1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
818 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
819 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
820 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
821 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
822 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
823 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
824 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
825 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
828 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
829 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
830 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
831 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
832 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
833 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
834 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
835 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
836 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
837 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
838 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
839 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
840 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
841 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
842 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
844 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
845 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
846 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
847 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
849 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
850 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
851 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
852 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
854 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
855 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
856 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
857 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
858 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
860 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
861 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
862 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
863 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
865 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
866 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
867 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
869 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
870 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
871 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
872 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
873 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
875 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
876 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
879 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
880 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
882 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
883 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
884 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
885 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
887 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
888 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
890 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
891 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
895 (0, update, required),
898 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
899 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
900 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
901 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
907 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
908 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
910 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
920 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
928 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
929 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
930 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
933 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
934 /// in a timely manner.
935 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
938 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
939 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
940 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
942 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
943 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
944 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
945 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
949 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
950 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
951 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
953 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
954 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
955 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
956 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
958 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
962 /// The current channel ID.
963 channel_id: ChannelId,
964 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
965 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
966 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
967 channel_state: ChannelState,
969 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
970 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
972 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
973 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
974 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
977 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
978 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
981 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
982 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
987 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
988 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
990 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
991 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
992 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
994 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
995 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
996 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1001 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1002 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1003 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1004 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1005 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1006 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1008 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1010 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1011 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1012 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1014 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1015 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1016 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1017 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1022 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1023 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1024 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1026 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1027 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1028 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1029 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1030 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1031 /// outbound or inbound.
1032 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1034 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1036 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1037 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1038 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1039 // HTLCs with similar state.
1040 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1041 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1042 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1043 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1044 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1045 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1046 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1049 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1051 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1052 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1053 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1055 update_time_counter: u32,
1057 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1058 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1062 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1065 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1067 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1068 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1069 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1072 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1073 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1075 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1077 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1079 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1080 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1081 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1082 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1083 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1085 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1086 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1088 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1089 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1090 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1092 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1093 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1094 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1095 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1097 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1098 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1099 channel_creation_height: u32,
1101 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1106 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1122 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1124 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1126 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1127 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1129 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1133 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1137 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1138 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1139 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1141 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1142 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1143 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1145 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1147 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1149 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1150 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1151 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1152 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1154 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1155 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1156 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1158 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1159 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1160 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1162 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1163 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1164 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1165 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1167 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1169 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1171 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1172 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1173 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1174 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1175 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1177 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1178 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1180 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1181 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1183 /// unblock the state machine.
1185 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1186 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1187 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1189 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1190 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1191 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1194 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1195 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1196 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1197 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1198 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1199 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1200 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1202 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1203 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1205 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1206 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1207 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1209 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1210 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1211 // associated channel mapping.
1213 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1214 // to store all of them.
1215 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1218 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1219 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1220 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1221 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1223 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1226 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1229 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1230 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1231 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1233 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1234 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1235 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1238 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1239 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1240 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1241 self.update_time_counter
1244 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1248 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.config.announced_channel
1252 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1256 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1257 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1258 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1262 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1263 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1264 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1267 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1268 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1269 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1270 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1271 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1272 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1273 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1276 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1277 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1278 match self.channel_state {
1279 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1280 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1282 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1283 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1284 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1287 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1289 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1290 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1294 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1295 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1296 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1297 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1299 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1303 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1304 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1308 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1309 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1311 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1312 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1315 // Public utilities:
1317 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1321 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1323 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1324 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1325 self.temporary_channel_id
1328 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1332 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1333 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1334 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1338 /// Gets the channel's type
1339 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1343 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1345 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1346 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.short_channel_id
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1357 self.outbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1362 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1363 return &self.holder_signer
1366 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1367 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1368 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1369 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1370 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1371 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1374 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1375 /// get_funding_created.
1376 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1380 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1381 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1382 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1383 if conf_height > 0 {
1390 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1392 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1395 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1398 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1402 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1405 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1409 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1413 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1415 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1418 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1419 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 self.counterparty_node_id
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1434 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1438 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1440 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1441 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1442 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1443 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1445 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1451 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1459 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1461 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1464 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1469 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1470 self.channel_value_satoshis
1473 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1474 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1477 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1478 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1481 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1485 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1487 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1488 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1489 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1495 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1496 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1497 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1500 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1502 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1515 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1517 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1520 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1522 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1525 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1526 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1527 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1528 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1529 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1532 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1534 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1535 self.prev_config = None;
1539 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1540 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1544 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1545 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1546 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1547 let did_channel_update =
1548 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1549 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1550 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1551 if did_channel_update {
1552 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1553 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1554 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1555 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1557 self.config.options = *config;
1561 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1562 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1563 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1564 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1565 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1568 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1569 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1570 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1571 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1572 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1574 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1575 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1576 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1577 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1578 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1579 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1580 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1582 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1583 where L::Target: Logger
1585 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1586 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1587 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1589 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1590 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1591 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1594 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1595 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1596 if match update_state {
1597 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1598 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1603 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1608 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1609 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1611 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1613 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1614 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1615 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1617 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1618 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1619 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1620 transaction_output_index: None
1625 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1626 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1627 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1628 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1629 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1632 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1634 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1636 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1639 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1643 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1648 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1649 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1650 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1652 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1653 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1659 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1663 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1664 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1665 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1666 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1667 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1671 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1672 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1676 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1677 if generated_by_local {
1678 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1679 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1680 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1690 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1692 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1697 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1701 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1709 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1714 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1718 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1722 if !generated_by_local {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1731 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1732 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1733 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1734 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1735 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1736 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1737 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1738 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1742 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1743 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1744 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1745 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1747 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1749 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1750 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1751 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1752 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1755 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1756 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1757 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1758 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1760 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1763 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1764 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1765 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1766 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1768 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1771 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1772 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1777 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1778 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1783 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1785 let channel_parameters =
1786 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1787 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1788 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1795 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1798 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1799 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1800 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1801 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1803 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1804 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1805 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1841 //may see payments to it!
1842 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1849 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1850 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1851 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1852 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1853 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1856 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1857 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1860 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1864 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1865 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1866 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1867 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1868 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1869 // which are near the dust limit.
1870 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1871 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1872 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1873 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1874 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1876 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1877 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2320 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2321 match self.channel_state {
2322 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2323 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2332 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2334 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2335 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2338 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2340 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2341 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2346 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2347 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2348 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2351 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2353 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2354 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2357 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2358 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2359 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2360 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2361 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2362 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2363 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2364 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2365 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2366 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2367 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2369 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2370 // return them to fail the payment.
2371 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2372 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2373 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2375 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2376 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2381 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2382 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2383 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2384 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2385 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2386 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2387 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2388 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2389 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2390 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2393 if generate_monitor_update {
2394 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2395 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2396 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2397 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2401 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2403 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2404 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2407 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2408 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2409 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2410 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2414 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2415 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2416 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2417 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2419 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2420 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2421 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2422 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2424 match &self.holder_signer {
2425 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2427 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2428 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2429 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2436 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2437 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2438 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2439 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2440 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2441 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2444 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2445 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2447 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2454 // Internal utility functions for channels
2456 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2457 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2460 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2462 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2463 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2464 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2466 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2469 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2471 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2474 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2475 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2478 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2480 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2481 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2482 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2483 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2484 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2487 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2488 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2489 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2490 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2491 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2492 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2493 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2496 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2497 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2499 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2500 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2503 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2504 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2505 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2506 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2507 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2508 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2511 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2512 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2513 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2514 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2517 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2518 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2520 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2521 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2522 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2526 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2527 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2528 trait FailHTLCContents {
2529 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2530 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2531 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2532 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2534 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2535 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2536 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2537 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2539 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2540 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2542 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2543 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2547 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2548 fn name() -> &'static str;
2550 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2551 fn name() -> &'static str {
2556 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2557 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2558 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2560 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2561 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2562 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2563 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2565 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2566 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2568 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2570 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2571 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2572 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2573 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2575 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2576 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2580 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2586 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2587 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2588 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2589 // outside of those situations will fail.
