1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 enum OutboundHTLCState {
170 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
171 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
172 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
173 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
174 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
175 /// money back (though we won't), and,
176 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
177 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
178 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
179 /// we'll never get out of sync).
180 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
181 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
182 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
184 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
185 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
186 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
191 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
194 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
195 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
196 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
197 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
198 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
202 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
204 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
205 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
208 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
211 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
212 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
217 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
218 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
220 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
221 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
226 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
231 state: OutboundHTLCState,
233 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
234 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
237 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
238 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
239 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
243 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
246 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
247 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
248 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
251 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
256 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
260 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
261 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
262 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
263 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
264 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
265 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
266 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
268 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
269 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
270 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
271 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
272 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
273 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
274 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
276 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
277 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
278 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
280 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
281 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
282 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
283 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
284 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
285 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
287 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
288 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
290 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
291 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
292 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
293 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
294 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
295 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
296 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
297 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
298 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
300 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
301 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
302 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
303 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
304 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
305 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
306 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
307 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
308 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
309 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
310 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
311 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
312 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
313 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
314 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
315 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
317 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
318 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
319 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
320 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
321 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
322 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
323 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
324 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
326 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
327 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
328 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
329 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
331 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
333 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
335 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
337 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
338 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
342 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
344 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
346 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
348 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
349 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
350 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
351 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
352 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
354 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
355 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
357 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
359 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
360 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
362 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
363 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
364 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
365 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
366 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
367 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
369 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
370 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
372 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
373 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
374 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
375 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
376 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
378 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
379 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
381 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
382 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
384 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
385 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
386 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
387 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
393 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
394 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
396 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
397 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
398 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
403 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
404 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
406 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
408 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
413 macro_rules! secp_check {
414 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
417 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
422 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
423 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
424 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
425 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
426 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
427 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
428 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
429 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
431 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
433 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
435 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
439 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
441 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
442 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
443 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
445 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
449 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
450 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
451 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
452 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
454 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
455 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
459 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
465 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
468 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
469 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
470 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
471 holding_cell_msat: u64,
472 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
475 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
476 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
477 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
478 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
479 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
480 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
481 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
482 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
483 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
484 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
487 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
488 struct HTLCCandidate {
490 origin: HTLCInitiator,
494 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
502 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
504 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
506 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
507 htlc_value_msat: u64,
508 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
513 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
514 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
515 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
516 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
517 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
519 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
520 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
521 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
522 htlc_value_msat: u64,
524 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
525 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
529 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
530 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
531 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
532 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
533 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
534 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
535 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
536 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
537 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
542 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
544 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
545 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
546 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
547 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
548 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
551 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
552 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
553 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
554 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
555 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
556 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
558 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
561 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
563 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
564 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
565 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
566 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
567 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
568 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
569 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
570 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
573 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
574 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
575 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
576 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
577 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
578 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
579 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
580 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
581 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
582 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
583 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
584 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
585 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
586 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
587 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
589 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
590 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
591 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
592 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
594 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
595 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
596 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
597 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
599 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
600 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
601 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
602 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
603 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
605 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
606 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
607 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
608 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
610 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
611 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
612 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
614 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
615 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
616 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
617 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
618 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
620 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
621 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
624 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
625 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
627 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
628 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
629 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
630 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
632 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
633 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
635 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
636 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
639 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
640 (0, update, required),
643 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
644 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
645 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
646 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
647 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
651 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
652 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
653 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
655 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
657 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
658 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
659 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
663 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
665 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
667 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
672 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
673 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
674 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
675 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
676 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
678 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
679 /// in a timely manner.
680 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
683 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
684 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
685 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
687 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
688 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
689 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
690 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
694 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
695 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
696 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
698 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
699 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
700 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
701 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
703 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
707 /// The current channel ID.
708 channel_id: ChannelId,
709 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
710 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
711 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
714 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
715 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
717 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
718 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
719 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
721 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
722 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
723 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
724 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
726 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
727 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
729 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
731 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
732 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
733 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
735 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
736 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
737 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
739 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
740 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
741 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
742 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
743 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
744 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
746 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
747 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
748 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
749 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
750 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
751 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
753 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
755 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
756 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
757 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
759 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
760 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
761 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
762 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
763 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
764 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
765 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
767 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
768 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
769 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
771 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
772 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
773 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
774 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
775 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
776 /// outbound or inbound.
777 signer_pending_funding: bool,
779 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
781 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
782 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
783 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
784 // HTLCs with similar state.
785 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
786 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
787 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
788 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
789 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
790 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
791 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
792 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
793 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
796 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
797 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
798 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
800 update_time_counter: u32,
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
803 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
804 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
805 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
806 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
807 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
809 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
810 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
812 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
813 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
814 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
815 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
817 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
818 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
820 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
822 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
824 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
825 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
826 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
827 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
828 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
830 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
831 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
833 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
834 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
835 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
837 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
838 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
839 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
840 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
841 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
842 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
843 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
844 channel_creation_height: u32,
846 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
849 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
851 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
854 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
859 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
861 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
863 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
864 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
867 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
869 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
871 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
872 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
874 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
876 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
877 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
878 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
880 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
882 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
883 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
884 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
886 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
887 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
888 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
890 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
892 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
894 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
895 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
896 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
897 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
899 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
900 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
901 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
903 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
904 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
905 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
907 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
908 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
909 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
910 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
911 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
912 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
913 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
914 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
916 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
917 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
918 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
919 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
920 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
922 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
923 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
925 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
926 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
927 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
928 /// unblock the state machine.
930 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
931 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
932 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
934 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
935 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
936 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
939 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
940 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
941 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
942 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
943 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
944 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
945 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
947 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
948 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
950 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
951 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
952 // the channel's funding UTXO.
954 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
955 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
956 // associated channel mapping.
958 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
959 // to store all of them.
960 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
962 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
963 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
964 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
965 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
966 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
968 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
969 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
971 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
972 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
974 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
975 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
976 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
978 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
979 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
980 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
983 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
984 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
985 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
986 self.update_time_counter
989 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
990 self.latest_monitor_update_id
993 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
994 self.config.announced_channel
997 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
998 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1001 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1002 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1003 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1004 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1007 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1008 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1009 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1012 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1014 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1015 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1016 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1019 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1020 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1022 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1024 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1025 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1027 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1030 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1031 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1033 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1036 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1037 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1038 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1039 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1040 self.channel_state &
1041 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1042 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1043 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1044 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1047 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1048 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1051 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1054 // Public utilities:
1056 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1060 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1062 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1063 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1064 self.temporary_channel_id
1067 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1071 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1072 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1073 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1077 /// Gets the channel's type
1078 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1082 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1084 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1085 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.short_channel_id
1089 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1090 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1091 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1094 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1095 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1096 self.outbound_scid_alias
1099 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1101 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1102 return &self.holder_signer
1105 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1106 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1107 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1108 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1109 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1110 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1113 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1114 /// get_funding_created.
1115 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1116 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1119 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1120 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1121 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1122 if conf_height > 0 {
1129 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1130 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1131 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1134 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1135 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1136 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1137 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1141 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1144 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1145 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1148 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1149 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1152 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1153 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1154 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1157 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1158 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1162 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1163 self.counterparty_node_id
1166 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1167 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1168 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1171 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1172 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1173 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1176 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1177 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1179 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1180 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1181 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1182 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1184 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1188 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1189 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1190 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1193 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1194 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1195 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1198 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1199 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1200 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1202 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1203 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1208 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1209 self.channel_value_satoshis
1212 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1213 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1216 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1217 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1220 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1221 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1222 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1224 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1225 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1226 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1227 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1228 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1230 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1234 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1235 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1236 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1239 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1240 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1241 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1244 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1245 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1246 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1249 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1250 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1251 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1254 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1255 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1256 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1259 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1260 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1261 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1264 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1265 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1266 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1267 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1268 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1271 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1273 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1274 self.prev_config = None;
1278 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1279 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1283 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1284 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1285 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1286 let did_channel_update =
1287 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1288 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1289 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1290 if did_channel_update {
1291 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1292 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1293 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1294 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1296 self.config.options = *config;
1300 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1301 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1302 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1303 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1304 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1307 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1308 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1309 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1310 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1311 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1313 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1314 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1315 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1316 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1317 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1318 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1319 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1321 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1322 where L::Target: Logger
1324 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1325 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1326 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1328 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1329 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1330 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1331 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1333 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1334 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1335 if match update_state {
1336 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1337 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1338 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1339 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1340 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1342 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1346 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1347 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1348 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1350 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1352 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1353 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1354 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1356 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1357 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1358 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1359 transaction_output_index: None
1364 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1365 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1366 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1367 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1368 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1371 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1373 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1374 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1375 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1377 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1378 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1381 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1382 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1385 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1387 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1388 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1389 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1391 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1392 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1398 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1399 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1400 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1401 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1402 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1403 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1404 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1408 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1409 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1411 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1413 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1414 if generated_by_local {
1415 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1416 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1425 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1427 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1428 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1429 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1430 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1431 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1432 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1433 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1436 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1437 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1438 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1439 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1443 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1444 preimages.push(preimage);
1448 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1449 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1451 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1453 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1454 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1456 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1457 if !generated_by_local {
1458 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1466 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1467 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1468 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1469 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1470 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1471 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1472 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1473 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1475 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1477 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1478 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1479 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1480 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1482 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1484 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1485 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1486 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1487 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1490 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1491 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1492 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1493 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1495 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1498 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1499 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1500 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1501 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1503 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1506 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1507 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1512 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1513 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1518 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1520 let channel_parameters =
1521 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1522 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1523 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1530 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1533 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1534 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1535 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1536 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1538 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1539 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1540 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1548 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1549 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1555 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1556 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1557 /// our counterparty!)
