: u32,
775 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
776 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
777 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
779 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
780 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
782 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
783 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
785 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
786 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
787 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
788 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
790 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
791 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
793 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
797 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
798 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
799 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
800 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
801 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
802 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
803 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
804 channel_creation_height: u32,
806 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
811 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
814 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
823 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
824 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
827 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
831 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
834 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
840 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
842 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
843 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
844 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
846 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
847 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
850 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
852 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
854 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
855 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
856 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
857 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
859 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
860 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
861 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
863 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
864 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
865 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
867 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
868 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
869 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
870 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
873 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
874 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
876 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
877 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
878 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
879 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
880 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
882 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
883 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
885 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
886 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
887 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
888 /// unblock the state machine.
890 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
891 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
892 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
894 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
895 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
896 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
899 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
900 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
901 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
902 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
903 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
904 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
907 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
908 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
910 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
911 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
912 // the channel's funding UTXO.
914 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
915 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
916 // associated channel mapping.
918 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
919 // to store all of them.
920 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
922 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
923 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
924 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
925 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
926 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
928 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
929 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
931 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
932 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
934 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
935 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
936 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
938 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
939 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
940 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
943 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
946 self.update_time_counter
949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
954 self.config.announced_channel
957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
964 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
969 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
979 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
980 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
982 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
985 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
987 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
988 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
990 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
993 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
996 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
997 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
998 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1000 self.channel_state &
1001 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1002 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1003 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1008 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1011 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1014 // Public utilities:
1016 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1020 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1022 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1023 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1024 self.temporary_channel_id
1027 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1031 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1032 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1033 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1037 /// Gets the channel's type
1038 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1042 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1044 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1045 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1046 self.short_channel_id
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.outbound_scid_alias
1059 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1060 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1061 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1062 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1063 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1064 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1067 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1068 /// get_funding_created.
1069 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1073 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1074 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1075 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1078 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1079 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1080 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1081 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1085 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1088 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1089 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1092 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1093 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1096 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1097 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1098 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1101 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1102 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1106 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1107 self.counterparty_node_id
1110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1111 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1112 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1115 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1116 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1117 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1120 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1121 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1123 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1124 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1125 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1126 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1128 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1133 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1137 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1138 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1142 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1144 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1146 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1147 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1152 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.channel_value_satoshis
1156 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1157 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1160 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1161 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1164 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1165 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1168 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1169 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1170 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1171 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1172 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1174 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1178 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1179 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1180 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1183 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1184 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1185 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1188 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1189 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1193 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1194 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1195 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1198 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1199 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1200 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1203 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1204 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1205 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1208 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1209 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1210 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1211 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1212 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1215 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1217 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1218 self.prev_config = None;
1222 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1223 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1227 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1228 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1229 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1230 let did_channel_update =
1231 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1233 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1234 if did_channel_update {
1235 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1236 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1237 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1238 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1240 self.config.options = *config;
1244 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1245 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1246 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1247 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1248 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1251 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1252 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1253 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1254 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1255 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1257 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1258 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1259 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1260 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1261 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1262 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1263 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1265 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1266 where L::Target: Logger
1268 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1269 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1270 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1272 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1273 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1274 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1277 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1278 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1279 if match update_state {
1280 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1281 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1282 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1283 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1286 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1290 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1291 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1292 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1294 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1296 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1297 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1298 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1300 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1301 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1302 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1303 transaction_output_index: None
1308 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1309 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1310 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1311 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1312 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1315 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1317 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1318 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1319 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1321 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1322 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1325 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1326 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1329 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1331 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1332 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1333 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1336 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1343 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1344 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1352 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1353 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1357 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1358 if generated_by_local {
1359 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1360 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1369 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1371 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1372 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1373 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1380 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1388 preimages.push(preimage);
1392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1393 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1398 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1400 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1401 if !generated_by_local {
1402 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1411 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1412 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1413 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1414 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1415 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1416 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1417 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1419 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1421 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1422 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1423 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1424 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1430 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1431 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1434 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1435 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1436 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1439 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1442 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1443 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1444 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1445 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1447 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1450 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1451 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1456 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1462 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1464 let channel_parameters =
1465 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1466 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1467 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1474 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1477 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1478 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1479 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1480 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1482 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1483 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1484 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1492 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1493 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1499 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1500 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1501 /// our counterparty!)
1502 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1503 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1504 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1505 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1506 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1507 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1508 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1510 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1514 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1515 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1516 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1517 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1518 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1519 //may see payments to it!
1520 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1521 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1522 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1524 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1527 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1528 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1529 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1530 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1531 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1534 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1535 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1538 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1542 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1543 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1544 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1545 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1546 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1547 // which are near the dust limit.
1548 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1549 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1550 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1551 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1552 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1554 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1555 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1557 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1560 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1561 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1562 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1565 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1566 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1568 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1569 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1570 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1571 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1574 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1577 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1580 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1581 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1582 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1584 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1585 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1589 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1592 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1599 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1602 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1613 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1617 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1618 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1630 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1631 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1632 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1633 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1634 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1635 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1637 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1640 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1647 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1648 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1649 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1650 /// corner case properly.
1651 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1652 -> AvailableBalances
1653 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1655 let context = &self;
1656 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1657 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1660 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1661 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1663 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1666 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1668 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1669 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1671 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1673 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1675 if context.is_outbound() {
1676 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1677 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1679 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1680 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1682 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1683 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1684 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1685 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1688 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1689 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1690 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1691 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1693 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1694 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1695 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1696 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1697 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1698 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1699 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1700 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1701 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1702 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1704 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1707 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1708 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1717 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1718 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1719 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1721 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1722 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1723 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1724 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1728 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1730 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1731 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1732 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1733 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1734 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1735 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1736 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1739 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1741 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1742 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1746 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1747 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1748 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1749 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1752 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1753 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1754 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1755 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1756 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1757 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1760 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1761 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1762 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1764 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1768 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1769 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1771 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1772 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1776 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1777 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1778 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1779 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1781 outbound_capacity_msat,
1782 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1788 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1789 let context = &self;
1790 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1793 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1794 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1796 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1797 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1799 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1800 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1802 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1803 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1804 let context = &self;
1805 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1807 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1810 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1811 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1813 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1814 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1816 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1817 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1820 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1825 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1831 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1832 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1836 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1837 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1846 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1850 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1851 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1856 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1859 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1864 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1865 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1869 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1870 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1874 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1875 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1877 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1878 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1879 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1881 total_pending_htlcs,
1882 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1883 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1884 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1886 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1887 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1888 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1890 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1892 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1897 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1898 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1900 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1901 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1903 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1904 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1906 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1907 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1908 let context = &self;
1909 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1911 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1914 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1915 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1917 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1918 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1920 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1921 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1923 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1928 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1929 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1935 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1936 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1937 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1938 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1939 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1940 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943 included_htlcs += 1;
1946 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1950 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1951 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1953 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1954 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1960 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1961 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1966 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1968 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1969 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1971 total_pending_htlcs,
1972 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1973 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1974 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1977 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1978 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1980 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1982 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1987 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1988 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1989 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1990 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1997 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1999 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2000 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2003 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2005 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2006 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2007 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2011 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2012 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2013 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2016 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2018 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2019 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2022 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2023 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2024 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2025 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2026 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2027 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2028 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2029 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2030 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2031 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2032 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2034 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2035 // return them to fail the payment.
