1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
42 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
43 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
44 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
45 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
46 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
47 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
50 use crate::prelude::*;
51 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 use core::convert::TryInto;
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 enum InboundHTLCState {
107 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
108 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
109 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
110 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
111 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
112 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
113 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
114 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
115 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
116 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
117 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
118 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
119 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
120 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
121 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
123 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
127 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
128 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
129 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
130 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
131 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
132 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
133 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
134 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
135 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
139 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
141 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
142 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
143 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
144 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
145 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
147 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
148 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
150 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
151 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
152 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
153 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
154 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
155 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
156 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
157 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
160 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
164 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
165 state: InboundHTLCState,
168 enum OutboundHTLCState {
169 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
170 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
171 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
172 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
173 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
174 /// money back (though we won't), and,
175 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
176 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
177 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
178 /// we'll never get out of sync).
179 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
180 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
181 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
183 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
184 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
185 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
190 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
191 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
193 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
194 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
195 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
196 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
197 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
201 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
203 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
204 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
207 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
210 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
211 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
216 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
217 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
219 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
220 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
225 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
229 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
230 state: OutboundHTLCState,
232 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
235 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
236 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
237 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
241 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
243 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
244 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
245 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
248 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
253 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
257 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
258 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
259 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
260 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
261 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
262 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
263 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
265 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
266 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
267 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
268 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
269 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
270 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
271 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
273 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
274 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
275 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
280 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
281 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
282 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
284 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
285 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
287 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
288 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
289 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
290 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
291 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
292 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
293 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
294 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
295 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
297 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
298 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
299 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
300 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
301 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
302 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
303 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
304 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
305 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
306 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
307 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
308 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
309 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
310 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
311 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
312 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
314 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
315 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
316 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
317 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
318 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
319 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
320 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
321 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
323 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
324 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
325 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
326 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
328 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
330 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
332 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
333 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
334 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
335 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
339 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
343 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
345 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
346 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
347 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
348 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
349 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
351 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
352 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
354 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
356 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
357 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
359 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
360 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
361 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
362 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
363 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
364 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
366 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
367 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
369 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
370 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
371 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
372 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
373 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
375 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
376 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
378 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
379 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
381 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
382 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
383 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
384 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
390 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
391 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
393 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
394 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
395 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
400 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
401 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
403 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
404 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
405 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
410 macro_rules! secp_check {
411 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
419 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
420 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
421 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
422 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
423 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
424 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
425 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
426 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
428 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
430 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
432 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
436 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
438 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
439 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
440 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
442 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
443 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
445 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
446 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
447 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
448 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
449 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
451 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
452 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
456 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
462 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
465 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
466 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
468 holding_cell_msat: u64,
469 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
472 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
473 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
474 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
475 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
476 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
477 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
478 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
479 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
480 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
481 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
484 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
485 struct HTLCCandidate {
487 origin: HTLCInitiator,
491 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
499 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
501 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
503 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
504 htlc_value_msat: u64,
505 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
510 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
511 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
512 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
513 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
514 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
516 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
517 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
518 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
519 htlc_value_msat: u64,
521 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
522 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
526 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
527 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
528 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
529 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
530 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
531 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
532 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
533 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
534 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
535 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
536 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
539 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
541 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
542 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
543 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
544 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
545 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
549 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
550 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
551 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
552 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
553 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
554 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
555 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
558 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
560 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
561 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
562 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
563 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
564 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
565 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
566 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
567 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
570 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
571 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
572 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
573 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
574 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
575 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
576 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
577 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
578 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
579 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
580 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
581 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
582 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
584 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
586 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
587 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
588 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
589 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
591 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
592 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
593 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
594 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
596 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
597 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
598 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
599 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
600 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
602 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
603 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
604 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
605 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
607 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
608 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
609 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
611 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
612 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
613 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
614 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
615 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
617 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
618 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
621 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
622 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
624 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
625 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
626 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
627 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
629 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
630 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
632 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
633 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
637 (0, update, required),
640 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
641 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
642 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
643 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
644 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
648 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
649 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
650 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
652 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
654 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
655 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
656 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
660 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
662 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
664 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
669 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
670 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
671 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
672 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
673 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
675 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
676 /// in a timely manner.
677 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
680 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
681 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
682 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
684 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
685 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
686 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
687 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
691 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
692 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
693 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
695 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
696 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
697 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
698 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
700 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
704 /// The current channel ID.
705 channel_id: ChannelId,
706 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
707 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
708 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
711 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
712 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
714 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
715 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
716 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
719 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
721 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
723 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
724 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
726 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
728 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
729 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
730 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
732 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
733 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
734 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
736 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
737 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
738 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
739 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
740 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
741 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
743 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
744 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
745 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
746 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
747 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
748 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
750 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
752 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
753 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
754 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
756 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
757 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
758 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
759 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
760 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
761 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
762 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
764 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
765 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
766 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
768 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
769 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
770 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
771 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
772 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
773 /// outbound or inbound.
774 signer_pending_funding: bool,
776 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
778 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
779 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
780 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
781 // HTLCs with similar state.
782 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
783 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
784 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
785 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
786 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
787 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
788 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
789 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
790 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
793 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
794 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
795 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
797 update_time_counter: u32,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
801 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
803 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
804 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
806 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
807 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
809 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
810 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
811 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
812 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
814 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
815 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
817 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
821 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
822 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
823 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
824 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
825 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
827 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
828 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
830 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
831 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
832 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
834 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
835 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
836 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
837 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
838 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
839 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
840 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
841 channel_creation_height: u32,
843 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
848 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
851 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
853 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
860 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
861 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
864 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
868 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
871 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
874 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
875 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
877 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
879 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
880 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
881 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
883 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
884 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
885 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
887 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
889 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
891 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
892 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
893 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
894 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
896 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
897 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
898 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
900 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
901 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
902 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
904 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
905 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
906 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
907 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
911 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
913 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
914 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
915 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
916 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
917 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
919 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
920 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
922 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
923 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
924 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
925 /// unblock the state machine.
927 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
928 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
929 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
931 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
932 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
933 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
936 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
937 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
938 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
939 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
940 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
941 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
942 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
944 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
945 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
947 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
948 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
949 // the channel's funding UTXO.
951 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
952 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
953 // associated channel mapping.
955 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
956 // to store all of them.
957 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
959 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
960 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
961 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
962 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
963 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
965 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
966 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
968 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
969 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
971 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
972 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
973 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
975 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
976 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
977 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
980 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
982 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
983 self.update_time_counter
986 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
987 self.latest_monitor_update_id
990 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
991 self.config.announced_channel
994 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
998 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1001 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1004 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1005 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1006 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1009 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1012 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1013 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1016 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1017 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1018 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1019 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1022 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1024 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1025 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1027 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1030 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1033 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1034 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1035 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1036 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1037 self.channel_state &
1038 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1039 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1040 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1041 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1044 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1045 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1047 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1048 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1051 // Public utilities:
1053 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1057 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1059 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1060 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1061 self.temporary_channel_id
1064 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1068 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1069 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1070 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1074 /// Gets the channel's type
1075 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1079 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1081 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1082 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.short_channel_id
1086 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1087 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1088 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1091 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1092 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1093 self.outbound_scid_alias
1096 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1098 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1099 return &self.holder_signer
1102 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1103 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1104 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1105 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1106 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1107 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1110 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1111 /// get_funding_created.