1558 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1559 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1560 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1561 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1562 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1563 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1564 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1566 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1570 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1571 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1572 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1573 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1574 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1575 //may see payments to it!
1576 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1577 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1578 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1580 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1583 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1584 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1585 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1586 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1587 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1590 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1591 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1594 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1598 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1599 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1600 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1601 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1602 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1603 // which are near the dust limit.
1604 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1605 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1606 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1607 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1608 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1610 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1611 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1613 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1616 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1617 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1618 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1621 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1622 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1624 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1625 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1626 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1627 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1628 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1629 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1630 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1633 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1637 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1638 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1640 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1641 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1642 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1643 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1644 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1645 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1647 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1648 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1654 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1655 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1657 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1658 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1659 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1660 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1661 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1662 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1663 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1666 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1669 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1670 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1671 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1673 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1674 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1675 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1676 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1677 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1678 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1680 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1681 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1685 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1686 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1687 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1688 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1689 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1690 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1691 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1693 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1694 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1696 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1703 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1704 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1705 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1706 /// corner case properly.
1707 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1708 -> AvailableBalances
1709 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1711 let context = &self;
1712 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1713 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1714 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1716 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1717 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1718 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1719 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1722 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1724 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1725 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1727 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1729 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1731 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1732 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1736 if context.is_outbound() {
1737 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1738 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1740 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1741 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1743 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1744 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1745 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1746 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1749 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1750 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1751 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1752 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1753 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1754 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1755 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1758 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1759 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1760 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1761 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1762 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1763 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1764 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1765 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1766 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1767 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1768 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1770 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1773 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1774 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1775 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1776 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1777 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1780 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1781 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1783 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1784 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1785 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1787 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1788 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1789 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1790 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1794 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1796 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1797 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1798 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1799 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1800 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1801 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1802 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1804 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1805 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1807 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1808 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1809 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1811 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1812 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1813 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1814 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1815 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1818 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1819 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1820 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1821 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1822 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1823 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1826 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1827 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1828 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1830 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1834 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1835 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1837 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1838 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1842 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1843 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1844 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1845 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1847 outbound_capacity_msat,
1848 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1849 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1854 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1855 let context = &self;
1856 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1859 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1860 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1862 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1863 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1865 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1866 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1868 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1869 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1870 let context = &self;
1871 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1873 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1876 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1877 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1879 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1880 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1882 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1883 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1885 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1886 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1890 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1891 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1897 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1898 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1899 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1902 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1903 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1904 included_htlcs += 1;
1907 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1912 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1913 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1914 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1915 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1916 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1917 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1922 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1925 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1930 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1931 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1935 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1936 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1937 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1940 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1941 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1943 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1944 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1945 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1947 total_pending_htlcs,
1948 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1949 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1950 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1952 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1953 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1954 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1956 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1958 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1963 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1964 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1966 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1967 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1969 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1970 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1972 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1973 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1974 let context = &self;
1975 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1977 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1980 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1981 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1983 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1984 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1986 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1987 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1989 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1990 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1994 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1995 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2001 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2002 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2003 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2004 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2005 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2006 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2009 included_htlcs += 1;
2012 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2013 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2016 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2017 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2019 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2020 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2021 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2026 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2027 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2028 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2031 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2032 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2034 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2035 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2037 total_pending_htlcs,
2038 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2039 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2040 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2042 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2043 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2044 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2046 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2048 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2053 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2054 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2055 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2056 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2063 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2065 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2066 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2069 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2071 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2072 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2073 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2077 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2078 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2079 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2082 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2084 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2085 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2088 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2089 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2090 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2091 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2092 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2093 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2094 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2095 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2096 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2097 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2098 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2100 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2101 // return them to fail the payment.
2102 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2103 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2104 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2106 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2107 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2112 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2113 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2114 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2115 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2116 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2117 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2118 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2119 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2120 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2121 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2122 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2123 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2124 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2128 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2130 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2131 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2134 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2135 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2139 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2140 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2141 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2142 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2143 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2144 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2145 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2146 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2147 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2149 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2154 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2155 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2156 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2159 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2160 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2161 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2162 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2165 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2167 next_local_nonce: None,
2171 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2172 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2173 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2174 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2176 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2177 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2178 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2179 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2181 match &self.holder_signer {
2182 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2183 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2184 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2185 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2186 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2189 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2193 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2194 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2195 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2196 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2197 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2198 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2201 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2202 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2204 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2211 // Internal utility functions for channels
2213 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2214 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2215 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2217 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2219 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2220 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2221 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2223 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2226 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2228 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2231 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2232 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2233 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2235 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2237 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2238 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2239 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2240 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2241 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2244 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2245 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2246 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2247 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2248 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2249 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2250 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2253 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2254 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2256 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2257 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2260 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2261 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2262 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2263 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2264 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2265 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2268 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2269 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2270 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2271 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2274 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2275 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2277 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2278 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2279 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2283 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2284 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2285 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2287 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2288 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2289 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2290 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2292 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2293 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2295 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2297 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2298 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2299 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2300 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2302 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2303 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2313 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2314 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2315 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2316 // outside of those situations will fail.
2317 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2321 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2326 1 + // script length (0)
2330 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2331 2 + // witness marker and flag
2332 1 + // witness element count
2333 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2334 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2335 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2336 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2337 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2338 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2340 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2341 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2342 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2348 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2349 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2350 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2351 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2353 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2354 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2355 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2357 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2358 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2359 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2360 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2361 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2362 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2365 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2366 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2369 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2370 value_to_holder = 0;
2373 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2374 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2375 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2376 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2378 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2379 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2382 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2383 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2386 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2389 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2390 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2392 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2394 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2395 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2396 where L::Target: Logger {
2397 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2398 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2399 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2400 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2401 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2402 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2403 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2404 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2408 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2409 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2410 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2411 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2413 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2414 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2416 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2418 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2419 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2420 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2422 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2423 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2424 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2425 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2426 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2427 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2428 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2430 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2431 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2432 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2434 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2435 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2437 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2440 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2441 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2445 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2449 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2450 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2451 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2452 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2453 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2454 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2457 // Now update local state:
2459 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2460 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2461 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2462 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2463 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2464 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2465 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2469 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2470 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2471 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2472 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2473 // do not not get into this branch.
2474 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2475 match pending_update {
2476 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2477 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2478 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2479 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2481 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2482 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2485 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2486 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2487 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2488 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2489 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2490 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2491 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2497 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2498 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2499 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2502 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2503 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2505 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2506 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2509 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2510 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2512 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2513 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2515 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2516 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2519 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2522 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2523 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2524 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2525 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2530 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2531 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2532 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2533 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2534 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2535 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2536 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2537 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2538 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2539 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2540 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2541 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2542 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2543 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2544 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2546 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2547 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2548 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2549 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2550 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2553 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2554 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2555 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2561 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2562 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2564 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2568 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2569 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2570 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2571 /// before we fail backwards.
2573 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2574 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2575 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2576 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2577 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2578 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2579 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2582 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2583 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2584 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2585 /// before we fail backwards.
