1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
183 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
188 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
197 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
203 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222 (2, Committed) => {},
223 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 state: InboundHTLCState,
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
239 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
243 /// The amount in msat.
244 pub amount_msat: u64,
245 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247 /// The payment hash.
248 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
251 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
252 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
254 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
256 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
257 /// states may result in `None` here.
258 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
259 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
260 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
261 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
262 /// transactions as well.
264 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
265 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
268 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
269 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
274 (0, htlc_id, required),
275 (2, amount_msat, required),
276 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
277 (6, payment_hash, required),
278 (7, state, upgradable_option),
279 (8, is_dust, required),
282 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
283 enum OutboundHTLCState {
284 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
285 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
286 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
287 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
288 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
289 /// money back (though we won't), and,
290 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
291 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
292 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
293 /// we'll never get out of sync).
294 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
295 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
296 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
298 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
299 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
300 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
301 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
302 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
303 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
304 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
305 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
306 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
307 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
308 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
309 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
310 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
311 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
312 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
315 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
317 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
318 /// through the following states in the state machine:
319 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
320 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
321 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
323 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
324 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
325 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
327 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
329 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
330 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
331 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
332 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
333 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
334 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
336 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
337 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
339 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
340 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
344 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
345 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
346 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
347 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
348 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
351 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
352 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
354 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
355 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
356 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
357 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
358 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
360 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
361 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
363 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
364 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
365 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
367 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
368 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
369 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
375 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
376 (2, Committed) => {},
377 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
378 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
382 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
383 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
384 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
385 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
386 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
389 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
390 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
392 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
393 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
398 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
399 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
401 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
402 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
407 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
408 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
412 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
413 state: OutboundHTLCState,
415 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
419 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
420 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
421 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
423 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
424 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
425 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
427 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
428 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
429 /// The amount in msat.
430 pub amount_msat: u64,
431 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
432 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
433 /// The payment hash.
434 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
435 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
437 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
438 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
440 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
442 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
443 /// states may result in `None` here.
444 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
445 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
446 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
448 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
449 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
450 /// transactions as well.
452 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
453 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
456 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
457 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
462 (0, htlc_id, required),
463 (2, amount_msat, required),
464 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
465 (6, payment_hash, required),
466 (7, state, upgradable_option),
467 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
468 (10, is_dust, required),
471 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
472 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
473 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
474 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
481 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
482 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
491 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
496 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
500 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
501 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
502 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
503 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
504 struct $flag_type(u32);
509 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
512 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
514 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
517 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
520 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
521 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
524 Ok($flag_type(flags))
529 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
531 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
533 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
535 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
539 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
542 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
544 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
546 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
547 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
549 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
551 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
553 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
554 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
557 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
558 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
560 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
563 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
565 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
567 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
570 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
571 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
573 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
574 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
575 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
576 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
577 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
578 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
579 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
580 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
582 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
584 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
586 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
589 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
591 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
593 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
594 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
596 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
597 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
599 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
600 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
605 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
608 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
609 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
610 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
611 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
612 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
613 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
614 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
615 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
616 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
617 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
618 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
619 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
620 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
621 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
625 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
627 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
628 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
629 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
630 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
631 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
632 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
633 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
634 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
635 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
636 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
637 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
638 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
639 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
640 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
645 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
646 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
647 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
648 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
649 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
650 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
655 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
656 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
657 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
658 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
659 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
660 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
661 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
662 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
663 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
664 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
665 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
666 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
667 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
668 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
673 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
674 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
675 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
676 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
677 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
678 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
679 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
680 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
684 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
685 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
686 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
688 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
689 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
690 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
691 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
692 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
694 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
695 /// funding transaction to confirm.
696 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
697 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
699 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
700 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
701 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
705 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
706 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
708 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
711 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
720 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
722 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
726 fn $clear(&mut self) {
729 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
731 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
735 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
736 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
738 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
739 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
744 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
746 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
747 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
749 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
750 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
751 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
752 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
753 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
754 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
755 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
756 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
764 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
766 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
767 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
768 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
769 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
770 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
774 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
775 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
778 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
779 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
782 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
784 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
785 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
786 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
790 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
792 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
793 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
794 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
795 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
797 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
803 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
804 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
805 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
806 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
807 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
808 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
809 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
810 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
813 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
815 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
817 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
818 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
819 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
820 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
824 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
826 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
828 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
830 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
831 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
832 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
833 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
834 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
836 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
837 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
839 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
841 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
842 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
844 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
845 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
846 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
847 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
848 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
849 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
851 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
852 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
854 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
855 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
856 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
857 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
858 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
860 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
861 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
863 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
864 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
866 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
867 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
868 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
869 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
875 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
876 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
878 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
879 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
880 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
885 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
886 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
888 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
889 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
890 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
895 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
897 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
898 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
901 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
902 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
903 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
904 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
905 self.logger.log(record)
909 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
910 where L::Target: Logger {
911 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
912 where S::Target: SignerProvider
916 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
917 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
922 macro_rules! secp_check {
923 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
926 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
931 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
932 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
933 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
934 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
935 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
937 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
938 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
940 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
942 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
944 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
948 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
950 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
951 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
952 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
954 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
955 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
957 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
958 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
959 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
960 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
961 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
963 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
964 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
968 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
974 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
977 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
978 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
979 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
980 holding_cell_msat: u64,
981 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
984 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
985 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
986 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
987 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
988 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
989 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
990 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
991 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
992 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
993 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
994 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
997 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
998 struct HTLCCandidate {
1000 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1003 impl HTLCCandidate {
1004 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1012 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1014 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1016 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1017 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1018 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1023 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1024 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1025 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1026 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1027 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1029 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1030 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1031 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1032 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1034 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1035 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1039 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1040 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1041 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1042 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1043 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1044 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1045 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1046 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1047 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1048 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1049 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1052 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1054 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1055 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1056 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1057 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1060 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1061 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1062 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1063 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1064 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1065 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1066 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1067 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1070 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1072 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1073 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1074 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1075 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1076 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1077 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1078 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1079 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1080 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1081 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1082 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1083 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1084 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1085 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1086 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1090 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1091 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1092 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1093 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1094 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1095 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1096 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1097 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1098 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1099 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1100 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1101 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1102 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1103 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1105 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1106 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1107 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1108 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1110 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1111 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1112 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1113 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1115 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1116 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1117 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1118 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1119 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1121 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1122 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1123 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1124 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1126 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1127 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1128 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1130 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1131 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1132 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1133 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1134 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1136 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1137 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1140 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1141 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1143 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1144 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1145 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1146 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1148 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1149 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1151 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1152 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1156 (0, update, required),
1159 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1160 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1161 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1162 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1163 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1164 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1167 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1168 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1169 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1171 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1173 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1175 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1179 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1181 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1182 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1183 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1188 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1189 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1190 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1191 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1192 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1194 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1195 /// in a timely manner.
1196 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1199 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1200 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1201 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1203 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1204 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1205 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1206 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1210 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1211 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1212 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1214 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1215 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1216 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1217 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1219 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1223 /// The current channel ID.
1224 channel_id: ChannelId,
1225 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1226 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1227 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1228 channel_state: ChannelState,
1230 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1231 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1233 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1234 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1235 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1237 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1238 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1242 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1243 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1245 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1247 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1248 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1249 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1255 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1256 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1271 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1275 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1276 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1277 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1278 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1279 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1280 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1281 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1283 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1284 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1285 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1287 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1288 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1289 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1290 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1291 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1292 /// outbound or inbound.
1293 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1295 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1297 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1298 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1299 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1300 // HTLCs with similar state.
1301 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1302 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1303 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1304 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1305 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1306 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1307 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1308 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1309 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1310 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1312 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1313 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1314 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1316 update_time_counter: u32,
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1320 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1322 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1323 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1325 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1326 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1328 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1329 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1330 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1333 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1334 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1336 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1338 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1340 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1341 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1342 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1343 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1344 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1346 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1347 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1349 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1350 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1351 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1353 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1354 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1355 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1356 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1357 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1358 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1359 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1360 channel_creation_height: u32,
1362 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1365 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1367 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1370 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1372 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1375 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1379 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1380 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1383 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1385 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1388 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1390 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1392 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1393 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1394 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1396 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1398 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1399 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1400 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1402 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1403 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1406 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1408 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1410 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1411 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1412 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1413 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1415 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1416 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1417 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1419 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1420 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1421 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1432 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1433 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1434 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1435 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1436 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1438 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1439 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1441 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1442 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1443 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1444 /// unblock the state machine.
1446 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1447 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1448 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1450 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1451 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1452 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1456 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1457 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1458 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1459 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1460 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1461 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1463 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1464 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1466 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1467 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1468 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1470 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1471 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1472 // associated channel mapping.
1474 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1475 // to store all of them.
