1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
713 Close((String, ClosureReason)),
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close((err.clone(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err }))
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
943 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
944 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
945 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
946 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
947 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
948 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
949 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
950 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
951 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
952 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
953 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
954 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
955 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
956 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
958 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
959 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
960 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
961 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
963 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
964 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
965 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
966 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
968 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
969 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
970 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
971 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
972 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
974 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
975 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
976 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
977 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
979 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
980 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
981 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
983 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
984 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
985 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
986 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
987 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
989 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
990 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
993 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
994 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
996 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
997 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
998 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
999 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1001 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1002 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1004 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1005 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1008 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1009 (0, update, required),
1012 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1013 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1014 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1015 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1016 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1017 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1018 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1019 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1020 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1021 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1024 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1025 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1026 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1028 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1030 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1031 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1032 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1033 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1034 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1035 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1036 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1040 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1042 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1043 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1044 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1045 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1046 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1047 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1048 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1053 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1054 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1055 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1056 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1057 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1059 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1060 /// in a timely manner.
1061 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1064 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1065 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1066 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1068 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1069 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1070 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1071 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1075 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1076 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1077 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1079 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1080 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1081 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1082 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1084 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1088 /// The current channel ID.
1089 channel_id: ChannelId,
1090 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1091 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1092 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1093 channel_state: ChannelState,
1095 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1096 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1098 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1099 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1100 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1102 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1103 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1104 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1105 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1107 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1108 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1110 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1112 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1113 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1114 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1116 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1117 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1118 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1120 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1121 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1122 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1123 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1124 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1125 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1127 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1128 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1129 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1130 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1131 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1132 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1134 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1136 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1137 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1138 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1140 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1141 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1142 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1143 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1144 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1145 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1146 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1147 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1149 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1150 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1151 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1153 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1154 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1155 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1156 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1157 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1158 /// outbound or inbound.
1159 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1161 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1163 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1164 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1165 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1166 // HTLCs with similar state.
1167 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1168 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1169 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1170 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1171 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1172 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1173 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1174 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1175 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1176 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1178 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1179 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1180 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1182 update_time_counter: u32,
1184 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1185 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1186 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1187 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1188 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1189 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1191 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1192 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1194 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1195 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1196 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1197 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1199 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1200 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1202 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1204 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1206 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1207 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1208 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1209 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1210 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1212 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1213 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1215 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1216 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1217 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1219 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1220 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1221 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1222 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1223 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1224 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1225 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1226 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1228 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1231 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1233 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1236 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1238 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1241 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1243 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1245 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1246 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1249 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1251 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1253 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1256 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1258 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1259 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1260 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1262 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1264 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1265 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1266 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1268 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1269 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1270 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1272 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1274 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1276 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1277 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1278 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1279 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1281 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1282 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1283 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1285 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1286 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1287 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1289 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1290 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1291 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1292 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1294 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1295 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1296 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1298 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1299 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1300 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1301 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1302 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1304 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1305 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1307 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1308 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1309 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1310 /// unblock the state machine.
1312 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1313 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1314 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1316 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1317 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1318 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1321 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1322 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1323 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1324 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1325 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1326 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1327 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1329 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1330 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1332 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1333 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1334 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1336 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1337 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1338 // associated channel mapping.
1340 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1341 // to store all of them.
1342 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1344 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1345 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1346 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1347 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1348 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1350 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1351 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1353 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1354 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1356 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1357 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1359 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1360 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1362 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1364 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1366 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1367 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1368 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1371 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1372 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1373 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1374 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1375 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1376 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1377 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1379 config: &'a UserConfig,
1380 current_chain_height: u32,
1383 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1384 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1385 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1386 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1389 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1390 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1395 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1397 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1398 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1400 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1402 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1403 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1404 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1406 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1410 // Check sanity of message fields:
1411 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1412 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
1413 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1414 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1415 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1417 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1418 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1420 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1421 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1423 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1424 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1427 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1428 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1430 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1433 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1435 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1436 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1439 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1442 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1443 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1446 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1447 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1450 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1451 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1453 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1456 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1459 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1462 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1463 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1465 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1466 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1469 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1471 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1472 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1473 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1477 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1478 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1479 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1480 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1482 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1483 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1485 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1486 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1487 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1489 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1493 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1494 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1495 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1496 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1500 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1501 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1502 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1503 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1506 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1507 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1508 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1509 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1510 return Err(ChannelError::close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1513 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1514 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1515 &Some(ref script) => {
1516 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1517 if script.len() == 0 {
1520 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1521 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1523 Some(script.clone())
1526 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1528 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1533 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1534 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1535 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1536 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1540 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1541 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1546 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1547 Ok(script) => script,
1548 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1551 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1552 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1554 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1557 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1560 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1562 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1564 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1567 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1568 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1570 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1575 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1577 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1578 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1579 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1580 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1582 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1585 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1587 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1588 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1591 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1592 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1595 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1596 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1597 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1598 pending_update_fee: None,
1599 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1600 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1601 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1602 update_time_counter: 1,
1604 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1606 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1607 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1608 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1609 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1610 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1611 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1612 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1614 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1615 signer_pending_funding: false,
1618 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1619 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1621 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1623 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1624 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1625 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1626 closing_fee_limits: None,
1627 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1629 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1630 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1631 short_channel_id: None,
1632 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1634 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1635 channel_value_satoshis,
1636 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1638 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1640 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1641 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1642 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1643 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1644 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1645 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1648 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1650 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1651 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1652 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1653 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1654 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1655 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1656 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1658 funding_outpoint: None,
1659 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1661 funding_transaction: None,
1662 is_batch_funding: None,
1664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1666 counterparty_node_id,
1668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1673 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1675 announcement_sigs: None,
1677 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1678 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1679 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1680 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1682 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1683 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1685 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1686 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1688 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1689 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1692 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1697 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1699 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1705 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1706 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1707 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1708 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1709 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1710 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1711 funding_satoshis: u64,
1714 config: &'a UserConfig,
1715 current_chain_height: u32,
1716 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1717 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1718 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1719 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1720 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1721 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1722 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1726 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1728 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1729 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1731 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1733 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1736 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1739 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1740 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1743 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1744 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1747 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1748 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1750 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1753 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1755 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1757 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1758 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1759 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1763 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1764 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1766 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1767 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1768 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1769 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1773 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1774 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1775 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1779 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1780 Ok(script) => script,
1781 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1784 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1789 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1790 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1791 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1792 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1797 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1799 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1800 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1801 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1802 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1804 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1805 channel_value_satoshis,
1807 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1809 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1810 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1813 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1814 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1817 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1818 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1819 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1820 pending_update_fee: None,
1821 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1822 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1823 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1824 update_time_counter: 1,
1826 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1828 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1829 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1830 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1831 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1832 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1833 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1834 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1836 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1837 signer_pending_funding: false,
1839 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1840 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1842 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1843 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1844 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1846 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1847 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1848 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1849 closing_fee_limits: None,
1850 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1852 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1853 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1854 short_channel_id: None,
1855 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1857 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1858 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1859 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1860 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1861 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1862 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1863 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1864 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1865 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1868 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1869 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1870 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1872 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1874 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1875 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1876 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1877 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1878 counterparty_parameters: None,
1879 funding_outpoint: None,
1880 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1882 funding_transaction: None,
1883 is_batch_funding: None,
1885 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1886 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1887 counterparty_node_id,
1889 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1891 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1893 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1894 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1896 announcement_sigs: None,
1898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1899 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1900 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1901 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1903 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1904 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1906 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1907 outbound_scid_alias,
1909 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1910 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1913 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1918 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1919 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1924 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1925 self.update_time_counter
1928 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1929 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1932 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1933 self.config.announced_channel
1936 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1937 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1940 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1941 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1942 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1943 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1946 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1947 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1948 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1951 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1953 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1954 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1955 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1956 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1957 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1960 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1961 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1962 match self.channel_state {
1963 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1964 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1965 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1966 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1967 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1968 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1969 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1971 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1973 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1974 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1978 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1979 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1980 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1981 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1982 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1983 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1986 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1987 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1988 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1992 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1993 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1995 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1996 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1999 // Public utilities:
2001 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2005 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2007 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2008 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2009 self.temporary_channel_id
2012 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2016 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2017 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2018 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2022 /// Gets the channel's type
2023 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2027 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2029 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2030 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2031 self.short_channel_id
2034 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2035 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2036 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2039 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2040 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2041 self.outbound_scid_alias
2044 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2046 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2047 return &self.holder_signer
2050 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2051 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2052 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2053 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2054 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2055 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2058 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2059 /// get_funding_created.