2590 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2594 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2599 1 + // script length (0)
2603 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2604 2 + // witness marker and flag
2605 1 + // witness element count
2606 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2607 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2608 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2609 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2610 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2611 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2613 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2614 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2615 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2621 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2622 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2623 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2624 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2626 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2627 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2628 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2630 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2631 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2632 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2633 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2634 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2635 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2638 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2639 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2642 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2643 value_to_holder = 0;
2646 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2647 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2648 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2649 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2651 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2652 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2655 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2656 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2659 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2662 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2663 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2665 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2667 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2668 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2669 where L::Target: Logger {
2670 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2671 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2672 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2673 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2674 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2675 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2676 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2677 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2681 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2682 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2683 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2684 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2686 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2687 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2690 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2691 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2692 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2694 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2695 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2696 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2697 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2698 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2699 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2700 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2702 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2703 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2704 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2706 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2707 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2709 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2712 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2713 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2717 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2721 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2722 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2723 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2724 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2725 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2726 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2729 // Now update local state:
2731 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2732 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2733 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2734 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2735 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2736 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2737 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2741 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2742 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2743 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2744 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2745 // do not not get into this branch.
2746 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2747 match pending_update {
2748 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2749 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2750 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2751 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2752 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2753 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2754 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2757 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2758 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2760 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2761 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2762 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2763 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2764 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2765 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2771 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2772 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2773 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2776 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2777 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2779 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2780 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2783 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2784 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2786 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2787 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2789 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2790 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2793 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2796 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2797 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2798 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2799 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2804 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2805 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2806 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2807 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2808 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2809 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2810 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2811 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2812 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2813 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2814 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2815 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2816 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2817 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2818 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2820 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2821 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2822 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2823 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2824 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2827 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2828 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2829 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2835 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2836 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2838 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2842 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2843 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2844 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2845 /// before we fail backwards.
2847 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2848 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2849 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2850 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2851 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2852 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2853 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2856 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2857 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2858 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2859 /// before we fail backwards.
2861 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2862 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2863 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2864 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2865 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2867 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2868 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2869 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2872 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2873 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2874 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2876 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2877 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2878 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2880 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2881 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2882 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2884 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2889 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2896 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2898 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2899 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2900 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2904 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2905 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2906 force_holding_cell = true;
2909 // Now update local state:
2910 if force_holding_cell {
2911 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2912 match pending_update {
2913 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2914 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2916 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2920 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2921 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2923 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2924 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2931 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2932 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2936 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2937 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2939 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2940 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2943 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2946 // Message handlers:
2947 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2948 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2949 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2950 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2951 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2952 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2953 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
2956 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2957 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2959 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2960 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2961 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2962 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2964 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2967 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
2968 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2972 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2973 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2974 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2975 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2976 // when routing outbound payments.
2977 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2981 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2982 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2983 let mut check_reconnection = false;
2984 match &self.context.channel_state {
2985 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
2986 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
2987 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
2988 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
2989 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
2990 check_reconnection = true;
2991 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
2992 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
2993 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
2994 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
2995 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2997 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
2998 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3001 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3002 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3003 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3005 if check_reconnection {
3006 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3007 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3008 let expected_point =
3009 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3010 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3012 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3013 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3014 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3015 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3016 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3017 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3019 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3020 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3021 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3022 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3023 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3025 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3031 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3032 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3034 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3036 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3039 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3040 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3041 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3042 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3043 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3044 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3046 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3049 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3050 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3051 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3053 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3054 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3057 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3060 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3063 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3066 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3070 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3071 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3072 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3075 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3079 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3080 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3081 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3082 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3083 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3084 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3085 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3086 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3087 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3088 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3089 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3091 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3092 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3093 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3094 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3095 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3096 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3100 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3101 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3104 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3105 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3106 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3108 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3109 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3110 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3111 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3112 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3113 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3114 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3118 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3119 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3120 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3121 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3122 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3123 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3124 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3128 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3129 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3130 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3131 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3132 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3136 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3137 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3139 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3140 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3141 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3143 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3144 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3148 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3151 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3156 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3157 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3161 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3162 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3163 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3164 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3165 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3166 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3167 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3168 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3169 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3171 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3172 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3173 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3174 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3175 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3178 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3179 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3180 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3181 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3185 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3188 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3192 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3193 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3194 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3198 // Now update local state:
3199 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3200 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3201 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3202 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3203 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3204 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3205 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3210 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3212 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3213 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3214 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3215 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3216 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3217 None => fail_reason.into(),
3218 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3219 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3220 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3227 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3229 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3230 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3232 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3238 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3241 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3242 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3245 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3249 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3252 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3253 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3256 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3260 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3264 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3265 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3268 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3272 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3276 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3277 where L::Target: Logger
3279 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3282 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3285 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3289 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3291 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3293 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3294 let commitment_txid = {
3295 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3296 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3297 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3299 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3300 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3301 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3302 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3303 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3308 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3310 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3311 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3312 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3313 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3316 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3317 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3318 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3322 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3324 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3325 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3326 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3327 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3328 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3329 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3330 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3331 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3332 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3333 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3334 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3340 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3344 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3345 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3346 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3347 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3348 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3349 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3350 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3351 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3352 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3353 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3354 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3355 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3356 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3359 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3360 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3361 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3362 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3363 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3364 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3365 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3367 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3368 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3369 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3370 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3371 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3372 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3373 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3376 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3377 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3380 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3382 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3383 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3384 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3387 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3390 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3391 commitment_stats.tx,
3393 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3394 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3395 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3398 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3399 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3401 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3402 let mut need_commitment = false;
3403 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3404 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3405 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3406 need_commitment = true;
3410 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3411 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3412 Some(forward_info.clone())
3414 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3415 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3416 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3417 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3418 need_commitment = true;
3421 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3422 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3423 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3424 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3425 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3426 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3427 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3428 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3429 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3430 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3431 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3432 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3433 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3434 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3436 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3438 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3439 need_commitment = true;
3443 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3444 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3445 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3447 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3448 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3450 nondust_htlc_sources,
3454 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3455 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3456 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3457 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3458 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3460 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3461 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3462 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3463 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3464 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3465 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3466 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3467 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3468 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3469 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3470 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3471 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3472 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3473 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3475 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3476 &self.context.channel_id);
3477 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3480 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3481 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3482 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3483 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3484 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3485 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3486 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3487 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3488 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3492 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3493 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3494 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3495 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3498 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3499 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3500 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3501 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3502 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3503 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3504 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3506 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3507 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3508 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3511 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3512 /// for our counterparty.
3513 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3514 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3515 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3516 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3518 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3519 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3520 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3521 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3523 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3524 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3525 updates: Vec::new(),
3528 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3529 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3530 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3531 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3532 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3533 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3534 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3535 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3536 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3537 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3538 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3539 // to rebalance channels.
3540 match &htlc_update {
3541 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3542 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3543 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3545 match self.send_htlc(
3546 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3547 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3549 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3552 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3553 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3554 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3555 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3556 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3557 // into the holding cell without ever being
3558 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3559 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3560 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3563 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3569 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3570 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3571 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3572 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3573 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3574 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3575 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3576 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3577 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3578 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3579 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3580 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3582 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3583 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3584 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3585 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3586 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3587 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3588 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3589 // for a full revocation before failing.