1476 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1478 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1479 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1480 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1481 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1482 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1484 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1485 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1487 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1488 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1490 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1491 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1493 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1494 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1496 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1498 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1500 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1501 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1502 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1505 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1506 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1507 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1508 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1509 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1510 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1511 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1513 config: &'a UserConfig,
1514 current_chain_height: u32,
1517 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1518 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1519 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1520 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1521 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1523 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1524 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1526 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1527 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1529 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1531 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1532 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1534 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1536 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1537 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1538 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1540 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1544 // Check sanity of message fields:
1545 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1547 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1548 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1549 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1551 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1554 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1557 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1558 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1561 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1564 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1567 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1569 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1570 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1571 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1573 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1576 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1580 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1581 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1584 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1587 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1590 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1591 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1593 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1596 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1599 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1603 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1605 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1606 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1611 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1612 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1613 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1616 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1619 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1620 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1621 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1623 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1627 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1628 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1629 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1630 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1634 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1635 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1636 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1640 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1641 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1642 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1643 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1647 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1648 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1649 &Some(ref script) => {
1650 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1651 if script.len() == 0 {
1654 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1657 Some(script.clone())
1660 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1667 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1668 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1669 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1674 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1675 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1680 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1681 Ok(script) => script,
1682 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1685 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1686 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1688 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1691 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1694 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1696 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1698 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1701 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1702 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1704 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1709 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1711 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1712 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1713 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1714 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1716 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1719 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1721 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1722 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1729 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1730 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1731 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1732 pending_update_fee: None,
1733 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1734 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1735 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1736 update_time_counter: 1,
1738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1743 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1744 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1745 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1747 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1748 signer_pending_funding: false,
1751 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1752 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1753 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1754 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1756 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1757 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1758 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1759 closing_fee_limits: None,
1760 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1762 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1763 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1764 short_channel_id: None,
1765 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1767 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1768 channel_value_satoshis,
1769 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1770 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1771 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1772 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1773 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1777 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1778 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1781 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1783 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1784 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1785 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1786 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1787 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1788 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1789 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1791 funding_outpoint: None,
1792 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1794 funding_transaction: None,
1795 is_batch_funding: None,
1797 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1798 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1799 counterparty_node_id,
1801 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1803 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1805 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1806 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1808 announcement_sigs: None,
1810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1811 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1812 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1813 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1815 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1816 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1818 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1819 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1821 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1822 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1824 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1825 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1830 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1832 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1838 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1839 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1840 self.update_time_counter
1843 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1844 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1847 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1848 self.config.announced_channel
1851 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1852 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1855 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1856 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1857 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1858 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1861 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1862 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1863 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1866 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1867 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1868 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1869 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1870 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1871 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1872 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1875 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1876 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1877 match self.channel_state {
1878 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1879 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1880 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1881 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1882 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1883 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1884 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1886 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1888 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1889 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1893 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1894 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1895 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1896 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1897 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1898 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1901 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1902 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1903 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1907 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1908 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1910 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1911 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1914 // Public utilities:
1916 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1920 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1922 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1923 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1924 self.temporary_channel_id
1927 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1931 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1932 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1933 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1937 /// Gets the channel's type
1938 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1942 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1944 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1945 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1946 self.short_channel_id
1949 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1950 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1951 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1955 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1956 self.outbound_scid_alias
1959 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1961 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1962 return &self.holder_signer
1965 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1966 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1967 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1968 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1969 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1970 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1973 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1974 /// get_funding_created.
1975 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1976 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1979 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1980 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1981 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1982 if conf_height > 0 {
1989 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1991 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1994 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1995 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1996 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1997 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2001 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2004 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2005 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2008 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2009 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2012 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2013 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2014 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2017 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2018 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2022 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2023 self.counterparty_node_id
2026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2028 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2032 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2033 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2037 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2039 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2040 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2041 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2042 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2044 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2050 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2054 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2055 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2058 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2059 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2060 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2062 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2063 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2068 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2069 self.channel_value_satoshis
2072 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2073 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2076 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2077 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2080 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2081 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2082 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2084 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2085 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2086 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2087 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2088 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2090 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2094 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2095 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2096 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2101 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2104 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2105 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2106 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2109 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2110 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2111 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2114 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2115 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2116 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2119 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2120 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2121 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2124 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2125 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2126 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2127 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2128 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2131 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2133 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2134 self.prev_config = None;
2138 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2139 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2143 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2144 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2145 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2146 let did_channel_update =
2147 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2148 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2149 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2150 if did_channel_update {
2151 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2152 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2153 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2154 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2156 self.config.options = *config;
2160 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2161 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2162 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2163 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2164 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2167 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2168 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2169 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2170 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2171 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2173 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2174 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2175 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2176 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2177 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2178 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2179 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2181 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2182 where L::Target: Logger
2184 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2185 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2186 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2188 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2189 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2190 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2191 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2193 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2194 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2195 if match update_state {
2196 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2197 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2198 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2199 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2200 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2202 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2206 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2207 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2208 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2210 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2212 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2213 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2214 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2216 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2217 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2218 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2219 transaction_output_index: None
2224 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2225 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2226 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2227 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2228 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2231 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2233 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2234 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2235 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2237 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2238 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2241 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2242 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2245 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2247 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2248 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2249 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2251 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2252 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2258 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2260 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2261 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2262 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2263 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2264 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2265 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2266 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2270 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2271 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2273 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2275 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2276 if generated_by_local {
2277 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2278 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2279 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2289 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2291 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2292 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2293 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2294 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2296 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2297 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2300 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2301 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2302 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2303 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2307 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2308 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2312 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2313 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2315 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2318 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2320 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2321 if !generated_by_local {
2322 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2330 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2331 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2332 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2333 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2334 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2335 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2336 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2337 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2341 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2342 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2343 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2344 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2346 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2348 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2349 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2350 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2351 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2354 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2355 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2356 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2357 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2359 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2362 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2363 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2364 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2365 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2367 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2370 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2371 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2376 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2377 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2382 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2384 let channel_parameters =
2385 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2386 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2387 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2394 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2397 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2398 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2399 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2400 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2408 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2409 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2410 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2411 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2416 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2417 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2418 /// our counterparty!)
2419 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2420 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2421 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2422 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2423 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2424 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2425 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2427 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2431 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2432 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2433 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2434 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2435 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2436 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2437 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2439 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2442 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2443 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2444 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2445 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2446 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2449 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2450 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2453 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2457 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2458 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2459 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2460 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2461 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2462 // which are near the dust limit.
2463 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2464 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2465 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2466 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2467 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2469 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2470 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2472 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2473 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2476 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2477 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2478 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2481 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2482 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2484 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2485 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2486 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2487 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2488 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2489 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2490 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2493 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2496 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2497 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2498 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2500 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2501 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2502 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2503 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2504 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2505 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2508 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2514 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2515 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2517 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2518 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2519 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2520 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2521 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2522 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2523 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2526 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2529 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2530 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2531 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2533 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2534 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2535 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2536 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2537 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2538 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2540 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2541 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2545 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2546 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2547 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2548 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2549 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2550 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2551 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2553 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2554 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2556 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2563 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2564 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2565 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2566 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2567 match holding_cell_update {
2568 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2569 holding_cell_states.insert(
2571 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2575 holding_cell_states.insert(
2577 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2580 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2581 holding_cell_states.insert(
2583 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2587 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2590 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2591 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2594 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2595 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2597 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2598 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2599 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2600 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2601 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2602 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2603 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2604 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2605 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2606 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2613 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2614 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2615 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2616 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2619 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2620 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2622 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2623 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2624 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2625 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2626 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2627 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2628 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2629 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2630 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2631 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2634 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2635 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2641 } = *holding_cell_update {
2642 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2644 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2645 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2646 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2647 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2648 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2649 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2656 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2657 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2658 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2659 /// corner case properly.
2660 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2661 -> AvailableBalances
2662 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2664 let context = &self;
2665 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2666 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2667 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2669 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2670 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2671 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2672 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2675 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2677 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2678 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2680 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2682 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2684 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2685 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2689 if context.is_outbound() {
2690 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2691 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2693 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2694 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2696 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2697 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2699 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2702 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2703 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2704 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2705 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2706 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2707 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2708 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2711 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2712 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2713 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2714 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2715 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2716 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2717 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2718 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2719 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2720 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2721 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2723 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2726 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2727 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2728 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2729 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2730 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2733 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2734 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2736 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2737 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2738 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2740 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2741 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2742 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2743 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2747 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2749 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2750 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2751 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2752 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2753 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2754 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2755 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2757 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2758 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2760 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2761 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2762 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2764 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2765 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2766 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2767 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2768 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2771 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2772 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2773 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2774 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2775 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2776 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2779 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2780 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2781 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2783 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2787 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2788 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2790 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2791 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2795 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2796 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2797 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2798 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2800 outbound_capacity_msat,
2801 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2802 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2807 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2808 let context = &self;
2809 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2812 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2813 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2815 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2816 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2818 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2819 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2821 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2822 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2823 let context = &self;
2824 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2826 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2829 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2830 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2832 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2833 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2835 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2836 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2843 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2844 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2850 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2851 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2852 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2855 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2856 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2857 included_htlcs += 1;
2860 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2865 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2866 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2867 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2868 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2869 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2870 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2875 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2877 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2878 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2883 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2884 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2888 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2889 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2893 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2894 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2896 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2897 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2898 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2900 total_pending_htlcs,
2901 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2902 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2903 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2905 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2906 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2907 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2909 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2911 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2916 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2917 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2919 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2920 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2922 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2923 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2925 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2926 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2927 let context = &self;
2928 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2930 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2933 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2934 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2936 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2937 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2939 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2940 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2942 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2947 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2948 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2954 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2955 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2956 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2957 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2958 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2959 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2962 included_htlcs += 1;
2965 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2969 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2970 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2972 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2973 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2974 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2979 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2980 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2981 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2984 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2985 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2987 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2988 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2990 total_pending_htlcs,
2991 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2992 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2993 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2995 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2996 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2997 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2999 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3001 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3006 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3007 match self.channel_state {
3008 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3009 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3010 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3011 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3021 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3023 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3024 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3027 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3029 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3030 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3031 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3035 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3036 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3037 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3040 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3042 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3043 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3046 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3047 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3048 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3049 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3050 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3051 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3052 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3053 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3054 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3055 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3056 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3058 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3059 // return them to fail the payment.