2587 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2588 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2589 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2590 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2591 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2592 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2593 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2595 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2597 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2598 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2599 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2601 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2602 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2603 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2605 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2606 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2607 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2609 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2614 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2615 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2621 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2622 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2623 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2624 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2625 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2629 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2630 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2631 force_holding_cell = true;
2634 // Now update local state:
2635 if force_holding_cell {
2636 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2637 match pending_update {
2638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2639 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2640 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2641 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2645 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2646 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2647 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2648 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2654 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2655 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2656 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2662 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2664 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2665 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2668 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2669 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2670 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2675 // Message handlers:
2677 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2678 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2679 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2680 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2681 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2685 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2688 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2691 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2692 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2693 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2694 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2697 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2699 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2700 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2701 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2702 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2704 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2705 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2707 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2708 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2710 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2711 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2712 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2713 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2714 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2719 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2720 initial_commitment_tx,
2723 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2724 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2727 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2728 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2731 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2732 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2733 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2734 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2735 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2736 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2737 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2738 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2739 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2740 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2741 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2742 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2744 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2746 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2747 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2748 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2749 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2750 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2751 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2752 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2754 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2755 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2756 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2758 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2760 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2761 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2763 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2765 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2766 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2770 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2771 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2772 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2773 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2774 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2775 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2776 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2779 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2780 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2782 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2783 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2784 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2785 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2790 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2791 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2792 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2795 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2796 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2797 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2798 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2799 // when routing outbound payments.
2800 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2804 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2806 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2807 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2809 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2810 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2812 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2813 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2814 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2815 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2816 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2817 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2818 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2819 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2820 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2822 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2823 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2824 let expected_point =
2825 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2826 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2828 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2829 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2830 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2831 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2832 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2833 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2835 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2836 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2837 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2838 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2839 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2841 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2849 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2850 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2852 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2854 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2857 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2858 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2859 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2860 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2861 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2862 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2864 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2865 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2866 if local_sent_shutdown {
2867 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2869 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2870 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2871 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2874 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2877 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2880 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2883 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2887 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2888 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2889 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2892 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2896 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2897 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2898 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2899 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2900 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2901 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2902 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2903 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2904 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2905 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2906 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2908 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2909 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2910 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2911 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2912 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2913 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2917 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2918 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2921 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2922 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2923 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2925 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2926 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2927 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2928 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2929 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2930 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2931 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2935 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2936 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2937 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2938 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2939 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2940 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2941 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2945 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2946 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2947 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2948 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2949 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2953 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2954 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2956 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2957 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2958 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2960 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2961 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2965 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2968 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2973 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2974 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2978 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2979 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2980 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2981 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2982 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2983 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2984 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2985 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2986 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2988 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2989 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2990 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2991 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2992 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2995 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2996 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2997 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2998 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3002 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3005 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3009 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3010 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3011 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3015 // Now update local state:
3016 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3017 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3018 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3019 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3020 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3021 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3022 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3027 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3029 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3030 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3031 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3032 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3033 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3034 None => fail_reason.into(),
3035 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3036 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3037 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3040 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3044 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3046 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3047 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3049 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3055 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3058 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3059 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3062 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3066 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3069 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3070 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3073 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3077 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3081 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3082 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3085 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3089 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3093 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3094 where L::Target: Logger
3096 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3099 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3102 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3106 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3108 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3110 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3111 let commitment_txid = {
3112 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3113 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3114 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3116 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3117 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3118 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3119 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3120 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3125 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3127 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3128 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3129 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3130 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3133 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3134 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3135 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3139 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3141 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3142 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3143 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3144 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3145 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3146 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3147 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3148 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3149 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3150 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3151 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3157 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3161 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3162 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3163 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3164 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3165 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3166 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3167 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3168 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3169 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3170 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3171 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3172 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3173 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3176 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3177 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3178 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3179 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3180 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3181 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3182 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3184 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3185 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3186 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3187 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3188 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3189 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3190 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3193 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3194 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3197 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3199 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3200 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3201 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3204 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3207 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3208 commitment_stats.tx,
3210 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3211 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3212 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3215 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3216 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3218 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3219 let mut need_commitment = false;
3220 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3221 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3222 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3223 need_commitment = true;
3227 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3228 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3229 Some(forward_info.clone())
3231 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3232 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3233 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3234 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3235 need_commitment = true;
3238 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3239 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3240 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3241 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3242 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3243 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3244 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3245 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3246 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3247 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3248 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3249 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3250 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3251 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3253 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3255 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3256 need_commitment = true;
3260 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3261 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3262 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3263 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3264 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3265 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3267 nondust_htlc_sources,
3271 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3272 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3273 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3274 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3275 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3277 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3278 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3279 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3280 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3281 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3282 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3283 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3284 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3285 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3286 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3287 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3288 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3289 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3290 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3292 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3293 &self.context.channel_id);
3294 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3297 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3298 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3299 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3300 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3301 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3302 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3303 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3304 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3305 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3309 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3310 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3311 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3312 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3315 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3316 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3317 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3318 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3319 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3320 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3321 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3323 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3324 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3325 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3326 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3329 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3330 /// for our counterparty.
3331 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3332 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3333 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3334 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3336 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3337 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3338 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3339 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3341 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3342 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3343 updates: Vec::new(),
3346 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3347 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3348 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3349 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3350 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3351 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3352 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3353 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3354 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3355 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3356 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3357 // to rebalance channels.
3358 match &htlc_update {
3359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3360 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3361 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3363 match self.send_htlc(
3364 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3365 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3367 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3370 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3371 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3372 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3373 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3374 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3375 // into the holding cell without ever being
3376 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3377 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3378 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3381 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3387 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3388 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3389 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3390 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3391 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3392 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3393 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3394 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3395 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3396 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3397 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3398 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3400 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3401 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3402 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3403 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3404 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3405 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3406 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3407 // for a full revocation before failing.
3408 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3409 update_fail_count += 1;
3412 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3414 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3421 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3422 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3424 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3425 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3430 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3431 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3432 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3433 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3434 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3436 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3437 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3438 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3440 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3441 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3447 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3448 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3449 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3450 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3451 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3452 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3453 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3454 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3455 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3457 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3460 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3463 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3467 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3469 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3470 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3475 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3476 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3477 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3478 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3479 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3480 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3481 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3482 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3488 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3489 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3492 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3493 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3494 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3495 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3497 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3499 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3504 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3505 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3506 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3507 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3508 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3509 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3510 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3511 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3515 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3516 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3517 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3518 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3519 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3520 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3521 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3522 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3523 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3525 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3526 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3529 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3530 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3531 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3532 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3533 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3534 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3535 let mut require_commitment = false;
3536 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3539 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3540 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3541 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3542 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3544 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3545 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3546 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3547 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3548 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3549 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3551 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3555 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3556 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3557 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3558 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3559 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3561 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3562 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3563 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3568 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3569 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3571 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3575 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3576 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3578 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3579 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3580 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3581 require_commitment = true;
3582 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3583 match forward_info {
3584 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3585 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3586 require_commitment = true;
3588 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3589 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3590 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3592 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3593 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3594 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3598 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3599 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3600 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3601 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3607 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3608 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3609 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3610 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3611 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3613 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3614 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3615 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3616 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3617 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3618 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3619 require_commitment = true;
3623 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3625 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3626 match update_state {
3627 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3628 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3629 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3630 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3631 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3632 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3634 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3635 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3636 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3637 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3638 require_commitment = true;
3639 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3640 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3645 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3646 let release_state_str =
3647 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3648 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3649 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3650 if !release_monitor {
3651 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3652 update: monitor_update,
3654 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3656 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3661 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3662 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3663 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3664 if require_commitment {
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3666 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3667 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3668 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3670 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3671 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3672 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3674 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3676 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3677 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3678 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3679 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3680 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3683 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3684 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3685 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3686 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3687 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3688 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3690 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3691 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3693 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3694 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3696 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3697 if require_commitment {
3698 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3700 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3701 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3702 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3703 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3705 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3706 &self.context.channel_id(),
3707 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3710 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3711 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3713 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3714 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3716 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3717 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3723 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3724 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3725 /// commitment update.
3726 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3727 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3728 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3730 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3731 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3734 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3735 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3736 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3737 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3739 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3740 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3741 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3742 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3743 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3744 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3745 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3747 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3748 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3750 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3751 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3753 if !self.context.is_live() {
3754 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3757 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3758 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3759 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3760 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3761 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3762 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3763 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3764 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3765 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3766 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3770 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3771 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3772 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3773 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3774 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3775 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3778 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3779 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3783 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3784 force_holding_cell = true;
3787 if force_holding_cell {
3788 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3792 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3793 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3795 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3796 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3801 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3802 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3804 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3806 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3807 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3808 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3809 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3813 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3814 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3815 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3819 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3820 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3823 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3824 // will be retransmitted.