2036 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2037 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2038 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2040 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2041 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2046 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2047 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2048 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2049 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2050 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2051 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2052 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2053 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2054 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2055 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2056 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2057 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2058 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2062 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2064 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2065 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2066 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2070 // Internal utility functions for channels
2072 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2073 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2074 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2076 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2078 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2079 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2080 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2082 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2085 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2087 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2090 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2091 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2092 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2094 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2096 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2097 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2098 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2099 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2100 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2103 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2104 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2105 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2106 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2107 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2108 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2109 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2112 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2113 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2115 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2119 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2120 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2121 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2122 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2123 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2124 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2127 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2128 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2129 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2130 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2134 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2136 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2137 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2138 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2142 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2143 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2144 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2146 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2147 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2148 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2149 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2151 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2152 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2153 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2154 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2155 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2156 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2157 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2165 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2166 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2168 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2170 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2171 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2172 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2173 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2175 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2176 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2186 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2187 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2188 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2189 // outside of those situations will fail.
2190 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2194 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2199 1 + // script length (0)
2203 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2204 2 + // witness marker and flag
2205 1 + // witness element count
2206 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2207 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2208 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2209 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2210 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2211 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2213 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2214 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2215 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2221 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2222 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2223 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2224 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2226 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2227 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2228 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2230 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2231 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2232 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2233 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2234 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2235 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2238 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2239 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2242 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2243 value_to_holder = 0;
2246 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2247 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2248 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2249 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2251 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2252 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2255 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2256 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2259 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2262 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2263 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2265 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2267 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2268 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2269 where L::Target: Logger {
2270 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2271 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2272 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2273 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2274 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2275 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2276 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2277 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2281 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2282 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2283 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2284 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2286 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2287 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2289 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2291 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2292 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2293 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2295 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2296 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2297 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2298 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2299 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2300 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2301 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2303 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2304 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2305 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2307 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2308 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2310 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2313 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2314 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2318 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2322 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2323 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2324 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2325 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2326 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2327 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2330 // Now update local state:
2332 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2333 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2334 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2335 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2336 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2337 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2338 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2342 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2343 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2344 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2345 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2346 // do not not get into this branch.
2347 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2348 match pending_update {
2349 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2350 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2351 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2352 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2353 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2354 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2355 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2358 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2359 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2360 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2361 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2362 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2363 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2364 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2370 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2371 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2372 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2374 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2375 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2376 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2378 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2379 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2382 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2383 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2385 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2386 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2388 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2389 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2392 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2395 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2396 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2397 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2398 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2403 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2404 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2405 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2406 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2407 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2408 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2409 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2410 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2411 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2412 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2413 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2414 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2415 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2416 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2417 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2419 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2420 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2421 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2422 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2423 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2426 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2427 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2428 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2434 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2435 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2437 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2441 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2442 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2443 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2444 /// before we fail backwards.
2446 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2447 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2448 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2449 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2450 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2451 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2452 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2455 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2456 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2457 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2458 /// before we fail backwards.
2460 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2461 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2462 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2463 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2464 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2465 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2466 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2468 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2470 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2471 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2472 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2474 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2475 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2476 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2478 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2479 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2480 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2482 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2487 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2488 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2494 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2496 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2497 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2498 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2502 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2503 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2504 force_holding_cell = true;
2507 // Now update local state:
2508 if force_holding_cell {
2509 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2510 match pending_update {
2511 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2512 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2513 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2514 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2519 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2520 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2521 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2527 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2528 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2529 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2535 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2537 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2538 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2541 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2542 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2543 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2548 // Message handlers:
2550 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2551 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2552 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2553 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2554 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2558 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2561 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2564 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2565 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2566 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2567 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2570 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2572 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2573 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2574 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2575 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2577 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2578 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2580 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2581 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2583 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2584 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2585 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2586 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2587 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2592 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2593 initial_commitment_tx,
2596 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2597 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2600 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2601 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2604 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2605 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2606 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2607 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2608 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2609 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2610 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2611 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2612 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2613 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2614 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2615 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2617 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2619 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2620 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2621 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2622 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2623 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2624 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2625 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2627 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2628 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2629 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2631 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2633 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2634 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2636 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2638 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2639 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2643 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2644 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2645 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2646 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2647 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2648 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2649 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2652 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2653 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2655 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2656 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2657 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2658 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2663 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2664 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2668 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2669 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2670 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2671 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2672 // when routing outbound payments.
2673 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2677 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2679 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2680 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2682 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2683 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2685 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2686 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2687 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2688 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2689 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2690 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2691 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2692 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2693 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2695 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2696 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2697 let expected_point =
2698 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2699 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2701 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2702 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2703 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2704 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2705 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2706 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2708 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2709 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2710 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2711 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2712 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2714 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2722 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2723 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2725 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2727 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2730 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2731 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2732 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2733 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2734 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2735 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2737 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2738 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2739 if local_sent_shutdown {
2740 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2742 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2743 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2744 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2747 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2750 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2753 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2756 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2760 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2761 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2762 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2765 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2768 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2769 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2770 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2771 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2772 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2773 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2774 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2775 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2776 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2777 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2778 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2780 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2781 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2782 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2783 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2784 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2785 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2789 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2790 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2793 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2794 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2795 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2797 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2798 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2799 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2800 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2801 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2802 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2803 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2807 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2808 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2809 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2810 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2811 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2812 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2813 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2817 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2818 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2819 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2820 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2821 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2825 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2826 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2827 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2828 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2829 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2831 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2835 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2839 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2840 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2841 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2842 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2843 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2844 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2845 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2846 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2847 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2848 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2849 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2850 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2851 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2852 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2853 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2854 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2857 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2858 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2859 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2860 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2864 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2867 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2871 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2872 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2873 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2877 // Now update local state:
2878 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2879 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2881 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2882 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2883 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2884 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2889 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2891 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2892 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2893 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2894 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2895 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2896 None => fail_reason.into(),
2897 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2898 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2899 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2902 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2906 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2908 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2909 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2911 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2917 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2920 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2921 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2924 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2928 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2931 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2932 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2935 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2939 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2943 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2944 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2947 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2951 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2955 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2956 where L::Target: Logger
2958 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2961 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2964 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2968 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2970 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2972 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2973 let commitment_txid = {
2974 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2975 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2976 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2978 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2979 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2980 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2981 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2982 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2987 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2989 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2990 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2991 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2992 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2995 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2996 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2997 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3003 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3004 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3005 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3006 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3007 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3008 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3009 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3010 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3011 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3012 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3013 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3019 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3023 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3024 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3025 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3026 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3027 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3028 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3029 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3030 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3031 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3032 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3033 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3034 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3035 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3038 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3039 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3040 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3041 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3042 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3043 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3044 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3046 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3047 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3048 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3049 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3050 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3051 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3052 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3055 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3056 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3059 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3061 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3062 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3063 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3066 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3069 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3070 commitment_stats.tx,
3072 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3073 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3074 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3077 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3078 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3080 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3081 let mut need_commitment = false;
3082 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3083 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3084 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3085 need_commitment = true;
3089 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3090 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3091 Some(forward_info.clone())
3093 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3094 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3095 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3096 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3097 need_commitment = true;
3100 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3101 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3102 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3103 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3104 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3105 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3106 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3107 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3108 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3109 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3110 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3111 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3112 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3113 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3115 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3117 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3118 need_commitment = true;
3122 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3123 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3124 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3125 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3126 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3127 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3129 nondust_htlc_sources,
3133 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3134 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3135 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3136 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3138 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3139 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3140 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3141 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3142 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3143 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3144 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3145 // includes the right HTLCs.