3060 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3061 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3062 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3064 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3065 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3070 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3071 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3072 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3073 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3074 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3075 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3076 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3077 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3078 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3079 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3080 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3081 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3082 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3083 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3084 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3088 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3089 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3091 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3092 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3096 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3097 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3098 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3099 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3100 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3101 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3102 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3103 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3107 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3108 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3109 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3110 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3112 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3113 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3114 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3115 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3117 match &self.holder_signer {
3118 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3119 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3120 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3121 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3122 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3125 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3129 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3130 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3131 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3133 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3134 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3135 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3137 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3139 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3142 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3143 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3145 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3152 // Internal utility functions for channels
3154 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3155 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3156 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3158 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3160 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3161 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3162 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3164 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3167 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3169 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3172 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3173 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3174 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3176 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3178 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3179 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3180 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3181 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3182 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3185 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3186 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3187 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3188 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3189 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3190 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3191 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3194 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3195 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3197 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3199 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3200 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3201 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3202 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3203 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3204 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3207 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3208 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3210 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3211 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3214 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3215 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3216 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3217 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3218 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3219 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3222 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3223 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3224 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3225 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3226 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3227 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3228 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3229 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3230 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3231 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3232 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3233 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3236 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3237 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3238 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3239 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3240 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3241 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3244 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3245 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3247 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3248 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3249 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3253 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3254 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3255 trait FailHTLCContents {
3256 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3257 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3258 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3259 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3261 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3262 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3263 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3264 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3266 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3267 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3269 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3270 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3273 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3274 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3275 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3276 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3279 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3280 failure_code: self.1
3283 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3284 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3286 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3287 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3289 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3290 failure_code: self.1
3295 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3296 fn name() -> &'static str;
3298 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3299 fn name() -> &'static str {
3303 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3304 fn name() -> &'static str {
3305 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3309 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3310 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3311 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3313 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3314 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3315 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3316 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3318 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3319 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3321 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3323 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3324 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3325 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3326 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3328 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3329 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3339 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3340 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3341 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3342 // outside of those situations will fail.
3343 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3347 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3352 1 + // script length (0)
3356 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3357 2 + // witness marker and flag
3358 1 + // witness element count
3359 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3360 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3361 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3362 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3363 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3364 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3366 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3367 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3368 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3374 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3375 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3376 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3377 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3379 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3380 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3381 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3383 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3384 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3385 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3386 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3387 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3388 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3391 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3392 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3395 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3396 value_to_holder = 0;
3399 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3400 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3401 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3402 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3404 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3405 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3408 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3409 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3412 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3415 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3416 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3418 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3420 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3421 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3422 where L::Target: Logger {
3423 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3424 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3425 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3426 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3427 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3428 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3429 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3430 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3434 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3435 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3436 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3437 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3439 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3440 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3443 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3444 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3445 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3447 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3448 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3449 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3450 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3451 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3452 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3453 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3455 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3456 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3457 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3459 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3460 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3462 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3465 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3466 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3470 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3474 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3476 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3477 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3478 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3479 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3482 // Now update local state:
3484 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3485 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3486 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3487 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3488 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3489 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3490 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3491 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3493 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3496 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3497 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3498 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3499 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3500 // do not not get into this branch.
3501 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3502 match pending_update {
3503 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3504 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3505 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3506 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3507 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3508 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3509 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3512 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3513 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3515 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3516 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3517 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3518 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3519 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3520 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3526 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3527 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3528 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3530 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3531 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3532 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3534 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3535 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3538 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3539 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3541 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3542 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3544 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3545 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3548 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3551 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3552 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3553 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3554 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3559 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3560 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3561 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3562 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3563 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3564 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3565 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3566 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3567 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3568 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3569 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3570 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3571 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3572 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3573 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3575 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3576 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3577 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3578 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3579 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3582 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3583 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3584 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3590 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3591 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3593 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3597 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3598 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3599 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3600 /// before we fail backwards.
3602 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3603 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3604 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3605 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3606 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3607 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3608 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3611 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3612 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3614 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3615 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3616 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3617 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3618 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3619 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3622 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3623 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3624 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3625 /// before we fail backwards.
3627 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3628 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3629 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3630 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3631 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3633 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3634 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3635 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3638 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3639 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3640 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3642 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3643 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3644 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3646 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3647 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3648 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3650 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3655 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3656 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3662 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3663 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3664 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3665 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3666 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3670 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3671 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3672 force_holding_cell = true;
3675 // Now update local state:
3676 if force_holding_cell {
3677 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3678 match pending_update {
3679 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3680 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3682 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3686 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3687 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3689 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3690 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3691 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3697 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3698 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3702 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3703 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3705 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3706 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3709 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3712 // Message handlers:
3713 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3714 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3715 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3716 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3717 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3718 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3719 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3722 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3724 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3726 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3727 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3728 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3729 debug_assert!(matches!(
3730 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3732 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3733 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3736 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3737 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3739 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3740 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3741 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3742 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3744 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3747 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3748 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3749 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3752 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3753 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3754 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3755 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3756 // when routing outbound payments.
3757 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3761 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3762 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3763 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3764 match &self.context.channel_state {
3765 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3766 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3767 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3768 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3769 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3770 check_reconnection = true;
3771 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3772 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3773 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3774 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3775 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3777 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3778 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3781 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3782 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3783 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3785 if check_reconnection {
3786 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3787 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3788 let expected_point =
3789 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3790 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3792 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3793 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3794 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3795 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3796 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3797 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3799 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3800 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3801 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3802 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3803 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3805 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3811 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3812 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3814 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3816 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3819 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3820 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3821 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3822 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3823 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3824 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3826 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3829 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3830 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3831 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3833 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3834 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3837 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3840 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3843 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3846 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3850 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3851 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3852 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3855 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3859 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3860 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3861 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3862 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3863 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3864 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3865 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3866 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3867 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3868 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3869 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3871 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3872 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3873 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3874 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3875 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3876 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3880 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3881 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3884 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3885 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3886 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3888 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3889 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3890 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3891 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3892 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3894 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3898 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3899 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3900 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3901 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3902 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3903 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3904 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3908 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3909 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3910 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3911 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3912 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3916 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3917 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3919 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3920 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3921 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3923 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3924 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3928 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3931 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3936 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3937 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3941 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3942 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3943 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3944 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3945 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3946 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3947 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3948 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3949 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3951 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3952 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3953 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3954 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3955 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3958 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3959 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3960 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3961 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3965 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3968 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3972 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3973 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3974 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3978 // Now update local state:
3979 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3980 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3981 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3982 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3983 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3984 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3985 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3990 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3992 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3993 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3994 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3995 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3996 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3997 None => fail_reason.into(),
3998 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3999 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4000 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4003 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4007 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4009 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4010 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4012 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4018 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4021 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4022 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4025 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4029 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4032 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4033 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4036 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4040 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4044 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4045 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4048 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4052 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4056 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4057 where L::Target: Logger
4059 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4062 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4065 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4069 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4071 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4073 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4074 let commitment_txid = {
4075 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4076 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4077 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4079 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4080 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4081 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4082 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4083 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4088 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4090 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4091 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4092 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4093 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4096 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4097 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4098 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4102 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4104 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4105 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4106 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4107 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4108 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4109 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4110 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4111 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4112 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4113 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4114 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4120 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4124 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4125 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4126 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4127 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4128 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4129 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4130 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4131 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4132 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4133 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4134 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4135 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4136 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4139 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4140 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4141 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4142 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4143 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4144 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4145 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4147 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4148 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4149 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4150 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4151 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4152 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4153 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4156 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4157 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4160 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4162 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4163 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4164 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4167 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4170 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4171 commitment_stats.tx,
4173 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4174 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4175 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4178 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4179 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4181 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4182 let mut need_commitment = false;
4183 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4184 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4185 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4186 need_commitment = true;
4190 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4191 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4192 Some(forward_info.clone())
4194 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
4195 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4196 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4197 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
4198 need_commitment = true;
4201 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4202 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4203 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4204 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4205 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4206 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4207 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4208 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4209 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4210 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4211 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4212 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4213 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4214 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4216 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4218 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4219 need_commitment = true;
4223 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4224 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4225 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4226 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4227 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4228 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4229 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4231 nondust_htlc_sources,
4233 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4236 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4237 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4238 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4239 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4240 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4242 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4243 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4244 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4245 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4246 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4247 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4248 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4249 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4250 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4251 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4252 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4253 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4255 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4257 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4258 &self.context.channel_id);
4259 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4262 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4263 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4264 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4265 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4266 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4267 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4268 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4269 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4270 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4274 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4275 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4276 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4277 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4280 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4281 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4282 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4283 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4284 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4285 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4286 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4288 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4289 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4290 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4293 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4294 /// for our counterparty.
4295 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4296 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4297 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4298 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4300 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4301 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4302 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4303 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4305 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4306 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4307 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4308 updates: Vec::new(),
4309 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4312 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4313 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4314 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4315 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4316 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4317 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4318 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4319 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4320 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4321 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4322 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4323 // to rebalance channels.