3825 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3826 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3827 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3829 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3830 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3832 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3833 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3834 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3835 // this HTLC accordingly
3836 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3839 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3840 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3841 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3842 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3845 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3846 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3847 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3848 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3849 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3850 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3855 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3857 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3858 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3859 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3860 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3864 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3865 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3866 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3867 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3868 // the update upon reconnection.
3869 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3873 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3875 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3876 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3880 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3881 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3882 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3883 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3884 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3885 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3886 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3888 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3889 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3890 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3891 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3892 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3893 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3894 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3896 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3897 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3898 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3899 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3900 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3901 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3902 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3905 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3906 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3907 /// to the remote side.
3908 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3909 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3910 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3911 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3914 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3916 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3917 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3919 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3920 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3921 // first received the funding_signed.
3922 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3923 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3924 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3926 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3927 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3928 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3929 funding_broadcastable = None;
3932 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3933 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3934 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3935 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3936 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3937 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3938 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3939 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3940 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3941 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3942 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3943 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3944 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3945 next_per_commitment_point,
3946 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3950 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3952 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3953 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3954 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3955 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3956 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3957 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3959 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3960 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3961 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3962 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3963 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3964 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3968 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3969 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3971 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3972 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3974 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3975 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3978 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3979 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3980 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3981 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3982 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3983 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3984 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3985 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3986 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3990 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3991 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3993 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3996 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3999 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4001 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4002 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4003 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4004 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4005 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4006 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4007 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4008 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4009 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4010 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4012 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4014 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4016 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4022 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4025 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4026 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4027 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4029 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4030 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4032 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4033 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4035 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4036 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4039 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4040 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4041 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4042 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4043 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4045 SignerResumeUpdates {
4053 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4054 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4055 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4056 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4057 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4058 per_commitment_secret,
4059 next_per_commitment_point,
4061 next_local_nonce: None,
4065 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4066 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4067 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4068 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4069 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4070 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4072 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4073 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4074 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4075 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4076 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4077 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4078 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4079 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4080 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4081 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4082 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4087 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4088 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4090 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4091 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4093 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4094 reason: err_packet.clone()
4097 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4098 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4099 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4100 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4101 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4102 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4105 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4106 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4107 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4108 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4109 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4116 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4117 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4118 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4119 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4123 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4124 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4125 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4126 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4127 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4128 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4129 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4133 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4134 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4135 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4139 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4140 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4145 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4146 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4147 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4148 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4149 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4150 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4151 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4156 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4157 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4159 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4160 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4161 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4162 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4163 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4164 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4165 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4166 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4169 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4171 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4172 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4173 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4174 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4178 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4179 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4183 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4184 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4185 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4186 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4187 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4188 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4191 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4192 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4193 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4194 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4195 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4198 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4199 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4200 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4201 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4202 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4203 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4204 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4205 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4209 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4210 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4211 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4213 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4214 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4215 our_commitment_transaction
4219 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4220 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4221 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4222 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4224 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4226 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4228 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4229 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4230 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4231 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4232 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4235 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4236 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4237 channel_ready: None,
4238 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4239 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4240 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4244 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4245 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4246 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4247 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4248 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4249 next_per_commitment_point,
4250 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4252 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4253 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4254 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4258 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4259 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4260 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4262 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4263 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4264 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4267 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4270 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4272 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4273 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4274 our_commitment_transaction
4278 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4279 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4280 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4281 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4282 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4283 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4284 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4286 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4288 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4289 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4290 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4291 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4292 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4293 next_per_commitment_point,
4294 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4298 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4299 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4300 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4302 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4305 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4306 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4307 raa: required_revoke,
4308 commitment_update: None,
4309 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4311 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4312 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4313 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4315 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4318 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4319 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4320 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4321 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4322 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4323 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4326 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4327 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4328 raa: required_revoke,
4329 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4330 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4333 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4334 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4335 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4336 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4337 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4340 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4341 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4342 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4343 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4348 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4349 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4350 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4351 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4353 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4355 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4357 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4358 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4359 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4360 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4361 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4362 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4363 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4364 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4366 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4367 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4368 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4369 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4370 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4372 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4373 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4374 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4375 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4378 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4379 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4380 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4381 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4382 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4383 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4384 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4385 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4386 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4387 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4388 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4389 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4390 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4391 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4392 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4394 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4397 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4398 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4401 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4402 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4403 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4404 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4405 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4406 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4409 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4410 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4411 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4412 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4413 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4414 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4417 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4423 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4424 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4425 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4426 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4428 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4429 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4430 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4431 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4432 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4433 return Ok((None, None, None));
4436 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4437 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4438 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4440 return Ok((None, None, None));
4443 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4444 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4445 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4446 return Ok((None, None, None));
4449 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4451 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4452 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4453 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4454 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4456 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4457 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4459 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4460 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4462 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4463 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4464 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4465 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4467 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4468 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4469 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4473 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4479 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4480 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4482 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4483 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4486 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4487 /// within our expected timeframe.
4489 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4490 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4491 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4494 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4497 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4498 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4502 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4503 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4505 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4508 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4509 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4510 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4511 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4514 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4515 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4519 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4521 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4522 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4525 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4526 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4527 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4530 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4533 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4534 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4535 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4536 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4538 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4541 assert!(send_shutdown);
4542 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4543 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4544 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4546 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4549 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4554 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4556 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4557 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4559 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4560 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4561 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4562 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4563 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4564 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4567 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4568 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4570 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4571 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4572 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4573 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4577 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4578 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4579 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4580 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4581 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4582 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4584 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4585 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4592 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4593 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4595 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4598 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4599 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4601 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4603 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4604 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4605 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4606 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4607 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4608 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4609 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4610 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4611 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4613 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4614 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4617 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4621 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4622 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4623 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4624 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4626 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4627 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4629 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4630 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4632 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4635 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4639 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4643 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4644 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4645 return Ok((None, None, None));
4648 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4649 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4650 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4653 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4655 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4658 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4659 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4660 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4661 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4662 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4666 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4667 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4672 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4673 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4674 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4675 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4676 monitor_update: None,
4677 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4678 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4680 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4681 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4682 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4683 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4687 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4689 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4690 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4691 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4692 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4694 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4697 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4698 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4700 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4701 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4702 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4703 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4704 monitor_update: None,
4705 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4706 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4708 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4709 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4710 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4711 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4716 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4717 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4719 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4721 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4722 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4723 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4725 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4727 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4734 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4735 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4738 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4739 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4741 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4742 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4745 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4746 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4747 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4748 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4749 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4751 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4753 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4755 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4756 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4759 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4760 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4761 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4762 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4763 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4764 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4765 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4766 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4771 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4772 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4773 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4774 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4776 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4780 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4781 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4782 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4783 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4785 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4791 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4792 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4793 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4794 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4795 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4796 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4797 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4799 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4800 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4803 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4805 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4806 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4812 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4813 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4814 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4815 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4816 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4817 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4818 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4820 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4821 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4828 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4829 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4832 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4833 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4836 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4837 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4841 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
4842 &self.context.holder_signer
4846 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4848 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4849 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4850 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4851 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4852 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4853 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4855 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4857 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4865 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4866 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4870 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4872 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4873 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4876 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4877 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4878 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4879 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4882 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4883 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4884 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4885 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4886 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4887 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4890 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4891 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4892 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4893 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4894 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4895 if !release_monitor {
4896 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4905 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4906 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4909 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4910 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4911 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4913 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4914 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4915 if self.context.channel_state &
4916 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4917 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4918 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4919 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4920 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4923 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4924 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4925 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4926 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4927 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4928 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4930 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4931 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4932 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4934 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4935 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4936 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4937 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4938 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4939 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4945 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4946 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4947 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4950 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4951 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4952 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4955 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4956 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4957 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4960 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4961 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4962 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4963 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4964 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4965 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4970 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4971 self.context.channel_update_status
4974 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4975 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4976 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4979 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4981 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4982 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4983 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4987 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4988 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4989 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4992 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4996 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4997 // channel_ready yet.