3146 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3147 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3148 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3149 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3150 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3151 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3153 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3154 &self.context.channel_id);
3155 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3158 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3159 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3160 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3161 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3162 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3163 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3164 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3165 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3166 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3170 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3171 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3172 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3173 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3176 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3177 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3178 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3179 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3180 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3181 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3182 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3184 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3185 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3186 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3187 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3190 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3191 /// for our counterparty.
3192 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3193 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3194 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3195 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3197 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3198 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3199 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3200 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3202 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3203 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3204 updates: Vec::new(),
3207 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3208 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3209 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3210 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3211 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3212 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3213 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3214 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3215 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3216 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3217 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3218 // to rebalance channels.
3219 match &htlc_update {
3220 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3221 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3222 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3224 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3225 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3227 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3230 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3231 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3232 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3233 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3234 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3235 // into the holding cell without ever being
3236 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3237 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3238 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3241 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3247 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3248 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3249 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3250 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3251 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3252 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3253 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3254 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3255 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3256 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3257 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3258 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3260 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3261 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3262 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3263 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3264 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3265 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3266 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3267 // for a full revocation before failing.
3268 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3269 update_fail_count += 1;
3272 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3274 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3281 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3282 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3284 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3285 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3290 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3291 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3292 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3293 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3294 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3296 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3297 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3298 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3300 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3301 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3307 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3308 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3309 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3310 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3311 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3312 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3313 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3314 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3315 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3317 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3320 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3323 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3327 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3329 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3330 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3335 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3336 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3337 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3338 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3339 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3340 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3341 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3342 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3346 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3348 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3349 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3352 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3353 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3354 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3355 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3357 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3361 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3362 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3363 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3364 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3365 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3366 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3367 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3368 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3372 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3373 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3374 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3375 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3376 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3377 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3378 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3379 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3380 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3382 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3383 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3386 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3387 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3388 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3389 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3390 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3391 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3392 let mut require_commitment = false;
3393 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3396 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3397 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3398 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3400 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3401 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3402 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3403 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3404 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3405 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3410 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3411 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3412 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3413 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3414 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3416 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3417 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3418 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3423 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3424 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3426 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3430 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3431 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3433 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3434 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3435 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3436 require_commitment = true;
3437 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3438 match forward_info {
3439 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3440 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3441 require_commitment = true;
3443 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3444 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3445 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3447 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3448 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3453 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3454 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3455 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3462 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3463 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3464 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3465 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3467 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3468 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3469 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3470 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3471 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3472 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3473 require_commitment = true;
3477 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3479 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3480 match update_state {
3481 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3482 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3483 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3484 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3485 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3487 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3488 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3489 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3490 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3491 require_commitment = true;
3492 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3493 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3498 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3499 let release_state_str =
3500 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3501 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3502 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3503 if !release_monitor {
3504 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3505 update: monitor_update,
3507 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3509 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3514 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3515 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3516 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3517 if require_commitment {
3518 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3519 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3520 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3521 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3522 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3523 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3524 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3525 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3526 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3528 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3529 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3531 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3532 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3535 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3536 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3537 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3538 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3543 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3545 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3546 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3548 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3549 if require_commitment {
3550 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3552 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3553 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3554 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3557 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3558 &self.context.channel_id(),
3559 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3562 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3563 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3565 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3566 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3568 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3569 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3575 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3576 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3577 /// commitment update.
3578 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3579 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3580 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3582 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3583 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3586 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3587 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3588 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3589 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3591 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3592 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3593 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3594 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3595 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3596 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3597 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3599 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3600 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3602 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3603 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3605 if !self.context.is_live() {
3606 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3609 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3610 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3611 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3612 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3613 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3614 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3615 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3616 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3617 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3618 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3622 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3623 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3624 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3625 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3626 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3627 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3630 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3635 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3636 force_holding_cell = true;
3639 if force_holding_cell {
3640 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3644 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3645 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3647 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3648 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3653 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3654 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3656 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3658 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3659 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3660 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3661 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3665 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3666 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3667 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3671 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3672 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3675 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3676 // will be retransmitted.
3677 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3678 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3679 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3681 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3682 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3684 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3685 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3686 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3687 // this HTLC accordingly
3688 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3691 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3692 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3693 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3694 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3697 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3698 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3699 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3700 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3701 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3702 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3707 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3709 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3710 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3711 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3712 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3716 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3717 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3718 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3719 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3720 // the update upon reconnection.
3721 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3725 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3727 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3728 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3732 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3733 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3734 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3735 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3736 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3737 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3738 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3740 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3741 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3742 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3743 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3744 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3745 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3746 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3748 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3749 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3750 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3751 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3752 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3753 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3754 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3757 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3758 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3759 /// to the remote side.
3760 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3761 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3762 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3763 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3766 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3768 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3769 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3771 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3772 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3773 // first received the funding_signed.
3774 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3775 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3776 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3778 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3779 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3780 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3781 funding_broadcastable = None;
3784 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3785 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3786 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3787 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3788 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3789 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3790 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3791 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3792 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3793 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3794 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3795 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3796 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3797 next_per_commitment_point,
3798 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3802 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3804 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3805 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3806 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3807 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3808 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3811 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3812 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3813 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3814 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3815 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3816 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3820 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3821 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3823 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3824 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3825 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3828 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3829 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3830 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3831 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3832 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3833 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3834 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3835 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3836 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3840 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3841 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3843 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3846 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3849 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3850 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3852 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3853 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3854 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3855 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3856 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3857 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3858 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3859 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3860 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3861 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3862 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3863 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3865 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3867 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3869 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3875 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3876 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3877 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3878 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3879 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3880 per_commitment_secret,
3881 next_per_commitment_point,
3883 next_local_nonce: None,
3887 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3888 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3889 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3890 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3891 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3893 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3894 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3895 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3896 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3897 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3898 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3899 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3900 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3901 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3902 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3907 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3908 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3910 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3911 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3912 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3913 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3914 reason: err_packet.clone()
3917 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3918 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3920 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3921 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3922 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3925 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3926 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3927 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3928 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3929 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3936 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3937 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3939 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3943 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3944 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3945 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3946 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3947 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3948 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3952 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3953 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3954 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3955 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3956 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3957 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3958 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3963 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3964 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3966 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3967 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3968 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3969 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3970 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3971 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3972 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3973 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3976 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3978 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3979 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3980 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3981 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3985 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3986 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3990 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3991 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3992 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3993 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3994 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3997 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3998 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3999 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4000 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4001 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4004 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4005 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4006 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4007 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4008 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4009 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4010 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4011 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4015 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4016 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4017 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4018 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4020 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4024 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4025 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4026 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4027 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4029 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4031 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4033 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4034 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4035 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4036 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4037 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4040 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4041 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4042 channel_ready: None,
4043 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4044 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4045 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4049 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4050 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4051 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4052 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4053 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4054 next_per_commitment_point,
4055 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4057 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4058 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4059 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4063 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4064 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4065 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4067 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4068 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4069 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4072 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4078 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4079 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4080 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4081 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4082 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4083 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4084 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4086 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4088 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4089 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4090 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4091 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4093 next_per_commitment_point,
4094 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4098 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4099 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4100 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4102 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4105 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4106 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4107 raa: required_revoke,
4108 commitment_update: None,
4109 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4111 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4112 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4113 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4115 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4118 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4119 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4120 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4121 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4122 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4123 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4126 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4127 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4128 raa: required_revoke,
4129 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4130 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4134 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4138 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4139 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4140 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4141 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4143 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4145 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4147 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4148 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4149 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4150 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4151 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4152 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4153 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4154 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4156 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4157 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4158 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4159 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4160 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4162 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4163 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4164 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4165 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4168 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4169 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4170 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4171 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4172 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4173 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4174 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4175 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4176 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4177 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4178 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4179 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4180 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4181 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4182 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4184 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4187 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4188 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4191 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4192 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4193 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4194 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4195 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4196 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4199 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4200 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4201 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4202 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4203 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4204 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4207 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4213 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4214 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4215 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4216 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4218 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4219 return Ok((None, None));
4222 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4223 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4224 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4226 return Ok((None, None));
4229 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4231 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4232 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4233 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4234 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4236 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4237 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4239 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4240 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4242 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4243 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4244 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4245 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4247 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4248 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4249 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4256 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4257 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4259 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4260 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4263 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4264 /// within our expected timeframe.