2060 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2061 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2064 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2065 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2066 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2067 if conf_height > 0 {
2074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2108 self.counterparty_node_id
2111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2154 self.channel_value_satoshis
2157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2165 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2167 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2168 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2171 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2172 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2173 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2174 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2176 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2180 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2181 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2182 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2185 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2186 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2187 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2190 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2191 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2192 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2195 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2196 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2197 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2200 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2201 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2202 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2205 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2206 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2207 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2210 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2211 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2212 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2213 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2214 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2217 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2219 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2220 self.prev_config = None;
2224 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2225 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2229 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2230 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2231 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2232 let did_channel_update =
2233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2234 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2235 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2236 if did_channel_update {
2237 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2238 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2239 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2242 self.config.options = *config;
2246 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2247 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2248 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2249 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2250 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2253 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2254 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2255 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2256 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2257 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2259 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2260 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2261 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2262 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2263 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2264 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2265 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2267 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2268 where L::Target: Logger
2270 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2271 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2272 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2274 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2275 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2276 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2277 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2279 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2280 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2281 if match update_state {
2282 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2283 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2284 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2285 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2286 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2288 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2292 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2293 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2294 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2296 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2298 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2299 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2300 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2302 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2303 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2304 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2305 transaction_output_index: None
2310 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2311 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2312 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2313 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2314 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2317 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2319 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2320 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2321 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2323 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2324 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2327 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2328 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2331 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2333 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2334 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2335 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2337 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2338 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2344 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2346 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2347 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2348 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2349 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2350 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2351 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2352 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2356 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2357 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2359 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2361 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2362 if generated_by_local {
2363 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2364 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2365 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2375 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2377 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2378 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2379 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2380 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2386 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2393 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2394 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2398 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2399 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2401 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2404 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2406 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2407 if !generated_by_local {
2408 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2416 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2417 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2418 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2419 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2420 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2421 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2422 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2423 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2425 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2427 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2428 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2429 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2430 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2432 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2434 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2435 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2436 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2437 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2440 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2441 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2442 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2443 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2445 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2448 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2449 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2450 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2451 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2453 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2456 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2462 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2468 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2470 let channel_parameters =
2471 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2472 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2473 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2480 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2483 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2484 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2485 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2486 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2494 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2495 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2496 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2497 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2502 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2503 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2504 /// our counterparty!)
2505 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2506 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2507 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2508 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2509 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2510 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2511 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2513 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2517 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2518 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2519 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2520 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2548 // which are near the dust limit.
2549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2558 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2559 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2562 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2563 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2564 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2567 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2568 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2570 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2572 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2573 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2576 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2577 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2580 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2581 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2583 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2584 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2586 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2589 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2590 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2592 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2593 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2596 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2604 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2605 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2606 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2607 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2609 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2610 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2611 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2612 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2614 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2616 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2624 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2625 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2626 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2627 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2628 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2629 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2631 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2633 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2634 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2636 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2642 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2643 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2644 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2645 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2646 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2647 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2648 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2649 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2650 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2651 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2652 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2653 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2654 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2655 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2656 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2657 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2658 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2663 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2664 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2665 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2666 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2667 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2668 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2669 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2670 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2674 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2675 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2676 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2677 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2678 match holding_cell_update {
2679 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2680 holding_cell_states.insert(
2682 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2685 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2686 holding_cell_states.insert(
2688 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2691 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2692 holding_cell_states.insert(
2694 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2698 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2701 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2702 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2705 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2706 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2708 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2709 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2710 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2711 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2712 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2713 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2714 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2715 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2716 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2717 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2724 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2725 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2726 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2727 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2730 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2731 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2733 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2735 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2736 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2737 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2738 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2739 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2740 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2741 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2742 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2745 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2746 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2752 } = *holding_cell_update {
2753 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2755 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2756 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2757 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2758 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2759 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2760 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2767 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2768 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2769 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2770 /// corner case properly.
2771 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2772 -> AvailableBalances
2773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2775 let context = &self;
2776 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2779 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2780 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2782 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2783 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2784 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2785 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2788 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2790 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2791 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2793 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2795 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2797 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2798 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2802 if context.is_outbound() {
2803 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2804 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2806 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2807 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2809 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2810 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2811 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2812 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2815 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2816 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2817 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2818 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2819 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2820 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2821 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2824 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2825 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2826 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2827 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2828 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2829 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2830 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2831 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2832 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2833 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2834 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2836 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2839 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2840 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2841 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2842 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2843 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2846 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2847 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2849 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2850 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2851 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2853 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2854 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2855 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2856 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2860 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2862 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2863 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2864 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2865 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2866 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2867 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2868 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2870 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2871 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2873 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2874 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2875 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2878 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2879 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2880 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2881 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2882 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2883 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2884 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2885 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2886 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2887 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2891 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2892 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2893 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2894 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2895 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2896 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2899 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2900 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2901 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2902 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2903 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2906 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2907 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2908 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2910 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2914 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2915 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2917 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2918 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2922 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2923 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2924 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2925 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2927 outbound_capacity_msat,
2928 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2929 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2934 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2935 let context = &self;
2936 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2939 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2940 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2942 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2943 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2945 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2946 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2948 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2949 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2950 let context = &self;
2951 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2953 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2956 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2957 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2959 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2960 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2962 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2963 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2965 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2970 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2977 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2978 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2979 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2982 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2983 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2984 included_htlcs += 1;
2987 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2988 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2992 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2993 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2994 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2995 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2996 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2997 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3002 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3004 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3005 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3010 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3011 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3015 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3016 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3017 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3020 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3021 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3023 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3024 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3025 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3027 total_pending_htlcs,
3028 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3029 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3030 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3032 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3033 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3034 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3036 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3038 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3043 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3044 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3046 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3047 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3049 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3050 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3052 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3053 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3054 let context = &self;
3055 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3057 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3060 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3061 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3063 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3064 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3066 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3067 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3069 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3070 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3074 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3075 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3081 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3082 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3083 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3084 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3085 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3086 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3089 included_htlcs += 1;
3092 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3093 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3096 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3097 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3099 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3100 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3101 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3106 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3107 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3111 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3112 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3114 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3115 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3117 total_pending_htlcs,
3118 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3119 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3120 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3122 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3123 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3124 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3126 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3128 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3133 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3134 match self.channel_state {
3135 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3136 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3137 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3138 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3148 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3150 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3151 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3154 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3156 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3157 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3158 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3162 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3163 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3164 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3167 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3169 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3170 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3173 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3174 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3175 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3176 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3177 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3178 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3179 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3180 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3181 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3182 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3183 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3185 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3186 // return them to fail the payment.