3590 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3591 update_fail_count += 1;
3594 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3596 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3601 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
3606 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3607 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3609 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3610 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3615 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3616 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3617 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3618 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3619 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3621 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3622 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3623 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3625 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3626 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3632 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3633 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3634 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3635 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3636 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3637 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3638 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3639 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3640 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3642 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3645 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3648 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3652 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3654 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3655 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3660 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3661 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3662 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3663 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3664 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3665 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3666 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3667 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3671 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3673 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3674 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3677 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3678 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3679 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3680 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3682 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3684 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3689 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3690 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3692 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3693 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3694 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3695 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3696 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3700 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3701 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3702 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3703 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3704 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3705 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3706 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3707 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3708 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3710 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3711 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3714 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3715 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3716 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3717 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3718 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3719 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3720 let mut require_commitment = false;
3721 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3724 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3725 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3726 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3727 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3729 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3730 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3731 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3732 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3733 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3734 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3736 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3740 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3741 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3742 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3743 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3744 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3746 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3747 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3748 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3753 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3754 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3756 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3760 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3761 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3763 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3764 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3765 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3766 require_commitment = true;
3767 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3768 match forward_info {
3769 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3770 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3771 require_commitment = true;
3773 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3774 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3775 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3777 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3778 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3779 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3783 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3784 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3785 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3786 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3792 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3793 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3794 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3795 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3796 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3798 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3799 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3800 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3801 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3802 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3803 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3804 require_commitment = true;
3808 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3810 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3811 match update_state {
3812 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3813 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3814 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3815 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3816 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3817 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3819 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3820 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3821 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3822 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3823 require_commitment = true;
3824 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3825 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3830 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3831 let release_state_str =
3832 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3833 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3834 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3835 if !release_monitor {
3836 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3837 update: monitor_update,
3839 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3841 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3846 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3847 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3848 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3849 if require_commitment {
3850 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3851 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3852 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3853 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3855 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3856 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3857 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3859 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3861 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3862 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3863 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3864 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3865 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3868 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3869 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3870 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3871 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3872 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3873 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3875 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3876 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3878 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3879 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3881 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3882 if require_commitment {
3883 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3885 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3886 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3887 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3888 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3890 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3891 &self.context.channel_id(),
3892 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3895 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3896 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3898 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3899 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3901 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3902 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3908 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3909 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3910 /// commitment update.
3911 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3912 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3913 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3915 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3916 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3919 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3920 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3921 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3922 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3924 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3925 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3926 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3927 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3928 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3929 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3930 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3932 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3933 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3935 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3936 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3938 if !self.context.is_live() {
3939 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3942 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3943 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3944 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3945 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3946 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3947 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3948 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3949 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3950 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3951 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3955 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3956 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3957 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3958 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3959 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3960 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3963 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3968 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3969 force_holding_cell = true;
3972 if force_holding_cell {
3973 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3977 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3978 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3980 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3981 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3986 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3987 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3989 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3991 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3992 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3993 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3994 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3998 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3999 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4000 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4004 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4005 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4008 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4009 // will be retransmitted.
4010 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4011 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4012 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4014 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4015 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4017 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4018 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4019 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4020 // this HTLC accordingly
4021 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4024 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4025 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4026 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4027 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4030 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4031 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4032 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4033 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4034 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4035 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4040 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4042 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4043 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4044 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4045 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4049 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4050 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4051 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4052 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4053 // the update upon reconnection.
4054 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4058 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4060 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4061 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4065 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4066 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4067 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4068 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4069 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4070 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4071 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4073 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4074 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4075 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4076 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4077 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4078 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4079 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4081 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4082 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4083 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4084 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4085 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4086 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4087 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4090 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4091 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4092 /// to the remote side.
4093 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4094 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4095 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4096 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4099 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4101 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4102 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4104 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4105 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4106 // first received the funding_signed.
4107 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4108 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4109 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4110 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4112 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4114 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4115 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4116 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4117 funding_broadcastable = None;
4120 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4121 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4122 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4123 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4124 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4125 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4126 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4127 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4128 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4129 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4130 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4131 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4132 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4133 next_per_commitment_point,
4134 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4138 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4140 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4141 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4142 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4143 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4144 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4145 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4147 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4148 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4149 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4150 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4151 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4152 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4156 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4157 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4159 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4160 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4162 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4163 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4166 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4167 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4168 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4169 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4170 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4171 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4172 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4173 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4174 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4178 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4181 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4184 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4187 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4189 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4190 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4191 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4192 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4193 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4194 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4195 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4196 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4197 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4198 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4200 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4202 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4204 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4210 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4213 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4214 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4215 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4217 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4218 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4220 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4221 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4224 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4225 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4226 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4227 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4229 SignerResumeUpdates {
4236 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4237 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4238 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4239 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4240 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4241 per_commitment_secret,
4242 next_per_commitment_point,
4244 next_local_nonce: None,
4248 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4249 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4250 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4251 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4252 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4253 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4255 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4256 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4257 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4258 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4259 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4260 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4261 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4262 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4263 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4264 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4265 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4270 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4271 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4273 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4274 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4276 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4277 reason: err_packet.clone()
4280 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4281 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4282 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4283 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4284 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4285 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4288 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4289 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4290 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4291 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4292 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4299 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4300 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4301 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4302 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4306 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4307 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4308 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4309 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4310 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4311 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4312 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4316 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4317 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4318 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4322 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4323 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4328 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4329 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4330 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4331 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4332 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4333 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4334 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4339 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4340 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4342 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4343 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4344 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4345 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4346 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4347 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4348 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4349 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4352 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4354 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4355 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4356 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4357 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4361 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4362 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4366 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4367 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4368 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4369 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4371 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4374 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4375 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4376 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4377 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4378 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4381 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4382 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4383 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4384 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4385 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4386 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4387 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4388 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4392 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4393 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4394 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4395 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4396 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4397 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4398 our_commitment_transaction
4402 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4403 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4404 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4405 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4407 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4409 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4411 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4412 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4413 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4414 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4415 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4418 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4419 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4420 channel_ready: None,
4421 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4422 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4423 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4427 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4428 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4429 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4430 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4431 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4432 next_per_commitment_point,
4433 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4435 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4436 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4437 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4441 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4442 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4443 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4445 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4446 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4447 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4450 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4453 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4455 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4456 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4457 our_commitment_transaction
4461 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4462 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4463 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4464 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4465 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4466 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4467 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4469 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4471 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4472 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4473 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4474 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4475 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4476 next_per_commitment_point,
4477 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4481 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4482 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4483 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4485 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4488 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4489 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4490 raa: required_revoke,
4491 commitment_update: None,
4492 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4494 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4495 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4496 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4498 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4501 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4502 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4503 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4504 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4505 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4506 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4509 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4510 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4511 raa: required_revoke,
4512 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4513 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4516 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4517 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4518 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4519 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4520 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4523 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4524 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4525 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4526 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4531 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4532 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4533 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4534 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4536 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4538 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4540 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4541 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4542 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4543 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4544 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4545 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4546 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4547 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4549 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4550 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4551 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4552 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4553 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4555 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4556 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4557 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4558 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4561 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4562 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4563 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4564 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4565 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4566 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4567 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4568 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4569 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4570 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4571 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4572 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4573 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4574 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4575 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4577 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4580 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4581 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4584 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4585 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4586 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4587 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4588 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4589 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4592 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4593 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4594 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4595 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4596 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4597 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4600 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4606 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4607 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4608 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4609 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4611 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4612 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4613 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4614 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4615 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4616 return Ok((None, None, None));
4619 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4620 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4621 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4623 return Ok((None, None, None));
4626 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4627 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4628 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4629 return Ok((None, None, None));
4632 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4634 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4635 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4636 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4637 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4639 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4640 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4642 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4643 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4645 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4646 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4647 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4648 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4650 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4651 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4652 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4656 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4662 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4663 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4665 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4666 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4669 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4670 /// within our expected timeframe.