1112 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1113 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1116 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1117 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1118 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1121 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1122 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1123 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1124 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1128 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1131 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1132 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1135 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1136 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1139 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1140 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1141 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1144 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1145 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1148 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1149 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1150 self.counterparty_node_id
1153 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1154 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1155 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1159 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1160 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1163 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1164 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1166 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1167 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1168 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1169 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1171 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1175 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1176 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1177 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1180 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1181 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1182 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1185 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1186 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1187 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1189 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1190 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1195 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1196 self.channel_value_satoshis
1199 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1200 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1203 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1204 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1207 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1208 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1209 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1211 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1212 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1213 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1214 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1215 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1217 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1221 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1222 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1223 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1226 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1227 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1228 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1231 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1232 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1233 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1236 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1237 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1238 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1241 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1242 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1243 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1246 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1247 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1248 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1251 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1252 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1253 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1254 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1255 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1258 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1260 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1261 self.prev_config = None;
1265 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1266 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1270 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1271 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1272 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1273 let did_channel_update =
1274 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1275 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1276 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1277 if did_channel_update {
1278 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1279 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1280 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1281 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1283 self.config.options = *config;
1287 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1288 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1289 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1290 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1291 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1294 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1295 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1296 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1297 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1298 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1300 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1301 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1302 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1303 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1304 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1305 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1306 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1308 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1309 where L::Target: Logger
1311 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1312 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1313 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1315 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1316 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1317 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1318 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1320 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1321 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1322 if match update_state {
1323 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1324 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1325 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1326 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1327 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1329 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1333 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1334 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1335 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1337 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1339 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1340 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1341 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1343 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1344 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1345 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1346 transaction_output_index: None
1351 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1352 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1353 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1354 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1355 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1358 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1360 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1361 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1362 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1364 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1365 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1368 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1369 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1372 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1374 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1375 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1376 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1378 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1379 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1385 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1386 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1387 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1388 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1389 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1390 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1391 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1395 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1396 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1400 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1401 if generated_by_local {
1402 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1403 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1412 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1414 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1415 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1416 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1417 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1418 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1419 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1420 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1423 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1424 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1425 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1426 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1430 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1431 preimages.push(preimage);
1435 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1436 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1438 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1440 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1441 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1443 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1444 if !generated_by_local {
1445 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1453 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1454 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1455 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1456 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1457 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1458 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1459 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1460 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1462 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1464 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1465 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1466 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1467 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1469 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1471 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1472 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1473 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1474 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1477 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1478 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1479 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1480 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1482 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1485 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1486 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1487 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1488 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1490 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1493 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1499 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1505 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1507 let channel_parameters =
1508 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1509 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1510 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1517 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1520 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1521 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1522 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1523 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1525 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1526 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1527 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1535 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1536 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1542 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1543 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1544 /// our counterparty!)
1545 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1546 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1547 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1548 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1549 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1550 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1551 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1553 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1557 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1558 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1559 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1560 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1561 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1562 //may see payments to it!
1563 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1564 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1565 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1567 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1570 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1571 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1572 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1573 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1574 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1577 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1578 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1581 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1585 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1586 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1587 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1588 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1589 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1590 // which are near the dust limit.
1591 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1592 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1593 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1594 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1595 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1597 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1598 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1600 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1603 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1604 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1605 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1608 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1609 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1611 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1612 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1613 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1614 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1615 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1616 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1617 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1620 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1623 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1624 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1625 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1627 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1628 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1629 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1630 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1631 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1632 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1634 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1635 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1641 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1642 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1644 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1645 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1646 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1647 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1648 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1649 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1650 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1653 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1656 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1657 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1658 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1660 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1661 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1662 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1663 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1664 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1665 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1668 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1672 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1673 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1674 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1675 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1676 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1677 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1678 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1680 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1681 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1683 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1690 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1691 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1692 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1693 /// corner case properly.
1694 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1695 -> AvailableBalances
1696 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1698 let context = &self;
1699 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1700 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1701 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1703 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1704 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1705 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1706 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1709 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1711 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1712 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1714 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1716 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1718 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1719 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1723 if context.is_outbound() {
1724 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1725 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1727 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1728 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1730 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1731 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1732 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1733 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1736 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1737 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1738 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1739 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1740 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1741 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1742 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1745 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1746 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1747 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1748 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1749 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1750 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1751 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1752 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1753 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1754 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1755 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1757 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1760 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1761 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1762 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1763 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1764 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1767 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1768 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1770 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1771 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1772 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1774 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1775 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1776 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1777 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1781 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1783 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1784 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1785 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1786 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1787 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1788 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1789 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1791 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1792 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1794 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1795 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1796 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1798 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1799 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1800 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1801 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1802 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1805 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1806 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1807 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1808 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1809 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1810 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1813 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1814 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1815 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1817 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1821 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1822 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1824 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1825 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1829 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1830 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1831 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1832 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1834 outbound_capacity_msat,
1835 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1836 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1841 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1842 let context = &self;
1843 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1846 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1847 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1849 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1850 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1852 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1853 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1855 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1856 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1857 let context = &self;
1858 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1860 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1863 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1864 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1866 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1867 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1869 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1870 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1877 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1878 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1884 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1885 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1886 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1889 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1890 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1891 included_htlcs += 1;
1894 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1895 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1899 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1900 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1901 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1902 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1903 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1904 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1909 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1911 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1912 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1917 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1918 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1922 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1923 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1924 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1927 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1928 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1930 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1931 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1932 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1934 total_pending_htlcs,
1935 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1936 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1937 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1939 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1940 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1941 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1943 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1945 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1950 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1951 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1953 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1954 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1956 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1957 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1959 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1960 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1961 let context = &self;
1962 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1964 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1967 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1968 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1970 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1971 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1973 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1974 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1976 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1977 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1981 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1982 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1988 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1989 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1990 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1991 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1992 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1993 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1996 included_htlcs += 1;
1999 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2000 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2003 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2004 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2006 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2007 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2008 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2013 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2014 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2015 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2018 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2019 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2021 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2022 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2024 total_pending_htlcs,
2025 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2026 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2027 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2030 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2031 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2033 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2035 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2040 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2041 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2042 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2043 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2050 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2052 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2053 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2056 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2058 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2059 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2060 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2064 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2065 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2066 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2069 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2071 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2072 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2075 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2076 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2077 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2078 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2079 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2080 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2081 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2082 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2083 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2084 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2085 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2087 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2088 // return them to fail the payment.
2089 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2090 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2091 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2093 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2094 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2099 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2100 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2101 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2102 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2103 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2104 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2105 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2106 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2107 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2108 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2109 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2110 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2111 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2115 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2117 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2118 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2121 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2122 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2126 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2127 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2128 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2129 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2130 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2131 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2132 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2133 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2134 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2138 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2139 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2140 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2143 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2144 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2145 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2146 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2149 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2151 next_local_nonce: None,
2155 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2156 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2157 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2158 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2160 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2161 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2162 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2163 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2165 match &self.holder_signer {
2166 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2167 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2168 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2169 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2170 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2173 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2177 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2178 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2179 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2180 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2181 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2182 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2185 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2186 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2192 // Internal utility functions for channels
2194 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2195 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2196 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2198 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2200 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2201 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2202 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2204 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2207 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2209 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2212 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2213 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2214 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2216 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2218 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2219 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2220 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2221 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2222 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2225 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2226 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2227 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2228 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2229 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2230 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2231 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2234 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2235 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2237 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2238 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2241 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2242 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2243 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2244 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2245 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2246 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2249 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2250 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2251 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2252 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2255 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2256 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2258 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2259 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2260 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2264 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2266 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2268 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2269 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2270 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2271 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2273 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2274 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2276 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2278 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2279 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2280 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2281 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2283 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2284 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2294 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2295 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2296 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2297 // outside of those situations will fail.
2298 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2302 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2307 1 + // script length (0)
2311 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2312 2 + // witness marker and flag
2313 1 + // witness element count
2314 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2315 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2316 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2317 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2318 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2319 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2321 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2322 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2323 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2329 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2330 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2331 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2332 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2334 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2335 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2336 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2338 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2339 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2340 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2341 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2342 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2343 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2346 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2347 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2350 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2351 value_to_holder = 0;
2354 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2355 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2356 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2357 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2359 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2360 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2363 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2364 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2367 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2370 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2371 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2373 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2375 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2376 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2377 where L::Target: Logger {
2378 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2379 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2380 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2381 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2382 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2383 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2384 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2385 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2389 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2390 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2391 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2392 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2394 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2395 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2397 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2399 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2400 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2401 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2403 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2404 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2405 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2406 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2407 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2408 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2409 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2411 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2412 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2413 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2415 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2416 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2418 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2421 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2422 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2426 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2430 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2431 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2432 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2433 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2434 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2435 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2438 // Now update local state:
2440 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2441 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2442 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2443 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2444 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2445 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2446 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2450 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2451 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2452 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2453 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2454 // do not not get into this branch.
2455 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2456 match pending_update {
2457 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2458 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2459 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2460 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2461 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2462 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2463 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2466 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2467 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2468 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2469 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2470 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2471 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2472 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2478 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2479 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2480 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2482 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2483 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2484 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2487 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2490 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2491 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2493 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2494 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2496 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2497 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2500 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2503 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2504 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2505 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2506 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2511 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2512 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2513 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2514 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2515 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2516 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2517 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2518 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2519 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2520 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2521 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2522 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2523 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2524 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2525 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2527 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2528 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2529 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2530 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2531 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2534 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2535 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2536 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2542 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2543 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2545 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2549 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2550 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2551 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2552 /// before we fail backwards.