4266 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4267 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4268 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4271 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4274 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4275 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4279 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4280 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4282 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4285 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4286 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4287 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4288 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4291 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4292 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4296 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4298 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4302 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4303 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4307 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4310 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4311 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4312 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4313 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4315 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4318 assert!(send_shutdown);
4319 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4320 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4321 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4323 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4326 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4331 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4333 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4334 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4336 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4337 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4338 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4339 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4340 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4341 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4344 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4345 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4347 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4348 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4349 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4350 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4354 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4355 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4356 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4357 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4358 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4359 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4361 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4362 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4369 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4370 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4372 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4375 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4376 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4378 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4380 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4381 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4382 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4383 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4384 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4385 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4386 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4387 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4390 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4391 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4394 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4398 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4399 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4400 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4401 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4403 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4404 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4406 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4409 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4412 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4416 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4420 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4421 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4422 return Ok((None, None));
4425 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4426 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4427 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4430 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4432 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4435 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4436 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4437 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4438 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4439 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4443 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4444 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4449 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4450 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4451 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4452 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4453 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4454 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4455 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4459 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4461 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4462 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4463 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4464 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4466 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4469 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4470 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4472 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4473 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4475 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4476 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4477 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4478 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4482 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4483 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4484 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4485 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4487 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4488 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4489 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4497 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4498 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4501 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4504 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4505 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4508 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4509 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4510 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4511 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4512 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4514 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4516 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4518 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4519 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4522 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4523 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4524 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4525 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4526 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4527 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4528 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4529 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4531 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4534 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4535 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4536 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4537 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4543 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4544 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4545 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4546 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4548 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4554 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4555 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4556 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4557 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4558 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4559 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4560 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4562 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4563 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4566 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4568 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4569 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4575 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4576 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4577 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4578 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4579 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4580 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4581 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4583 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4584 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4591 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4592 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4595 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4596 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4599 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4600 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4604 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4605 &self.context.holder_signer
4609 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4611 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4612 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4613 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4614 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4615 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4616 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4618 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4620 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4628 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4629 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4633 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4634 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4635 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4636 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4639 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4640 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4641 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4642 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4645 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4646 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4647 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4648 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4649 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4650 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4653 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4654 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4655 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4656 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4657 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4658 if !release_monitor {
4659 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4668 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4669 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4672 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4673 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4674 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4676 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4677 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4678 if self.context.channel_state &
4679 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4680 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4681 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4682 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4683 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4686 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4687 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4688 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4689 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4690 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4691 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4693 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4694 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4695 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4697 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4698 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4699 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4700 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4701 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4702 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4708 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4709 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4710 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4713 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4714 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4715 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4718 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4719 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4720 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4723 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4724 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4725 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4726 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4727 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4728 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4733 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4734 self.context.channel_update_status
4737 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4738 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4739 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4742 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4744 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4745 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4746 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4750 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4751 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4752 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4755 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4759 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4760 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4761 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4762 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4763 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4765 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4766 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4767 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4769 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4770 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4773 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4774 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4775 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4776 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4777 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4778 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4779 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4780 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4781 self.context.channel_state);
4783 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4787 if need_commitment_update {
4788 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4789 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4790 let next_per_commitment_point =
4791 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4792 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4793 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4794 next_per_commitment_point,
4795 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4799 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4805 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4806 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4807 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4808 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4809 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4810 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4811 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4813 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4816 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4817 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4818 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4819 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4820 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4821 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4822 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4823 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4824 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4825 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4826 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4827 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4828 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4829 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4830 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4831 // channel and move on.
4832 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4833 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4835 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4836 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4837 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4839 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4840 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4841 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4842 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4843 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4844 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4845 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4846 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4851 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4852 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4853 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4854 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4855 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4858 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4859 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4860 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4861 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4862 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4863 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4866 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4867 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4868 // may have already happened for this block).
4869 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4870 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4871 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4872 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4875 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4876 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4877 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4878 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4886 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4887 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4888 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4889 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4891 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4892 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4895 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4897 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4898 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4899 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4900 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4902 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4905 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4908 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4909 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4910 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4911 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4913 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4916 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4917 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4918 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4920 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4921 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4923 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4924 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4925 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4933 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4935 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4936 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4937 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4939 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4940 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4943 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4944 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4945 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4946 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4947 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4948 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4949 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4950 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4951 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4954 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4955 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4956 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4957 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4959 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4960 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4961 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4963 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4964 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4965 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4966 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4968 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4969 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4970 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4971 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4972 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4973 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4974 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4977 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4978 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4980 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4983 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4984 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4985 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4986 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4987 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4988 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4989 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4990 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4991 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4992 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4993 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4994 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4995 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4996 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4997 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4998 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4999 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5005 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5010 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5011 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5013 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5014 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5015 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5016 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5018 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5021 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5023 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5024 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5025 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5026 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5027 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5028 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5030 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5031 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5034 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5035 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5036 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5037 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5038 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5039 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5041 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5042 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5045 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5046 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5047 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5048 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5049 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5055 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5056 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5057 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5058 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5063 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5067 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5071 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5072 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5076 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5080 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5081 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5084 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5088 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5090 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5095 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5096 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5097 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5099 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5104 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5106 None => return None,
5109 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5111 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5112 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5114 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5115 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5121 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5123 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5124 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5125 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5126 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5127 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5128 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5129 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5131 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5132 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5133 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5134 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5135 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5136 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5137 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5138 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5139 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5140 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5141 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5142 contents: announcement,
5147 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5151 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5152 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5153 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5154 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5155 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5156 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5157 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5158 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5160 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5162 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5164 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5165 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5167 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5169 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5170 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5173 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5174 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5175 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5176 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5179 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5182 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5183 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5184 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5185 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5186 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5187 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5190 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5192 Err(_) => return None,
5194 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5195 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5200 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5201 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5202 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5203 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5204 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5205 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5206 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5207 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5208 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5209 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5210 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5211 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5212 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5213 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5214 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5215 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5218 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5221 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5222 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5223 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5224 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5225 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5226 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5227 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5228 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5229 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5231 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5232 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5233 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5234 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5235 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5236 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5237 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5238 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5239 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5241 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5242 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5243 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5244 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5245 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5246 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5247 next_funding_txid: None,
5252 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5254 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5255 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5256 /// commitment update.