4672 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4673 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4674 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4677 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4680 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4681 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4685 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4686 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4688 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4691 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4692 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4693 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4694 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4697 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4698 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4702 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4704 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4705 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4708 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4709 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4710 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4713 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4716 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4717 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4718 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4719 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4721 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4724 assert!(send_shutdown);
4725 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4726 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4727 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4729 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4730 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4732 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4737 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4739 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4740 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4742 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4743 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4744 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4745 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4746 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4747 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4750 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4751 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4753 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4754 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4755 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4756 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4760 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4761 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4762 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4763 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4764 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4765 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4767 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4768 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4775 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4776 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4778 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4781 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4782 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4784 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4786 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4787 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4788 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4789 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4790 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4791 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4792 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4793 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4794 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4796 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4797 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4800 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4804 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4805 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4806 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4807 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4809 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4812 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4815 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4818 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4822 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4826 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4827 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4828 return Ok((None, None, None));
4831 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4832 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4833 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4834 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4836 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4838 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4841 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4842 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4843 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4844 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4845 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4849 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4850 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4855 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4856 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4857 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4858 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4859 monitor_update: None,
4860 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4861 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4862 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4863 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4865 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4866 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4867 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4868 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4872 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4874 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4875 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4876 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4877 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4879 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4882 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4883 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4885 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4886 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4887 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4888 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4889 monitor_update: None,
4890 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4891 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4892 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4893 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4895 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4896 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4897 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4898 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4903 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4904 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4906 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4908 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4909 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4910 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4912 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4914 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4921 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4922 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4925 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4926 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4928 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4929 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4932 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4933 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4934 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4935 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4936 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4938 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4940 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4942 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4943 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4946 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4947 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4948 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4949 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4950 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4951 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4952 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4953 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4958 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4959 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4960 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4961 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4967 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4968 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4969 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4970 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4972 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4978 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4979 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4980 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4981 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4982 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4983 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4984 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4986 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4987 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4990 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4992 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4993 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4999 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5000 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5001 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5002 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5003 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5004 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5005 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5007 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5008 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5015 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5016 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5019 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5020 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5023 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5024 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5028 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5029 &self.context.holder_signer
5033 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5035 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5036 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5037 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5038 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5039 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5040 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5042 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5044 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5052 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5053 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5057 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5059 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5060 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5063 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5064 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5065 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5066 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5069 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5070 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5071 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5072 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5073 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5074 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5077 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5078 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5079 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5080 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5081 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5082 if !release_monitor {
5083 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5092 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5093 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5096 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5097 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5098 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5100 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5101 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5103 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5104 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5106 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5107 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5108 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5111 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5112 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5113 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5114 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5115 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5116 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5118 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5119 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5120 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5122 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5123 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5124 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5125 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5126 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5127 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5133 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5134 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5135 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5136 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5139 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5140 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5141 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5144 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5145 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5146 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5149 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5150 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5151 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5152 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5153 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5156 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5157 self.context.channel_update_status
5160 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5161 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5162 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5165 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5167 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5168 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5169 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5173 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5174 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5175 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5178 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5182 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5183 // channel_ready yet.
5184 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5188 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5189 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5190 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5191 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5193 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5194 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5195 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5197 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5198 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5201 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5202 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5204 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5205 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5206 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5207 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5208 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5209 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5210 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5211 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5213 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5217 if need_commitment_update {
5218 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5219 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5220 let next_per_commitment_point =
5221 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5222 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5223 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5224 next_per_commitment_point,
5225 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5229 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5235 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5236 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5237 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5238 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5239 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5240 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5241 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5243 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5246 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5247 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5248 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5249 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5250 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5251 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5252 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5253 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5254 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5255 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5256 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5257 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5258 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5259 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5260 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5261 // channel and move on.
5262 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5263 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5265 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5266 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5267 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5269 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5270 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5271 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5272 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5273 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5274 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5275 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5276 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5281 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5282 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5283 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5284 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5285 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5288 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5289 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5290 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5291 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5292 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5293 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5296 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5297 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5298 // may have already happened for this block).
5299 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5300 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5301 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5302 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5305 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5306 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5307 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5308 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5316 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5317 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5318 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5319 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5321 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5322 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5325 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5327 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5328 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5329 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5330 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5332 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5335 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5338 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5339 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5340 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5341 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5343 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5346 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5347 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5348 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5350 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5351 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5354 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5355 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5363 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5365 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5366 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5367 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5369 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5370 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5373 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5374 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5375 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5376 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5377 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5378 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5379 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5380 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5383 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5384 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5385 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5386 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5388 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5389 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5390 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5392 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5393 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5394 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5395 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5397 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5398 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5399 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5400 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5401 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5402 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5403 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5406 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5407 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5409 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5412 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5413 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5414 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5415 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5416 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5417 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5418 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5419 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5420 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5421 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5422 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5423 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5424 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5425 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5426 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5427 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5428 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5434 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5439 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5440 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5442 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5443 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5444 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5445 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5447 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5450 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5452 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5453 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5454 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5455 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5456 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5457 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5459 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5460 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5463 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5464 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5465 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5466 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5467 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5468 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5470 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5471 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5474 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5475 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5476 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5477 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5478 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5484 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5485 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5486 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5487 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5489 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5492 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5496 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5500 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5501 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5505 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5509 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5510 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5513 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5517 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5519 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5524 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5525 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5526 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5528 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5533 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5535 None => return None,
5538 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5540 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5541 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5543 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5544 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5547 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5553 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5555 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5556 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5557 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5558 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5559 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5561 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5563 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5564 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5565 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5566 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5567 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5568 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5569 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5570 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5571 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5572 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5573 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5574 contents: announcement,
5577 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5582 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5586 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5587 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5588 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5589 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5590 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5591 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5592 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5593 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5595 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5597 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5599 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5600 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5602 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5604 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5605 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5608 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5609 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5610 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5611 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5614 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5617 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5618 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5619 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5620 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5621 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5622 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5625 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5627 Err(_) => return None,
5629 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5630 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5635 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5636 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5637 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5638 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5639 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5640 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5641 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5642 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5643 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5644 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5645 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5646 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5647 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5648 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5649 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5650 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5653 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5656 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5657 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5658 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5659 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5660 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5661 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5662 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5663 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5664 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5666 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5667 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5668 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5669 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5670 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5671 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5672 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5673 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5674 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5676 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5677 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5678 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5679 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5680 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5681 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5682 next_funding_txid: None,
5687 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5689 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5690 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5691 /// commitment update.
5693 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5694 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5695 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5696 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5697 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5698 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5699 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5702 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5703 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5704 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5706 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5707 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5712 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5713 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5715 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5717 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5718 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5720 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5721 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5722 /// regenerate them.