4324 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4325 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4326 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4327 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4329 match self.send_htlc(
4330 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4331 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4333 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4336 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4337 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4338 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4339 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4340 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4341 // into the holding cell without ever being
4342 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4343 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4344 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4347 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4354 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4355 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4356 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4357 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4358 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4359 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4360 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4361 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4362 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4363 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4364 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4365 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4368 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4369 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4370 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4372 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4373 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4374 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4377 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4379 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4380 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4381 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4382 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4383 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4384 // for a full revocation before failing.
4385 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4386 update_fail_count += 1;
4388 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4390 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4395 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4396 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4398 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4399 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4404 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4405 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4406 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4407 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4408 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4410 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4411 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4412 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4414 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4415 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4421 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4422 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4423 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4424 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4425 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4426 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4427 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4428 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4429 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4431 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4434 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4437 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4441 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4443 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4444 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4449 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4450 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4451 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4452 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4453 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4454 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4455 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4456 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4460 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4462 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4463 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4466 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4467 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4468 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4469 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4471 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4473 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4478 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4479 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4480 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4481 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4482 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4483 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4484 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4485 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4486 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4488 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4491 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4492 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4493 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4494 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4495 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4496 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4497 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4498 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4499 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4501 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4502 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4505 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4506 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4507 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4508 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4509 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4510 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4511 let mut require_commitment = false;
4512 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4515 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4516 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4517 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4518 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4520 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4521 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4522 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4523 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4524 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4525 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4527 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4531 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4532 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4533 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4534 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4535 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4537 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4538 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4539 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4544 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4545 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4547 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4551 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4552 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4554 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4555 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4556 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4557 require_commitment = true;
4558 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4559 match forward_info {
4560 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4561 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4562 require_commitment = true;
4564 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4565 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4566 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4568 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4569 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4570 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4574 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4575 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4576 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4577 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4583 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4584 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4585 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4586 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4587 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4589 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4590 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4591 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4592 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4593 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4594 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4595 require_commitment = true;
4599 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4601 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4602 match update_state {
4603 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4604 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4605 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4606 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4607 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4608 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4610 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4611 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4612 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4613 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4614 require_commitment = true;
4615 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4616 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4621 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4622 let release_state_str =
4623 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4624 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4625 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4626 if !release_monitor {
4627 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4628 update: monitor_update,
4630 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4632 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4637 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4638 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4639 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4640 if require_commitment {
4641 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4642 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4643 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4644 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4646 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4647 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4648 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4649 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4650 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4652 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4653 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4654 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4655 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4656 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4659 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4660 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4661 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4662 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4663 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4664 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4666 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4667 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4669 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4670 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4672 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4673 if require_commitment {
4674 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4676 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4677 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4678 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4679 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4681 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4682 &self.context.channel_id(),
4683 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4686 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4687 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4689 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4690 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4692 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4693 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4699 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4700 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4701 /// commitment update.
4702 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4703 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4704 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4706 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4707 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4710 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4711 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4712 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4713 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4715 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4716 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4717 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4718 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4719 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4720 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4721 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4723 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4724 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4726 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4727 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4729 if !self.context.is_live() {
4730 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4733 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4734 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4735 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4736 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4737 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4738 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4739 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4740 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4741 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4742 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4746 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4747 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4748 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4749 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4750 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4751 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4754 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4755 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4759 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4760 force_holding_cell = true;
4763 if force_holding_cell {
4764 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4768 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4769 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4771 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4772 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4777 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4778 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4780 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4782 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4783 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4784 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4785 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4789 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4790 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4791 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4795 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4796 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4799 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4800 // will be retransmitted.
4801 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4802 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4803 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4805 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4806 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4808 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4809 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4810 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4811 // this HTLC accordingly
4812 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4815 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4816 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4817 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4818 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4821 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4822 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4823 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4824 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4825 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4826 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4831 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4833 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4834 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4835 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4836 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4840 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4841 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4842 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4843 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4844 // the update upon reconnection.
4845 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4849 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4851 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4852 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4856 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4857 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4858 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4859 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4860 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4861 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4862 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4864 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4865 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4866 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4867 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4868 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4869 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4870 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4872 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4873 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4874 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4875 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4876 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4877 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4878 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4881 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4882 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4883 /// to the remote side.
4884 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4885 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4886 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4887 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4890 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4892 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4893 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4895 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4896 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4897 // first received the funding_signed.
4898 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4899 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4900 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4901 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4903 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4905 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4906 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4907 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4908 funding_broadcastable = None;
4911 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4912 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4913 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4914 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4915 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4916 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4917 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4918 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4919 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4920 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4921 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4922 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4923 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4924 next_per_commitment_point,
4925 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4929 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4931 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4932 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4933 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4934 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4935 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4936 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4938 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4939 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4940 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4941 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4942 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4943 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4947 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4948 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4950 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4951 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4953 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4954 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4957 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4958 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4959 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4960 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4961 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4962 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4963 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4964 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4965 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4969 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4970 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4972 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4975 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4976 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4978 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4980 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4981 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4982 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4983 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4984 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4985 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4986 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4987 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4988 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4989 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4991 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4993 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4995 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
5001 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5003 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5004 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5005 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5006 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5008 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5009 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5011 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5012 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5015 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5016 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5017 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5018 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5020 SignerResumeUpdates {
5027 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5028 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5029 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5030 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5031 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5032 per_commitment_secret,
5033 next_per_commitment_point,
5035 next_local_nonce: None,
5039 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5040 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5041 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5042 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5043 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5044 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5046 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5047 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5048 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5049 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5050 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5051 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5052 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5053 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5054 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5055 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5056 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5061 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5062 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5064 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5065 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5066 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5068 reason: err_packet.clone()
5071 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5072 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5073 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5074 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5075 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5076 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5079 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5080 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5081 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5082 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5083 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5090 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5091 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5093 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5097 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5098 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5099 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5100 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5101 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5102 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5103 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5107 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5108 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5110 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5111 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5112 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5113 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5118 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5119 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5124 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5125 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5126 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5127 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5128 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5129 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5130 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5135 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5136 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5138 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5139 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5140 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5141 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5142 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5143 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5144 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5145 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5148 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5150 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5151 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5152 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5153 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5157 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5158 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5162 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5163 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5164 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5165 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5166 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5167 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5170 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5171 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5172 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5173 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5174 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5177 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5178 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5179 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5180 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5181 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5182 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5183 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5184 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5188 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5189 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5190 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5191 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5192 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5193 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5194 our_commitment_transaction
5198 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5199 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5200 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5201 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5203 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5205 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
5207 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5208 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5209 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5210 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5211 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5214 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5215 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5216 channel_ready: None,
5217 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5218 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5219 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5223 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5224 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5225 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5226 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5227 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5228 next_per_commitment_point,
5229 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5231 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5232 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5233 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5237 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5238 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5239 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5241 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5242 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5243 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5246 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5249 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5251 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5252 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5253 our_commitment_transaction
5257 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5258 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5259 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5260 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5261 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5262 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5263 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5265 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5267 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5268 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5269 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5270 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5272 next_per_commitment_point,
5273 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5277 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5278 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5281 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5284 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5285 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5286 raa: required_revoke,
5287 commitment_update: None,
5288 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5290 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5291 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5292 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5294 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5297 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5298 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5299 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5300 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5301 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5302 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5305 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5306 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5307 raa: required_revoke,
5308 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5309 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5312 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5313 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5314 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5315 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5316 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5319 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5320 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5321 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5322 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5327 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5328 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5329 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5330 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5332 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5334 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5336 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5337 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5338 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5339 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5340 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5341 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5342 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5343 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5345 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5346 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5347 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5348 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5349 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5351 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5352 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5353 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5354 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5357 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5358 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5359 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5360 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5361 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5362 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5363 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5364 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5365 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5366 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5367 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5368 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5369 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5370 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5371 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5373 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5376 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5377 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5380 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5381 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5382 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5383 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5384 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5385 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5388 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5389 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5390 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5391 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5392 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5393 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5396 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5402 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5403 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5404 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5405 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5407 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5408 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5409 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5410 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5411 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5412 return Ok((None, None, None));
5415 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5416 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5417 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5419 return Ok((None, None, None));
5422 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5423 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5424 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5425 return Ok((None, None, None));
5428 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5430 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5431 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5432 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5433 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5435 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5436 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5438 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5439 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5441 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5442 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5443 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5444 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5446 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5447 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5448 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5452 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5458 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5459 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5461 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5462 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5465 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5466 /// within our expected timeframe.