2554 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2555 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2556 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2557 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2558 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2559 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2560 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2563 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2564 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2565 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2566 /// before we fail backwards.
2568 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2569 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2570 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2571 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2572 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2573 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2574 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2576 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2578 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2579 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2580 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2582 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2583 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2584 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2586 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2587 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2588 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2590 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2595 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2602 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2604 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2605 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2606 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2610 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2611 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2612 force_holding_cell = true;
2615 // Now update local state:
2616 if force_holding_cell {
2617 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2618 match pending_update {
2619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2620 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2622 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2627 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2628 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2629 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2635 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2636 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2637 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2643 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2645 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2646 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2649 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2650 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2651 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2656 // Message handlers:
2658 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2659 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2660 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2661 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2662 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2666 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2667 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2669 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2672 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2673 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2674 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2675 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2678 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2680 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2681 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2682 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2683 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2685 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2686 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2688 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2689 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2691 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2692 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2693 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2694 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2695 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2696 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2700 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2701 initial_commitment_tx,
2704 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2705 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2708 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2709 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2712 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2713 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2714 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2715 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2716 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2717 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2718 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2719 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2720 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2721 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2722 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2723 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2725 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2727 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2728 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2729 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2730 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2731 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2732 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2733 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2735 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2736 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2737 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2739 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2741 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2742 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2744 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2746 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2747 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2751 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2752 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2753 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2754 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2755 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2756 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2757 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2760 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2761 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2763 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2764 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2765 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2766 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2768 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2771 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2772 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2773 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2776 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2777 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2778 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2779 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2780 // when routing outbound payments.
2781 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2785 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2787 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2788 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2790 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2791 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2793 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2794 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2795 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2796 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2797 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2798 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2799 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2800 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2801 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2803 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2804 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2805 let expected_point =
2806 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2807 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2809 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2810 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2811 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2812 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2813 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2814 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2816 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2817 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2818 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2819 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2820 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2822 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2830 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2831 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2833 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2835 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2838 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2839 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2840 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2841 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2842 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2843 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2845 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2846 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2847 if local_sent_shutdown {
2848 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2850 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2851 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2852 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2855 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2858 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2861 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2864 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2868 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2869 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2870 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2873 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2874 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2877 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2878 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2879 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2880 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2881 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2882 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2883 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2884 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2885 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2886 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2887 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2889 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2890 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2891 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2892 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2893 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2894 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2898 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2902 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2906 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2907 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2908 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2909 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2910 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2911 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2912 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2916 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2917 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2918 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2919 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2920 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2921 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2922 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2926 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2927 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2928 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2929 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2930 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2934 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2935 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2937 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2938 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2939 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2941 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2942 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2946 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2949 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2954 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2955 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2959 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2960 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2961 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2962 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2963 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2965 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2966 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2967 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2969 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2970 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2971 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2972 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2973 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2976 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2977 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2978 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2979 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2983 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2986 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2990 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2991 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2992 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2996 // Now update local state:
2997 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2998 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2999 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3000 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3001 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3002 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3003 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3008 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3010 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3011 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3012 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3013 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3014 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3015 None => fail_reason.into(),
3016 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3017 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3018 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3021 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3025 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3027 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3028 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3030 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3036 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3039 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3040 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3043 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3047 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3050 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3051 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3054 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3058 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3062 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3063 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3066 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3070 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3074 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3075 where L::Target: Logger
3077 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3080 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3083 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3087 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3089 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3091 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3092 let commitment_txid = {
3093 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3094 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3095 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3097 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3098 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3099 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3100 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3101 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3106 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3108 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3109 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3110 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3111 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3114 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3115 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3116 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3120 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3122 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3123 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3124 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3125 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3126 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3127 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3128 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3129 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3130 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3131 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3132 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3138 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3142 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3143 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3144 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3145 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3146 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3147 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3148 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3149 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3150 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3151 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3152 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3153 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3154 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3157 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3158 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3159 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3160 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3161 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3162 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3163 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3165 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3166 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3167 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3168 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3169 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3170 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3171 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3174 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3175 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3178 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3180 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3181 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3182 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3185 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3188 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3189 commitment_stats.tx,
3191 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3192 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3193 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3196 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3197 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3199 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3200 let mut need_commitment = false;
3201 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3202 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3203 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3204 need_commitment = true;
3208 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3209 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3210 Some(forward_info.clone())
3212 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3213 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3214 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3215 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3216 need_commitment = true;
3219 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3220 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3221 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3222 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3223 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3224 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3225 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3226 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3227 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3228 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3229 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3230 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3231 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3232 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3234 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3236 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3237 need_commitment = true;
3241 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3242 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3243 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3244 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3245 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3246 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3248 nondust_htlc_sources,
3252 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3253 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3254 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3255 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3256 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3258 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3259 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3260 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3261 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3262 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3263 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3264 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3265 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3266 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3267 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3268 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3269 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3270 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3271 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3273 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3274 &self.context.channel_id);
3275 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3278 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3279 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3280 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3281 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3282 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3283 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3284 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3285 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3286 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3290 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3291 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3292 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3293 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3296 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3297 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3298 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3299 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3300 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3301 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3302 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3304 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3305 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3306 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3307 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3310 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3311 /// for our counterparty.
3312 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3313 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3314 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3315 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3317 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3318 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3319 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3320 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3322 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3323 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3324 updates: Vec::new(),
3327 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3328 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3329 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3330 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3331 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3332 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3333 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3334 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3335 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3336 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3337 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3338 // to rebalance channels.
3339 match &htlc_update {
3340 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3341 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3342 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3344 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3345 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3347 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3350 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3351 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3352 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3353 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3354 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3355 // into the holding cell without ever being
3356 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3357 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3358 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3361 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3368 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3369 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3370 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3371 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3372 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3373 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3374 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3375 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3376 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3377 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3378 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3380 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3381 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3382 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3383 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3384 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3385 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3386 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3387 // for a full revocation before failing.
3388 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3389 update_fail_count += 1;
3392 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3394 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3401 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3402 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3404 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3405 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3410 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3411 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3412 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3413 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3414 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3416 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3417 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3418 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3420 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3421 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3427 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3428 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3429 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3430 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3431 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3432 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3433 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3434 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3435 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3437 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3440 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3443 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3447 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3449 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3450 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3455 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3456 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3457 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3458 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3459 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3460 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3461 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3462 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3466 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3468 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3469 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3472 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3473 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3474 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3475 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3477 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3481 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3482 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3483 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3484 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3485 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3486 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3487 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3488 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3492 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3493 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3494 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3495 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3496 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3497 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3498 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3499 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3500 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3502 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3503 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3506 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3507 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3508 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3510 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3511 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3512 let mut require_commitment = false;
3513 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3516 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3517 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3518 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3519 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3521 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3522 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3523 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3524 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3525 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3526 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3528 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3532 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3533 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3534 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3535 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3536 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3538 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3539 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3540 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3545 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3546 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3548 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3552 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3553 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3555 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3556 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3557 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3558 require_commitment = true;
3559 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3560 match forward_info {
3561 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3562 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3563 require_commitment = true;
3565 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3566 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3567 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3569 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3570 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3571 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3575 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3576 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3577 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3578 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3584 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3585 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3586 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3588 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3590 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3591 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3592 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3593 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3594 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3595 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3596 require_commitment = true;
3600 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3602 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3603 match update_state {
3604 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3605 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3606 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3607 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3608 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3609 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3611 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3612 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3613 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3614 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3615 require_commitment = true;
3616 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3617 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3622 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3623 let release_state_str =
3624 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3625 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3626 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3627 if !release_monitor {
3628 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3629 update: monitor_update,
3631 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3633 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3638 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3639 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3640 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3641 if require_commitment {
3642 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3643 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3644 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3645 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3647 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3648 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3649 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3650 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3651 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3654 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3656 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3657 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3660 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3661 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3662 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3663 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3664 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3665 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3667 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3668 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3670 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3671 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3673 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3674 if require_commitment {
3675 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3677 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3678 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3679 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3680 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3682 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3683 &self.context.channel_id(),
3684 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3687 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3688 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3690 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3691 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3693 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3694 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3700 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3701 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3702 /// commitment update.