5258 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5259 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5260 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5261 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5262 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5263 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5264 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5267 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5268 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5269 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5271 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5272 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5277 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5278 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5280 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5282 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5283 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5285 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5286 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5287 /// regenerate them.
5289 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5290 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5292 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5293 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5294 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5295 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5296 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5297 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5298 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5300 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5301 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5303 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5304 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5305 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5308 if amount_msat == 0 {
5309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5312 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5313 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5314 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5315 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5318 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5319 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5320 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5323 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5324 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5325 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5326 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5327 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5328 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5329 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5330 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5333 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5334 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5335 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5336 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5337 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5338 else { "to peer" });
5340 if need_holding_cell {
5341 force_holding_cell = true;
5344 // Now update local state:
5345 if force_holding_cell {
5346 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5351 onion_routing_packet,
5357 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5358 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5360 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5362 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5367 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5368 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5369 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5373 onion_routing_packet,
5376 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5381 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5382 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5383 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5384 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5386 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5387 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5388 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5390 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5391 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5395 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5396 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5397 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5398 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5399 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5400 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5401 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5404 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5405 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5406 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5407 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5408 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5409 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5412 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5414 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5415 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5416 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5417 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5418 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5420 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5421 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5424 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5425 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5426 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5427 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5428 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5429 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5430 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5431 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5432 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5433 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5434 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5437 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5441 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5442 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5443 where L::Target: Logger
5445 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5446 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5447 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5449 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5451 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5452 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5453 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5454 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5455 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5456 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5457 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5458 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5459 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5460 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5461 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5467 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5470 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5471 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5472 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5473 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5474 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5475 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5477 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5478 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5479 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5481 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5482 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5483 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5486 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5487 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5491 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5494 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5496 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5497 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5498 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5499 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5501 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5502 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5503 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5504 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5505 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5506 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5510 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5511 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5515 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5516 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5521 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5522 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5524 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5525 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5526 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5527 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5528 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5529 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5530 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5531 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5533 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5534 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5535 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5538 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5539 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5540 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5546 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5548 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5549 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5550 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5551 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5552 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5554 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5556 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5562 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5563 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5565 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5566 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5567 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5568 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5569 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5571 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5572 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5576 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5577 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5578 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5580 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5584 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5587 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5588 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5589 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5592 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5593 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5594 let mut chan_closed = false;
5595 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5599 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5601 None if !chan_closed => {
5602 // use override shutdown script if provided
5603 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5604 Some(script) => script,
5606 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5607 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5608 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5609 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5613 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5614 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5616 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5622 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5623 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5624 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5625 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5627 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5629 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5631 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5632 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5633 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5634 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5635 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5636 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5639 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5640 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5642 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5643 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5644 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5647 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5648 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5649 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5650 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5651 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5653 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5654 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5661 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5662 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5664 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5667 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5668 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5669 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5671 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5672 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5676 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5680 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5681 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5682 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5683 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5686 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5687 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5688 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5689 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5690 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5691 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5692 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5693 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5695 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5696 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5697 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5698 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5700 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5703 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5704 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5706 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5707 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5708 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5710 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5713 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5714 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5715 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5716 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5717 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5720 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5721 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5723 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5724 ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee
5726 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
5728 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5730 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5731 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5732 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5733 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5736 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5737 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5739 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5740 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5741 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5742 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5746 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5747 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5748 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5752 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5753 Ok(script) => script,
5754 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5757 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5760 context: ChannelContext {
5763 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5764 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5765 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5766 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5771 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5773 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5774 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5775 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5776 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5778 channel_value_satoshis,
5780 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5782 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5783 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5786 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5787 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5790 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5791 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5792 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5793 pending_update_fee: None,
5794 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5795 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5796 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5797 update_time_counter: 1,
5799 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5801 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5802 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5803 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5804 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5805 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5806 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5808 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5809 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5810 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5811 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5813 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5814 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5815 closing_fee_limits: None,
5816 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5818 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5819 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5820 short_channel_id: None,
5821 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5823 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5824 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5825 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5826 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5827 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5828 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5829 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5830 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5831 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5832 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5833 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5834 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5836 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5838 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5839 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5840 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5841 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5842 counterparty_parameters: None,
5843 funding_outpoint: None,
5844 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5846 funding_transaction: None,
5847 is_batch_funding: None,
5849 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5850 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5851 counterparty_node_id,
5853 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5855 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5857 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5858 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5860 announcement_sigs: None,
5862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5863 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5865 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5867 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5868 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5870 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5871 outbound_scid_alias,
5873 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5874 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5877 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5882 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5884 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5888 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5889 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5890 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5891 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5892 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5893 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5894 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5895 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5896 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5901 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5902 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5903 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5904 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5905 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5906 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5907 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5908 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5909 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5910 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5911 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5913 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5914 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5916 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5917 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5918 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5919 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5922 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5923 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5925 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5928 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5929 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5930 return Err((self, e));
5934 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5936 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5938 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5939 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5941 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5942 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5943 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5944 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5945 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5946 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5949 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5950 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5952 let channel = Channel {
5953 context: self.context,
5956 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5957 temporary_channel_id,
5958 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5959 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5962 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5964 next_local_nonce: None,
5968 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5969 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5970 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5971 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5972 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5973 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5974 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5975 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5976 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5977 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5980 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5981 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5982 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5983 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5984 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5985 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5991 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5992 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5993 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5994 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5995 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5996 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5998 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6000 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6001 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6002 // We've exhausted our options
6005 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6006 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6009 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6010 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6011 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6012 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6014 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6015 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6016 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6017 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6018 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6019 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6021 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6023 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6024 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6027 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6028 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6029 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6031 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6032 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6035 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6036 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6039 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6040 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6044 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6045 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6046 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6047 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6048 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6049 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6050 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6051 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6052 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6053 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6054 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6055 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6056 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6057 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6058 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6059 first_per_commitment_point,
6060 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6061 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6062 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6063 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6065 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6070 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6071 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6073 // Check sanity of message fields:
6074 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6077 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6080 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6083 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6086 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6089 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6091 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6093 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6094 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6097 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6098 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6101 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6104 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6108 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6109 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6112 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6115 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6118 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6124 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6127 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6131 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6132 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6135 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6136 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6138 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6139 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6142 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6143 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6146 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6147 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6148 &Some(ref script) => {
6149 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6150 if script.len() == 0 {
6153 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6156 Some(script.clone())
6159 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6166 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6167 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6168 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6169 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6170 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6172 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6173 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6175 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6178 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6179 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6180 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6181 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6182 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6183 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6186 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6187 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6188 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6191 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6192 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6194 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6195 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6201 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6202 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6203 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6204 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6207 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6208 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6209 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6210 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6211 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6212 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6213 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6214 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6215 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6216 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6217 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6220 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6222 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6223 // support this channel type.
6224 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6225 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6229 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6230 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6231 // `static_remote_key`.