5468 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5469 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5470 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5473 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5476 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5477 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5481 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5482 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5484 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5487 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5488 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5489 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5490 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5493 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5494 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5498 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5500 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5501 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5504 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5505 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5506 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5509 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5512 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5513 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5514 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5515 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5517 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5520 assert!(send_shutdown);
5521 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5522 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5523 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5525 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5528 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5533 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5535 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5536 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5538 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5540 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5541 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5542 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5543 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5544 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5546 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5548 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5549 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5551 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5552 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5553 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5554 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5558 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5559 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5560 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5561 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5562 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5563 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5565 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5566 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5573 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5574 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5576 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5579 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5580 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5582 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5584 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5585 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5586 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5587 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5588 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5589 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5590 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5591 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5592 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5594 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5595 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5598 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5602 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5603 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5604 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5605 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5607 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5610 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5613 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5616 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5620 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5624 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5625 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5626 return Ok((None, None, None));
5629 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5630 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5631 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5632 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5634 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5636 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5639 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5640 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5641 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5642 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5643 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5647 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5648 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5653 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5654 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5656 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5659 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5660 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5661 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5662 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5664 monitor_update: None,
5665 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5666 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5667 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5668 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5669 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5670 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5671 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5672 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5674 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5675 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5676 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5677 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5681 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5683 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5684 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5685 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5686 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5688 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5691 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5692 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5694 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5695 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5696 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5697 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5699 monitor_update: None,
5700 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5701 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5702 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5703 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5704 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5705 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5706 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5707 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5709 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5710 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5711 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5712 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5717 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5718 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5719 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5720 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5722 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5723 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5724 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5726 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5728 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5735 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5736 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5737 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5739 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5742 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5743 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5746 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5747 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5748 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5749 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5750 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5752 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5754 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5756 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5757 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5760 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5761 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5762 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5763 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5764 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5765 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5766 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5767 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5772 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5773 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5774 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5775 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5781 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5782 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5783 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5784 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5786 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5792 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5793 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5794 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5795 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5796 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5797 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5798 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5800 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5801 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5804 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5806 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5807 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5813 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5814 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5815 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5816 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5817 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5818 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5819 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5821 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5822 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5829 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5830 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5833 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5834 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5837 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5838 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5842 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5843 &self.context.holder_signer
5847 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5849 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5850 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5851 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5852 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5853 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5854 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5856 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5866 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5867 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5871 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5872 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5873 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5874 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5877 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5878 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5879 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5880 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5883 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5884 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5885 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5886 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5887 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5888 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5891 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5892 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5893 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5894 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5895 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5896 if !release_monitor {
5897 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5906 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5907 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5910 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5911 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5912 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5914 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5915 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5917 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5918 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5920 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5921 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5922 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5925 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5926 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5927 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5928 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5929 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5930 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5932 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5933 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5934 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5936 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5937 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5938 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5939 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5940 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5941 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5947 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5948 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5949 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5950 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5953 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5954 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5955 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5958 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5959 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5960 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5963 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5964 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5965 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5968 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5969 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5970 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5971 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5972 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5975 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5976 self.context.channel_update_status
5979 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5980 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5981 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5984 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5986 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5987 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5988 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5992 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5993 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5994 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5997 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6001 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6002 // channel_ready yet.
6003 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6007 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6008 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6009 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6010 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6012 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6013 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6014 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6016 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6017 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6020 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6021 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6023 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6024 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6025 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6026 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6027 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6028 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6029 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6030 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6032 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6036 if need_commitment_update {
6037 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6038 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6039 let next_per_commitment_point =
6040 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6041 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6042 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6043 next_per_commitment_point,
6044 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6048 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6054 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6055 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6056 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6057 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6058 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6059 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6060 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6062 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6065 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6066 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6067 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6068 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6069 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6070 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6071 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6072 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6073 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6074 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6075 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6076 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6077 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6078 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6079 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6080 // channel and move on.
6081 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6082 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6084 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6085 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6086 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6088 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6089 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6090 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6091 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6092 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6093 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6094 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6095 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6100 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6101 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6102 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6103 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6104 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6107 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6108 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6109 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6110 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6111 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6112 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6115 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6116 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6117 // may have already happened for this block).
6118 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6119 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6120 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6121 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6124 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6125 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6126 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6127 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6135 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6136 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6137 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6138 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6140 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6141 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6144 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6146 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6147 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6148 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6149 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6151 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6154 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6157 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6158 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6159 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6160 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6162 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6165 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6166 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6167 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6169 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6170 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6172 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6173 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6174 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6182 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6184 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6185 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6186 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6188 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6189 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6192 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6193 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6194 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6195 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6196 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6197 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6198 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6199 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6202 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6203 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6204 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6205 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6207 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6208 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6209 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6211 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6212 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6213 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6214 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6216 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6217 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6218 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6219 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6220 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6221 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6222 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6225 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6226 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6228 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6231 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6232 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6233 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6234 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6235 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6236 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6237 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6238 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6239 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6240 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6241 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6242 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6243 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6244 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6245 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6246 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6247 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6253 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6258 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6259 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6261 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6262 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6263 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6264 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6266 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6269 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6271 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6272 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6273 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6274 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6275 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6276 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6278 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6282 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6283 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6284 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6285 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6286 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6287 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6289 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6290 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6293 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6294 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6295 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6296 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6297 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6303 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6304 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6305 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6306 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6308 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6311 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6315 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6319 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6320 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6324 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6328 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6329 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6332 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6336 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6338 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6343 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6344 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6345 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6347 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6352 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6354 None => return None,
6357 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6359 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6360 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6362 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6363 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6366 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6372 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6374 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6375 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6376 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6377 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6378 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6379 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6380 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6382 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6383 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6384 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6385 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6386 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6388 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6389 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6390 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6391 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6392 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6393 contents: announcement,
6396 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6401 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6405 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6406 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6407 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6408 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6409 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6410 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6411 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6412 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6414 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6416 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6418 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6419 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6421 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6423 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6424 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6427 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6428 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6429 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6430 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6433 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6436 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6437 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6438 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6439 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6440 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6441 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6444 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6446 Err(_) => return None,
6448 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6449 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6454 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6455 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6456 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6457 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6458 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6459 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6460 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6461 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6462 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6463 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6464 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6465 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6466 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6467 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6468 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6469 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6472 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6475 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6476 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6477 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6478 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6479 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6480 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6481 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6482 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6483 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6485 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6486 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6487 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6488 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6489 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6490 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6491 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6492 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6493 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6495 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6496 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6497 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6498 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6499 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6500 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6501 next_funding_txid: None,
6506 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6508 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6509 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6510 /// commitment update.
6512 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6513 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6514 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6515 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6516 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6517 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6518 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6521 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6522 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6523 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6525 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6526 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6531 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6532 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6534 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6536 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6537 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6539 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6540 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6541 /// regenerate them.
6543 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6544 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6546 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6547 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6548 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6549 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6550 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6551 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6552 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6553 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6555 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6556 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6557 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6559 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6561 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6562 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6566 if amount_msat == 0 {
6567 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6570 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6571 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6573 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6576 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6578 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6581 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6582 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6583 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6584 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6585 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6586 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6587 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6588 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6591 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6592 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6593 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6594 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6595 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6596 else { "to peer" });
6598 if need_holding_cell {
6599 force_holding_cell = true;
6602 // Now update local state:
6603 if force_holding_cell {
6604 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6609 onion_routing_packet,
6616 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6617 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6619 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6621 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6627 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6628 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6629 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6633 onion_routing_packet,
6637 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6642 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6643 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6644 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6645 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6647 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6648 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6649 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6651 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6652 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6656 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6657 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6658 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6659 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6660 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6661 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6662 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6665 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6666 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6667 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6668 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6669 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6670 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6673 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6675 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6676 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6677 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6678 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6679 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6681 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6682 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6685 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6686 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6687 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6688 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6689 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6690 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6691 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6692 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6693 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6694 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6695 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6696 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6698 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6700 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6704 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6705 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6706 where L::Target: Logger
6708 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6709 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6710 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6714 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6715 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6716 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6717 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6718 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6719 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6720 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6721 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6722 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6723 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6724 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6730 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6733 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6734 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6735 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6736 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6738 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6740 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6741 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6742 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6744 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6745 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6746 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6749 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6750 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6754 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6755 &commitment_stats.tx,
6756 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6757 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6758 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6759 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6761 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6763 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6764 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6765 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6766 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6768 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6769 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6770 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6771 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6772 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6773 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6777 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6778 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6782 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6783 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6785 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6791 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6792 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6794 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6795 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6796 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6797 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6798 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6799 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6800 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6801 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6803 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6804 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6805 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6808 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6809 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6810 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6816 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6818 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6819 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6820 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6821 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6822 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6824 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6826 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6832 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6833 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6834 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6835 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6836 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6838 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6839 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6843 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6844 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6846 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6847 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6849 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6850 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6852 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6853 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6854 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6857 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6860 // use override shutdown script if provided
6861 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6862 Some(script) => script,
6864 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6865 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6866 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6867 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6871 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6872 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6874 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6879 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6880 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6881 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6882 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6883 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6885 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6886 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6887 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6888 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6889 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6890 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6891 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6893 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6895 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6896 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6898 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6899 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6900 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6903 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6904 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6905 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6906 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6907 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6909 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6917 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6918 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6920 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6923 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6924 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6925 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6927 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6928 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6932 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6936 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6937 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6938 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6939 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6942 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6943 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6944 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6945 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6946 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6947 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6948 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6949 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6951 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6952 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6953 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6954 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6956 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6959 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6962 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6963 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6966 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6969 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6970 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6971 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6972 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6976 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6977 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6979 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6980 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6982 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6984 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6986 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6987 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6988 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6989 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6992 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6993 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6995 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6996 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6997 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6998 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7002 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7003 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7004 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7008 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7009 Ok(script) => script,
7010 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
7013 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
7016 context: ChannelContext {
7019 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7020 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7021 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
7022 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7027 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
7029 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
7030 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
7031 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
7032 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7034 channel_value_satoshis,
7036 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7038 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7039 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7042 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7043 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7046 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7047 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7048 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7049 pending_update_fee: None,
7050 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7051 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7052 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7053 update_time_counter: 1,
7055 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7057 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7058 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7059 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7060 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7061 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7062 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7064 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7065 signer_pending_funding: false,
7067 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7068 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
7069 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7070 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
7072 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7073 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7074 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7075 closing_fee_limits: None,
7076 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7078 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7079 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7080 short_channel_id: None,
7081 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7083 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
7084 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
7085 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7086 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
7087 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7088 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
7089 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7090 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
7091 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7092 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
7093 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7094 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
7096 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7098 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7099 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7100 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7101 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
7102 counterparty_parameters: None,
7103 funding_outpoint: None,
7104 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7106 funding_transaction: None,
7107 is_batch_funding: None,
7109 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
7110 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7111 counterparty_node_id,
7113 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
7115 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7117 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7118 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7120 announcement_sigs: None,
7122 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7123 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7124 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7125 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7127 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7128 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7130 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7131 outbound_scid_alias,
7133 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7134 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7136 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7137 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
7142 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7143 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7145 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7149 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7150 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7151 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7152 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7153 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7154 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7155 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7156 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7157 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7159 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7164 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7165 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7166 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7169 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7170 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7171 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7172 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7175 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7177 next_local_nonce: None,
7181 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7182 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7183 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7184 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7185 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7186 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7187 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7188 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7189 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7190 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7191 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7194 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7195 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7197 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7199 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7200 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7201 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7202 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7205 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7206 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7208 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7210 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7211 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7213 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7214 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7215 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7216 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7217 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7218 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7221 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7222 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7224 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7225 if funding_created.is_none() {
7226 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7227 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7229 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7230 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7231 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7232 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7240 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7241 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
7242 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
7243 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
7244 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
7245 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7246 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
7247 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
7248 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
7249 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
7252 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
7253 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
7254 // `only_static_remotekey`.