3703 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3704 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3705 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3707 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3708 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3711 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3712 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3713 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3714 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3716 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3717 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3718 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3719 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3720 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3721 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3722 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3724 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3725 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3727 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3728 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3730 if !self.context.is_live() {
3731 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3734 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3735 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3736 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3737 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3738 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3739 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3740 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3741 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3742 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3743 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3747 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3748 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3749 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3750 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3751 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3752 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3755 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3760 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3761 force_holding_cell = true;
3764 if force_holding_cell {
3765 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3769 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3770 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3772 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3773 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3778 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3779 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3781 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3783 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3784 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3785 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3786 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3790 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3791 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3792 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3796 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3797 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3800 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3801 // will be retransmitted.
3802 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3803 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3804 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3806 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3807 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3809 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3810 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3811 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3812 // this HTLC accordingly
3813 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3816 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3817 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3818 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3819 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3822 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3823 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3824 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3825 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3826 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3827 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3832 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3834 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3835 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3836 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3837 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3841 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3842 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3843 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3844 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3845 // the update upon reconnection.
3846 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3850 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3852 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3853 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3857 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3858 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3859 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3860 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3861 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3862 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3863 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3865 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3866 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3867 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3868 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3869 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3870 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3871 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3873 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3874 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3875 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3876 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3877 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3878 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3879 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3882 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3883 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3884 /// to the remote side.
3885 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3886 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3887 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3888 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3891 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3893 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3894 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3896 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3897 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3898 // first received the funding_signed.
3899 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3900 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3901 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3903 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3904 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3905 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3906 funding_broadcastable = None;
3909 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3910 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3911 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3912 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3913 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3914 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3915 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3916 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3917 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3918 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3919 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3920 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3921 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3922 next_per_commitment_point,
3923 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3927 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3929 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3930 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3931 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3932 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3933 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3934 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3936 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3938 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3939 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3940 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3941 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3945 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3946 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3948 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3949 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3951 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3952 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3955 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3956 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3957 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3958 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3959 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3960 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3961 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3962 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3963 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3967 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3968 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3970 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3973 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3976 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3978 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3979 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3980 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3981 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3982 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3983 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3984 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3985 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3986 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3987 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3989 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3991 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3993 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3999 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4002 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4003 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4004 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4006 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4007 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4009 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4010 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4012 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4013 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4016 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4017 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4018 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4019 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4020 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4022 SignerResumeUpdates {
4030 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4031 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4032 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4033 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4034 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4035 per_commitment_secret,
4036 next_per_commitment_point,
4038 next_local_nonce: None,
4042 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4043 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4044 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4045 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4046 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4047 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4049 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4050 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4051 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4052 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4053 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4054 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4055 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4056 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4057 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4058 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4063 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4064 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4066 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4067 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4068 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4069 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4070 reason: err_packet.clone()
4073 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4074 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4075 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4076 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4077 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4078 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4081 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4082 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4083 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4084 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4085 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4092 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4093 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4094 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4095 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4099 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4100 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4101 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4102 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4103 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4104 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4105 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4109 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4110 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4111 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4115 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4116 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4121 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4122 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4123 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4124 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4125 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4126 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4127 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4132 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4133 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4135 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4136 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4137 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4138 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4139 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4140 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4141 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4142 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4145 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4147 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4148 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4149 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4150 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4154 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4155 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4159 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4160 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4161 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4162 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4163 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4166 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4167 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4168 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4169 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4170 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4173 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4174 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4175 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4176 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4177 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4178 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4179 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4180 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4184 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4185 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4186 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4187 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4189 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4193 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4194 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4195 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4196 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4198 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4200 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4202 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4203 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4204 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4205 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4206 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4209 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4210 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4211 channel_ready: None,
4212 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4213 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4214 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4218 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4219 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4220 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4221 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4222 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4223 next_per_commitment_point,
4224 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4226 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4227 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4228 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4232 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4233 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4234 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4236 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4237 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4238 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4241 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4247 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4248 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4249 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4250 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4251 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4252 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4253 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4255 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4257 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4258 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4259 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4260 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4261 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4262 next_per_commitment_point,
4263 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4267 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4268 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4269 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4271 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4274 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4275 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4276 raa: required_revoke,
4277 commitment_update: None,
4278 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4280 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4281 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4282 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4284 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4287 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4288 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4289 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4290 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4291 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4292 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4295 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4296 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4297 raa: required_revoke,
4298 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4299 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4303 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4307 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4308 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4309 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4310 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4314 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4316 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4317 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4318 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4319 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4320 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4321 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4322 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4323 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4325 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4326 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4327 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4328 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4329 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4331 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4332 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4333 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4334 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4337 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4338 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4339 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4340 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4341 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4342 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4343 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4344 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4345 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4346 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4347 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4348 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4349 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4350 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4351 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4353 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4356 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4357 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4360 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4361 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4362 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4363 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4364 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4365 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4368 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4369 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4370 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4371 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4372 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4373 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4376 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4382 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4383 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4384 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4385 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4387 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4388 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4389 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4390 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4391 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4392 return Ok((None, None, None));
4395 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4396 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4397 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4399 return Ok((None, None, None));
4402 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4403 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4404 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4405 return Ok((None, None, None));
4408 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4410 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4411 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4412 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4413 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4415 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4416 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4418 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4419 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4421 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4422 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4423 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4424 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4426 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4427 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4428 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4435 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4436 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4438 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4439 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4442 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4443 /// within our expected timeframe.
4445 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4446 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4447 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4450 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4453 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4454 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4458 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4459 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4461 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4464 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4465 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4466 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4467 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4470 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4471 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4475 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4477 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4478 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4481 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4482 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4483 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4486 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4489 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4490 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4491 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4492 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4494 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4497 assert!(send_shutdown);
4498 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4499 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4500 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4502 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4505 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4510 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4512 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4513 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4515 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4516 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4517 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4518 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4519 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4520 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4523 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4524 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4526 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4527 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4528 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4529 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4533 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4534 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4535 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4536 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4537 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4538 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4540 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4541 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4548 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4549 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4551 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4554 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4555 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4557 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4559 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4560 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4561 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4562 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4563 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4564 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4565 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4566 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4567 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4569 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4570 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4573 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4577 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4578 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4579 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4580 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4582 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4585 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4588 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4591 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4595 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4599 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4600 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4601 return Ok((None, None, None));
4604 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4605 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4606 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4609 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4611 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4614 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4615 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4616 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4617 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4618 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4622 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4623 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4628 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4629 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4630 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4631 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4632 monitor_update: None,
4633 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4634 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4636 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4637 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4638 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4639 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4643 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4645 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4646 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4647 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4648 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4650 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4653 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4654 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4656 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4657 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4658 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4659 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4660 monitor_update: None,
4661 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4662 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4664 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4665 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4666 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4667 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4672 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4673 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4674 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4675 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4677 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4678 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4679 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4681 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4687 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4688 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4689 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4691 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4694 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4695 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4698 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4699 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4700 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4701 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4702 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4704 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4706 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4708 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4709 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4712 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4713 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4714 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4715 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4716 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4717 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4718 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4719 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4721 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4724 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4725 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4726 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4727 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4733 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4734 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4735 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4736 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4738 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4744 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4745 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4746 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4747 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4748 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4749 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4750 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4752 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4753 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4756 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4758 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4759 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4765 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4766 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4767 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4768 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4769 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4770 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4771 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4773 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4774 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4781 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4782 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4785 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4786 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4789 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4790 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4794 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4795 &self.context.holder_signer
4799 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4801 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4802 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4803 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4804 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4805 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4806 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4808 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4810 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4818 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4819 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4823 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4824 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4825 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4826 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4829 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4830 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4831 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4832 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4835 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4836 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4837 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4838 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4839 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4840 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4843 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4844 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4845 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4846 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4847 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4848 if !release_monitor {
4849 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4858 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4859 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4862 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4863 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4864 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4866 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4867 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4868 if self.context.channel_state &
4869 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4870 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4871 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4872 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4873 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4876 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4877 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4878 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4879 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4880 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4881 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4883 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4884 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4885 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4887 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4888 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4889 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4890 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4891 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4892 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4898 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4899 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4900 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4903 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4904 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4905 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4908 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4909 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4910 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4913 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4914 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4915 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4916 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4917 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4918 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4923 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4924 self.context.channel_update_status
4927 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4928 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4929 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4932 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4934 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4935 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4936 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4940 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4941 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4942 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4945 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4949 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4950 // channel_ready yet.