5724 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5725 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5727 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5728 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5729 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5730 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5731 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5732 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5733 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5734 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5736 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5737 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5738 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5742 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5743 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5744 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5747 if amount_msat == 0 {
5748 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5751 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5752 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5754 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5757 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5758 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5759 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5762 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5763 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5764 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5765 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5766 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5767 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5768 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5769 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5772 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5773 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5774 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5775 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5776 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5777 else { "to peer" });
5779 if need_holding_cell {
5780 force_holding_cell = true;
5783 // Now update local state:
5784 if force_holding_cell {
5785 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5790 onion_routing_packet,
5797 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5798 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5800 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5802 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5808 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5809 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5810 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5814 onion_routing_packet,
5818 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5823 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5824 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5825 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5826 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5828 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5829 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5830 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5832 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5833 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5837 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5838 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5839 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5840 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5841 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5842 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5843 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5846 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5847 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5848 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5849 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5850 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5851 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5854 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5856 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5857 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5858 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5859 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5860 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5862 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5863 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5866 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5867 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5868 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5870 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5871 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5872 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5873 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5874 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5875 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5876 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5879 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5883 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5884 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5885 where L::Target: Logger
5887 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5888 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5889 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5893 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5894 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5895 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5896 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5897 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5898 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5899 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5900 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5901 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5902 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5903 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5909 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5912 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5913 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5914 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5915 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5917 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5919 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5920 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5921 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5923 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5924 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5925 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5928 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5929 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5933 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
5934 &commitment_stats.tx,
5935 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
5936 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
5937 &self.context.secp_ctx,
5938 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5940 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5942 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5943 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5944 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5945 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5947 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5948 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5949 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5950 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5951 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5952 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5956 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5957 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5961 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5962 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5964 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5970 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5971 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5973 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5974 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5975 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5976 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5977 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5978 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5979 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5980 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5982 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5983 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
5984 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5987 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5988 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5989 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5995 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5997 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5998 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5999 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6000 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6001 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6003 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6005 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6011 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6012 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6013 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6014 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6015 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6017 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6018 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6022 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6025 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6028 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6031 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6032 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6036 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6039 // use override shutdown script if provided
6040 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6041 Some(script) => script,
6043 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6044 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6045 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6046 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6050 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6051 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6058 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6059 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6060 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6061 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6063 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6064 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6065 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6066 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6067 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6068 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6071 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6072 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6074 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6075 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6076 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6079 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6080 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6081 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6082 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6083 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6085 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6086 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6093 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6094 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6096 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6099 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6100 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6101 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6103 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6104 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6108 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6112 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6113 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6114 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6115 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6118 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6119 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6120 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6121 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6122 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6123 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6124 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6125 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6127 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6128 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6129 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6130 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6132 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6133 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6135 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6136 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6138 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6139 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6140 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6142 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6143 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6145 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6146 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6147 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6148 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6152 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6153 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6155 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6156 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6158 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6160 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6162 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6163 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6164 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6168 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6169 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6171 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6172 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6173 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6174 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6178 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6179 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6180 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6184 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6185 Ok(script) => script,
6186 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6189 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6192 context: ChannelContext {
6195 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6196 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6197 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6198 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6203 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6205 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6206 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6207 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6208 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6210 channel_value_satoshis,
6212 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6214 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6215 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6218 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6219 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6222 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6223 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6224 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6225 pending_update_fee: None,
6226 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6227 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6228 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6229 update_time_counter: 1,
6231 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6233 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6234 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6235 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6236 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6237 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6238 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6240 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6241 signer_pending_funding: false,
6243 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6244 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6245 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6246 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6248 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6249 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6250 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6251 closing_fee_limits: None,
6252 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6254 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6255 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6256 short_channel_id: None,
6257 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6259 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6260 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6261 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6262 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6263 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6264 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6265 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6266 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6267 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6268 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6269 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6270 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6272 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6274 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6275 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6276 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6277 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6278 counterparty_parameters: None,
6279 funding_outpoint: None,
6280 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6282 funding_transaction: None,
6283 is_batch_funding: None,
6285 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6286 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6287 counterparty_node_id,
6289 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6291 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6293 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6294 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6296 announcement_sigs: None,
6298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6299 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6301 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6303 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6304 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6306 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6307 outbound_scid_alias,
6309 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6310 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6312 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6313 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6318 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6320 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6324 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6325 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6326 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6327 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6328 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6329 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6330 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6331 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6332 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6334 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6339 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6340 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6341 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6344 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6345 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6346 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6347 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6350 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6352 next_local_nonce: None,
6356 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6357 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6358 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6359 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6360 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6361 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6362 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6363 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6364 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6365 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6366 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6369 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6370 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6372 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6374 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6375 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6376 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6377 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6380 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6381 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6383 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6385 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6386 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6388 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6389 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6390 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6391 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6392 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6393 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6396 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6397 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6399 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6400 if funding_created.is_none() {
6401 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6402 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6403 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6410 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6411 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6412 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6413 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6414 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6415 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6416 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6417 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6418 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6419 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6422 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6423 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6424 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6425 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6426 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6427 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6433 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6434 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6435 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6436 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6437 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6438 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6440 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6442 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6444 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6445 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6450 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6451 // We've exhausted our options
6454 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6455 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6458 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6459 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6460 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6461 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6463 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6464 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6465 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6466 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6467 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6468 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6470 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6472 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6473 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6476 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6477 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6478 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6480 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6481 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6484 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6485 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6488 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6489 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6493 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6494 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6495 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6496 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6497 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6498 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6499 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6500 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6501 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6502 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6503 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6504 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6505 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6506 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6507 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6508 first_per_commitment_point,
6509 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6510 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6511 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6512 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6514 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6519 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6520 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6522 // Check sanity of message fields:
6523 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6526 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6529 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6532 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6535 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6538 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6540 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6542 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6543 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6544 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6546 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6547 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6548 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6550 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6553 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6554 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6557 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6558 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6561 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6564 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6567 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6568 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6570 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6571 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6573 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6574 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6576 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6580 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6581 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6584 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6585 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6587 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6588 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6591 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6592 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6595 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6596 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6597 &Some(ref script) => {
6598 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6599 if script.len() == 0 {
6602 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6605 Some(script.clone())
6608 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6615 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6616 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6617 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6618 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6619 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6621 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6622 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6624 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6627 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6628 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6629 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6630 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6631 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6632 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6635 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6636 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6637 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6640 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6641 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6643 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6644 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6646 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6651 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6652 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6653 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6654 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6655 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6659 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6660 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6662 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6663 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6665 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6666 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6667 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6668 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6671 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6673 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6674 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6675 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6676 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6678 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6679 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6681 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6682 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6684 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6685 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6686 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6687 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6688 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6689 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6693 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6694 initial_commitment_tx,
6697 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6698 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6702 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6703 if validated.is_err() {
6704 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6707 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6708 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6709 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6710 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6711 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6712 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6713 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6714 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6715 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6716 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6717 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6718 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6720 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6721 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6722 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6723 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6724 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6725 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6726 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6727 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6729 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6730 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6731 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6733 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6735 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6736 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6738 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6740 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6742 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6743 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6744 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6747 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6750 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6751 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6752 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6753 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6758 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6759 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6760 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6761 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6764 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6765 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6766 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6767 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6768 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6769 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6770 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6771 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6772 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6773 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6774 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6777 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6778 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6780 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6781 // support this channel type.
6782 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6783 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6787 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6788 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6789 // `static_remote_key`.