3187 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3188 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3189 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3191 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3192 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3197 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3198 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3199 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3200 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3201 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3202 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3203 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3204 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3205 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3206 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3207 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3208 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3209 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3210 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3211 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3215 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3216 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3218 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3219 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3223 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3224 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3225 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3226 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3227 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3228 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3229 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3230 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3234 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3235 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3236 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3237 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3239 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3240 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3241 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3242 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3244 match &self.holder_signer {
3245 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3246 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3247 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3248 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3249 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3252 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3256 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3257 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3258 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3260 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3261 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3262 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3264 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3266 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3269 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3270 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3272 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3278 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3279 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3280 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3281 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3282 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3285 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3287 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3289 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3290 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3295 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3296 // We've exhausted our options
3299 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3300 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3303 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3304 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3305 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3306 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3308 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3309 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3310 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3311 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3312 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3313 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3315 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3317 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3322 // Internal utility functions for channels
3324 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3325 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3326 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3328 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3330 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3331 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3332 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3334 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3337 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3339 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3342 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3343 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3344 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3346 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3348 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3349 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3350 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3351 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3352 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3355 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3356 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3357 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3358 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3359 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3360 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3361 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3364 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3365 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3367 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3369 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3370 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3371 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3372 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3373 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3374 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3375 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3378 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3379 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3381 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3382 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3385 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3386 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3387 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3388 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3389 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3390 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3393 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3394 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3395 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3396 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3397 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3398 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3404 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3405 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3406 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3407 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3408 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3409 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3410 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3411 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3412 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3413 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3414 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3415 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3418 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3419 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3420 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3421 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3422 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3423 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3427 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3429 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3430 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3431 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3435 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3436 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3437 trait FailHTLCContents {
3438 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3439 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3440 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3441 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3443 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3444 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3445 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3446 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3448 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3449 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3451 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3452 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3455 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3456 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3457 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3458 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3461 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3462 failure_code: self.1
3465 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3466 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3468 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3469 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3471 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3472 failure_code: self.1
3477 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3478 fn name() -> &'static str;
3480 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3481 fn name() -> &'static str {
3485 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3486 fn name() -> &'static str {
3487 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3491 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3493 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3495 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3496 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3497 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3498 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3500 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3501 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3503 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3505 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3506 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3507 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3508 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3510 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3511 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close((format!(
3516 "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit
3517 ), ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
3518 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
3519 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: lower_limit,
3526 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3527 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3528 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3529 // outside of those situations will fail.
3530 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3534 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3539 1 + // script length (0)
3543 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3544 2 + // witness marker and flag
3545 1 + // witness element count
3546 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3547 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3548 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3549 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3550 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3551 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3553 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3554 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3555 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3561 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3562 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3563 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3564 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3566 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3567 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3568 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3570 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3571 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3572 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3573 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3574 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3575 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3578 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3579 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3582 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3583 value_to_holder = 0;
3586 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3587 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3588 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3589 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3591 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3592 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3595 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3596 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3599 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3602 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3603 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3605 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3607 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3608 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3609 where L::Target: Logger {
3610 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3611 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3612 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3613 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3614 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3615 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3616 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3617 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3621 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3622 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3623 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3624 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3626 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3627 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3630 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3631 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3632 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3634 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3635 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3636 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3637 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3638 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3639 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3640 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3642 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3643 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3644 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3646 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3647 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3649 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3652 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3653 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3657 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3661 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3662 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3663 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3664 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3665 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3666 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3669 // Now update local state:
3671 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3672 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3674 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3675 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3676 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3677 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3678 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3680 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3683 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3684 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3685 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3686 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3687 // do not not get into this branch.
3688 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3689 match pending_update {
3690 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3691 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3692 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3693 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3695 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3696 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3699 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3700 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3702 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3703 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3704 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3705 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3706 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3707 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3713 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3714 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3715 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3717 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3718 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3719 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3722 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3725 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3726 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3728 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3729 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3731 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3732 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3735 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3738 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3739 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3740 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3741 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3746 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3747 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3748 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3749 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3750 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3751 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3752 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3753 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3754 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3755 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3756 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3757 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3758 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3759 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3760 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3762 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3763 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3764 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3765 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3766 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3769 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3770 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3771 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3777 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3778 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3780 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3784 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3785 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3786 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3787 /// before we fail backwards.
3789 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3790 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3791 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3792 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3793 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3794 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3795 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3798 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3799 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3801 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3802 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3803 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3804 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3805 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3806 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3809 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3810 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3811 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3812 /// before we fail backwards.
3814 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3815 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3816 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3817 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3818 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3820 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3821 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3822 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3825 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3826 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3827 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3829 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3830 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3831 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3833 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3834 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3835 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3837 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3842 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3849 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3850 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3851 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3852 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3853 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3857 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3858 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3859 force_holding_cell = true;
3862 // Now update local state:
3863 if force_holding_cell {
3864 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3865 match pending_update {
3866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3867 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3868 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3869 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3873 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3876 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3877 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3884 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3885 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3889 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3890 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3892 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3893 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3896 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3899 // Message handlers:
3900 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3901 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3902 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3903 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3904 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3905 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3906 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3909 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3911 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3913 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3914 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3915 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3916 debug_assert!(matches!(
3917 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3919 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3920 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3923 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3924 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3926 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3927 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3928 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3929 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3931 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3934 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3935 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3936 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3939 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3940 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3941 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3942 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3943 // when routing outbound payments.
3944 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3948 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3949 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3950 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3951 match &self.context.channel_state {
3952 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3953 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3954 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3955 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3956 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3957 check_reconnection = true;
3958 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3959 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3960 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3961 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3962 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3964 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3965 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3968 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3969 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3970 _ => return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3972 if check_reconnection {
3973 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3974 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3975 let expected_point =
3976 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3977 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3979 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3980 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3981 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3982 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3983 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3984 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3986 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3987 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3988 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3989 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3990 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3992 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3993 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3998 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3999 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4001 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4003 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4006 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4007 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4008 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4009 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4010 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4011 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4013 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4014 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4015 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4017 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4018 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4020 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4021 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4023 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4024 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4026 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4027 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4030 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4031 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4032 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4033 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4035 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4036 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4039 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4040 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4041 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4042 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4043 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4044 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4045 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4046 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4047 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4048 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4049 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4051 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4052 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4053 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4054 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4055 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4056 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4060 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4061 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4062 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4063 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4064 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4068 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4069 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4071 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4072 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4073 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4075 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4076 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4080 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4083 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4088 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4089 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4093 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4094 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4095 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4096 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4097 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4101 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4104 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4108 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4109 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4110 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4114 // Now update local state:
4115 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4116 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4117 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4118 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4119 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4120 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4121 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4122 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4128 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4130 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4131 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4132 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4133 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4134 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4135 None => fail_reason.into(),
4136 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4137 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4138 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4139 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4141 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4145 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4146 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4147 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4148 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4150 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4151 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4156 Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4159 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4160 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4163 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4167 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4170 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4171 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4174 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4175 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4178 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4182 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4183 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4186 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4190 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4194 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4195 where L::Target: Logger
4197 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4200 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4201 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4203 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4207 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4209 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4211 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4212 let commitment_txid = {
4213 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4214 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4215 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4217 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4218 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4219 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4220 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4221 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4226 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4228 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4229 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4230 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4231 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4234 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4235 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4236 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4242 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4243 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4244 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4245 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4246 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4247 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4248 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4249 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4250 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4251 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4252 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4258 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4262 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4263 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4264 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4265 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4266 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4267 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4268 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4269 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4270 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4271 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4272 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4273 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4274 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4277 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4278 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4279 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4280 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4281 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4282 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4283 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4285 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4286 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4287 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4288 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4289 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4290 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4291 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4294 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4295 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4298 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4300 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4301 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4302 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4305 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4308 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4309 commitment_stats.tx,
4311 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4312 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4313 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4316 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4317 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4319 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4320 let mut need_commitment = false;
4321 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4322 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4323 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4324 need_commitment = true;
4328 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4329 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4330 Some(resolution.clone())
4332 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4333 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4334 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4336 need_commitment = true;
4339 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4340 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4341 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4342 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4343 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4344 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4345 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4346 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4347 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4348 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4349 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4350 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4351 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4352 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4354 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4356 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4357 need_commitment = true;
4361 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4362 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4363 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4364 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4365 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4366 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4367 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4369 nondust_htlc_sources,
4371 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4374 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4375 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4376 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4377 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4378 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4380 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4381 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4382 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4383 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4384 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4385 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4386 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4387 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4388 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4389 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4390 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4391 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4392 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4393 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4395 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4396 &self.context.channel_id);
4397 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4400 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4401 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4402 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4403 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4404 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4405 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4406 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4407 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4408 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4412 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4413 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4414 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4415 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4418 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4419 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4420 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4421 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4422 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4423 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4424 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4426 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4427 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4428 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4431 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4432 /// for our counterparty.
4433 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4434 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4435 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4436 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4438 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4439 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4440 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4441 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4443 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4444 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4445 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4446 updates: Vec::new(),
4447 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4450 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4451 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4452 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4453 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4454 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4455 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4456 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4457 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4458 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4459 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4460 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4461 // to rebalance channels.