7255 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
7256 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7257 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
7263 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7264 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7265 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7266 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7267 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7268 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7270 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7272 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
7274 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7275 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
7280 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7281 // We've exhausted our options
7284 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
7285 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
7288 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
7289 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
7290 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
7291 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
7293 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7294 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
7295 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
7296 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
7297 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
7298 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
7300 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7302 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
7303 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7306 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7307 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7308 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7310 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7311 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7314 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7315 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7318 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7319 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7322 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7324 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7325 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7326 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7327 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7328 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7329 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7330 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7331 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7332 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7333 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7334 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7335 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7336 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7337 first_per_commitment_point,
7338 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7339 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7340 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7341 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7343 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7345 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7346 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7351 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7352 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7354 // Check sanity of message fields:
7355 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7358 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7361 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7364 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7367 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7370 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7372 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7374 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7375 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7376 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7378 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7379 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7380 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7382 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7385 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7389 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7390 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7393 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7396 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7399 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7400 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7402 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7405 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7408 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7412 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7413 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7416 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7417 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7419 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7420 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7423 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7424 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7427 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7428 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7429 &Some(ref script) => {
7430 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7431 if script.len() == 0 {
7434 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7437 Some(script.clone())
7440 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7447 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7448 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7449 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7450 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7451 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7453 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7454 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7456 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7459 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7460 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7461 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7462 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7463 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7464 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7467 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7468 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7469 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7472 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7473 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7475 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7476 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7478 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7483 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7484 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7485 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7486 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7487 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7491 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7492 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7494 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7495 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7497 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7499 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7500 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7503 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7505 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7506 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7507 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7508 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7510 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7511 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7513 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7514 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7516 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7517 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7518 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7519 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7520 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7521 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7525 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7526 initial_commitment_tx,
7529 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7530 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7534 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7535 if validated.is_err() {
7536 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7539 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7540 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7541 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7542 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7543 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7544 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7545 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7546 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7547 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7548 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7549 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7550 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7552 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7553 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7554 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7555 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7556 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7557 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7558 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7559 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7561 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7562 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7563 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7565 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7567 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7568 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7570 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7572 let mut channel = Channel {
7573 context: self.context,
7574 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7575 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7578 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7579 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7580 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7583 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7585 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7586 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7587 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7588 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7589 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7594 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7595 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7596 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7597 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7600 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7601 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7602 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7603 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7604 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7605 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7606 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7607 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7611 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7612 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7613 // `static_remote_key`.
7614 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7617 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7618 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7621 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7622 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7625 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7627 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7628 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7635 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7636 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7637 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7638 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7639 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7640 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7641 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7642 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7643 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7644 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7648 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7650 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7651 // support this channel type.
7652 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7654 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7655 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7656 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7657 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7658 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7659 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7660 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7664 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7668 counterparty_node_id,
7672 current_chain_height,
7677 counterparty_pubkeys,
7679 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7680 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7682 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7684 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7689 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7690 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7692 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7693 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7694 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7695 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7698 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7699 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7701 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7703 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7704 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7707 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7710 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7711 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7712 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7714 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7715 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7716 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7717 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7719 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7720 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7721 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7722 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7723 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7724 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7725 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7726 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7727 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7728 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7729 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7730 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7731 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7732 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7733 first_per_commitment_point,
7734 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7735 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7736 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7738 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7740 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7742 next_local_nonce: None,
7746 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7747 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7749 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7751 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7752 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7755 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7756 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7758 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7759 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7760 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7761 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7762 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7763 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7764 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7765 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7766 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7767 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7768 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7770 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7773 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7774 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7775 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7779 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7780 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7783 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7784 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7786 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7787 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7789 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7791 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7792 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7793 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7794 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7797 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7798 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7799 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7800 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7801 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7803 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7805 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7806 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7807 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7810 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7811 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7812 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7816 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7817 initial_commitment_tx,
7820 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7821 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7824 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7825 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7828 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7830 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7831 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7832 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7833 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7835 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7837 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7838 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7839 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7840 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7841 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7842 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7843 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7844 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7845 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7846 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7847 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7849 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7850 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7851 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7852 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7853 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7854 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7855 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7857 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7858 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7860 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7861 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7862 let mut channel = Channel {
7863 context: self.context,
7864 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7865 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7867 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7868 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7870 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7874 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7875 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7876 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7877 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7878 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7879 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7882 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7883 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7884 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
7885 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7886 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7887 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7888 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7889 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
7890 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
7891 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7892 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7896 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
7897 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7898 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
7899 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7900 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7902 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7903 // support this channel type.
7904 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
7905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
7906 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
7908 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7910 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7911 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7912 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7913 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7914 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7915 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7918 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7922 counterparty_node_id,
7926 current_chain_height,
7932 counterparty_pubkeys,
7934 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7935 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7936 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
7937 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7939 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
7940 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
7941 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
7942 context.channel_id = channel_id;
7946 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7947 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7948 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7949 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7950 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
7951 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7958 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
7959 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7961 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
7962 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
7963 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7964 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7967 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7968 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7970 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
7972 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7973 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
7976 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
7979 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7980 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7981 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7983 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
7984 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
7985 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
7986 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7987 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
7988 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7989 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7991 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
7992 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7993 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7994 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7995 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7996 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7997 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7998 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7999 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8000 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8001 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8002 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8003 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8004 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8005 first_per_commitment_point,
8006 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8007 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8008 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8010 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8012 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8013 second_per_commitment_point,
8014 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8018 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8019 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8021 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8023 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8024 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8028 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8029 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8031 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8037 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8038 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8039 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8040 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8041 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8043 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8044 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8045 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8046 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8052 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8053 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8054 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8055 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8056 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8057 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8062 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8063 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8064 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8065 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8067 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8068 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8069 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8070 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8075 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8076 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8077 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8078 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8079 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8080 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8085 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8086 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8087 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8090 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8092 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8093 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8094 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8095 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8096 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8098 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8099 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8100 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8101 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8103 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8105 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8106 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8107 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8109 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8111 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8113 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8115 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8117 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8118 // deserialized from that format.
8119 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8120 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8121 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8123 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8125 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8126 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8127 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8129 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8130 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8131 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8132 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8135 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8136 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8137 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8140 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8141 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8142 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8143 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8145 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8146 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
8148 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
8150 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
8152 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
8154 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8157 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8159 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8164 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8165 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8166 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8168 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8169 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8170 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8171 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8172 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8173 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8174 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8176 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8178 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8180 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8183 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8184 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8185 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8188 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8190 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8191 preimages.push(preimage);
8193 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8194 reason.write(writer)?;
8196 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8198 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8199 preimages.push(preimage);
8201 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8202 reason.write(writer)?;
8205 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8206 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8209 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8210 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8211 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8212 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8213 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8214 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8216 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8217 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8218 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8221 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8222 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8223 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8224 source.write(writer)?;
8225 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8227 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8228 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8230 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8232 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8233 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8235 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8237 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8238 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8240 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8241 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8243 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8244 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8245 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8247 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8249 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8250 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8255 match self.context.resend_order {
8256 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8257 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8260 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8261 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8262 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8264 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8265 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8266 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8267 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8270 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8271 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8272 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8273 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8274 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8277 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8278 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8279 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8280 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8282 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8283 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8284 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8286 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8288 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8289 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8290 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8291 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8293 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8294 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8295 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8296 // consider the stale state on reload.