6790 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6793 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6794 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6797 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6800 channel_type.clone()
6802 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6803 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6809 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6810 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6811 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6812 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6813 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6814 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6815 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6816 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6817 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6820 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6824 // Check sanity of message fields:
6825 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6828 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6831 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6834 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6835 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6838 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6841 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6844 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6846 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6847 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6850 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6853 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6857 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6858 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6861 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6864 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6867 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6870 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6873 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6874 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6876 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6880 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6882 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6883 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6888 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6889 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6890 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6891 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6894 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6897 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6898 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6899 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6901 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6902 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6905 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6906 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6907 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6908 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6912 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6913 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6914 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6918 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6919 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6920 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6921 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6925 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6926 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6927 &Some(ref script) => {
6928 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6929 if script.len() == 0 {
6932 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6933 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6935 Some(script.clone())
6938 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6945 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6946 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6947 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6948 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6952 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6953 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6958 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6959 Ok(script) => script,
6960 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6963 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6964 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6966 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6969 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6973 context: ChannelContext {
6976 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6977 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6979 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6984 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6986 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6987 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6988 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6989 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6991 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6994 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6996 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6997 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7000 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7001 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7002 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7004 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7005 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7006 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7007 pending_update_fee: None,
7008 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7009 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7010 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7011 update_time_counter: 1,
7013 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7015 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7016 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7017 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7022 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7023 signer_pending_funding: false,
7025 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7026 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7027 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7028 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7030 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7031 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7032 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7033 closing_fee_limits: None,
7034 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7036 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7037 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7038 short_channel_id: None,
7039 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7041 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7042 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7043 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7044 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7045 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7046 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7047 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7048 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7049 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7050 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7051 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7052 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7055 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7057 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7058 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7059 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7060 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7061 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7062 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7063 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7065 funding_outpoint: None,
7066 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7068 funding_transaction: None,
7069 is_batch_funding: None,
7071 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7072 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7073 counterparty_node_id,
7075 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7077 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7079 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7080 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7082 announcement_sigs: None,
7084 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7085 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7086 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7087 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7089 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7090 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7092 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7093 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7095 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7096 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7099 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7104 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7106 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7112 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7113 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7115 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7116 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7117 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7118 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7121 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7122 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7124 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7126 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7127 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7130 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7133 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7134 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7135 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7137 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7138 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7139 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7140 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7142 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7143 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7144 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7145 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7146 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7147 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7148 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7149 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7150 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7151 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7152 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7153 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7154 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7155 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7156 first_per_commitment_point,
7157 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7158 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7159 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7161 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7163 next_local_nonce: None,
7167 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7168 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7170 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7172 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7173 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7176 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7177 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7179 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7180 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7181 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7182 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7183 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7184 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7185 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7186 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7187 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7188 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7189 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7191 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7194 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7195 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7196 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7200 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7201 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7204 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7205 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7207 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7208 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7210 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7212 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7213 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7214 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7215 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7218 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7219 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7220 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7221 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7222 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7224 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7226 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7227 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7228 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7231 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7232 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7233 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7237 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7238 initial_commitment_tx,
7241 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7242 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7245 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7246 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7249 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7251 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7252 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7253 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7254 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7256 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7258 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7259 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7260 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7261 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7262 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7263 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7264 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7265 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7266 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7267 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7268 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7270 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7271 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7272 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7273 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7274 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7275 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7276 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7278 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7279 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7281 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7282 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7283 let mut channel = Channel {
7284 context: self.context,
7286 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7287 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7289 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7293 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7294 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7296 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7302 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7303 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7304 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7305 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7306 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7308 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7309 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7310 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7311 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7317 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7318 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7319 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7320 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7321 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7322 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7327 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7328 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7329 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7330 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7332 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7333 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7334 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7335 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7340 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7341 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7342 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7343 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7344 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7345 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7350 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7351 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7352 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7355 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7357 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7358 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7359 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7360 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7361 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7363 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7364 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7365 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7366 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7368 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7370 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7371 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7372 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7374 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7376 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7378 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7380 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7381 // deserialized from that format.
7382 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7383 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7384 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7386 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7388 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7389 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7390 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7392 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7393 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7394 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7395 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7398 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7399 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7400 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7403 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7404 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7405 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7406 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7408 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7409 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7411 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7413 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7415 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7417 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7420 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7422 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7427 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7428 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7429 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7431 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7432 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7433 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7434 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7435 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7436 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7437 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7439 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7441 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7443 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7446 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7447 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7448 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7451 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7453 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7454 preimages.push(preimage);
7456 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7457 reason.write(writer)?;
7459 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7461 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7462 preimages.push(preimage);
7464 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7465 reason.write(writer)?;
7468 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7469 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7472 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7473 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7474 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7475 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7476 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7477 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7479 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7480 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7481 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7484 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7485 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7486 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7487 source.write(writer)?;
7488 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7490 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7491 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7493 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7495 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7496 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7500 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7501 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7503 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7504 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7506 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7507 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7508 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7510 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7512 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7513 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7518 match self.context.resend_order {
7519 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7520 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7523 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7524 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7525 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7527 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7528 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7529 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7530 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7533 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7534 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7535 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7536 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7537 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7540 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7541 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7542 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7543 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7545 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7546 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7547 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7549 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7551 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7552 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7553 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7554 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7556 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7557 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7558 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7559 // consider the stale state on reload.
7562 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7563 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7564 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7566 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7567 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7568 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7570 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7571 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7573 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7574 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7575 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7577 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7578 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7580 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7583 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7584 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7585 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7587 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7590 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7591 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7593 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7594 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7595 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7597 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7599 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7601 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7604 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7606 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7607 htlc.write(writer)?;
7610 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7611 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7612 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7614 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7615 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7617 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7618 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7619 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7620 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7621 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7622 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7623 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7625 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7626 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7627 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7628 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7629 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7631 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7632 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7634 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7635 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7636 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7637 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7639 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7641 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7642 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7643 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7644 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7645 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7646 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7647 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7649 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7650 (2, chan_type, option),
7651 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7652 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7653 (5, self.context.config, required),
7654 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7655 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7656 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7657 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7658 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7659 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7660 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7661 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7662 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7663 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7664 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7665 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7666 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7667 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7668 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7669 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7670 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7671 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7672 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7673 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7674 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7675 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7682 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7683 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7685 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7686 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7688 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7689 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7690 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7692 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7693 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7694 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7695 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7697 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7699 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7700 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7701 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7702 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7703 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7705 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7706 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7709 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7710 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7711 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7713 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7715 let mut keys_data = None;
7717 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7718 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7719 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7720 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7721 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7722 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7723 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7724 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7725 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7726 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7730 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7731 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7732 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7735 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7737 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7738 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7739 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7741 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7743 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7744 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7745 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7746 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7747 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7748 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7749 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7750 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7751 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7752 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7753 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7754 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7755 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7760 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7762 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7763 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7764 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7765 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7766 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7767 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7768 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7769 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7770 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7771 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7773 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7774 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7777 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7778 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7781 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7782 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7786 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7787 blinding_point: None,
7791 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7792 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7793 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7794 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7795 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7796 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7797 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7798 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7799 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7800 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7801 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7802 blinding_point: None,
7804 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7805 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7806 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7808 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7809 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7810 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7812 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7816 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7817 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7818 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7819 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7822 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7823 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7828 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7829 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7832 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7833 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7834 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7835 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7838 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7840 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7842 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7843 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7844 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7848 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7849 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7850 // consider the stale state on reload.
7851 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7854 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7855 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7856 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7861 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7862 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7865 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7868 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7870 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7871 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7873 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7874 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7876 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7877 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7878 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7880 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7882 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7883 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7885 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7886 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7889 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7891 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7892 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7893 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7894 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7896 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7899 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7900 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7902 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7908 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7910 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7913 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7914 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7916 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7917 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7918 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7922 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7923 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7924 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7926 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7932 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7933 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7934 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7935 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7936 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7937 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7938 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7939 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7940 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7941 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7943 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7944 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7945 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7946 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7947 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7948 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7949 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7951 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7952 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7953 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7954 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7956 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7958 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7959 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7961 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7963 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7964 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7966 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
7968 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7969 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7970 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7971 (2, channel_type, option),
7972 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7973 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7974 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7975 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7976 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7977 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7978 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7979 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7980 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7981 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7982 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7983 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7984 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7985 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7986 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7987 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7988 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7989 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7990 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7991 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7992 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7993 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7994 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7995 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7996 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7999 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8000 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8001 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8002 // required channel parameters.
8003 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8004 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8006 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8008 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8009 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8010 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8011 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8014 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8015 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8016 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8018 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8019 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8021 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8022 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8027 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8028 if iter.next().is_some() {
8029 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8033 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8034 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8035 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8036 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8037 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8040 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8041 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8042 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8044 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8045 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8047 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8048 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8049 // separate u64 values.