4462 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4463 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4464 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4465 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4467 match self.send_htlc(
4468 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4469 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4471 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4474 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4475 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4476 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4477 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4478 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4479 // into the holding cell without ever being
4480 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4481 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4482 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4485 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4492 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4493 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4494 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4495 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4496 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4497 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4498 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4499 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4500 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4501 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4502 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4503 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4506 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4507 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4508 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4510 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4511 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4512 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4515 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4517 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4518 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4519 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4520 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4521 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4522 // for a full revocation before failing.
4523 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4524 update_fail_count += 1;
4526 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4528 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4533 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4534 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4536 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4537 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4542 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4543 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4544 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4545 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4546 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4548 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4549 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4550 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4552 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4553 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4559 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4560 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4561 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4562 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4563 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4564 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4565 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4566 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4567 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4569 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4572 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4575 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4576 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4579 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4581 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4582 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4583 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4587 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4588 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4589 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4590 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4591 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4592 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4593 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4594 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4595 return Err(ChannelError::close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4598 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4600 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4601 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4604 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4605 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4606 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4607 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4609 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4611 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4616 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4617 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4618 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4619 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4620 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4621 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4622 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4623 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4624 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4626 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4629 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4630 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4631 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4632 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4633 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4634 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4635 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4636 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4637 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4639 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4640 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4643 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4644 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4645 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4646 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4647 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4648 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4649 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4650 let mut require_commitment = false;
4651 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4654 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4655 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4656 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4657 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4659 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4660 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4661 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4662 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4663 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4664 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4666 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4670 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4671 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4672 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4673 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4674 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4676 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4677 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4678 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4683 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4684 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4686 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4690 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4691 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4693 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4694 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4695 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4696 require_commitment = true;
4697 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4699 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4700 match pending_htlc_status {
4701 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4702 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4703 require_commitment = true;
4705 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4706 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4707 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4709 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4710 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4715 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4716 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4717 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4718 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4721 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4722 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4723 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4724 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4730 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4731 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4732 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4733 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4734 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4736 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4737 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4738 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4739 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4740 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4741 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4742 require_commitment = true;
4746 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4748 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4749 match update_state {
4750 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4751 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4752 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4753 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4754 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4755 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4757 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4758 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4759 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4760 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4761 require_commitment = true;
4762 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4763 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4768 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4769 let release_state_str =
4770 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4771 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4772 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4773 if !release_monitor {
4774 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4775 update: monitor_update,
4777 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4779 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4784 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4786 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4787 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4788 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4789 if require_commitment {
4790 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4791 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4792 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4793 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4795 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4796 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4797 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4798 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4799 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4801 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4802 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4803 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4804 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4805 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4808 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4809 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4810 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4811 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4812 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4813 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4815 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4816 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4818 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4819 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4821 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4822 if require_commitment {
4823 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4825 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4826 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4827 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4828 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4830 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4831 &self.context.channel_id(),
4832 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4835 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4836 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4838 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4839 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4841 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4842 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4848 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4849 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4850 /// commitment update.
4851 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4852 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4853 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4855 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4856 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4859 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4860 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4861 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4862 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4864 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4865 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4866 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4867 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4868 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4869 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4870 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4872 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4873 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4875 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4876 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4878 if !self.context.is_live() {
4879 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4882 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4883 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4884 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4885 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4886 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4887 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4888 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4889 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4890 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4891 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4895 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4896 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4897 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4898 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4901 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4902 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4907 force_holding_cell = true;
4910 if force_holding_cell {
4911 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4915 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4916 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4918 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4924 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4925 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4927 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4929 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4930 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4931 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4932 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4936 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4937 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4938 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4942 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4943 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4946 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4947 // will be retransmitted.
4948 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4949 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4950 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4952 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4953 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4955 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4956 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4957 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4958 // this HTLC accordingly
4959 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4962 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4963 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4964 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4965 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4968 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4969 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4970 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4971 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4972 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4973 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4978 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4980 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4981 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4982 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4983 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4987 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4988 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4989 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4990 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4991 // the update upon reconnection.
4992 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4996 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4998 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4999 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5003 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5004 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5005 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5006 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5007 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5008 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5009 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5011 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5012 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5013 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5014 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5015 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5016 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5017 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5019 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5020 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5021 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5022 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5023 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5024 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5025 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5028 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5029 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5030 /// to the remote side.
5031 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5032 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5033 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5034 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5037 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5039 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5040 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5042 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5043 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5044 // first received the funding_signed.
5045 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5046 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5047 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5048 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5050 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5052 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5053 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5054 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5055 funding_broadcastable = None;
5058 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5059 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5060 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5061 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5062 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5063 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5064 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5065 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5066 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5067 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5068 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5069 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5070 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5071 next_per_commitment_point,
5072 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5076 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5078 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5079 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5080 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5081 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5082 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5083 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5084 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5085 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5087 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5088 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5089 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5090 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5091 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5092 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5093 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5097 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5098 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5100 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5101 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5103 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5104 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5107 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5108 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5109 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5110 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5111 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5112 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5113 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5114 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5115 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5116 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5120 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5121 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5123 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5124 return Err(ChannelError::close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5126 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5127 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5129 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5131 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5132 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5133 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5134 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5135 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5136 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5137 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5138 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5139 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5141 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5142 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5143 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5148 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5150 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5151 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5152 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5153 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5155 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5156 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5158 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5159 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5162 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5163 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5164 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5165 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5167 SignerResumeUpdates {
5174 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5175 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5176 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5177 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5178 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5179 per_commitment_secret,
5180 next_per_commitment_point,
5182 next_local_nonce: None,
5186 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5187 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5188 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5189 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5190 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5191 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5193 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5194 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5195 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5196 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5197 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5198 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5199 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5200 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5201 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5202 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5203 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5208 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5209 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5211 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5212 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5213 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5214 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5215 reason: err_packet.clone()
5218 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5219 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5220 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5221 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5222 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5223 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5226 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5227 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5228 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5229 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5230 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5237 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5238 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5239 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5240 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5244 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5245 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5246 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5247 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5248 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5249 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5250 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5254 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5255 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5257 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5258 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5259 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5260 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5265 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5266 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5271 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5272 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5273 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5274 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5275 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5276 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5277 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5282 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5283 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5285 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5286 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5287 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5288 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5289 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5290 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5291 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5292 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5295 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5297 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5298 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5299 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5300 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5301 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5304 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5305 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5306 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5309 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5310 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5311 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5312 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5314 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5315 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5317 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5318 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5319 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5320 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5321 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5324 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5325 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5326 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5327 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5328 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5329 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5330 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5331 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5335 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5336 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5337 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5338 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5339 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5340 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5341 our_commitment_transaction
5345 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5346 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5347 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5348 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5350 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5352 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5354 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5355 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5356 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5357 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5358 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5359 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5361 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5362 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5363 channel_ready: None,
5364 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5365 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5366 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5370 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5371 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5372 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5373 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5374 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5375 next_per_commitment_point,
5376 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5378 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5379 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5380 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5384 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5385 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5386 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5388 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5389 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5390 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5393 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5396 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5397 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5398 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5399 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5400 our_commitment_transaction
5404 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5405 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5406 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5407 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5408 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5409 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5410 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5412 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5414 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5415 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5416 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5417 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5419 next_per_commitment_point,
5420 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5424 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5425 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5426 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5428 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5431 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5432 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5433 raa: required_revoke,
5434 commitment_update: None,
5435 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5437 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5438 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5439 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5441 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5444 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5445 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5446 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5447 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5448 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5449 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5452 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5453 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5454 raa: required_revoke,
5455 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5456 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5459 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5460 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5461 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5462 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5463 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5466 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5467 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5468 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5469 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5474 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5475 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5476 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5477 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5479 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5481 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5483 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5484 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5485 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5486 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5487 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5488 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5489 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5490 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5492 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5493 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5494 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5495 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5496 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5498 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5499 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5500 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5501 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5504 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5505 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5506 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5507 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5508 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5509 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5510 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5511 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5512 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5513 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5514 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5515 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5516 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5517 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5518 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5520 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5523 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5524 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5527 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5528 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5529 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5530 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5531 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5532 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5535 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5536 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5537 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5538 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5539 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5540 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5541 return Err(ChannelError::close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5543 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5549 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5550 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5551 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5552 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5554 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5555 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5556 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5557 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5558 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5559 return Ok((None, None, None));
5562 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5563 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5564 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5566 return Ok((None, None, None));
5569 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5570 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5571 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5572 return Ok((None, None, None));
5575 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5577 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5578 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5579 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5580 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5582 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5583 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5585 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5586 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5588 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5589 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5590 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5591 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5593 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5594 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5595 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5599 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5605 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5606 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5608 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5609 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5612 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5613 /// within our expected timeframe.