4998 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5002 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5003 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5004 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5005 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5006 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5008 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5009 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5010 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5012 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5013 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5016 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5017 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5018 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5019 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5020 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5021 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5022 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5023 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5024 self.context.channel_state);
5026 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5030 if need_commitment_update {
5031 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5032 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5033 let next_per_commitment_point =
5034 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5035 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5036 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5037 next_per_commitment_point,
5038 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5042 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5048 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5049 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5050 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5051 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5052 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5053 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5054 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5056 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5059 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5060 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5061 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5062 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5063 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5064 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5065 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5066 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5067 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5068 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5069 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5070 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5071 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5072 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5073 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5074 // channel and move on.
5075 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5076 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5078 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5079 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5080 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5082 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5083 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5084 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5085 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5086 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5087 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5088 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5089 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5094 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5095 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5096 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5097 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5098 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5101 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5102 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5103 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5104 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5105 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5106 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5109 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5110 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5111 // may have already happened for this block).
5112 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5113 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5114 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5115 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5118 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5119 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5120 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5121 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5129 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5130 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5131 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5132 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5134 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5135 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5138 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5140 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5141 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5142 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5143 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5145 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5148 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5151 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5152 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5153 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5154 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5156 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5159 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5160 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5161 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5163 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5164 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5167 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5168 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5176 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5178 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5179 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5180 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5182 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5183 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5186 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5187 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5188 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5189 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5190 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5191 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5192 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5193 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5194 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5197 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5198 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5199 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5200 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5202 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5203 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5204 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5206 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5207 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5208 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5209 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5211 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5212 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5213 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5214 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5215 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5216 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5217 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5220 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5221 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5223 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5226 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5227 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5228 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5229 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5230 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5231 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5232 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5233 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5234 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5235 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5236 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5237 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5238 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5239 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5240 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5241 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5242 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5248 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5253 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5254 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5256 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5257 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5258 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5259 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5261 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5264 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5266 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5267 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5268 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5269 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5270 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5271 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5273 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5274 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5277 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5278 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5279 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5280 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5281 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5282 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5284 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5285 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5288 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5289 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5290 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5291 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5292 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5298 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5299 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5300 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5301 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5303 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5306 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5310 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5314 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5315 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5319 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5323 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5324 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5327 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5331 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5333 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5338 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5339 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5340 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5342 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5347 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5349 None => return None,
5352 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5354 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5355 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5357 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5358 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5361 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5367 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5369 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5370 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5371 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5372 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5373 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5374 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5375 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5377 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5378 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5379 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5380 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5381 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5382 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5383 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5384 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5385 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5386 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5387 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5388 contents: announcement,
5391 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5396 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5400 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5401 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5402 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5403 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5404 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5405 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5406 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5407 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5409 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5411 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5413 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5414 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5416 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5418 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5419 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5422 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5423 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5424 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5425 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5428 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5431 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5432 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5433 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5434 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5435 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5436 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5439 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5441 Err(_) => return None,
5443 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5444 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5449 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5450 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5451 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5452 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5453 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5454 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5455 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5456 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5457 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5458 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5459 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5460 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5461 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5462 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5463 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5464 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5467 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5470 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5471 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5472 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5473 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5474 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5475 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5476 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5477 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5478 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5480 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5481 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5482 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5483 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5484 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5485 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5486 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5487 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5488 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5490 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5491 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5492 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5493 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5494 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5495 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5496 next_funding_txid: None,
5501 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5503 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5504 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5505 /// commitment update.
5507 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5508 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5509 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5510 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5511 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5512 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5513 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5516 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5517 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5518 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5520 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5521 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5526 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5527 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5529 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5531 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5532 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5534 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5535 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5536 /// regenerate them.
5538 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5539 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5541 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5542 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5543 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5544 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5545 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5546 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5547 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5548 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5550 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5553 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5554 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5555 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5558 if amount_msat == 0 {
5559 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5562 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5563 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5564 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5565 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5568 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5569 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5570 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5573 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5574 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5575 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5576 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5577 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5578 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5579 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5580 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5583 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5584 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5585 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5586 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5587 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5588 else { "to peer" });
5590 if need_holding_cell {
5591 force_holding_cell = true;
5594 // Now update local state:
5595 if force_holding_cell {
5596 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5601 onion_routing_packet,
5608 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5609 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5611 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5613 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5619 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5620 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5621 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5625 onion_routing_packet,
5629 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5634 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5635 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5636 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5637 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5639 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5640 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5641 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5643 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5644 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5648 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5649 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5650 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5651 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5652 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5653 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5654 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5657 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5658 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5659 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5660 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5661 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5662 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5665 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5667 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5668 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5669 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5670 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5671 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5673 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5674 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5677 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5678 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5679 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5680 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5681 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5682 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5683 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5684 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5685 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5686 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5687 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5690 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5694 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5695 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5696 where L::Target: Logger
5698 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5699 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5700 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5704 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5705 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5706 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5707 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5708 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5709 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5710 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5711 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5712 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5713 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5714 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5720 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5723 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5724 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5725 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5726 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5727 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5728 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5730 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5731 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5732 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5734 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5735 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5736 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5739 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5740 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5744 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5745 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5747 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5749 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5750 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5751 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5752 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5754 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5755 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5756 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5757 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5758 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5759 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5763 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5764 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5768 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5769 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5771 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5777 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5778 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5780 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5781 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5782 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5783 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5784 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5785 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5786 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5787 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5789 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5790 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
5791 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5794 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5795 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5796 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5802 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5804 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5805 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5806 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5807 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5808 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5810 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5812 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5818 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5819 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5821 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5822 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5823 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5824 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5825 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5827 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5828 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5829 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5832 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5833 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5834 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5836 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5840 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5841 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5843 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5844 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5845 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5848 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5849 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5850 let mut chan_closed = false;
5851 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5855 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5857 None if !chan_closed => {
5858 // use override shutdown script if provided
5859 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5860 Some(script) => script,
5862 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5863 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5864 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5865 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5869 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5870 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5872 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5878 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5879 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5880 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5881 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5882 monitor_update: None,
5883 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5884 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5886 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5887 Some(shutdown_result)
5889 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5892 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5894 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5895 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5896 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5897 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5898 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5899 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5902 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5903 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5905 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5906 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5907 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5910 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5911 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5912 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5913 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5914 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5916 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5917 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5924 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5925 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5927 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5930 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5931 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5932 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5934 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5935 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5939 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5943 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5944 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5945 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5946 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5949 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5950 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5951 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5952 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5953 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5954 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5955 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5956 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5958 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5959 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5960 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5961 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5963 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5966 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5969 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5970 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5973 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5976 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5977 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5978 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5979 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5983 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5984 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5986 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5987 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5989 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5991 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5993 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5994 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5995 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5999 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6000 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6002 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6003 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6004 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6005 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6009 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6010 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6011 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6015 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6016 Ok(script) => script,
6017 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6020 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6023 context: ChannelContext {
6026 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6027 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6028 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6029 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6034 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6036 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6037 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6038 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6039 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6041 channel_value_satoshis,
6043 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6045 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6046 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6049 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6050 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6053 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6054 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6055 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6056 pending_update_fee: None,
6057 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6058 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6060 update_time_counter: 1,
6062 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6064 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6065 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6066 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6067 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6068 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6069 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6071 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6072 signer_pending_funding: false,
6074 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6075 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6076 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6077 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6079 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6080 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6081 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6082 closing_fee_limits: None,
6083 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6085 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6086 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6087 short_channel_id: None,
6088 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6090 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6091 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6092 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6093 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6094 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6095 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6096 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6097 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6098 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6099 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6100 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6101 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6103 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6105 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6106 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6107 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6108 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6109 counterparty_parameters: None,
6110 funding_outpoint: None,
6111 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6113 funding_transaction: None,
6114 is_batch_funding: None,
6116 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6117 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6118 counterparty_node_id,
6120 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6122 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6124 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6125 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6127 announcement_sigs: None,
6129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6130 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6132 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6134 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6135 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6137 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6138 outbound_scid_alias,
6140 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6141 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6143 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6144 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6149 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6151 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6155 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6156 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6157 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6158 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6159 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6160 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6161 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6162 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6163 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6164 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6165 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6167 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6168 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6170 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6171 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6172 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6173 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6176 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6177 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6179 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6181 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6182 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6184 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6185 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6186 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6187 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6188 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6189 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6192 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6193 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6195 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6196 if funding_created.is_none() {
6197 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6198 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6199 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6203 let channel = Channel {
6204 context: self.context,
6207 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6210 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6211 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6212 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6213 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6214 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6215 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6216 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6217 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6218 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6219 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6222 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6223 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6224 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6225 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6226 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6227 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6233 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6234 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6235 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6236 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6237 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6238 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6240 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6242 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6243 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6244 // We've exhausted our options
6247 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6248 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6251 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6252 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6253 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6254 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6256 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6257 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6258 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6259 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6260 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6261 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6263 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6265 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6266 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6269 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6270 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6271 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6273 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6274 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6277 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6278 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6281 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6282 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6286 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6287 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6288 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6289 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6290 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6291 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6292 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6293 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6294 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6295 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6296 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6297 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6298 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6299 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6300 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6301 first_per_commitment_point,
6302 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6303 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6304 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6305 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6307 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6312 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6313 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6315 // Check sanity of message fields:
6316 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6319 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6322 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6325 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6328 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6331 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6333 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6335 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6336 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6339 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6340 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6343 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6346 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6350 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6351 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6354 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6357 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6358 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6360 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6361 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6363 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6364 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6366 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6369 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6370 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6373 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6374 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6377 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6378 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6380 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6381 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6384 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6385 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6388 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6389 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6390 &Some(ref script) => {
6391 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6392 if script.len() == 0 {
6395 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6398 Some(script.clone())
6401 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6403 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6408 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6409 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6410 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6411 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6412 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6414 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6415 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6417 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6420 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6421 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6422 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6423 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6424 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6425 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6428 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6429 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6430 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6433 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6434 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6436 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6437 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6443 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6444 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6445 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6446 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6449 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6450 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6451 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6452 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6453 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6454 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6455 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6456 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6457 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6458 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6462 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6464 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6465 // support this channel type.