8299 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8300 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8301 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8303 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8304 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8305 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8307 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8308 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8310 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8311 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8312 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8314 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8315 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8317 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8320 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8321 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8322 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8324 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8327 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8328 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8330 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8331 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8332 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8334 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8336 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8338 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8340 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8341 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8342 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8343 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8344 htlc.write(writer)?;
8347 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8348 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8349 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8351 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8352 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8354 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8355 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8356 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8357 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8358 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8359 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8360 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8362 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8363 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8364 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8365 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8366 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8368 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8369 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8371 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8372 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8373 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8374 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8376 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8378 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8379 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8380 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8381 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8382 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8383 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8384 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8386 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8387 (2, chan_type, option),
8388 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8389 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8390 (5, self.context.config, required),
8391 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8392 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8393 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8394 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8395 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8396 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8397 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8398 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8399 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8400 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8401 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8402 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8403 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8404 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8405 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8406 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8407 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8408 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8409 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8410 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8411 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8412 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8413 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8420 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8421 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8423 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8424 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8426 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8427 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8428 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8430 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8431 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8432 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8433 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8435 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8437 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8438 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8439 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8440 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8441 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8443 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8444 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8447 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8448 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8449 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8451 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8453 let mut keys_data = None;
8455 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8456 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8457 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8458 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8459 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8460 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8461 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8462 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8463 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8464 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8468 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8469 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8470 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8473 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8475 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8476 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8477 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8479 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8481 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8482 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8483 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8484 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8485 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8486 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8487 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8488 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8489 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8490 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8491 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8492 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8493 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8498 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8499 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8500 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8501 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8502 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8503 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8504 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8505 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8506 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8507 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8508 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8509 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8511 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8512 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8515 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8516 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8519 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8520 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8524 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8525 blinding_point: None,
8529 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8530 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8531 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8532 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8533 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8534 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8535 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8536 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8537 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8538 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8539 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8540 blinding_point: None,
8542 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8543 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8544 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8546 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8547 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8548 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8550 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8554 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8555 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8556 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8560 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8561 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8562 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8564 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8565 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8566 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8567 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8570 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8571 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8572 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8573 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8576 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8578 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8580 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8581 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8582 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8583 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8585 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8586 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8587 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8588 // consider the stale state on reload.
8589 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8592 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8593 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8594 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8596 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8599 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8600 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8601 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8603 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8604 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8605 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8606 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8608 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8609 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8611 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8612 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8614 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8615 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8616 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8618 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8620 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8621 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8623 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8624 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8627 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8629 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8630 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8631 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8632 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8634 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8637 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8638 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8640 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8642 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8643 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8645 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8646 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8648 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8650 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8651 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8652 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8654 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8655 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8656 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8660 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8661 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8662 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8664 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8670 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8671 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8672 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8673 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8674 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8675 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8676 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8677 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8678 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8679 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8681 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8682 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8683 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8684 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8685 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8686 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8687 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8689 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8690 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8691 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8692 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8694 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8696 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8697 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8699 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8701 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8703 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8704 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8706 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8708 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8709 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8710 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8711 (2, channel_type, option),
8712 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8713 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8714 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8715 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8716 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8717 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8718 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8719 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8720 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8721 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8722 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8723 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8724 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8725 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8726 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8727 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8728 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8729 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8730 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8731 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8732 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8733 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8734 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8735 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8736 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8737 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8740 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8741 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8742 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8743 // required channel parameters.
8744 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8745 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8747 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8749 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8750 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8751 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8752 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8755 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8756 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8757 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8759 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8760 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8762 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8763 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8768 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8769 if iter.next().is_some() {
8770 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8774 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8775 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8776 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8777 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8778 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8781 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8782 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8783 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8785 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8786 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8788 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8789 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8790 // separate u64 values.
8791 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8793 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8795 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8796 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8797 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8798 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8800 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8801 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8803 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8804 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8805 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8806 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8807 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8810 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8811 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8813 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8814 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8815 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8816 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8818 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8819 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8821 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8822 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8823 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8824 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8825 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8828 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8829 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8832 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8833 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8834 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8835 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8836 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8837 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8840 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8841 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8842 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8844 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8849 context: ChannelContext {
8852 config: config.unwrap(),
8856 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8857 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8858 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8861 temporary_channel_id,
8863 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8865 channel_value_satoshis,
8867 latest_monitor_update_id,
8869 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8870 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8873 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8874 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8877 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8878 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8879 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8880 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8884 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8885 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8886 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8887 monitor_pending_forwards,
8888 monitor_pending_failures,
8889 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8891 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8892 signer_pending_funding: false,
8895 holding_cell_update_fee,
8896 next_holder_htlc_id,
8897 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8898 update_time_counter,
8901 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8902 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8903 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8904 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8906 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8907 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8908 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8909 closing_fee_limits: None,
8910 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8912 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8913 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8915 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8917 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8918 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8919 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8920 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8921 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8922 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8923 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8924 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8925 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8928 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8930 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8931 funding_transaction,
8934 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8935 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8936 counterparty_node_id,
8938 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8942 channel_update_status,
8943 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8947 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8948 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8949 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8950 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8952 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8953 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8955 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8956 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8957 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8959 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8960 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8963 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8965 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8968 local_initiated_shutdown,
8970 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8972 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8973 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8981 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8982 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8983 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8984 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8985 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8986 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8987 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8988 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8989 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8990 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8991 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8992 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8993 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8994 use crate::ln::msgs;
8995 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8996 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8997 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8998 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8999 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9000 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9001 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9002 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9003 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9004 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9005 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9006 use crate::util::test_utils;
9007 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9008 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9009 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9010 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9011 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9012 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9013 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9014 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9015 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9016 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9017 use crate::prelude::*;
9020 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9021 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9022 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9023 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9025 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9026 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9027 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9028 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9031 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9034 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9035 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9041 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9042 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9043 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9044 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9048 signer: InMemorySigner,
9051 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9052 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9055 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9056 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9058 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9060 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9061 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9064 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9068 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9070 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9071 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9072 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9073 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9074 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9077 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9078 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9079 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9080 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9084 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9085 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9086 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9090 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9091 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9092 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9093 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9096 let seed = [42; 32];
9097 let network = Network::Testnet;
9098 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9099 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9100 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9104 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9105 let config = UserConfig::default();
9106 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9107 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9108 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9110 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9111 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9115 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9116 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9118 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9119 let original_fee = 253;
9120 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9121 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9122 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9123 let seed = [42; 32];
9124 let network = Network::Testnet;
9125 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9127 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9128 let config = UserConfig::default();
9129 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9131 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9132 // same as the old fee.
9133 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9134 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9135 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9139 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9140 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9141 // dust limits are used.
9142 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9143 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9144 let seed = [42; 32];
9145 let network = Network::Testnet;
9146 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9147 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9148 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9150 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9151 // they have different dust limits.
9153 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9154 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9155 let config = UserConfig::default();
9156 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9158 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9159 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9160 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9161 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9162 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9164 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9165 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9166 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9167 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9168 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9170 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9171 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9172 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9173 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9175 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9176 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9177 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9179 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9180 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9181 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9183 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9184 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9185 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9187 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9188 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9189 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9190 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9193 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9195 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9196 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9197 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9198 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9199 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9200 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9201 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9202 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9203 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9205 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9206 blinding_point: None,
9209 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9210 // the dust limit check.
9211 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9212 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9213 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9214 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9216 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9217 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9218 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9219 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9220 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9221 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9222 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9226 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9227 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9228 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9229 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9230 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9231 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9232 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9233 let seed = [42; 32];
9234 let network = Network::Testnet;
9235 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9237 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9238 let config = UserConfig::default();
9239 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9241 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9242 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9244 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9245 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9246 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9247 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9248 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9249 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9251 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9252 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9253 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9254 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9255 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9257 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9259 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9260 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9261 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9262 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9263 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9265 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9266 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9267 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9268 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9269 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9273 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9274 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9275 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9277 let seed = [42; 32];
9278 let network = Network::Testnet;
9279 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9280 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9281 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9283 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9285 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9286 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9287 let config = UserConfig::default();
9288 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9290 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9291 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9292 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9293 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9295 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9296 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9297 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9299 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9300 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9301 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9302 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9304 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9305 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9306 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9308 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9309 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9310 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9312 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9313 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9314 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9315 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9316 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9317 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9318 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9320 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9322 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9323 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9324 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9325 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9326 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9330 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9331 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9332 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9333 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9334 let seed = [42; 32];
9335 let network = Network::Testnet;
9336 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9337 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9338 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9340 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9341 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9342 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9343 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9344 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9345 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9346 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9347 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9349 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9350 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9351 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9352 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9353 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9354 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9356 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9357 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9358 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9359 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9361 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9363 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9364 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9365 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9366 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9367 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9368 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9370 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9371 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9372 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9373 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9375 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9376 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9377 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9378 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9379 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9381 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9382 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9384 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9385 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9386 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9388 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9389 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9390 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9391 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9392 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9394 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9395 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9397 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9398 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9399 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9403 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9405 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9406 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9407 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9409 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9410 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9411 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9412 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9414 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9415 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9416 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9418 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9420 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9421 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9424 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9425 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9426 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9427 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9428 let seed = [42; 32];
9429 let network = Network::Testnet;
9430 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9431 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9432 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9435 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9436 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9437 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9439 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9440 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9442 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9443 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9444 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9446 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9447 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9449 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9451 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9452 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9454 // Channel Negotiations failed
9455 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9456 assert!(result.is_err());
9461 fn channel_update() {
9462 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9463 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9464 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9465 let seed = [42; 32];
9466 let network = Network::Testnet;
9467 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9468 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9471 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9472 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9473 let config = UserConfig::default();
9474 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9476 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9477 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9478 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9479 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9480 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9482 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9483 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9484 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9485 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9486 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9488 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9489 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9490 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9491 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9493 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9494 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9495 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9497 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9498 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9499 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9501 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9502 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9503 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9505 short_channel_id: 0,
9508 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9509 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9510 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9512 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9513 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9515 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9517 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9519 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9520 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9521 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9522 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9524 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9525 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9526 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9528 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9531 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9535 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9536 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9538 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9539 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9541 let seed = [42; 32];
9542 let network = Network::Testnet;
9543 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9544 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9546 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9547 let config = UserConfig::default();
9548 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9549 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9550 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9552 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9553 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9554 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9556 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9557 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9558 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9560 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9561 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9562 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9563 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9564 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9567 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9569 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9570 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9571 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9572 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9576 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9577 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9578 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9580 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9583 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9585 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9586 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9587 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9588 blinding_point: None,
9590 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9591 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9593 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9596 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9599 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9601 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9604 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9605 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9606 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9608 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9609 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9612 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9613 blinding_point: None,
9615 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9616 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9619 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9620 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9622 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9623 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9625 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9628 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9629 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9630 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9631 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9632 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9633 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9634 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9635 } = &mut dummy_add {
9636 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9637 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9639 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9640 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9641 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9643 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9646 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9648 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9649 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9650 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9651 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9652 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9653 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9654 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9655 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9658 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9660 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9661 use bitcoin::sighash;
9662 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9663 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9664 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9665 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9666 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9667 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9668 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9669 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9670 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9671 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9672 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9673 use crate::sync::Arc;
9674 use core::str::FromStr;
9675 use hex::DisplayHex;
9677 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9678 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9679 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9680 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9682 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9684 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9685 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9686 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9687 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9688 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9690 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9691 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9697 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9698 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9699 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9701 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9702 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9703 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9704 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9705 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9706 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9708 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9710 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9711 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9712 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9713 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9714 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9715 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9717 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9718 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9719 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9720 selected_contest_delay: 144
9722 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9723 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9725 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9726 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9728 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9729 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9731 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9732 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9734 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9735 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9736 // build_commitment_transaction.