6232 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6235 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6236 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6239 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6242 channel_type.clone()
6244 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6245 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6251 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6252 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6253 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6254 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6255 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6256 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6257 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6258 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6259 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6262 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6266 // Check sanity of message fields:
6267 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6270 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6273 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6276 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6277 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6280 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6283 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6286 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6288 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6289 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6292 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6295 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6299 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6300 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6303 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6306 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6309 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6312 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6315 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6318 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6322 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6324 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6325 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6330 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6331 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6332 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6333 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6336 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6339 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6340 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6341 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6343 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6347 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6348 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6349 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6350 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6351 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6355 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6356 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6357 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6358 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6362 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6363 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6364 &Some(ref script) => {
6365 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6366 if script.len() == 0 {
6369 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6370 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6372 Some(script.clone())
6375 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6382 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6383 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6384 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6385 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6389 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6390 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6395 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6396 Ok(script) => script,
6397 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6400 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6401 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6403 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6406 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6410 context: ChannelContext {
6413 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6414 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6416 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6421 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6423 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6424 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6425 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6426 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6429 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6431 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6432 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6435 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6436 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6437 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6439 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6440 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6441 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6442 pending_update_fee: None,
6443 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6444 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6445 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6446 update_time_counter: 1,
6448 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6450 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6451 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6452 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6453 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6454 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6455 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6457 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6458 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6459 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6460 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6462 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6463 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6464 closing_fee_limits: None,
6465 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6467 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6468 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6469 short_channel_id: None,
6470 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6472 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6473 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6474 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6475 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6476 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6477 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6478 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6479 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6480 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6481 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6482 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6483 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6486 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6488 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6489 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6490 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6491 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6492 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6493 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6494 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6496 funding_outpoint: None,
6497 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6499 funding_transaction: None,
6500 is_batch_funding: None,
6502 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6503 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6504 counterparty_node_id,
6506 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6508 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6510 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6511 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6513 announcement_sigs: None,
6515 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6516 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6517 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6518 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6520 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6521 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6523 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6524 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6526 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6527 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6529 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6530 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6535 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6537 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6543 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6544 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6546 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6547 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6548 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6549 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6551 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6552 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6554 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6555 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6558 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6561 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6562 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6563 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6565 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6566 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6567 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6568 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6570 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6571 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6572 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6573 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6574 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6575 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6576 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6577 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6578 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6579 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6580 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6581 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6582 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6583 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6584 first_per_commitment_point,
6585 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6586 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6587 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6589 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6591 next_local_nonce: None,
6595 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6596 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6598 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6600 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6601 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6604 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6605 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6607 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6608 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6610 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6611 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6612 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6613 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6614 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6615 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6616 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6617 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6618 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6621 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6622 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6624 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6625 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6626 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6627 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6629 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6630 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6631 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6632 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6633 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6635 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6636 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6641 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6642 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6643 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6647 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6648 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6650 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6651 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6652 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6654 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6656 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6657 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6658 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6659 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6662 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6663 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6664 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6665 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6666 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6668 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6670 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6671 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6672 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6675 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6676 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6677 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6681 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6682 initial_commitment_tx,
6685 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6686 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6689 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6690 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6693 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6695 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6696 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6697 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6698 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6699 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6700 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6701 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6702 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6703 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6704 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6705 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6707 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6709 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6710 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6711 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6712 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6713 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6714 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6716 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6717 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6718 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6719 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6721 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6723 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6724 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6725 let mut channel = Channel {
6726 context: self.context,
6728 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6729 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6730 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6732 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6736 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6737 }, channel_monitor))
6741 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6742 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6744 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6750 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6752 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6753 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6754 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6756 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6757 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6758 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6759 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6765 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6766 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6767 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6768 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6769 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6770 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6775 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6776 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6777 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6778 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6780 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6781 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6782 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6783 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6788 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6789 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6790 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6791 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6792 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6793 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6798 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6800 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6803 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6805 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6806 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6807 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6808 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6809 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6811 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6812 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6813 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6814 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6816 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6817 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6818 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6820 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6822 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6823 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6824 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6825 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6826 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6827 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6828 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6830 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6831 // deserialized from that format.
6832 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6833 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6834 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6836 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6838 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6839 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6840 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6842 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6843 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6844 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6845 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6848 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6849 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6850 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6853 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6854 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6855 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6856 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6858 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6859 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6861 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6863 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6865 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6867 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6870 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6872 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6877 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6878 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6880 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6881 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6882 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6883 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6884 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6885 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6886 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6888 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6890 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6892 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6895 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6896 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6897 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6900 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6902 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6903 preimages.push(preimage);
6905 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6906 reason.write(writer)?;
6908 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6910 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6911 preimages.push(preimage);
6913 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6914 reason.write(writer)?;
6917 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6918 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6919 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6921 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6922 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6923 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6927 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6928 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6929 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6931 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6932 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6936 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6937 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6938 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6939 source.write(writer)?;
6940 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6942 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6943 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6944 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6946 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6947 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6951 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6952 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6954 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6956 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6957 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6962 match self.context.resend_order {
6963 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6964 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6967 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6968 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6969 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6971 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6972 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6973 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6974 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6977 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6978 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6979 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6980 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6981 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6984 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6985 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6986 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6987 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6989 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6990 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6991 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6993 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6995 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6996 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6998 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7000 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7001 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7002 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7003 // consider the stale state on reload.
7006 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7007 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7008 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7010 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7011 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7012 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7014 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7015 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7017 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7018 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7019 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7021 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7022 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7024 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7027 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7028 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7029 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7031 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7034 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7035 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7037 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7038 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7039 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7041 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7043 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7045 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7047 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7048 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7050 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7051 htlc.write(writer)?;
7054 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7055 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7056 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7058 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7059 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7061 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7062 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7063 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7064 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7065 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7066 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7067 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7069 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7070 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7071 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7072 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7073 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7075 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7076 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7078 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7079 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7080 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7081 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7083 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7085 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7086 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7087 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7088 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7089 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7090 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7091 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7093 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7094 (2, chan_type, option),
7095 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7096 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7097 (5, self.context.config, required),
7098 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7099 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7100 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7101 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7102 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7103 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7104 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7105 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7106 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7107 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7108 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7109 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7110 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7111 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7112 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7113 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7114 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7115 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7116 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7123 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7124 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7126 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7127 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7129 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7130 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7131 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7133 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7134 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7135 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7136 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7140 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7141 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7147 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let mut keys_data = None;
7158 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7159 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7160 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7162 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7163 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7164 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7165 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7166 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7167 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7171 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7172 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7173 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7176 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7185 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7186 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7187 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7188 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7189 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7190 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7191 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7192 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7193 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7194 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7195 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7196 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7201 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7203 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7204 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7205 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7206 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7207 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7208 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7209 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7210 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7211 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7212 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7214 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7215 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7218 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7219 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7222 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7225 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7227 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7231 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7233 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7234 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7235 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7236 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7237 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7238 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7239 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7240 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7241 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7243 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7244 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7245 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7247 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7248 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7249 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7251 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7255 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7256 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7257 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7258 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7261 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7262 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7267 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7268 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7271 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7272 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7273 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7274 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7277 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7281 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7283 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7284 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7287 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7288 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7289 // consider the stale state on reload.
7290 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7293 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7295 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7297 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7300 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7301 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7309 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7310 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7312 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7313 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7319 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7321 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7322 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7324 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7325 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7330 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7331 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7332 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7333 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7335 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7338 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7352 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7353 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7355 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7357 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7361 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7362 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7363 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7365 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7371 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7372 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7373 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7374 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7375 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7376 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7377 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7378 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7379 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7380 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7382 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7383 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7384 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7385 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7386 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7387 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7388 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7390 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7391 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7392 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7393 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7395 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7397 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7398 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7400 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7402 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7403 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7404 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7405 (2, channel_type, option),
7406 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7407 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7408 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7409 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7410 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7411 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7412 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7413 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7414 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7415 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7416 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7417 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7418 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7419 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7420 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7421 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7422 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7423 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7424 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7425 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7426 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7427 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7430 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7431 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7432 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7433 // required channel parameters.