6466 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6467 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6471 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6472 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6473 // `static_remote_key`.
6474 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6477 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6478 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6481 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6484 channel_type.clone()
6486 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6487 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6493 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6494 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6495 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6496 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6497 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6498 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6499 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6500 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6501 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6504 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6508 // Check sanity of message fields:
6509 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6512 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6513 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6515 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6518 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6519 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6522 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6525 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6528 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6530 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6531 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6534 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6537 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6541 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6542 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6545 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6548 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6551 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6554 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6557 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6558 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6560 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6561 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6564 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6566 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6567 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6572 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6573 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6574 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6575 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6576 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6578 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6579 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6581 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6582 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6583 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6585 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6589 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6590 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6591 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6592 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6596 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6597 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6598 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6599 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6602 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6603 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6604 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6605 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6609 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6610 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6611 &Some(ref script) => {
6612 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6613 if script.len() == 0 {
6616 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6619 Some(script.clone())
6622 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6629 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6630 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6631 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6632 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6636 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6637 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6642 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6643 Ok(script) => script,
6644 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6647 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6648 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6650 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6653 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6657 context: ChannelContext {
6660 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6661 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6663 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6668 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6670 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6671 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6672 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6673 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6676 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6678 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6679 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6682 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6683 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6684 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6686 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6687 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6688 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6689 pending_update_fee: None,
6690 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6691 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6692 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6693 update_time_counter: 1,
6695 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6697 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6698 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6699 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6700 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6701 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6702 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6704 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6705 signer_pending_funding: false,
6707 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6708 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6709 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6710 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6712 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6713 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6714 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6715 closing_fee_limits: None,
6716 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6718 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6719 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6720 short_channel_id: None,
6721 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6723 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6724 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6725 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6726 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6727 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6728 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6729 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6730 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6731 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6732 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6733 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6734 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6737 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6739 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6740 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6741 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6742 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6743 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6744 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6745 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6747 funding_outpoint: None,
6748 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6750 funding_transaction: None,
6751 is_batch_funding: None,
6753 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6754 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6755 counterparty_node_id,
6757 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6759 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6761 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6762 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6764 announcement_sigs: None,
6766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6767 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6768 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6769 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6771 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6772 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6774 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6775 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6777 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6778 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6781 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6786 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6788 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6794 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6795 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6797 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6798 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6799 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6800 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6802 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6803 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6805 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6806 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6809 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6812 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6813 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6814 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6816 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6817 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6818 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6819 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6821 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6822 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6823 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6824 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6825 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6826 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6827 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6828 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6829 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6830 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6831 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6832 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6833 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6834 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6835 first_per_commitment_point,
6836 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6837 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6838 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6840 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6842 next_local_nonce: None,
6846 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6847 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6849 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6851 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6852 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6855 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6856 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6858 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6859 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6860 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6861 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6862 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6863 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6864 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6865 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6866 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6867 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6868 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6870 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6873 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6874 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6875 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6879 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6880 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6882 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6883 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6884 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6886 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6888 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6889 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6890 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6891 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6894 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6895 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6896 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6897 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6898 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6900 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6902 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6903 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6904 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6907 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6908 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6909 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6913 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6914 initial_commitment_tx,
6917 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6918 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6921 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6922 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6925 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6927 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6928 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6929 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6930 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6932 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6934 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6935 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6936 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6937 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6938 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6939 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6940 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6941 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6942 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6943 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6944 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6946 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6948 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6949 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6950 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6951 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6952 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6953 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6955 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6956 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6958 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6959 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6960 let mut channel = Channel {
6961 context: self.context,
6963 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6964 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6966 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6970 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6971 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6973 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6979 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6981 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6982 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6983 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6985 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6986 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6987 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6988 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6994 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6995 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6996 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6997 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6998 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6999 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7004 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7005 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7006 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7007 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7009 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7010 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7011 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7012 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7017 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7018 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7019 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7020 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7021 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7022 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7027 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7028 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7029 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7032 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7034 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7035 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7036 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7037 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7038 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7040 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7041 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7042 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7043 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7045 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7046 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7047 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7049 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7051 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7052 // deserialized from that format.
7053 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7054 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7055 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7057 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7059 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7060 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7061 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7063 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7064 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7065 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7066 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7069 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7070 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7071 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7074 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7075 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7076 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7077 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7079 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7080 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7082 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7084 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7086 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7088 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7091 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7093 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7098 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7099 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7100 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7102 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7103 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7104 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7105 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7106 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7107 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7108 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7110 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7112 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7114 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7117 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7118 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7119 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7122 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7124 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7125 preimages.push(preimage);
7127 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7128 reason.write(writer)?;
7130 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7132 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7133 preimages.push(preimage);
7135 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7136 reason.write(writer)?;
7139 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7140 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7141 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7143 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7144 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7145 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7147 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7150 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7151 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7152 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7153 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7155 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7156 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7157 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7160 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7161 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7162 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7163 source.write(writer)?;
7164 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7166 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7167 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7168 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7170 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7171 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7173 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7175 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7177 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7178 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7180 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7182 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7183 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7188 match self.context.resend_order {
7189 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7190 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7193 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7194 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7195 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7197 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7198 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7199 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7200 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7203 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7204 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7205 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7206 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7207 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7210 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7211 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7212 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7213 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7215 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7216 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7217 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7219 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7221 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7222 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7223 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7224 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7226 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7227 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7228 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7229 // consider the stale state on reload.
7232 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7233 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7234 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7236 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7237 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7238 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7240 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7241 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7243 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7244 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7245 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7247 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7248 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7250 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7253 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7254 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7255 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7257 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7260 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7261 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7263 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7264 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7265 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7267 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7269 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7271 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7274 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7275 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7276 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7277 htlc.write(writer)?;
7280 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7281 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7282 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7284 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7285 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7287 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7288 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7289 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7290 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7291 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7292 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7293 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7295 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7296 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7297 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7298 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7299 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7301 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7302 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7304 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7305 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7306 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7307 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7309 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7311 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7312 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7313 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7314 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7315 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7316 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7317 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7319 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7320 (2, chan_type, option),
7321 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7322 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7323 (5, self.context.config, required),
7324 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7325 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7326 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7327 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7328 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7329 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7330 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7331 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7332 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7333 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7334 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7335 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7336 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7337 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7338 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7339 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7340 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7341 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7342 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7343 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7344 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7351 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7352 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7354 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7355 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7357 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7358 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7359 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7361 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7362 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7363 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7364 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7368 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7369 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7375 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7380 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 let mut keys_data = None;
7386 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7387 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7388 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7390 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7391 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7392 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7393 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7394 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7395 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7399 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7400 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7401 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7404 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7406 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7412 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7413 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7414 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7415 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7417 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7418 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7419 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7420 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7421 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7422 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7423 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7424 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7429 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7431 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7432 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7433 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7434 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7435 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7436 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7437 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7438 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7439 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7440 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7442 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7446 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7450 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7453 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7455 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7456 blinding_point: None,
7460 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7462 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7463 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7464 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7465 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7466 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7467 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7468 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7469 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7470 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7471 blinding_point: None,
7473 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7474 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7475 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7477 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7478 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7479 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7485 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7486 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7487 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7488 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7491 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7496 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7497 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7498 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7501 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7503 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7504 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7507 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7514 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7517 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7518 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7519 // consider the stale state on reload.