8050 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8052 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8054 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8055 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8056 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8057 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8059 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8060 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8062 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8063 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8064 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8065 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8066 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8069 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8070 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8072 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8073 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8074 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8075 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8077 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8078 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8080 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8081 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8082 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8083 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8084 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8087 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8088 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8091 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8092 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8093 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8094 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8095 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8096 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8099 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8100 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8101 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8103 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8108 context: ChannelContext {
8111 config: config.unwrap(),
8115 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8116 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8117 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8120 temporary_channel_id,
8122 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8124 channel_value_satoshis,
8126 latest_monitor_update_id,
8128 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8129 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8132 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8133 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8136 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8137 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8138 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8139 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8143 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8144 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8145 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8146 monitor_pending_forwards,
8147 monitor_pending_failures,
8148 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8150 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8151 signer_pending_funding: false,
8154 holding_cell_update_fee,
8155 next_holder_htlc_id,
8156 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8157 update_time_counter,
8160 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8161 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8162 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8163 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8165 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8166 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8167 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8168 closing_fee_limits: None,
8169 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8171 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8172 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8174 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8176 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8177 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8178 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8179 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8180 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8181 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8182 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8183 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8184 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8187 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8189 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8190 funding_transaction,
8193 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8194 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8195 counterparty_node_id,
8197 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8201 channel_update_status,
8202 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8206 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8207 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8209 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8211 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8212 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8214 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8215 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8216 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8218 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8219 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8221 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8222 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8224 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8227 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8236 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8237 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8238 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8239 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8240 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8241 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8242 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8243 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8244 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8245 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8246 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8247 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8248 use crate::ln::msgs;
8249 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8250 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8251 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8252 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8253 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8254 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8255 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8256 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8257 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8258 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8259 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8260 use crate::util::test_utils;
8261 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8262 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8263 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8264 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8265 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8266 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8267 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8268 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8269 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8270 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8271 use crate::prelude::*;
8273 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8276 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8277 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8283 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8284 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8285 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8286 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8290 signer: InMemorySigner,
8293 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8294 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8297 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8298 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8300 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8302 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8303 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8306 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8310 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8312 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8313 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8314 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8315 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8316 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8319 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8321 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8322 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8326 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8327 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8328 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8332 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8333 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8334 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8335 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8338 let seed = [42; 32];
8339 let network = Network::Testnet;
8340 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8341 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8342 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8345 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8346 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8347 let config = UserConfig::default();
8348 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8349 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8350 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8352 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8353 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8357 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8358 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8360 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8361 let original_fee = 253;
8362 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8363 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8365 let seed = [42; 32];
8366 let network = Network::Testnet;
8367 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8369 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8370 let config = UserConfig::default();
8371 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8373 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8374 // same as the old fee.
8375 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8376 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8377 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8381 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8382 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8383 // dust limits are used.
8384 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8386 let seed = [42; 32];
8387 let network = Network::Testnet;
8388 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8389 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8390 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8392 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8393 // they have different dust limits.
8395 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8396 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8397 let config = UserConfig::default();
8398 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8400 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8401 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8402 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8403 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8404 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8406 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8407 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8408 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8409 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8410 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8412 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8413 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8414 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8415 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8417 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8418 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8419 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8421 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8422 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8423 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8425 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8426 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8427 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8429 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8430 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8431 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8432 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8435 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8437 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8438 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8439 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8440 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8441 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8442 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8443 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8444 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8445 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8447 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8448 blinding_point: None,
8451 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8452 // the dust limit check.
8453 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8454 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8455 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8456 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8458 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8459 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8460 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8461 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8462 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8463 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8464 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8468 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8469 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8470 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8471 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8472 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8473 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8475 let seed = [42; 32];
8476 let network = Network::Testnet;
8477 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8479 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8480 let config = UserConfig::default();
8481 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8483 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8484 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8486 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8487 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8488 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8489 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8490 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8491 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8493 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8494 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8495 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8496 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8497 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8499 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8501 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8502 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8503 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8504 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8505 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8507 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8508 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8509 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8510 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8511 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8515 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8516 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8517 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8518 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8519 let seed = [42; 32];
8520 let network = Network::Testnet;
8521 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8522 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8525 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8527 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8528 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8529 let config = UserConfig::default();
8530 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8532 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8533 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8534 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8535 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8537 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8538 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8539 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8541 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8542 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8543 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8544 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8546 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8547 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8548 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8550 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8551 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8552 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8554 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8555 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8556 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8557 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8558 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8559 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8560 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8562 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8564 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8565 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8566 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8567 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8568 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8572 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8573 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8574 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8575 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8576 let seed = [42; 32];
8577 let network = Network::Testnet;
8578 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8579 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8580 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8582 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8583 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8584 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8585 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8586 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8587 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8588 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8589 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8591 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8592 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8593 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8594 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8595 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8596 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8598 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8599 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8600 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8601 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8603 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8605 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8606 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8607 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8608 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8609 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8610 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8612 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8613 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8614 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8615 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8617 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8618 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8619 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8620 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8621 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8623 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8624 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8626 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8627 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8628 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8630 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8631 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8632 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8633 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8634 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8636 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8637 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8639 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8640 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8641 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8645 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8647 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8648 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8649 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8651 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8652 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8653 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8654 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8656 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8657 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8658 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8660 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8662 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8663 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8666 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8667 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8668 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8670 let seed = [42; 32];
8671 let network = Network::Testnet;
8672 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8673 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8674 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8677 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8678 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8679 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8681 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8682 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8684 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8685 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8686 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8688 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8689 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8691 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8693 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8694 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8696 // Channel Negotiations failed
8697 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8698 assert!(result.is_err());
8703 fn channel_update() {
8704 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8705 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8706 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8707 let seed = [42; 32];
8708 let network = Network::Testnet;
8709 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8710 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8711 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8713 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8714 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8715 let config = UserConfig::default();
8716 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8718 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8719 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8720 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8721 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8722 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8724 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8725 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8726 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8727 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8728 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8730 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8731 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8732 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8733 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8735 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8736 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8737 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8739 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8740 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8741 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8743 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8744 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8745 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8747 short_channel_id: 0,
8750 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8751 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8752 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8754 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8755 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8757 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8759 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8761 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8762 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8763 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8764 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8766 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8767 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8768 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8770 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8773 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8777 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_ser() {
8778 // Ensure that channel blinding points and skimmed fees are (de)serialized properly.
8779 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8780 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8781 let seed = [42; 32];
8782 let network = Network::Testnet;
8783 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8785 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8786 let config = UserConfig::default();
8787 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8788 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8789 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8791 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8793 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8794 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8795 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8796 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8800 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8801 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8802 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8804 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8807 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8809 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8810 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8811 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8812 blinding_point: None,
8814 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8815 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8817 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8820 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8823 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8825 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8828 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8829 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8830 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8832 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8833 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8836 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8837 blinding_point: None,
8839 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8840 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8843 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8846 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8847 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8848 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8850 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8851 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8852 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8853 } = &mut dummy_add {
8854 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8855 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8857 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8860 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8862 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8863 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8864 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8865 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8866 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8867 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8868 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8869 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8872 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8874 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8875 use bitcoin::sighash;
8876 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8877 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8878 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8879 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8880 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8881 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8882 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8883 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8884 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8885 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8886 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8887 use crate::sync::Arc;
8888 use core::str::FromStr;
8889 use hex::DisplayHex;
8891 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8892 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8893 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8896 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8898 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8899 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8900 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8901 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8902 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8904 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8905 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8911 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8912 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8913 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8915 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8916 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8917 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8918 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8919 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8920 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8922 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8924 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8925 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8926 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8927 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8928 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8929 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8931 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8932 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8933 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8934 selected_contest_delay: 144
8936 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8937 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8939 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8940 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8942 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8943 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8945 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8946 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8948 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8949 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8950 // build_commitment_transaction.