5615 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5616 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5617 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5620 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5623 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5624 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5628 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5629 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5631 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5632 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5634 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5635 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5636 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5637 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5638 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5640 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5641 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5642 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5645 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5647 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5648 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5651 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5652 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5653 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5656 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5659 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5660 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5661 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5662 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5664 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5667 assert!(send_shutdown);
5668 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5669 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5672 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5675 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5680 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5682 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5683 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5685 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5686 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5687 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5688 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5689 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5690 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5691 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5693 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5695 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5696 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5698 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5699 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5700 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5701 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5705 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5706 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5707 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5708 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5709 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5710 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5712 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5713 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5720 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5721 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5723 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5726 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5727 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5729 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5731 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5732 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5733 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5734 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5735 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5736 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5737 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5738 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5739 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5741 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5742 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5745 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5749 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5750 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5751 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5752 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5754 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5755 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5757 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5758 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5760 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5761 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5763 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5764 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5767 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5768 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5771 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5772 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5773 return Ok((None, None, None));
5776 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5777 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5778 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5781 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5783 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5786 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5787 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5788 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5789 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5790 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5794 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5795 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5796 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5800 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5801 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5803 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5806 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5807 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5808 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5809 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5811 monitor_update: None,
5812 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5813 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5814 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5815 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5816 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5817 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5818 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5819 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5821 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5822 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5823 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5824 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5828 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5830 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5831 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5832 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5833 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5835 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5838 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5839 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5841 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5842 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5843 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5844 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5846 monitor_update: None,
5847 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5848 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5849 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5850 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5851 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5852 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5853 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5854 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5856 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5857 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5858 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5859 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5864 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5865 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5866 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5867 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5869 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5870 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5871 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5873 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5875 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5882 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5883 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5884 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5886 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5887 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5889 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5893 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5894 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5895 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5896 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5897 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5899 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5901 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5903 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5904 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5907 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5908 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5909 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5910 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5911 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5912 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5913 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5914 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5916 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5919 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5920 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5921 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5922 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5924 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5928 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5929 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5930 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5931 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5933 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5939 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5940 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5941 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5942 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5943 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5944 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5945 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5947 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5948 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5951 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5953 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5954 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5960 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5961 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5962 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5963 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5964 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5965 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5966 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5968 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5969 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5976 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5977 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
5978 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
5980 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5983 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5984 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
5987 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5988 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5989 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5990 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5993 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5994 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
5995 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
5997 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5998 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5999 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6000 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6001 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6002 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6003 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6006 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6007 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6008 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6009 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6010 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6011 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6012 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6013 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6017 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6018 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6019 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6020 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6021 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6022 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6023 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6027 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6028 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6033 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6034 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6035 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6036 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6037 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6038 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6042 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6043 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6044 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6045 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6047 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6048 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6049 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6050 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6051 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6052 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6053 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6054 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6055 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6057 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6058 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6059 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6066 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6067 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6070 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6071 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6074 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6075 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6079 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6080 &self.context.holder_signer
6084 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6086 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6087 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6088 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6089 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6090 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6091 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6093 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6095 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6103 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6104 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6108 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6109 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6110 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6111 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6114 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6115 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6116 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6117 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6120 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6121 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6122 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6123 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6124 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6125 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6128 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6129 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6130 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6131 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6132 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6133 if !release_monitor {
6134 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6143 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6144 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6145 /// here after logging them.
6146 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6147 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6148 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6149 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6152 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6153 update.update.update_id,
6163 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6164 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6167 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6168 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6169 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6171 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6172 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6174 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6175 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6177 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6178 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6179 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6182 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6183 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6184 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6185 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6186 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6187 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6189 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6190 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6191 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6193 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6194 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6195 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6196 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6197 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6198 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6204 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6205 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6206 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6207 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6210 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6211 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6212 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6215 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6216 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6217 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6220 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6221 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6222 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6225 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6226 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6227 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6228 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6229 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6232 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6233 self.context.channel_update_status
6236 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6237 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6238 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6241 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6243 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6244 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6245 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6249 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6250 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6251 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6254 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6258 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6259 // channel_ready yet.
6260 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6264 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6265 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6266 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6267 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6269 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6270 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6271 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6273 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6274 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6277 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6278 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6280 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6281 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6282 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6283 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6284 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6285 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6286 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6287 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6289 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6293 if need_commitment_update {
6294 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6295 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6296 let next_per_commitment_point =
6297 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6298 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6299 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6300 next_per_commitment_point,
6301 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6305 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6311 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6312 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6313 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6314 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6315 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6316 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6317 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6319 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6322 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6323 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6324 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6325 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6326 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6327 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6328 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6329 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6330 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6331 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6332 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6333 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6334 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6335 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6336 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6337 // channel and move on.
6338 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6339 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6341 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6342 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6343 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6345 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6346 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6347 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6348 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6349 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6350 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6351 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6352 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6357 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6358 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6359 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6360 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6361 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6364 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6365 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6366 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6367 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6368 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6369 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6372 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6373 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6374 // may have already happened for this block).
6375 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6376 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6377 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6378 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6381 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6382 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6383 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6384 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6392 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6393 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6394 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6395 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6397 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6398 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6401 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6403 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6404 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6405 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6406 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6408 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6411 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6414 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6415 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6416 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6417 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6419 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6422 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6423 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6424 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6426 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6427 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6429 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6430 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6431 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6439 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6441 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6442 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6443 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6445 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6446 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6449 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6450 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6451 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6452 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6453 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6454 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6455 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6456 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6459 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6460 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6461 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6462 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6464 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6465 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6466 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6468 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6469 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6470 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6471 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6473 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6474 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6475 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6476 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6477 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6478 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6479 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6482 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6483 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6485 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6488 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6489 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6490 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6491 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6492 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6493 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6494 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6495 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6496 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6497 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6498 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6499 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6500 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6501 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6502 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6503 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6504 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6510 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6515 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6516 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6518 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6519 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6520 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6521 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6523 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6526 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6528 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6529 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6530 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6531 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6532 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6533 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6535 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6539 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6540 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6541 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6542 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6543 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6544 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6546 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6547 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6550 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6551 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6552 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6553 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6554 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6560 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6561 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6562 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6563 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6565 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6568 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6572 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6576 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6577 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6581 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6585 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6586 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6589 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6593 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6595 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6600 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6601 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6602 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6604 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6609 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6611 None => return None,
6614 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6616 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6617 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6619 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6620 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6623 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6629 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6631 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6632 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6633 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6634 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6635 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6636 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6637 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6639 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6640 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6641 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6642 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6643 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6644 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6645 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6646 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6647 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6648 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6649 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6650 contents: announcement,
6653 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6658 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6662 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6663 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6664 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6665 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6666 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6667 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6668 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6669 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6671 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6673 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6674 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6675 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6676 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6678 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6680 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6681 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6684 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6685 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6686 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6687 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6690 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6693 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6694 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6695 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6696 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6697 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6698 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6701 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6703 Err(_) => return None,
6705 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6706 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6711 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6712 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6713 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6714 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6715 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6716 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6717 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6718 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6719 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6720 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6721 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6722 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6723 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6724 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6725 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6726 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6729 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6732 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6733 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6734 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6735 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6736 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6737 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6738 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6739 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6740 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6742 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6743 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6744 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6745 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6746 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6747 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6748 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6749 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6750 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6752 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6753 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6754 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6755 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6756 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6757 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6758 next_funding_txid: None,
6763 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6765 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6766 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6767 /// commitment update.