7520 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7523 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7524 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7525 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7530 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7532 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7535 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7536 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7537 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7539 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7540 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7542 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7543 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7545 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7546 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7547 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7549 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7551 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7552 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7554 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7555 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7558 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7560 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7561 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7562 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7563 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7565 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7568 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7569 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7571 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7573 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7574 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7576 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7577 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7579 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7581 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7582 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7583 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7585 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7586 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7587 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7591 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7592 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7593 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7595 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7601 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7602 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7603 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7604 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7605 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7606 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7607 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7608 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7609 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7610 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7612 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7613 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7614 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7615 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7616 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7617 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7618 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7620 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7621 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7622 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7623 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7625 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7627 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7628 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7630 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7632 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7633 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7635 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7636 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7637 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7638 (2, channel_type, option),
7639 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7640 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7641 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7642 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7643 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7644 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7645 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7646 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7647 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7648 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7649 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7650 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7651 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7652 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7653 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7654 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7655 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7656 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7657 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7658 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7659 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7660 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7661 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7662 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7665 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7666 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7667 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7668 // required channel parameters.
7669 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7670 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7671 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7673 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7675 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7676 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7677 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7678 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7681 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7682 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7683 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7685 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7686 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7688 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7689 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7694 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7695 if iter.next().is_some() {
7696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7700 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7701 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7702 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7703 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7704 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7707 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7708 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7709 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7711 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7712 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7714 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7715 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7716 // separate u64 values.
7717 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7719 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7721 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7722 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7723 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7724 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7726 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7727 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7729 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7730 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7731 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7732 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7733 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7736 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7737 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7739 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
7740 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
7741 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7742 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7744 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
7745 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7747 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
7748 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
7749 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7750 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
7751 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7754 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
7755 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7759 context: ChannelContext {
7762 config: config.unwrap(),
7766 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7767 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7768 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7771 temporary_channel_id,
7773 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7775 channel_value_satoshis,
7777 latest_monitor_update_id,
7779 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7780 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7783 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7784 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7787 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7788 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7789 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7790 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7794 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7795 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7796 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7797 monitor_pending_forwards,
7798 monitor_pending_failures,
7799 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7801 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7802 signer_pending_funding: false,
7805 holding_cell_update_fee,
7806 next_holder_htlc_id,
7807 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7808 update_time_counter,
7811 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7812 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7813 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7814 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7816 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7817 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7818 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7819 closing_fee_limits: None,
7820 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7822 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7823 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7825 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7827 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7828 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7829 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7830 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7831 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7832 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7833 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7834 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7835 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7838 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7840 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7841 funding_transaction,
7844 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7845 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7846 counterparty_node_id,
7848 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7852 channel_update_status,
7853 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7858 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7860 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7862 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7863 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7865 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7866 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7867 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7869 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7870 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7873 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7875 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7878 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7887 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7888 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7889 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7890 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7891 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7892 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7893 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7894 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7895 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7896 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7897 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7898 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7899 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7900 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7901 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7902 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7903 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7904 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7905 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7906 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7907 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7908 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7909 use crate::util::test_utils;
7910 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7911 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7912 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7914 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7915 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7916 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7917 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7918 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7919 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7920 use crate::prelude::*;
7922 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7925 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7926 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7932 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7933 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7934 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7935 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7939 signer: InMemorySigner,
7942 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7943 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7946 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7947 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
7949 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
7951 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7952 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7955 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
7959 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7961 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7962 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7963 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7964 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7965 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7968 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7969 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7970 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7971 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7975 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7976 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7977 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7981 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7982 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7983 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7984 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7987 let seed = [42; 32];
7988 let network = Network::Testnet;
7989 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7990 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7991 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7994 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7995 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7996 let config = UserConfig::default();
7997 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7998 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7999 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8001 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8002 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8006 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8007 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8009 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8010 let original_fee = 253;
8011 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8012 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8013 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8014 let seed = [42; 32];
8015 let network = Network::Testnet;
8016 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8018 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8019 let config = UserConfig::default();
8020 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8022 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8023 // same as the old fee.
8024 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8025 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8026 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8030 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8031 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8032 // dust limits are used.
8033 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8034 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8035 let seed = [42; 32];
8036 let network = Network::Testnet;
8037 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8038 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8039 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8041 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8042 // they have different dust limits.
8044 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8045 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8046 let config = UserConfig::default();
8047 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8049 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8050 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8051 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8052 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8053 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8055 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8056 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8057 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8058 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8059 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8061 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8062 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8063 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8064 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8066 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8067 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8068 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8070 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8071 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8073 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8074 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8075 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8077 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8078 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8079 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8080 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8083 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8085 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8087 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8088 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8089 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8090 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8091 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8092 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8093 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8095 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8096 blinding_point: None,
8099 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8100 // the dust limit check.
8101 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8102 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8103 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8104 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8106 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8107 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8108 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8109 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8110 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8111 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8112 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8116 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8117 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8118 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8119 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8120 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8121 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8122 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8123 let seed = [42; 32];
8124 let network = Network::Testnet;
8125 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8127 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8128 let config = UserConfig::default();
8129 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8131 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8132 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8134 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8135 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8136 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8137 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8138 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8139 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8141 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8142 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8143 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8144 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8145 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8147 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8149 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8150 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8151 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8152 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8153 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8155 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8156 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8157 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8158 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8159 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8163 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8164 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8165 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8167 let seed = [42; 32];
8168 let network = Network::Testnet;
8169 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8170 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8171 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8173 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8175 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8176 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8177 let config = UserConfig::default();
8178 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8180 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8181 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8182 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8183 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8185 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8186 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8187 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8189 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8190 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8191 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8192 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8194 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8195 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8196 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8198 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8199 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8201 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8202 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8203 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8204 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8205 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8206 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8207 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8209 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8211 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8212 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8213 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8214 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8215 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8219 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8220 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8221 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8222 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8223 let seed = [42; 32];
8224 let network = Network::Testnet;
8225 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8226 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8227 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8229 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8230 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8231 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8232 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8233 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8234 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8235 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8236 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8238 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8239 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8240 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8241 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8242 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8243 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8245 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8246 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8247 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8248 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8250 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8252 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8253 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8254 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8255 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8256 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8257 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8259 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8260 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8261 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8262 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8264 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8265 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8266 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8267 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8268 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8270 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8271 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8273 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8274 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8275 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8277 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8278 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8279 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8280 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8281 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8283 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8284 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8286 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8287 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8288 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8292 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8294 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8295 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8296 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8298 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8299 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8300 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8301 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8303 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8304 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8305 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8307 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8309 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8310 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8313 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8314 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8315 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8316 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8317 let seed = [42; 32];
8318 let network = Network::Testnet;
8319 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8320 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8321 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8324 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8325 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8326 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8328 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8329 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8331 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8332 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8333 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8335 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8336 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8338 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8340 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8341 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8343 // Channel Negotiations failed
8344 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8345 assert!(result.is_err());
8350 fn channel_update() {
8351 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8352 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8353 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8354 let seed = [42; 32];
8355 let network = Network::Testnet;
8356 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8357 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8358 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8360 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8361 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8362 let config = UserConfig::default();
8363 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8365 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8366 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8367 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8368 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8369 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8371 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8372 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8373 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8374 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8375 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8377 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8378 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8379 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8380 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8382 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8383 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8384 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8386 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8387 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8389 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8390 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8391 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8393 short_channel_id: 0,
8396 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8397 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8398 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8400 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8401 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8403 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8405 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8407 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8408 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8409 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8410 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8412 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8413 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8414 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8416 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8419 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8422 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8424 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8425 use bitcoin::sighash;
8426 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8427 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8428 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8429 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8430 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8431 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8432 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8433 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8434 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8435 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8436 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8437 use crate::sync::Arc;
8438 use core::str::FromStr;
8439 use hex::DisplayHex;
8441 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8442 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8443 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8446 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8448 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8449 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8450 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8451 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8452 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8454 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8455 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8461 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8462 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8463 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8465 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8466 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8467 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8468 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8469 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8470 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8472 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8474 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8475 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8476 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8477 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8478 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8479 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8481 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8482 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8483 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8484 selected_contest_delay: 144
8486 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8487 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8489 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8490 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8492 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8493 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8495 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8496 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8498 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8499 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8500 // build_commitment_transaction.