4951 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4955 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4956 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4957 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4958 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4959 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4961 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4962 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4963 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4965 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4966 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4969 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4970 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4971 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4972 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4973 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4974 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4975 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4976 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4977 self.context.channel_state);
4979 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4983 if need_commitment_update {
4984 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4985 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4986 let next_per_commitment_point =
4987 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4988 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4990 next_per_commitment_point,
4991 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4995 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5001 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5002 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5003 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5004 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5005 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5006 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5007 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5012 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5013 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5014 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5015 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5016 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5017 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5018 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5019 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5020 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5021 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5022 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5023 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5024 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5025 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5026 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5027 // channel and move on.
5028 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5029 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5031 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5032 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5033 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5035 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5036 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5037 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5038 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5039 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5040 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5041 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5042 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5047 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5048 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5049 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5050 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5051 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5054 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5055 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5056 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5057 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5058 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5059 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5062 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5063 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5064 // may have already happened for this block).
5065 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5066 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5067 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5068 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5071 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5072 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5073 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5074 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5082 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5083 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5084 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5085 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5087 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5088 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5091 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5093 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5094 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5095 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5096 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5098 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5101 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5104 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5105 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5106 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5107 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5109 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5112 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5113 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5114 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5116 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5117 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5120 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5121 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5129 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5131 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5132 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5133 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5135 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5136 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5139 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5140 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5141 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5142 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5143 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5144 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5145 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5146 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5147 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5150 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5151 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5152 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5153 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5155 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5156 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5157 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5159 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5160 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5161 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5162 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5164 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5165 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5166 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5167 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5168 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5169 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5170 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5173 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5174 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5176 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5179 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5180 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5181 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5182 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5183 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5184 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5185 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5186 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5187 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5188 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5189 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5190 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5191 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5192 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5193 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5194 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5195 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5201 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5206 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5207 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5209 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5210 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5211 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5212 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5214 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5217 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5219 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5220 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5221 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5222 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5223 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5226 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5227 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5230 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5231 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5232 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5233 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5234 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5235 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5237 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5238 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5241 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5242 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5243 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5244 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5245 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5251 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5252 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5253 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5254 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5256 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5259 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5263 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5267 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5268 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5272 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5276 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5277 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5280 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5284 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5286 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5291 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5292 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5293 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5295 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5300 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5302 None => return None,
5305 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5307 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5308 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5310 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5311 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5317 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5319 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5320 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5321 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5322 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5323 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5324 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5325 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5327 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5328 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5329 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5330 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5331 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5332 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5333 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5334 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5335 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5336 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5337 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5338 contents: announcement,
5343 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5347 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5348 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5349 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5350 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5351 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5352 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5353 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5354 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5356 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5358 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5360 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5361 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5363 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5364 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5365 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5366 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5369 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5370 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5371 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5372 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5375 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5378 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5379 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5380 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5381 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5382 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5383 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5386 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5388 Err(_) => return None,
5390 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5391 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5396 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5397 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5398 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5399 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5400 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5401 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5402 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5403 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5404 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5405 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5406 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5407 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5408 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5409 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5410 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5411 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5414 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5417 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5418 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5419 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5420 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5421 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5422 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5423 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5424 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5425 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5427 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5428 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5429 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5430 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5431 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5432 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5433 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5434 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5435 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5437 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5438 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5439 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5440 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5441 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5442 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5443 next_funding_txid: None,
5448 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5450 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5451 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5452 /// commitment update.
5454 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5455 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5456 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5457 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5458 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5459 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5460 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5463 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5464 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5465 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5467 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5468 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5473 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5474 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5476 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5478 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5479 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5481 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5482 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5483 /// regenerate them.
5485 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5486 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5488 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5489 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5490 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5491 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5492 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5493 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5494 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5496 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5497 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5499 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5500 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5501 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5504 if amount_msat == 0 {
5505 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5508 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5509 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5511 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5514 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5516 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5519 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5520 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5521 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5522 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5523 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5524 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5525 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5529 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5530 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5531 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5532 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5533 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5534 else { "to peer" });
5536 if need_holding_cell {
5537 force_holding_cell = true;
5540 // Now update local state:
5541 if force_holding_cell {
5542 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5547 onion_routing_packet,
5553 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5554 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5556 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5558 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5563 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5564 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5565 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5569 onion_routing_packet,
5572 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5577 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5578 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5579 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5580 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5582 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5583 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5584 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5586 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5587 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5591 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5592 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5593 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5594 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5595 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5596 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5597 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5601 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5602 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5604 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5605 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5608 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5610 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5611 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5612 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5613 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5614 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5616 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5617 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5620 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5621 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5622 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5623 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5624 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5625 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5626 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5627 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5628 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5629 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5630 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5633 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5637 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5638 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5639 where L::Target: Logger
5641 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5642 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5643 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5645 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5647 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5648 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5649 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5650 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5651 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5652 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5653 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5654 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5655 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5656 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5657 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5663 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5666 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5667 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5668 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5669 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5670 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5671 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5673 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5674 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5675 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5677 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5678 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5679 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5682 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5683 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5687 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5688 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5690 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5692 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5693 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5694 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5695 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5697 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5698 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5699 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5700 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5701 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5702 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5706 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5707 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5711 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5712 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5717 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5718 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5720 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5721 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5722 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5723 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5724 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5725 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5726 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5727 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5729 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5730 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5731 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5734 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5735 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5736 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5742 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5744 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5745 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5746 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5747 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5748 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5750 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5752 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5758 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5759 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5761 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5762 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5763 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5764 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5765 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5767 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5768 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5769 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5772 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5773 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5776 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5777 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5780 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5783 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5784 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5785 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5788 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5789 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5790 let mut chan_closed = false;
5791 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5795 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5797 None if !chan_closed => {
5798 // use override shutdown script if provided
5799 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5800 Some(script) => script,
5802 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5803 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5804 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5805 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5809 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5810 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5812 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5818 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5819 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5820 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5821 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5822 monitor_update: None,
5823 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5824 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5826 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5827 Some(shutdown_result)
5829 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5832 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5834 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5835 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5836 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5837 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5838 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5839 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5842 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5843 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5845 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5846 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5847 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5850 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5851 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5852 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5853 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5854 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5856 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5857 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5864 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5865 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5867 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5870 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5871 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5872 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5874 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5875 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5879 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5883 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5884 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5885 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5886 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5889 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5890 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5891 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5892 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5893 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5894 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5895 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5896 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5898 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5899 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5900 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5901 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5903 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5904 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5906 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5909 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5910 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5913 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5916 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5917 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5918 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5919 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5923 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5924 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5926 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5927 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5929 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5931 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5933 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5934 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5935 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5936 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5939 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5940 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5942 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5943 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5944 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5945 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5949 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5950 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5951 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5955 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5956 Ok(script) => script,
5957 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5960 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5963 context: ChannelContext {
5966 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5967 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5968 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5969 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5974 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5976 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5977 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5978 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5981 channel_value_satoshis,
5983 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5985 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5986 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5989 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5990 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5993 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5994 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5995 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5996 pending_update_fee: None,
5997 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5998 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5999 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6000 update_time_counter: 1,
6002 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6004 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6005 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6006 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6007 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6008 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6009 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6011 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6012 signer_pending_funding: false,
6014 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6015 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6016 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6017 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6019 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6020 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6021 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6022 closing_fee_limits: None,
6023 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6025 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6026 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6027 short_channel_id: None,
6028 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6030 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6031 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6032 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6033 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6034 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6035 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6036 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6037 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6038 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6039 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6040 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6041 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6043 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6045 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6046 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6047 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6048 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6049 counterparty_parameters: None,
6050 funding_outpoint: None,
6051 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6053 funding_transaction: None,
6054 is_batch_funding: None,
6056 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6057 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6058 counterparty_node_id,
6060 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6062 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6064 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6065 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6067 announcement_sigs: None,
6069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6070 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6072 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6074 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6075 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6077 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6078 outbound_scid_alias,
6080 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6081 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6083 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6084 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6089 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6091 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6095 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6096 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6097 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6098 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6099 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6100 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6101 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6102 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6103 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6104 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6105 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6107 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6108 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6110 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6111 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6112 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6113 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6116 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6117 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6119 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6121 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6122 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6124 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6125 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6126 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6127 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6128 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6129 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6132 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6133 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6135 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6136 if funding_created.is_none() {
6137 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6138 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6139 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6143 let channel = Channel {
6144 context: self.context,
6147 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6150 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6151 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6152 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6153 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6154 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6155 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6156 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6157 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6158 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6159 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6162 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6163 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6164 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6165 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6166 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6167 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6173 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6174 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6175 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6176 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6177 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6178 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6180 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6182 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6183 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6184 // We've exhausted our options
6187 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6188 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6191 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6192 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6193 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6194 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6196 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6197 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6198 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6199 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6200 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6201 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6203 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6205 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6206 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6209 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6210 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6211 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6213 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6214 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6217 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6218 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6221 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6222 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6226 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6227 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6228 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6229 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6230 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6231 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6232 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6233 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6234 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6235 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6236 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6237 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6238 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6239 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6240 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6241 first_per_commitment_point,
6242 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6243 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6244 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6245 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6247 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6252 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6253 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6255 // Check sanity of message fields:
6256 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6259 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6265 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6268 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6271 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6273 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6275 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6276 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6279 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6280 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6283 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6286 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6290 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6291 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6294 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6297 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6300 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6303 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6306 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6309 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6313 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6314 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6317 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6318 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6320 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6321 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6324 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6325 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6328 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6329 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6330 &Some(ref script) => {
6331 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6332 if script.len() == 0 {
6335 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6338 Some(script.clone())
6341 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6348 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6349 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6350 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6351 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6352 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6354 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6355 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6357 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6360 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6361 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6362 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6363 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6364 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6365 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6368 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6369 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6370 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6373 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6374 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6376 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6377 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6383 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6384 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6385 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6386 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6389 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6390 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6391 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6392 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6393 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6394 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6395 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6396 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6397 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6398 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6399 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6402 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6404 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6405 // support this channel type.