7434 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7435 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7436 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7438 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7440 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7441 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7442 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7443 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7446 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7447 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7448 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7450 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7451 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7453 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7454 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7459 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7460 if iter.next().is_some() {
7461 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7465 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7466 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7467 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7468 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7469 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7472 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7473 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7474 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7476 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7477 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7479 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7480 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7481 // separate u64 values.
7482 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7484 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7486 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7487 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7488 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7489 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7491 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7492 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7494 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7495 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7496 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7497 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7498 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7501 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7502 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7506 context: ChannelContext {
7509 config: config.unwrap(),
7513 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7514 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7515 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7518 temporary_channel_id,
7520 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7522 channel_value_satoshis,
7524 latest_monitor_update_id,
7526 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7527 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7530 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7531 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7534 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7535 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7536 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7537 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7541 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7542 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7543 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7544 monitor_pending_forwards,
7545 monitor_pending_failures,
7546 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7549 holding_cell_update_fee,
7550 next_holder_htlc_id,
7551 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7552 update_time_counter,
7555 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7556 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7557 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7558 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7560 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7561 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7562 closing_fee_limits: None,
7563 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7565 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7566 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7568 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7570 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7571 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7572 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7573 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7574 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7575 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7576 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7577 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7578 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7581 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7583 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7584 funding_transaction,
7587 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7588 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7589 counterparty_node_id,
7591 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7595 channel_update_status,
7596 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7600 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7601 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7602 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7603 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7605 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7606 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7608 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7609 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7610 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7612 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7613 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7615 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7616 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7618 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7621 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7630 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7631 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7632 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7633 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7634 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7636 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7637 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7638 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7639 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7640 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7641 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7642 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7643 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7644 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7645 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7646 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7647 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7648 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7649 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7650 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7651 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7652 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7653 use crate::util::test_utils;
7654 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7655 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7656 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7657 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7658 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7659 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7660 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7661 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7662 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7663 use crate::prelude::*;
7665 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7668 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7669 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7675 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7676 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7677 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7678 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7682 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7683 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7684 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7685 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7686 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7687 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7688 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7689 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7693 signer: InMemorySigner,
7696 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7697 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7700 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7701 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7703 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7704 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7707 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7711 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7713 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7715 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7716 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7717 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7720 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7722 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7723 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7727 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7728 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7729 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7733 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7734 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7735 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7736 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7738 let seed = [42; 32];
7739 let network = Network::Testnet;
7740 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7741 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7742 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7746 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7747 let config = UserConfig::default();
7748 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7749 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7750 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7752 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7753 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7757 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7758 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7760 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7761 let original_fee = 253;
7762 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7763 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7764 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7765 let seed = [42; 32];
7766 let network = Network::Testnet;
7767 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7769 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7770 let config = UserConfig::default();
7771 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7773 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7774 // same as the old fee.
7775 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7776 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7777 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7781 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7782 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7783 // dust limits are used.
7784 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7786 let seed = [42; 32];
7787 let network = Network::Testnet;
7788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7789 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7790 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7792 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7793 // they have different dust limits.
7795 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7796 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7797 let config = UserConfig::default();
7798 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7800 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7801 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7802 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7803 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7804 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7806 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7807 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7808 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7809 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7810 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7812 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7813 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7814 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7815 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7817 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7818 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7819 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7821 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7822 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7824 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7825 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7826 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7828 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7829 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7830 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7831 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7834 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7836 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7837 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7838 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7839 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7840 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7841 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7842 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7843 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7844 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7846 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7849 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7850 // the dust limit check.
7851 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7852 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7853 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7854 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7856 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7857 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7858 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7859 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7860 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7861 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7862 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7866 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7867 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7868 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7869 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7870 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7871 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7873 let seed = [42; 32];
7874 let network = Network::Testnet;
7875 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7877 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7878 let config = UserConfig::default();
7879 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7881 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7882 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7884 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7885 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7886 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7888 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7889 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7891 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7892 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7893 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7894 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7895 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7897 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7899 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7900 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7901 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7902 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7903 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7905 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7906 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7907 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7908 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7909 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7913 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7914 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7915 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7916 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7917 let seed = [42; 32];
7918 let network = Network::Testnet;
7919 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7920 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7923 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7925 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7926 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7927 let config = UserConfig::default();
7928 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7930 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7931 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7932 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7933 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7935 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7936 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7937 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7939 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7940 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7941 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7942 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7944 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7945 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7946 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7948 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7949 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7951 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7952 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7953 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7954 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7955 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7956 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7957 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7959 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7961 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7962 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7963 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7964 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7965 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7969 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7970 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7971 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7973 let seed = [42; 32];
7974 let network = Network::Testnet;
7975 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7976 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7977 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7979 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7980 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7981 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7982 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7983 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7984 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7985 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7986 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7988 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7989 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7990 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7991 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7992 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7993 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7995 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7996 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7997 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7998 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8000 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8002 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8003 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8004 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8005 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8006 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8007 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8009 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8010 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8011 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8012 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8014 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8015 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8016 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8017 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8018 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8020 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8021 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8023 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8024 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8025 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8027 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8028 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8029 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8030 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8031 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8033 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8034 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8036 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8037 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8038 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8042 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8044 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8045 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8046 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8048 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8049 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8050 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8051 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8053 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8054 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8055 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8057 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8059 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8060 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8063 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8064 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8065 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8066 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8067 let seed = [42; 32];
8068 let network = Network::Testnet;
8069 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8070 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8071 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8074 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8075 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8076 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8078 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8079 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8081 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8082 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8083 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8085 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8086 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8088 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8090 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8091 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8093 // Channel Negotiations failed
8094 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8095 assert!(result.is_err());
8100 fn channel_update() {
8101 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8102 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8104 let seed = [42; 32];
8105 let network = Network::Testnet;
8106 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8107 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8108 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8110 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8111 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8112 let config = UserConfig::default();
8113 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8115 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8116 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8117 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8118 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8119 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8121 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8122 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8123 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8124 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8125 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8127 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8128 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8129 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8130 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8132 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8133 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8134 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8136 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8137 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8139 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8140 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8141 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8143 short_channel_id: 0,
8146 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8147 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8148 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8150 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8151 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8153 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8155 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8157 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8158 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8159 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8160 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8162 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8163 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8164 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8166 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8169 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8172 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8174 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8175 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8176 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8177 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8178 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8179 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8180 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8181 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8182 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8183 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8184 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8185 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8186 use crate::sync::Arc;
8188 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8189 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8190 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8193 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8195 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8196 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8197 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8198 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8199 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8201 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8202 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8208 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8209 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8210 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8212 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8213 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8214 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8215 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8216 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8217 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8219 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8221 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8222 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8223 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8224 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8225 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8226 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8228 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8229 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8230 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8231 selected_contest_delay: 144
8233 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8234 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8236 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8237 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8239 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8240 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8242 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8243 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8245 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8246 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8247 // build_commitment_transaction.