8501 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8502 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8503 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8504 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8505 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8507 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8508 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8509 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8510 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8514 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8515 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8516 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8517 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8521 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8522 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8523 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8525 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8526 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8528 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8529 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8531 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8533 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8534 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8535 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8536 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8537 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8538 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8539 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8541 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8542 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8543 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8544 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8546 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8547 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8548 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8550 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8552 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8553 commitment_tx.clone(),
8554 counterparty_signature,
8555 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8556 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8557 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8559 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8560 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8562 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8563 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8564 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8566 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8567 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8570 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8571 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8573 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8574 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8575 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8576 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8577 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8578 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8579 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8580 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8582 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8585 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8586 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8587 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8591 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8594 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8595 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8596 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8597 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8598 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8599 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8601 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8602 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8603 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8604 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8606 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8607 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8608 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8609 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8610 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8612 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8613 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8614 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8615 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8616 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8617 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8619 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8623 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8624 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8625 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8626 "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", {});
8628 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8629 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8631 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8632 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8633 "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", {});
8635 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8636 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8637 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8638 "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", {});
8640 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8641 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8643 amount_msat: 1000000,
8645 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8646 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8648 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8651 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8652 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8654 amount_msat: 2000000,
8656 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8657 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8659 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8662 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8663 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8665 amount_msat: 2000000,
8667 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8668 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8669 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8670 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8671 blinding_point: None,
8673 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8676 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8677 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8679 amount_msat: 3000000,
8681 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8682 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8683 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8684 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8685 blinding_point: None,
8687 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8690 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8691 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8693 amount_msat: 4000000,
8695 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8696 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8698 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8702 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8703 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8704 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8706 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8707 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8708 "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", {
8711 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8712 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8713 "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" },
8716 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8717 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8718 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8721 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8722 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8723 "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" },
8726 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8727 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8728 "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" },
8731 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8732 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8733 "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" }
8736 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8737 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8738 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8740 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8741 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8742 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8745 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8746 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8747 "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" },
8750 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8751 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8752 "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" },
8755 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8756 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8757 "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" },
8760 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8761 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8762 "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" },
8765 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8766 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8767 "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" }
8770 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8771 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8772 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8774 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8775 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8776 "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", {
8779 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8780 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8781 "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" },
8784 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8785 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8786 "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" },
8789 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8790 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8791 "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" },
8794 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8795 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8796 "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" }
8799 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8800 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8801 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8802 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8804 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8805 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8806 "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", {
8809 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8810 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8811 "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" },
8814 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8815 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8816 "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" },
8819 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8820 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8821 "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" },
8824 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8825 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8826 "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" }
8829 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8830 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8831 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8832 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8834 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8835 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8836 "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", {
8839 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8840 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8841 "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" },
8844 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8845 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8846 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8849 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8850 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8851 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8854 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8855 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8856 "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" }
8859 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8860 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8861 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8863 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8864 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8865 "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", {
8868 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8869 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8870 "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" },
8873 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8874 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8875 "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" },
8878 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8879 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8880 "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" }
8883 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8884 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8885 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8887 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8888 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8889 "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", {
8892 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8893 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8894 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8897 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8898 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8899 "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" },
8902 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8903 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8904 "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" }
8907 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8908 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8909 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8911 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8912 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8913 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8916 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8917 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8918 "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" },
8921 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8922 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8923 "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" }
8926 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8927 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8928 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8929 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8930 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8931 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8933 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8934 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8935 "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", {
8938 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8939 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8940 "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" },
8943 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8944 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8945 "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" }
8948 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8949 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8950 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8951 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8952 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8954 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8955 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8956 "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", {
8959 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8960 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8961 "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" },
8964 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8965 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8966 "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" }
8969 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8970 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8971 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8973 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8974 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8975 "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", {
8978 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8979 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8980 "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" }
8983 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8984 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8985 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8986 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8987 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8989 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8990 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8991 "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", {
8994 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8995 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8996 "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" }
8999 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9000 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9001 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9002 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9003 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9005 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9006 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9007 "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", {
9010 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9011 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9012 "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" }
9015 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9016 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9017 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9018 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9020 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9021 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9022 "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", {});
9024 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9025 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9026 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9027 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9028 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9030 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9031 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9032 "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", {});
9034 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9035 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9036 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9037 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9038 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9040 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9041 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9042 "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", {});
9044 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9045 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9046 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9048 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9049 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9050 "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", {});
9052 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9053 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9054 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9055 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9056 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9058 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9059 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9060 "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", {});
9062 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9063 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9064 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9065 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9066 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9068 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9069 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9070 "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", {});
9072 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9073 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9074 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9075 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9076 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9077 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9079 amount_msat: 2000000,
9081 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9082 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9084 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9087 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9088 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9089 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9091 amount_msat: 5000001,
9093 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9094 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9095 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9096 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9097 blinding_point: None,
9099 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9102 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9103 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9105 amount_msat: 5000000,
9107 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9108 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9109 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9110 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9111 blinding_point: None,
9113 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9117 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9118 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9119 "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", {
9122 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9123 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9124 "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" },
9126 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9127 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9128 "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" },
9130 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9131 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9132 "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" }
9135 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9136 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9137 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9138 "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", {
9141 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9142 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9143 "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" },
9145 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9146 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9147 "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" },
9149 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9150 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9151 "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" }
9156 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9157 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9159 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9160 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9161 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9162 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9164 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9165 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9166 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9168 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9169 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9171 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9172 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9174 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9175 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9176 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9180 fn test_key_derivation() {
9181 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9182 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9184 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9185 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9187 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9188 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9190 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9191 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9193 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9194 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9196 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9197 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9199 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9200 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9204 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9205 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9207 let seed = [42; 32];
9208 let network = Network::Testnet;
9209 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9210 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9212 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9213 let config = UserConfig::default();
9214 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9215 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9217 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9218 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9220 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9221 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9222 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9223 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9224 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9225 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9226 assert!(res.is_ok());
9230 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9231 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9232 // resulting `channel_type`.
9233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9234 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9235 let network = Network::Testnet;
9236 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9237 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9239 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9240 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9242 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9243 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9245 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9246 // need to signal it.
9247 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9248 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9249 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9250 &config, 0, 42, None
9252 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9254 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9255 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9256 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9258 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9259 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9260 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9264 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9265 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9266 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9267 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9268 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9271 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9272 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9276 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9277 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9278 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9279 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9280 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9281 let network = Network::Testnet;
9282 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9283 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9285 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9286 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9288 let config = UserConfig::default();
9290 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9291 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9292 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9293 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9294 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9296 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9297 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9298 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9302 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9303 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9304 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9306 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9307 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9308 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9309 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9310 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9311 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9313 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9317 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9318 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9321 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9322 let network = Network::Testnet;
9323 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9324 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9326 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9327 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9329 let config = UserConfig::default();
9331 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9332 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9333 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9334 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9335 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9336 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9337 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9338 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9340 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9341 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9342 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9343 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9344 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9345 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9349 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9350 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9352 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9353 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9354 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9355 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9357 assert!(res.is_err());
9359 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9360 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9361 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9363 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9364 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9365 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9368 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9370 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9371 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9372 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9373 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9376 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9377 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9379 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9380 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9382 assert!(res.is_err());
9386 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9387 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9388 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9389 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9390 let seed = [42; 32];
9391 let network = Network::Testnet;
9392 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9393 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9394 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9396 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9397 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9398 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9399 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9401 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9402 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9403 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9408 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9418 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9419 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9420 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9425 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9426 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9432 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9435 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9436 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9437 &accept_channel_msg,
9438 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9439 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9442 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9443 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9444 let tx = Transaction {
9446 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9450 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9453 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9456 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9457 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9462 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9463 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9464 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9468 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9469 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9477 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9478 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9479 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9480 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9485 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9492 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9493 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9494 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9495 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9497 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9498 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9499 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9502 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9503 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9504 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9512 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9513 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9514 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9515 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9518 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9519 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9521 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9522 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9523 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9525 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());