6406 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6407 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6411 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6412 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6413 // `static_remote_key`.
6414 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6417 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6418 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6421 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6424 channel_type.clone()
6426 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6427 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6433 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6434 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6435 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6436 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6437 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6438 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6439 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6440 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6441 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6444 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6448 // Check sanity of message fields:
6449 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6452 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6455 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6456 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6458 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6459 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6462 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6463 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6465 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6468 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6470 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6471 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6474 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6477 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6481 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6482 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6485 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6488 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6489 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6491 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6494 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6495 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6497 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6500 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6504 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6506 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6507 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6512 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6513 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6514 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6515 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6518 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6521 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6522 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6523 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6525 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6529 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6530 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6531 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6532 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6536 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6537 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6538 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6542 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6543 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6544 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6545 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6549 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6550 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6551 &Some(ref script) => {
6552 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6553 if script.len() == 0 {
6556 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6557 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6559 Some(script.clone())
6562 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6569 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6570 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6571 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6572 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6576 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6577 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6582 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6583 Ok(script) => script,
6584 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6587 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6588 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6590 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6593 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6597 context: ChannelContext {
6600 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6601 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6603 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6608 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6610 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6611 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6612 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6613 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6616 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6618 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6619 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6622 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6623 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6624 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6626 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6627 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6628 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6629 pending_update_fee: None,
6630 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6631 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6632 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6633 update_time_counter: 1,
6635 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6637 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6638 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6639 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6640 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6641 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6642 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6644 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6645 signer_pending_funding: false,
6647 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6648 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6649 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6650 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6652 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6653 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6654 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6655 closing_fee_limits: None,
6656 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6658 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6659 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6660 short_channel_id: None,
6661 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6663 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6664 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6665 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6666 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6667 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6668 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6669 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6670 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6671 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6672 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6673 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6674 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6677 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6679 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6680 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6681 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6682 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6683 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6684 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6685 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6687 funding_outpoint: None,
6688 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6690 funding_transaction: None,
6691 is_batch_funding: None,
6693 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6694 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6695 counterparty_node_id,
6697 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6699 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6701 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6702 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6704 announcement_sigs: None,
6706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6707 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6709 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6711 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6712 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6714 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6715 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6717 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6718 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6721 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6726 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6728 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6734 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6735 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6737 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6738 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6739 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6740 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6742 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6743 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6745 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6746 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6749 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6752 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6753 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6754 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6756 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6757 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6758 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6759 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6761 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6762 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6763 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6764 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6765 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6766 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6767 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6768 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6769 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6770 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6771 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6772 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6773 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6774 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6775 first_per_commitment_point,
6776 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6777 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6778 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6780 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6782 next_local_nonce: None,
6786 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6787 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6789 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6791 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6792 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6795 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6796 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6798 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6799 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6800 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6801 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6802 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6803 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6804 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6805 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6806 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6807 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6808 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6810 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6813 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6814 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6815 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6819 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6820 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6822 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6823 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6824 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6826 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6828 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6829 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6830 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6831 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6834 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6835 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6836 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6837 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6838 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6840 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6842 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6843 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6844 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6847 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6848 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6849 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6853 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6854 initial_commitment_tx,
6857 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6858 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6861 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6862 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6865 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6867 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6868 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6869 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6870 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6872 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6874 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6875 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6876 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6877 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6878 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6879 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6880 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6881 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6882 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6883 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6884 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6886 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6888 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6889 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6890 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6891 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6892 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6893 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6895 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6896 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6898 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6899 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6900 let mut channel = Channel {
6901 context: self.context,
6903 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6904 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6906 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6910 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6911 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6913 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6919 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6920 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6921 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6922 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6923 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6925 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6926 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6927 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6928 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6934 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6935 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6936 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6937 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6938 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6939 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6944 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6945 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6946 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6947 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6949 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6950 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6951 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6952 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6957 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6958 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6959 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6960 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6961 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6962 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6967 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6968 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6969 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6972 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6974 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6975 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6976 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6977 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6978 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6980 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6981 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6982 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6983 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6985 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6986 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6987 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6989 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6991 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6992 // deserialized from that format.
6993 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6994 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6995 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6997 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6999 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7000 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7001 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7003 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7004 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7005 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7006 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7009 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7010 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7011 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7014 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7015 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7016 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7017 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7019 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7020 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7022 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7024 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7026 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7028 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7031 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7033 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7038 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7039 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7041 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7042 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7043 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7044 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7045 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7046 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7047 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7049 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7051 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7053 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7056 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7057 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7058 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7061 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7063 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7064 preimages.push(preimage);
7066 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7067 reason.write(writer)?;
7069 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7071 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7072 preimages.push(preimage);
7074 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7075 reason.write(writer)?;
7078 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7079 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7080 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7082 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7083 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7084 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7088 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7089 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7090 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7092 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7093 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7097 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7098 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7099 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7100 source.write(writer)?;
7101 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7103 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7104 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7105 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7107 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7108 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7110 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7112 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7113 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7115 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7117 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7118 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7123 match self.context.resend_order {
7124 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7125 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7128 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7129 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7130 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7132 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7133 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7134 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7135 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7138 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7139 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7140 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7141 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7142 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7145 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7146 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7147 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7148 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7150 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7151 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7152 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7154 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7157 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7158 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7159 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7161 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7162 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7163 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7164 // consider the stale state on reload.