6769 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6770 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6771 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6772 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6773 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6774 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6775 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6778 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6779 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6780 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6782 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6783 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6788 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6789 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6791 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6793 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6794 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6796 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6797 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6798 /// regenerate them.
6800 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6801 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6803 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6804 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6805 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6806 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6807 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6808 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6809 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6810 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6812 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6813 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6814 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6816 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6818 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6819 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6820 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6823 if amount_msat == 0 {
6824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6827 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6828 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6829 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6830 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6833 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6835 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6838 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6839 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6840 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6841 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6842 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6843 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6844 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6845 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6848 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6849 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6850 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6851 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6852 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6853 else { "to peer" });
6855 if need_holding_cell {
6856 force_holding_cell = true;
6859 // Now update local state:
6860 if force_holding_cell {
6861 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6866 onion_routing_packet,
6873 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6874 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6876 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6878 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6884 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6885 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6886 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6890 onion_routing_packet,
6894 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6899 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6900 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6901 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6902 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6904 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6905 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6906 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6908 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6909 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6913 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6914 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6915 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6916 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6917 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6918 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6919 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6922 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6923 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6924 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6925 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6926 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6927 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6930 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6932 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6933 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6934 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6935 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6936 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6938 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6939 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6942 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6943 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6944 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6945 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6947 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6948 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6949 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6950 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6951 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6952 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6953 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6955 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6957 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6961 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6962 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6963 where L::Target: Logger
6965 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6966 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6967 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6971 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6972 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6973 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6974 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6975 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6976 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6977 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6978 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6979 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6980 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6981 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6987 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6990 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6991 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6992 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6993 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6994 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6995 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6997 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6998 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6999 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7001 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7002 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7003 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7006 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7007 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7011 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7012 &commitment_stats.tx,
7013 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7014 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7015 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7016 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7018 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7020 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7021 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7022 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7023 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7025 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7026 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7027 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7028 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7029 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7030 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7034 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7035 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7039 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7040 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7042 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7048 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7049 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7051 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7052 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7053 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7054 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7055 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7056 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7057 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7058 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7060 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7061 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7062 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7065 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7066 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7067 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7073 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7075 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7076 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7077 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7078 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7079 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7081 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7083 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7089 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7090 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7091 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7092 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7093 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7095 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7096 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7100 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7101 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7103 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7104 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7106 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7107 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7109 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7110 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7111 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7114 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7117 // use override shutdown script if provided
7118 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7119 Some(script) => script,
7121 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7122 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7123 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7124 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7128 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7129 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7131 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7136 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7137 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7138 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7139 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7140 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7142 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7143 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7144 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7145 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7146 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7147 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7148 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7150 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7152 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7153 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7155 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7156 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7157 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7160 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7161 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7162 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7163 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7164 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7167 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7174 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7175 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7177 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7180 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7181 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7182 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7184 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7185 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7189 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7193 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7194 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7195 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7196 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7199 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7200 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7201 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7202 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7203 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7204 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7205 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7206 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7208 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7209 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7210 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7211 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7212 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7213 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7216 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7217 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7218 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7221 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7225 counterparty_node_id,
7227 channel_value_satoshis,
7231 current_chain_height,
7232 outbound_scid_alias,
7233 temporary_channel_id,
7234 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7239 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7244 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7245 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7246 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7247 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7248 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7249 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7250 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7251 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7252 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7254 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7259 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7260 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7261 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7264 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7265 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7266 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7267 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7270 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7272 next_local_nonce: None,
7276 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7277 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7278 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7279 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7280 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7281 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7282 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7283 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7284 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7285 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7286 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7289 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7290 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7292 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7294 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7295 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7296 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7297 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7300 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7301 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7303 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7305 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7306 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7308 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7309 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7310 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7311 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7312 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7313 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7316 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7317 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7319 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7320 if funding_created.is_none() {
7321 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7322 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7324 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7325 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7326 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7327 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7335 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7336 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7337 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7338 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7339 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7340 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7342 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7344 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7345 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7348 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7349 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7350 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7351 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7354 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7355 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7356 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7358 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7359 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7362 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7363 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7366 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7367 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7370 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7372 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7373 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7374 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7375 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7376 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7377 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7378 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7379 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7380 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7381 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7382 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7383 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7384 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7385 first_per_commitment_point,
7386 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7387 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7388 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7389 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7391 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7393 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7394 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7399 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7400 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7402 // Check sanity of message fields:
7403 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7404 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7406 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7407 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7409 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7410 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7412 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7413 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7415 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7416 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7418 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7419 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7420 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7422 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7423 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7424 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7426 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7427 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7428 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7430 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7431 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7433 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7434 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7437 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7438 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7439 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7441 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7442 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7444 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7445 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7447 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7448 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7450 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7451 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7453 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7454 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7456 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7457 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7460 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7461 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7462 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7464 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7465 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7467 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7468 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7469 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7471 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7472 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7475 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7476 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7477 &Some(ref script) => {
7478 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7479 if script.len() == 0 {
7482 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7483 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7485 Some(script.clone())
7488 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7490 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7495 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7496 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7497 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7498 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7499 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7501 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7502 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7504 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7507 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7508 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7509 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7510 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7511 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7512 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7515 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7516 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7517 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7520 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7521 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7523 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7524 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7526 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7531 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7532 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7533 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7534 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7535 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7539 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7540 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7542 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7543 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7545 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7546 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7547 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7548 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7551 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7553 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7554 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7555 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7556 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7558 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7559 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7561 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7562 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7564 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7565 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7566 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7567 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7568 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7569 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7573 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7574 initial_commitment_tx,
7577 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7578 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7582 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7583 if validated.is_err() {
7584 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7587 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7588 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7589 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7590 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7591 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7592 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7593 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7594 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7595 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7596 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7597 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7598 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7600 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7601 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7602 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7603 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7604 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7605 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7606 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7607 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7609 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7610 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7611 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7613 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7615 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7616 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7618 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7620 let mut channel = Channel {
7621 context: self.context,
7622 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7623 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7626 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7627 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7628 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7631 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7633 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7634 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7635 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7636 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7637 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7642 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7643 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7644 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7645 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7648 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7649 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7650 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7651 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7652 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7653 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7654 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7655 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7656 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7659 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7660 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7661 // `static_remote_key`.
7662 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7663 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7665 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7666 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7667 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7669 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7670 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7671 return Err(ChannelError::close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7673 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7675 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7676 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7677 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7683 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7684 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7685 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7686 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7687 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7688 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7689 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7690 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7691 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7692 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7696 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7698 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7699 // support this channel type.
7700 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7702 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7703 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7704 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7705 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7706 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7707 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7708 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7712 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7716 counterparty_node_id,
7720 current_chain_height,
7725 counterparty_pubkeys,
7727 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7728 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7730 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7732 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7737 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7738 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7740 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7741 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7742 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7743 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7746 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7747 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7749 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7751 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7752 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7755 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7758 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7759 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7760 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7762 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7763 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7764 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7765 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7767 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7768 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7769 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7770 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7771 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7772 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7773 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7774 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7775 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7776 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7777 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7778 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7779 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7780 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7781 first_per_commitment_point,
7782 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7783 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7784 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7786 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7788 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7790 next_local_nonce: None,
7794 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7795 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7797 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7799 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7800 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7803 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7804 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7806 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7807 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7808 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7809 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7810 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7811 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7812 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7813 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7814 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7815 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7816 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7818 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7821 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7822 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7823 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7827 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7828 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7831 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7832 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7834 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7835 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7837 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7839 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7840 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7841 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7842 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7845 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7846 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7847 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7848 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7849 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7851 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7853 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7854 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7855 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7858 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7859 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7860 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7864 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7865 initial_commitment_tx,
7868 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7869 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7872 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7873 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7876 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7878 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7879 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7880 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7881 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7883 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7885 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7886 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7887 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7888 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7889 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7890 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7891 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7892 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7893 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7894 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7895 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7897 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7898 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7899 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7900 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7901 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7902 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7903 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7905 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7906 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7908 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7909 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7910 let mut channel = Channel {
7911 context: self.context,
7912 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7913 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7915 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7916 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7918 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7922 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7923 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7924 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7925 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7926 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7927 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7928 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7931 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7932 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7933 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7934 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7935 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7936 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7937 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7938 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7939 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7942 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7943 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7944 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7946 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
7948 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7949 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7951 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
7952 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
7955 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7959 counterparty_node_id,
7965 current_chain_height,
7966 outbound_scid_alias,
7967 temporary_channel_id,
7968 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7973 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7974 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7975 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7976 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
7977 funding_tx_locktime,
7978 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7984 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7985 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7986 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7987 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7988 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7989 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
7991 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7993 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7994 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
7997 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
7998 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7999 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8002 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8003 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8006 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8007 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8008 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8009 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8010 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8011 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8012 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8014 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8015 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8017 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8018 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8019 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8020 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8021 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8022 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8023 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8024 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8025 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8026 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8027 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8028 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8029 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8030 first_per_commitment_point,
8031 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8032 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8033 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8034 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8036 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8038 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8039 second_per_commitment_point,
8040 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8041 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8046 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8047 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8048 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8049 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8050 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8051 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8054 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8055 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8056 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8057 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8058 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8059 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8060 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8061 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8062 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8063 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8064 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8065 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8068 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8069 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8070 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8071 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8072 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8074 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8075 // support this channel type.