9737 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9738 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9739 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9740 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9741 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9743 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9744 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9745 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9746 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9750 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9751 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9752 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9753 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9757 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9758 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9759 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9761 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9762 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9764 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9765 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9767 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9769 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9770 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9771 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9772 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9773 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9774 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9775 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9777 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9778 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9779 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9780 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9782 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9783 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9784 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9786 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9788 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9789 commitment_tx.clone(),
9790 counterparty_signature,
9791 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9792 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9793 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9795 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9796 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9798 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9799 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9800 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9802 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9803 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9806 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9807 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9809 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9810 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9811 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9812 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9813 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9814 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9815 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9816 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9818 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9821 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9822 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9823 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9827 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9830 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9831 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9832 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9833 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9834 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9835 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9837 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9838 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9839 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9840 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9842 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9843 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9844 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9845 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9846 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9848 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9849 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9850 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9851 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9852 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9853 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9855 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9859 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9860 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9861 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9862 "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", {});
9864 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9865 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9867 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9868 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9869 "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", {});
9871 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9872 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9873 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9874 "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", {});
9876 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9877 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9879 amount_msat: 1000000,
9881 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9882 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9884 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9887 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9888 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9890 amount_msat: 2000000,
9892 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9893 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9895 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9898 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9899 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9901 amount_msat: 2000000,
9903 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9904 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9905 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9906 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9907 blinding_point: None,
9909 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9912 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9913 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9915 amount_msat: 3000000,
9917 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9918 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9919 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9920 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9921 blinding_point: None,
9923 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9926 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9927 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9929 amount_msat: 4000000,
9931 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9932 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9934 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9938 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9939 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9940 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9942 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9943 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9944 "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", {
9947 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9948 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9949 "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" },
9952 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9953 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9954 "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" },
9957 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9958 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9959 "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" },
9962 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9963 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9964 "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" },
9967 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9968 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9969 "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" }
9972 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9973 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9974 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9976 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9977 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9978 "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", {
9981 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9982 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9983 "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" },
9986 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9987 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9988 "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" },
9991 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9992 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9993 "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" },
9996 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9997 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9998 "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" },
10001 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10002 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10003 "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" }
10006 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10007 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10008 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10010 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10011 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10012 "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", {
10015 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10016 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10017 "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" },
10020 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10021 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10022 "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" },
10025 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10026 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10027 "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" },
10030 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10031 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10032 "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" }
10035 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10036 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10037 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10038 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10040 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10041 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10042 "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", {
10045 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10046 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10047 "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" },
10050 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10051 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10052 "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" },
10055 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10056 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10057 "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" },
10060 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10061 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10062 "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" }
10065 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10066 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10067 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10068 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10070 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10071 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10072 "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", {
10075 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10076 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10077 "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" },
10080 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10081 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10082 "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" },
10085 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10086 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10087 "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" },
10090 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10091 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10092 "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" }
10095 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10096 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10097 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10099 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10100 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10101 "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", {
10104 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10105 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10106 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10109 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10110 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10111 "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" },
10114 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10115 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10116 "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" }
10119 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10120 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10121 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10123 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10124 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10125 "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", {
10128 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10129 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10130 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10133 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10134 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10135 "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" },
10138 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10139 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10140 "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" }
10143 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10144 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10145 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10147 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10148 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10149 "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", {
10152 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10153 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10154 "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" },
10157 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10158 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10159 "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" }
10162 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10163 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10164 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10165 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10166 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10167 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10169 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10170 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10171 "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", {
10174 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10175 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10176 "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" },
10179 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10180 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10181 "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" }
10184 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10185 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10186 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10187 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10188 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10190 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10191 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10192 "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", {
10195 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10196 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10197 "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" },
10200 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10201 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10202 "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" }
10205 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10206 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10207 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10209 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10210 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10211 "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", {
10214 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10215 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10216 "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" }
10219 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10220 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10221 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10222 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10223 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10225 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10226 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10227 "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", {
10230 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10231 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10232 "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" }
10235 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10236 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10237 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10238 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10239 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10241 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10242 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10243 "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", {
10246 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10247 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10248 "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" }
10251 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10252 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10253 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10254 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10256 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10257 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10258 "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", {});
10260 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10261 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10262 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10263 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10264 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10266 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10267 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10268 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10270 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10271 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10272 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10273 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10274 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10276 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10277 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10278 "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", {});
10280 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10281 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10282 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10284 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10285 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10286 "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", {});
10288 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10289 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10290 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10291 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10292 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10294 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10295 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10296 "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", {});
10298 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10299 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10300 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10301 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10302 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10304 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10305 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10306 "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", {});
10308 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10309 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10310 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10311 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10312 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10313 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10315 amount_msat: 2000000,
10317 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10318 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10320 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10323 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10324 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10325 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10327 amount_msat: 5000001,
10329 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10330 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10331 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10332 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10333 blinding_point: None,
10335 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10338 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10339 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10341 amount_msat: 5000000,
10343 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10344 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10345 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10346 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10347 blinding_point: None,
10349 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10353 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10354 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10355 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10358 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10359 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10360 "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" },
10362 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10363 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10364 "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" },
10366 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10367 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10368 "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" }
10371 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10372 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10373 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10374 "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", {
10377 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10378 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10379 "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" },
10381 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10382 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10383 "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" },
10385 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10386 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10387 "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" }
10392 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10393 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10395 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10396 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10397 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10398 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10400 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10401 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10402 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10404 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10405 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10407 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10408 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10410 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10411 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10412 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10416 fn test_key_derivation() {
10417 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10420 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10421 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10423 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10424 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10426 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10427 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10429 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10430 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10432 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10433 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10435 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10436 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10440 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10441 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10442 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10443 let seed = [42; 32];
10444 let network = Network::Testnet;
10445 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10446 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10448 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10449 let config = UserConfig::default();
10450 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10451 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10453 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10454 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10456 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10457 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10458 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10459 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10460 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10461 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10462 assert!(res.is_ok());
10466 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10467 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10468 // resulting `channel_type`.
10469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10470 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10471 let network = Network::Testnet;
10472 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10473 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10475 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10476 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10478 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10479 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10481 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10482 // need to signal it.
10483 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10484 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10485 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10486 &config, 0, 42, None
10488 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10490 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10491 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10492 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10494 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10495 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10496 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10500 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10501 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10502 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10503 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10504 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10507 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10508 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10512 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10513 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10514 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10515 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10516 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10517 let network = Network::Testnet;
10518 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10521 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10522 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10524 let config = UserConfig::default();
10526 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10527 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10528 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10529 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10530 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10532 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10533 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10534 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10538 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10539 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10540 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10542 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10543 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10544 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10545 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10546 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10547 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10549 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10553 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10554 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10556 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10557 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10558 let network = Network::Testnet;
10559 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10560 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10562 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10563 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10565 let config = UserConfig::default();
10567 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10568 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10569 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10570 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10571 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10572 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10573 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10574 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10576 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10577 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10578 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10579 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10580 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10581 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10585 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10586 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10588 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10589 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10590 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10591 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10593 assert!(res.is_err());
10595 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10596 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10597 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10599 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10600 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10601 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10604 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10606 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10607 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10608 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10609 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10612 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10613 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10615 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10616 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10618 assert!(res.is_err());
10622 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10623 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10624 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10625 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10626 let seed = [42; 32];
10627 let network = Network::Testnet;
10628 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10629 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10630 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10632 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10633 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10634 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10635 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10637 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10638 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10639 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10644 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10654 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10655 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10656 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10661 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10662 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10668 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10671 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10672 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10673 &accept_channel_msg,
10674 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10675 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10678 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10679 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10680 let tx = Transaction {
10682 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10686 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10689 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10692 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10693 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10694 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10695 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10696 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10697 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10701 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10702 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10710 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10711 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10712 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10713 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10715 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10716 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10723 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10724 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10725 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10726 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10727 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10729 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10730 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10731 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10739 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10740 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10743 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10744 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10745 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10746 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());