7167 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7168 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7169 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7171 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7172 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7173 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7175 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7176 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7178 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7179 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7180 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7182 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7183 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7185 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7188 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7189 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7190 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7192 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7195 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7196 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7198 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7199 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7200 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7202 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7204 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7206 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7209 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7210 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7211 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7212 htlc.write(writer)?;
7215 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7216 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7217 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7219 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7220 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7222 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7223 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7224 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7225 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7226 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7227 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7228 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7230 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7231 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7232 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7233 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7234 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7236 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7237 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7239 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7240 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7241 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7242 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7244 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7246 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7247 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7248 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7249 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7250 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7251 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7252 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7254 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7255 (2, chan_type, option),
7256 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7257 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7258 (5, self.context.config, required),
7259 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7260 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7261 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7262 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7263 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7264 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7265 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7266 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7267 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7268 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7269 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7270 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7271 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7272 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7273 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7274 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7275 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7276 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7277 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7284 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7285 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7287 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7288 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7290 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7291 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7292 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7294 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7295 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7296 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7297 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7301 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7302 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7308 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let mut keys_data = None;
7319 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7320 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7321 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7323 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7324 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7325 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7326 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7327 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7328 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7332 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7333 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7334 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7337 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7346 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7347 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7348 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7349 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7350 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7351 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7352 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7353 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7354 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7355 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7356 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7357 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7362 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7364 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7365 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7366 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7367 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7368 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7369 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7370 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7371 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7372 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7373 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7375 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7379 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7380 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7383 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7386 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7388 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7392 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7394 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7395 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7396 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7397 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7398 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7399 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7400 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7401 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7402 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7404 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7405 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7406 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7408 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7409 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7416 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7417 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7418 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7419 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7422 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7423 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7424 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7426 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7427 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7428 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7429 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7432 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7434 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7435 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7438 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7444 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7448 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7449 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7450 // consider the stale state on reload.
7451 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7454 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7461 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7470 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7471 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7473 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7474 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7482 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7483 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7485 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7486 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7491 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7492 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7493 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7494 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7496 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7499 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7505 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7513 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7514 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7516 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7518 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7522 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7523 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7524 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7526 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7532 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7533 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7534 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7535 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7536 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7537 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7538 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7539 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7540 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7541 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7543 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7544 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7545 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7546 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7547 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7548 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7549 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7551 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7552 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7553 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7554 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7556 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7558 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7559 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7561 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7563 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7564 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7565 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7566 (2, channel_type, option),
7567 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7568 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7569 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7570 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7571 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7572 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7573 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7574 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7575 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7576 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7577 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7578 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7579 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7580 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7581 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7582 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7583 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7584 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7585 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7586 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7587 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7588 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7591 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7592 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7593 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7594 // required channel parameters.
7595 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7596 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7597 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7599 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7601 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7602 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7603 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7604 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7607 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7608 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7609 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7611 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7612 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7614 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7615 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7620 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7621 if iter.next().is_some() {
7622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7626 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7627 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7628 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7629 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7630 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7633 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7634 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7635 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7637 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7638 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7640 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7641 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7642 // separate u64 values.
7643 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7645 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7647 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7648 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7649 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7650 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7652 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7653 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7655 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7656 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7657 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7658 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7659 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7662 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7663 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7667 context: ChannelContext {
7670 config: config.unwrap(),
7674 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7675 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7676 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7679 temporary_channel_id,
7681 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7683 channel_value_satoshis,
7685 latest_monitor_update_id,
7687 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7688 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7691 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7692 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7695 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7696 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7697 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7698 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7702 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7703 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7704 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7705 monitor_pending_forwards,
7706 monitor_pending_failures,
7707 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7709 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7710 signer_pending_funding: false,
7713 holding_cell_update_fee,
7714 next_holder_htlc_id,
7715 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7716 update_time_counter,
7719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7720 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7721 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7722 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7724 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7725 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7726 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7727 closing_fee_limits: None,
7728 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7730 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7731 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7733 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7735 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7736 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7737 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7738 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7739 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7740 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7741 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7742 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7743 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7746 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7748 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7749 funding_transaction,
7752 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7753 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7754 counterparty_node_id,
7756 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7760 channel_update_status,
7761 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7766 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7767 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7768 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7770 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7771 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7773 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7774 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7775 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7777 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7778 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7781 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7783 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7786 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7795 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7796 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7797 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7798 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7799 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7800 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7801 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7802 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7803 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7804 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7805 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7806 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7807 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7808 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7809 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7810 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7811 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7812 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7813 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7814 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7815 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7816 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7817 use crate::util::test_utils;
7818 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7819 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7820 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7821 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7822 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7823 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7824 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7825 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7826 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7827 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7828 use crate::prelude::*;
7830 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7833 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7834 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7840 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7841 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7842 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7843 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7847 signer: InMemorySigner,
7850 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7851 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7854 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7855 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7857 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7858 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7861 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7865 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7867 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7869 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7870 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7871 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7874 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7875 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7876 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7877 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7881 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7882 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7883 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7887 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7888 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7889 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7890 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7893 let seed = [42; 32];
7894 let network = Network::Testnet;
7895 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7896 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7897 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7901 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7902 let config = UserConfig::default();
7903 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7904 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7905 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7907 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7908 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7912 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7913 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7915 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7916 let original_fee = 253;
7917 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7918 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7919 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7920 let seed = [42; 32];
7921 let network = Network::Testnet;
7922 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7924 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7925 let config = UserConfig::default();
7926 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7928 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7929 // same as the old fee.
7930 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7931 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7932 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7936 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7937 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7938 // dust limits are used.
7939 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7941 let seed = [42; 32];
7942 let network = Network::Testnet;
7943 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7944 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7945 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7947 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7948 // they have different dust limits.
7950 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7951 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7952 let config = UserConfig::default();
7953 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7955 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7956 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7957 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7958 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7959 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7961 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7962 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7963 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7964 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7965 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7967 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7968 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7969 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7970 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7972 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7973 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7974 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7976 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7977 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7979 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7980 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7981 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7983 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7984 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
7985 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7986 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7989 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7991 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7992 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
7993 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7994 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7995 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7996 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7997 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7998 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7999 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8001 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8004 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8005 // the dust limit check.
8006 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8007 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8008 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8009 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8011 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8012 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8013 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8014 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8015 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8016 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8017 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8021 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8022 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8023 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8024 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8025 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8026 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8028 let seed = [42; 32];
8029 let network = Network::Testnet;
8030 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8032 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8033 let config = UserConfig::default();
8034 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8036 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8037 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8039 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8040 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8041 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8042 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8043 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8044 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8046 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8047 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8048 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8049 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8050 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8052 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8054 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8055 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8056 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8057 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8058 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8060 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8061 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8062 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8063 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8064 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8068 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8069 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8070 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8071 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8072 let seed = [42; 32];
8073 let network = Network::Testnet;
8074 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8075 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8076 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8078 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8080 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8081 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8082 let config = UserConfig::default();
8083 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8085 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8086 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8087 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8088 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8090 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8091 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8092 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8094 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8095 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8096 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8097 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8099 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8100 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8101 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8103 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8104 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8106 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8107 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8108 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8109 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8110 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8111 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8112 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8114 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8116 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8117 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8118 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8119 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8120 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8124 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8125 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8126 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8127 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8128 let seed = [42; 32];
8129 let network = Network::Testnet;
8130 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8131 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8132 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8134 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8135 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8136 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8137 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8138 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8139 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8140 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8141 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8143 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8144 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8145 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8146 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8147 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8148 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8150 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8151 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8152 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8153 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8155 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8157 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8158 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8159 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8160 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8161 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8162 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8164 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8165 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8166 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8167 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8169 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8170 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8171 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8172 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8173 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8175 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8176 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8178 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8179 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8180 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8182 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8183 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8184 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8185 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8186 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8188 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8189 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8191 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8192 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8193 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8197 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8199 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8200 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8201 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8203 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8204 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8205 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8206 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8208 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8209 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8210 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8212 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8214 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8215 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8218 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8219 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8220 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8222 let seed = [42; 32];
8223 let network = Network::Testnet;
8224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8225 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8226 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8229 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8230 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8231 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8233 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8234 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8236 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8237 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8238 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8240 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8241 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8243 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8245 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8246 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8248 // Channel Negotiations failed
8249 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8250 assert!(result.is_err());
8255 fn channel_update() {
8256 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8257 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8258 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8259 let seed = [42; 32];
8260 let network = Network::Testnet;
8261 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8262 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8263 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8265 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8266 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8267 let config = UserConfig::default();
8268 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8270 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8271 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8272 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8273 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8274 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8276 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8277 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8278 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8279 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8280 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8282 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8283 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8284 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8285 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8287 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8288 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8289 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8291 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8292 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8294 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8295 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8296 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8298 short_channel_id: 0,
8301 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8302 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8303 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8305 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8306 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8308 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8310 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8312 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8313 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8314 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8315 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8317 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8318 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8319 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8321 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8324 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8327 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8329 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8330 use bitcoin::sighash;
8331 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8332 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8333 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8334 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8335 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8336 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8337 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8338 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8339 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8340 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8341 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8342 use crate::sync::Arc;
8343 use core::str::FromStr;
8344 use hex::DisplayHex;
8346 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8347 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8348 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8349 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8351 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8353 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8354 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8355 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8356 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8357 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8359 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8360 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8366 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8367 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8368 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8370 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8371 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8372 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8373 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8374 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8375 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8377 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8379 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8380 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8381 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8382 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8383 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8384 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8386 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8387 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8388 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8389 selected_contest_delay: 144
8391 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8392 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8394 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8395 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8397 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8398 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8400 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8401 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8403 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8404 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8405 // build_commitment_transaction.