8951 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8952 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8953 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8954 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8955 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8957 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8958 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8959 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8960 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8964 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8965 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8966 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8967 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8971 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8972 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8973 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8975 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8976 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8978 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8979 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8981 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8983 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8984 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8985 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8986 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8987 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8988 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8989 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8991 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8992 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8993 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8994 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8996 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8997 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8998 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9000 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9002 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9003 commitment_tx.clone(),
9004 counterparty_signature,
9005 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9006 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9007 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9009 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9010 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9012 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9013 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9014 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9016 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9017 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9020 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9021 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9023 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9024 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9025 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9026 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9027 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9028 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9029 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9030 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9032 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9035 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9036 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9037 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9041 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9044 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9045 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9046 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9047 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9048 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9049 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9051 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9052 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9053 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9054 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9056 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9057 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9058 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9059 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9060 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9062 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9063 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9064 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9065 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9066 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9067 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9069 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9073 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9074 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9075 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9076 "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", {});
9078 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9079 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9081 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9082 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9083 "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", {});
9085 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9086 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9087 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9088 "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", {});
9090 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9091 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9093 amount_msat: 1000000,
9095 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9096 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9098 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9101 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9102 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9104 amount_msat: 2000000,
9106 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9107 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9109 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9112 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9113 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9115 amount_msat: 2000000,
9117 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9118 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9119 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9120 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9121 blinding_point: None,
9123 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9126 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9127 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9129 amount_msat: 3000000,
9131 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9132 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9133 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9134 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9135 blinding_point: None,
9137 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9140 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9141 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9143 amount_msat: 4000000,
9145 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9146 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9148 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9152 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9153 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9154 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9156 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9157 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9158 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9161 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9162 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9163 "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" },
9166 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9167 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9168 "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" },
9171 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9172 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9173 "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" },
9176 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9177 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9178 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9181 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9182 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9183 "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" }
9186 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9187 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9188 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9190 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9191 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9192 "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", {
9195 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9196 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9197 "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" },
9200 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9201 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9202 "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" },
9205 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9206 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9207 "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" },
9210 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9211 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9212 "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" },
9215 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9216 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9217 "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" }
9220 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9221 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9222 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9224 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9225 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9226 "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", {
9229 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9230 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9231 "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" },
9234 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9235 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9236 "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" },
9239 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9240 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9241 "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" },
9244 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9245 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9246 "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" }
9249 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9250 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9251 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9252 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9254 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9255 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9256 "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", {
9259 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9260 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9261 "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" },
9264 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9265 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9266 "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" },
9269 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9270 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9271 "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" },
9274 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9275 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9276 "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" }
9279 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9281 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9282 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9284 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9285 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9286 "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", {
9289 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9290 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9291 "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" },
9294 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9295 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9296 "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" },
9299 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9300 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9301 "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" },
9304 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9305 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9306 "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" }
9309 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9310 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9311 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9313 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9314 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9315 "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", {
9318 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9319 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9320 "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" },
9323 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9324 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9325 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9328 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9329 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9330 "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" }
9333 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9334 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9335 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9337 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9338 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9339 "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", {
9342 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9343 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9344 "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" },
9347 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9348 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9349 "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" },
9352 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9353 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9354 "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" }
9357 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9358 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9359 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9361 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9362 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9363 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9366 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9367 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9368 "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" },
9371 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9372 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9373 "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" }
9376 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9377 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9378 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9379 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9380 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9381 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9383 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9384 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9385 "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", {
9388 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9389 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9390 "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" },
9393 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9394 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9395 "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" }
9398 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9402 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9404 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9405 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9406 "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", {
9409 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9410 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9411 "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" },
9414 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9415 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9416 "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" }
9419 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9423 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9424 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9425 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9428 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9429 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9430 "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" }
9433 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9434 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9435 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9436 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9437 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9439 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9440 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9441 "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", {
9444 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9445 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9446 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9449 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9452 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9453 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9455 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9456 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9457 "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", {
9460 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9461 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9462 "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" }
9465 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9466 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9467 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9468 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9470 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9471 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9472 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9474 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9477 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9478 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9480 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9481 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9482 "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", {});
9484 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9487 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9488 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9490 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9491 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9492 "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", {});
9494 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9495 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9496 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9498 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9499 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9500 "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", {});
9502 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9503 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9504 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9505 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9506 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9508 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9509 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9510 "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", {});
9512 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9515 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9516 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9518 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9519 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9520 "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", {});
9522 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9525 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9526 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9527 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9529 amount_msat: 2000000,
9531 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9532 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9534 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9537 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9538 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9539 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9541 amount_msat: 5000001,
9543 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9544 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9545 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9546 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9547 blinding_point: None,
9549 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9552 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9553 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9555 amount_msat: 5000000,
9557 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9558 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9559 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9560 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9561 blinding_point: None,
9563 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9567 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9568 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9569 "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", {
9572 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9573 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9574 "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" },
9576 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9577 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9578 "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" },
9580 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9581 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9582 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9585 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9586 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9587 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9588 "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", {
9591 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9592 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9593 "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" },
9595 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9596 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9597 "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" },
9599 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9600 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9601 "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" }
9606 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9607 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9609 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9610 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9611 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9612 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9614 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9615 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9616 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9618 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9619 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9621 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9622 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9624 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9625 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9626 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9630 fn test_key_derivation() {
9631 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9634 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9635 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9637 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9638 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9640 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9641 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9643 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9644 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9646 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9647 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9649 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9650 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9654 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9655 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9656 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9657 let seed = [42; 32];
9658 let network = Network::Testnet;
9659 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9660 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9662 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9663 let config = UserConfig::default();
9664 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9665 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9667 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9668 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9670 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9671 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9672 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9673 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9674 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9675 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9676 assert!(res.is_ok());
9680 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9681 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9682 // resulting `channel_type`.
9683 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9684 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9685 let network = Network::Testnet;
9686 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9687 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9689 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9690 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9692 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9693 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9695 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9696 // need to signal it.
9697 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9698 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9699 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9700 &config, 0, 42, None
9702 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9704 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9705 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9706 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9708 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9709 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9710 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9714 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9715 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9716 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9717 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9718 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9721 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9722 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9726 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9727 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9728 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9729 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9730 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9731 let network = Network::Testnet;
9732 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9733 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9735 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9736 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9738 let config = UserConfig::default();
9740 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9741 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9742 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9743 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9744 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9746 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9747 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9748 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9752 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9753 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9754 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9756 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9757 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9758 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9759 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9760 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9761 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9763 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9767 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9768 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9770 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9771 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9772 let network = Network::Testnet;
9773 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9774 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9776 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9777 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9779 let config = UserConfig::default();
9781 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9782 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9783 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9784 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9785 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9786 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9787 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9788 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9790 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9791 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9792 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9793 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9794 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9795 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9799 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9800 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9802 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9804 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9805 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9807 assert!(res.is_err());
9809 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9810 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9811 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9813 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9814 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9815 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9818 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9820 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9821 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9822 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9823 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9826 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9827 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9829 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9830 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9832 assert!(res.is_err());
9836 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9837 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9838 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9840 let seed = [42; 32];
9841 let network = Network::Testnet;
9842 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9843 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9844 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9846 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9847 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9848 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9849 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9851 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9852 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9853 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9858 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9868 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9869 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9870 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9875 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9876 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9882 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9885 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9886 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9887 &accept_channel_msg,
9888 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9889 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9892 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9893 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9894 let tx = Transaction {
9896 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9900 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9903 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9906 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9907 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9908 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
9909 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9910 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9911 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9915 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9916 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9924 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9925 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9926 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9927 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
9929 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9930 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9937 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9938 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9939 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9940 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9941 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9943 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9944 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9945 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9953 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9954 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
9957 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9958 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9959 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
9960 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());