8248 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8249 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8250 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8251 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8252 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8254 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8255 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8256 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8257 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8261 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8262 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8263 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8264 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8268 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8269 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8270 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8272 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8273 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8275 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8276 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8278 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8280 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8281 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8282 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8283 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8284 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8285 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8286 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8288 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8289 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8290 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8291 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8293 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8294 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8295 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8297 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8299 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8300 commitment_tx.clone(),
8301 counterparty_signature,
8302 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8303 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8304 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8306 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8307 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8309 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8310 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8311 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8313 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8314 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8317 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8318 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8320 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8321 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8322 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8323 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8324 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8325 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8326 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8327 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8329 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8332 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8333 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8334 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8338 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8341 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8342 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8343 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8345 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8346 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8347 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8348 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8349 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8350 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8351 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8352 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8354 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8358 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8359 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8360 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8361 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8363 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8364 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8366 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8367 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8368 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8370 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8371 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8372 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8373 "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", {});
8375 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8376 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8378 amount_msat: 1000000,
8380 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8381 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8383 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8386 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8387 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8389 amount_msat: 2000000,
8391 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8392 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8394 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8397 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8398 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8400 amount_msat: 2000000,
8402 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8403 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8404 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8405 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8407 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8410 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8411 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8413 amount_msat: 3000000,
8415 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8416 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8417 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8418 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8420 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8423 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8424 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8426 amount_msat: 4000000,
8428 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8429 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8431 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8435 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8436 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8437 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8439 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8440 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8441 "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", {
8444 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8445 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8446 "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" },
8449 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8450 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8451 "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" },
8454 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8455 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8456 "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" },
8459 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8460 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8461 "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" },
8464 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8465 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8466 "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" }
8469 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8470 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8471 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8473 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8474 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8475 "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", {
8478 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8479 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8480 "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" },
8483 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8484 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8485 "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" },
8488 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8489 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8490 "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" },
8493 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8494 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8495 "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" },
8498 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8499 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8500 "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" }
8503 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8507 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8508 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8509 "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", {
8512 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8513 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8514 "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" },
8517 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8518 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8519 "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" },
8522 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8523 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8524 "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" },
8527 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8528 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8529 "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" }
8532 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8535 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8537 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8538 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8539 "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", {
8542 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8543 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8544 "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" },
8547 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8548 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8549 "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" },
8552 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8553 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8554 "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" },
8557 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8558 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8559 "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" }
8562 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8564 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8565 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8567 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8568 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8569 "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", {
8572 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8573 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8574 "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" },
8577 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8578 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8579 "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" },
8582 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8583 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8584 "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" },
8587 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8588 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8589 "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" }
8592 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8593 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8594 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8596 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8597 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8598 "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", {
8601 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8602 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8603 "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" },
8606 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8607 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8608 "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" },
8611 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8612 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8613 "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" }
8616 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8617 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8618 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8620 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8621 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8622 "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", {
8625 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8626 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8627 "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" },
8630 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8631 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8632 "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" },
8635 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8636 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8637 "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" }
8640 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8641 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8642 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8644 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8645 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8646 "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", {
8649 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8650 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8651 "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" },
8654 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8655 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8656 "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" }
8659 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8660 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8661 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8662 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8663 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8664 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8666 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8667 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8668 "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", {
8671 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8672 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8673 "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" },
8676 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8677 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8678 "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" }
8681 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8682 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8683 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8684 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8685 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8687 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8688 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8689 "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", {
8692 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8693 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8694 "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" },
8697 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8698 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8699 "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" }
8702 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8703 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8704 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8706 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8707 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8708 "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", {
8711 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8712 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8713 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8716 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8717 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8718 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8719 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8720 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8722 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8723 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8724 "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", {
8727 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8728 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8729 "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" }
8732 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8733 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8734 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8735 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8736 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8738 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8739 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8740 "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", {
8743 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8744 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8745 "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" }
8748 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8749 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8750 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8751 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8753 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8754 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8755 "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", {});
8757 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8758 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8759 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8760 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8761 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8763 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8764 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8765 "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", {});
8767 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8768 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8769 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8770 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8771 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8773 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8774 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8775 "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", {});
8777 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8778 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8779 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8781 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8782 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8783 "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", {});
8785 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8786 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8787 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8788 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8789 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8791 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8792 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8793 "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", {});
8795 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8796 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8797 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8798 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8799 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8801 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8802 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8803 "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", {});
8805 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8806 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8807 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8808 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8809 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8810 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8812 amount_msat: 2000000,
8814 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8815 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8817 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8820 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8821 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8822 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8824 amount_msat: 5000001,
8826 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8827 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8828 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8829 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8831 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8834 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8835 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8837 amount_msat: 5000000,
8839 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8840 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8841 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8842 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8844 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8848 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8849 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8850 "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", {
8853 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8854 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8855 "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" },
8857 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8858 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8859 "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" },
8861 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8862 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8863 "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" }
8866 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8867 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8868 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8869 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8872 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8873 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8874 "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" },
8876 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8877 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8878 "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" },
8880 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8881 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8882 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8887 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8888 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8890 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8891 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8892 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8893 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8895 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8896 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8897 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8899 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8900 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8902 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8903 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8905 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8906 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8907 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8911 fn test_key_derivation() {
8912 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8913 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8915 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8916 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8918 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8919 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8921 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8922 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8924 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8925 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8928 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8931 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8933 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8934 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8938 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8939 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8941 let seed = [42; 32];
8942 let network = Network::Testnet;
8943 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8944 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8946 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8947 let config = UserConfig::default();
8948 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8949 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8951 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8952 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8954 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8955 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8956 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8957 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8958 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8959 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8960 assert!(res.is_ok());
8964 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8965 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8966 // resulting `channel_type`.
8967 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8968 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8969 let network = Network::Testnet;
8970 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8971 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8973 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8974 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8976 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8977 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8979 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8980 // need to signal it.
8981 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8982 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8983 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8986 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8988 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8989 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8990 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8992 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8993 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8994 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8997 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8998 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8999 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9000 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9001 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9004 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9005 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9009 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9010 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9011 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9012 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9013 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9014 let network = Network::Testnet;
9015 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9016 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9018 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9019 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9021 let config = UserConfig::default();
9023 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9024 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9025 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9026 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9027 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9029 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9030 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9031 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9034 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9035 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9036 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9038 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9039 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9040 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9041 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9042 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9043 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9045 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9049 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9050 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9052 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9053 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9054 let network = Network::Testnet;
9055 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9056 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9058 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9059 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9061 let config = UserConfig::default();
9063 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9064 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9065 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9066 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9067 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9068 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9069 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9070 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9072 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9073 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9074 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9075 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9076 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9077 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9080 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9081 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9083 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9084 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9085 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9086 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9088 assert!(res.is_err());
9090 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9091 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9092 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9094 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9095 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9096 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9099 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9101 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9102 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9103 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9104 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9107 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9108 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9110 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9111 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9113 assert!(res.is_err());
9117 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9118 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9119 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9120 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9121 let seed = [42; 32];
9122 let network = Network::Testnet;
9123 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9124 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
9125 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9127 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9128 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9129 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9130 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9132 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9133 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9134 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9139 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9148 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9149 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9150 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9155 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9156 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9162 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9165 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9166 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9167 &accept_channel_msg,
9168 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9169 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9172 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9173 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9174 let tx = Transaction {
9176 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9180 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9183 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9186 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9187 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9192 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9193 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9194 &funding_created_msg,
9198 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9199 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9207 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9208 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9209 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9210 &funding_signed_msg,
9215 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9222 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9223 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9224 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9225 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9227 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9228 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9229 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9232 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9233 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9234 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9242 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9243 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9244 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9245 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9248 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9249 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9251 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9252 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9253 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9255 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());