8406 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8407 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8408 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8409 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8410 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8412 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8413 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8414 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8415 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8419 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8420 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8421 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8422 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8426 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8427 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8428 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8430 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8431 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8433 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8434 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8436 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8438 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8439 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8440 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8441 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8442 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8443 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8444 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8446 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8447 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8448 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8449 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8451 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8452 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8453 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8455 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8457 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8458 commitment_tx.clone(),
8459 counterparty_signature,
8460 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8461 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8462 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8464 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8465 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8467 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8468 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8469 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8471 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8472 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8475 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8476 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8478 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8479 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8480 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8481 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8482 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8483 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8484 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8485 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8487 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8490 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8491 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8492 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8496 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8499 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8500 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8501 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8502 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8503 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8504 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8506 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8507 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8508 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8509 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8511 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8512 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8513 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8514 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8515 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8517 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8518 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8519 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8520 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8521 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8522 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8524 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8528 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8529 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8530 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8531 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8533 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8536 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8537 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8538 "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", {});
8540 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8541 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8542 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8543 "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", {});
8545 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8546 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8548 amount_msat: 1000000,
8550 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8551 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8553 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8556 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8557 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8559 amount_msat: 2000000,
8561 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8562 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8564 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8567 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8568 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8570 amount_msat: 2000000,
8572 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8573 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8574 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8575 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8577 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8580 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8581 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8583 amount_msat: 3000000,
8585 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8586 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8587 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8588 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8590 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8593 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8594 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8596 amount_msat: 4000000,
8598 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8599 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8601 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8605 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8606 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8607 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8609 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8610 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8611 "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", {
8614 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8615 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8616 "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" },
8619 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8620 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8621 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8624 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8625 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8626 "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" },
8629 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8630 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8631 "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" },
8634 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8635 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8636 "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" }
8639 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8640 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8641 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8643 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8644 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8645 "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", {
8648 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8649 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8650 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8653 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8654 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8655 "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" },
8658 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8659 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8660 "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" },
8663 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8664 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8665 "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" },
8668 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8669 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8670 "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" }
8673 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8674 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8675 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8677 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8678 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8679 "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", {
8682 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8683 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8684 "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" },
8687 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8688 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8689 "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" },
8692 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8693 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8694 "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" },
8697 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8698 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8699 "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" }
8702 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8703 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8704 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8705 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8707 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8708 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8709 "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", {
8712 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8713 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8714 "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" },
8717 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8718 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8719 "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" },
8722 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8723 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8724 "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" },
8727 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8728 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8729 "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" }
8732 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8733 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8734 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8735 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8737 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8738 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8739 "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", {
8742 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8743 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8744 "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" },
8747 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8748 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8749 "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" },
8752 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8753 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8754 "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" },
8757 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8758 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8759 "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" }
8762 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8763 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8764 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8766 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8767 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8768 "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", {
8771 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8772 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8773 "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" },
8776 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8777 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8778 "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" },
8781 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8782 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8783 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8786 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8787 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8788 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8790 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8791 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8792 "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", {
8795 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8796 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8797 "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" },
8800 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8801 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8802 "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" },
8805 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8806 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8807 "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" }
8810 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8811 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8812 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8814 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8815 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8816 "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", {
8819 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8820 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8821 "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" },
8824 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8825 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8826 "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" }
8829 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8830 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8831 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8832 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8833 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8834 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8836 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8837 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8838 "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", {
8841 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8842 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8843 "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" },
8846 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8847 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8848 "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" }
8851 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8852 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8853 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8854 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8855 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8857 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8858 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8859 "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", {
8862 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8863 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8864 "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" },
8867 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8868 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8869 "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" }
8872 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8873 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8874 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8876 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8877 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8878 "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", {
8881 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8882 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8883 "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" }
8886 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8887 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8888 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8889 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8890 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8892 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8893 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8894 "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", {
8897 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8898 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8899 "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" }
8902 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8903 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8904 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8905 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8906 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8908 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8909 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8910 "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", {
8913 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8914 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8915 "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" }
8918 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8919 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8920 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8921 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8923 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8924 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8925 "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", {});
8927 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8928 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8929 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8930 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8931 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8933 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8934 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8935 "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", {});
8937 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8938 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8939 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8940 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8941 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8943 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8944 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8945 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8947 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8948 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8949 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8951 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8952 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8953 "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", {});
8955 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8956 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8957 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8958 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8959 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8961 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8962 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8963 "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", {});
8965 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8966 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8967 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8968 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8969 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8971 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8972 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8973 "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", {});
8975 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8976 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8977 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8978 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8979 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8980 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8982 amount_msat: 2000000,
8984 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8985 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8987 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8990 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8991 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8992 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8994 amount_msat: 5000001,
8996 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8997 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8998 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8999 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9001 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9004 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9005 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9007 amount_msat: 5000000,
9009 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9010 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9011 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9012 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9014 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9018 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9019 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9020 "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", {
9023 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9024 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9025 "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" },
9027 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9028 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9029 "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" },
9031 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9032 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9033 "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" }
9036 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9037 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9038 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9039 "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", {
9042 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9043 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9044 "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" },
9046 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9047 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9048 "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" },
9050 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9051 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9052 "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" }
9057 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9058 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9060 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9061 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9062 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9063 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9065 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9066 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9067 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9069 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9070 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9072 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9073 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9075 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9076 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9077 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9081 fn test_key_derivation() {
9082 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9083 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9085 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9086 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9088 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9089 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9091 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9092 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9094 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9095 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9097 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9098 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9100 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9101 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9105 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9106 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9107 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9108 let seed = [42; 32];
9109 let network = Network::Testnet;
9110 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9111 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9113 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9114 let config = UserConfig::default();
9115 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9116 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9118 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9119 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9121 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9122 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9123 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9124 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9125 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9126 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9127 assert!(res.is_ok());
9131 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9132 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9133 // resulting `channel_type`.
9134 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9135 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9136 let network = Network::Testnet;
9137 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9140 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9141 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9143 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9144 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9146 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9147 // need to signal it.
9148 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9149 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9150 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9151 &config, 0, 42, None
9153 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9155 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9156 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9157 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9159 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9160 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9161 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9165 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9166 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9167 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9168 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9169 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9172 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9173 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9177 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9178 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9179 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9181 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9182 let network = Network::Testnet;
9183 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9184 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9186 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9187 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9189 let config = UserConfig::default();
9191 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9192 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9193 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9194 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9195 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9197 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9198 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9199 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9203 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9204 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9205 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9207 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9208 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9209 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9210 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9211 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9212 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9214 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9218 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9219 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9222 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9223 let network = Network::Testnet;
9224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9225 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9227 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9228 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9230 let config = UserConfig::default();
9232 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9233 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9234 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9235 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9236 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9237 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9238 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9239 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9241 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9242 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9243 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9244 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9245 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9246 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9250 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9251 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9253 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9254 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9255 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9256 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9258 assert!(res.is_err());
9260 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9261 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9262 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9264 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9265 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9266 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9269 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9271 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9272 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9273 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9274 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9277 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9278 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9280 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9281 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9283 assert!(res.is_err());
9287 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9288 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9289 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9290 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9291 let seed = [42; 32];
9292 let network = Network::Testnet;
9293 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9294 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9295 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9297 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9298 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9299 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9300 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9302 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9303 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9304 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9309 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9319 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9320 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9321 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9326 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9327 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9333 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9336 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9337 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9338 &accept_channel_msg,
9339 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9340 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9343 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9344 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9345 let tx = Transaction {
9347 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9351 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9354 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9357 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9358 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9363 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9364 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9365 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9369 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9370 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9378 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9379 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9380 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9381 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9386 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9393 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9394 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9395 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9396 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9398 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9399 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9400 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9403 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9404 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9405 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9413 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9414 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9415 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9416 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9419 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9420 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9422 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9423 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9424 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9426 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());