8076 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8077 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8078 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8080 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8082 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8083 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8084 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8085 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8086 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8087 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8090 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8094 counterparty_node_id,
8098 current_chain_height,
8104 counterparty_pubkeys,
8106 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8107 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8108 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8109 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8111 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8112 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8113 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8114 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8118 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8119 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8120 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8121 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8122 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8123 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8130 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8131 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8133 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8134 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8135 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8136 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8139 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8140 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8142 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8144 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8145 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8148 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8151 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8152 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8153 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8155 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8156 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8157 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8158 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8159 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8160 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8161 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8163 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8164 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8165 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8166 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8167 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8168 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8169 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8170 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8171 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8172 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8173 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8174 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8175 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8176 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8177 first_per_commitment_point,
8178 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8179 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8180 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8182 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8184 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8185 second_per_commitment_point,
8186 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8190 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8191 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8193 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8195 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8196 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8200 // Unfunded channel utilities
8202 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8203 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8204 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8205 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8206 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8207 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8208 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8209 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8210 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8211 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8214 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8215 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8216 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8217 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8218 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8219 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8225 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8226 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8228 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8234 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8236 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8237 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8238 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8240 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8241 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8242 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8243 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8249 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8250 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8251 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8252 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8253 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8254 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8259 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8261 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8262 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8264 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8265 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8266 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8267 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8272 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8273 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8274 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8275 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8276 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8277 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8282 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8284 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8287 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8288 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8289 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8290 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8294 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8296 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8298 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8300 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8301 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8302 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8303 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8304 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8306 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8307 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8308 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8309 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8311 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8313 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8314 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8315 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8317 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8319 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8321 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8323 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8325 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8326 // deserialized from that format.
8327 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8328 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8329 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8331 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8333 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8334 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8335 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8337 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8338 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8339 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8340 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8343 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8344 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8345 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8348 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8349 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8350 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8351 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8353 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8354 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8356 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8357 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8358 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8363 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8366 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8368 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8369 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8370 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8375 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8378 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8381 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8383 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8388 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8389 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8390 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8392 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8393 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8394 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8395 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8396 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8397 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8398 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8400 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8402 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8404 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8407 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8408 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8409 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8412 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8414 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8415 preimages.push(preimage);
8417 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8418 reason.write(writer)?;
8420 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8422 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8423 preimages.push(preimage);
8425 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8426 reason.write(writer)?;
8429 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8430 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8433 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8434 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8435 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8436 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8437 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8438 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8440 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8441 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8442 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8445 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8446 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8447 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8448 source.write(writer)?;
8449 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8451 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8452 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8454 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8456 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8457 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8459 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8461 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8462 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8464 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8465 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8467 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8468 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8469 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8471 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8473 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8474 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8479 match self.context.resend_order {
8480 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8481 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8484 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8485 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8486 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8488 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8489 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8490 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8491 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8494 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8495 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8496 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8497 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8498 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8501 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8502 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8503 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8504 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8506 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8507 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8508 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8510 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8512 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8513 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8514 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8515 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8517 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8518 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8519 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8520 // consider the stale state on reload.
8523 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8524 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8525 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8527 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8528 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8529 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8531 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8532 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8534 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8535 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8536 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8538 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8539 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8541 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8544 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8545 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8546 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8548 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8551 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8552 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8554 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8555 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8556 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8558 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8560 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8562 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8564 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8565 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8566 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8567 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8568 htlc.write(writer)?;
8571 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8572 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8573 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8575 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8576 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8578 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8579 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8580 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8581 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8582 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8583 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8584 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8586 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8587 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8588 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8589 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8590 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8592 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8593 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8595 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8596 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8597 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8598 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8600 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8602 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8603 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8604 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8607 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8608 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8609 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8610 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8611 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8612 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8613 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8615 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8616 (2, chan_type, option),
8617 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8618 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8619 (5, self.context.config, required),
8620 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8621 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8622 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8623 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8624 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8625 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8626 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8627 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8628 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8629 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8630 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8631 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8632 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8633 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8634 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8635 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8636 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8637 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8638 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8639 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8640 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8641 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8642 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8643 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8644 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8651 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8652 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8654 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8655 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8657 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8658 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8659 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8661 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8662 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8663 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8664 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8666 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8668 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8669 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8670 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8671 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8672 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8674 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8675 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8678 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8679 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8680 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8682 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8684 let mut keys_data = None;
8686 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8687 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8688 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8689 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8690 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8691 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8692 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8693 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8694 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8695 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8699 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8700 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8701 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8704 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8706 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8708 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8710 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8712 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8713 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8714 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8715 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8716 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8717 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8718 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8719 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8721 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8722 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8724 Readable::read(reader)?
8726 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8729 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8730 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8732 Readable::read(reader)?
8734 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8736 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8737 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8738 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8743 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8744 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8745 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8746 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8747 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8748 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8749 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8750 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8751 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8752 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8753 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8754 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8756 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8757 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8760 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8761 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8764 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8767 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8769 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8770 blinding_point: None,
8774 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8775 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8776 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8777 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8778 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8779 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8780 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8781 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8782 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8783 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8784 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8785 blinding_point: None,
8787 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8788 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8789 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8791 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8792 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8793 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8795 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8799 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8800 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8801 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8802 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8805 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8806 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8807 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8809 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8810 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8811 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8812 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8815 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8816 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8817 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8818 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8821 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8823 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8825 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8826 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8827 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8828 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8830 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8831 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8832 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8833 // consider the stale state on reload.
8834 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8837 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8838 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8839 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8841 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8844 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8845 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8846 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8848 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8850 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8851 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8853 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8854 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8856 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8857 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8859 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8860 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8861 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8863 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8865 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8866 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8868 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8869 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8872 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8874 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8875 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8876 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8877 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8882 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8885 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8887 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8888 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8890 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8891 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8893 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8896 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8899 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8900 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8901 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8905 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8906 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8907 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8909 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8915 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8916 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8917 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8918 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8919 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8920 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8921 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8922 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8923 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8924 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8926 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8927 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8928 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8929 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8930 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8931 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8932 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8934 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8935 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8936 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8937 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8939 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8941 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8942 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8944 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8946 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8948 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8949 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8951 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8952 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
8954 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8955 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8956 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8957 (2, channel_type, option),
8958 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8959 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8960 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8961 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8962 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8963 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8964 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8965 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8966 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8967 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8968 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8969 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8970 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8971 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8972 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8973 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8974 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8975 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8976 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8977 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8978 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8979 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8980 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8981 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8982 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8983 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8984 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8985 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8988 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8989 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8990 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8991 // required channel parameters.
8992 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8993 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8995 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8997 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8998 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8999 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9000 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9003 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9004 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9005 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9007 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9008 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9010 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9011 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9016 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9017 if iter.next().is_some() {
9018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9022 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9023 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9024 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9025 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9026 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9029 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9030 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9031 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9033 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9034 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9036 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9037 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9038 // separate u64 values.
9039 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9041 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9043 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9044 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9045 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9046 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9048 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9049 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9051 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9052 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9053 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9054 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9055 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9058 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9059 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9061 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9062 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9063 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9064 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9066 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9067 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9069 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9070 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9071 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9072 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9073 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9076 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9077 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9080 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9081 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9082 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9083 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9084 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9085 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9088 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9089 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9090 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9092 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9097 context: ChannelContext {
9100 config: config.unwrap(),
9104 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9105 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9106 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9109 temporary_channel_id,
9111 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9113 channel_value_satoshis,
9115 latest_monitor_update_id,
9117 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9118 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9121 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9122 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9125 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9126 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9127 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9128 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9132 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9133 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9134 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9135 monitor_pending_forwards,
9136 monitor_pending_failures,
9137 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9138 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9140 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9141 signer_pending_funding: false,
9144 holding_cell_update_fee,
9145 next_holder_htlc_id,
9146 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9147 update_time_counter,
9150 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9151 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9152 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9153 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9155 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9156 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9157 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9158 closing_fee_limits: None,
9159 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9161 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9162 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9164 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9166 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9167 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9168 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9169 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9170 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9171 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9172 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9173 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9174 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9177 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9179 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9180 funding_transaction,
9183 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9184 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9185 counterparty_node_id,
9187 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9191 channel_update_status,
9192 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9196 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9197 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9199 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9201 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9202 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9204 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9205 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9206 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9208 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9209 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9212 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9214 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9217 local_initiated_shutdown,
9219 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9221 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9222 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9230 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9231 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9232 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9233 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9234 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9235 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9236 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9237 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9238 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9239 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9240 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9241 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9242 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9243 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9244 use crate::ln::msgs;
9245 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9246 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9247 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9248 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9249 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9250 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9251 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9252 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9253 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9254 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9255 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9256 use crate::util::test_utils;
9257 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9258 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9259 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9260 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9261 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9262 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9263 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9264 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9265 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9266 use crate::prelude::*;
9269 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9270 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9271 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9272 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9274 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9275 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9276 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9277 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9280 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9283 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9284 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9290 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9291 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9292 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9293 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9297 signer: InMemorySigner,
9300 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9301 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9304 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9305 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9307 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9309 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9310 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9313 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9317 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9319 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9321 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9322 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9323 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9326 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9327 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9328 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9329 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9333 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9334 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9335 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9339 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9340 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9341 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9342 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9345 let seed = [42; 32];
9346 let network = Network::Testnet;
9347 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9348 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9349 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9353 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9354 let config = UserConfig::default();
9355 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9356 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9357 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9359 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9360 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9364 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9365 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9367 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9368 let original_fee = 253;
9369 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9370 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9371 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9372 let seed = [42; 32];
9373 let network = Network::Testnet;
9374 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9376 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9377 let config = UserConfig::default();
9378 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9380 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9381 // same as the old fee.
9382 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9383 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9384 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9388 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9389 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9390 // dust limits are used.
9391 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9393 let seed = [42; 32];
9394 let network = Network::Testnet;
9395 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9396 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9397 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9399 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9400 // they have different dust limits.
9402 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9403 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9404 let config = UserConfig::default();
9405 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9407 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9408 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9409 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9410 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9411 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9413 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9414 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9415 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9416 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9417 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9419 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9420 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9421 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9422 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9424 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9425 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9426 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9428 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9429 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9430 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9432 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9433 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9434 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9436 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9437 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9438 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9439 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9442 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9444 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9445 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9446 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9447 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9448 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9449 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9450 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9451 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9452 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9454 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9455 blinding_point: None,
9458 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9459 // the dust limit check.
9460 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9461 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9462 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9463 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9465 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9466 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9467 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9468 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9469 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9470 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9471 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9475 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9476 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9477 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9478 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9479 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9480 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9482 let seed = [42; 32];
9483 let network = Network::Testnet;
9484 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9486 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9487 let config = UserConfig::default();
9488 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9490 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9491 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9493 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9494 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9495 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9496 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9497 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9498 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9500 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9501 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9502 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9503 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9504 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9506 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9508 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9509 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9510 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9511 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9512 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9514 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9515 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9516 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9517 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9518 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9522 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9523 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9526 let seed = [42; 32];
9527 let network = Network::Testnet;
9528 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9529 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9530 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9532 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9534 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9535 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9536 let config = UserConfig::default();
9537 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9539 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9540 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9541 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9542 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9544 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9545 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9546 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9548 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9549 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9550 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9551 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9553 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9554 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9555 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9557 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9558 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9559 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9561 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9562 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9563 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9564 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9565 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9566 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9567 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9569 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9571 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9572 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9573 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9574 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9575 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9579 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9580 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9581 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9583 let seed = [42; 32];
9584 let network = Network::Testnet;
9585 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9586 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9587 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9589 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9590 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9591 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9592 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9593 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9594 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9595 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9596 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9598 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9599 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9600 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9601 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9602 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9603 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9605 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9606 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9607 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9608 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9610 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9612 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9613 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9614 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9615 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9616 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9617 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9619 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9620 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9621 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9622 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9624 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9625 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9626 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9627 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9628 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9630 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9631 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9633 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9634 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9635 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9637 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9638 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9639 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9640 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9641 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9643 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9644 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9646 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9647 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9648 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9652 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9654 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9655 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9656 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9658 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9659 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9660 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9661 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9663 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9664 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9665 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9667 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9669 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9670 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9673 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9674 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9675 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9677 let seed = [42; 32];
9678 let network = Network::Testnet;
9679 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9680 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9681 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9684 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9685 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9686 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9688 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9689 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9691 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9692 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9693 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9695 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9696 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9698 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9700 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9701 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9703 // Channel Negotiations failed
9704 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9705 assert!(result.is_err());
9710 fn channel_update() {
9711 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9712 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9713 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9714 let seed = [42; 32];
9715 let network = Network::Testnet;
9716 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9717 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9718 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9720 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9721 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9722 let config = UserConfig::default();
9723 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9725 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9726 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9727 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9728 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9729 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9731 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9732 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9733 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9734 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9735 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9737 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9738 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9739 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9740 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9742 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9743 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9744 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9746 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9747 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9748 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9750 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9751 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9752 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9754 short_channel_id: 0,
9757 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9758 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9759 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9761 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9762 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9764 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9766 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9768 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9769 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9770 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9771 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9773 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9774 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9775 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9777 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9780 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9784 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9785 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9787 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9788 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9790 let seed = [42; 32];
9791 let network = Network::Testnet;
9792 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9793 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9795 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9796 let config = UserConfig::default();
9797 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9798 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9799 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9801 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9802 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9803 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9805 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9806 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9807 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9809 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9810 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9811 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9812 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9813 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9816 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9818 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9819 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9820 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9821 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9825 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9826 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9827 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9829 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9832 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9834 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9835 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9836 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9837 blinding_point: None,
9839 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9840 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9842 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9845 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9848 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9850 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9853 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9854 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9855 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9857 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9858 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9861 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9862 blinding_point: None,
9864 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9865 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9868 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9869 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9871 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9872 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9874 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9877 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9878 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9879 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9880 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9881 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9882 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9883 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9884 } = &mut dummy_add {
9885 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9886 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9888 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9889 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9890 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9892 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9895 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9897 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9898 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9899 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9900 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9901 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9902 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9903 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9904 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9907 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9909 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9910 use bitcoin::sighash;
9911 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9912 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9913 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9914 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9915 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9916 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9917 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9918 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9919 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9920 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9921 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9922 use crate::sync::Arc;
9923 use core::str::FromStr;
9924 use hex::DisplayHex;
9926 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9927 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9928 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9929 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9931 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9933 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9934 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9935 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9936 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9937 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9939 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9940 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9946 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9947 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9948 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9950 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9951 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9952 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9953 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9954 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9955 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9957 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9959 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9960 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9961 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9962 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9963 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9964 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9966 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9967 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9968 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9969 selected_contest_delay: 144
9971 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9972 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9974 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9975 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9977 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9978 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9980 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9981 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9983 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9984 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9985 // build_commitment_transaction.
9986 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9987 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9988 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9989 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9990 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9992 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9993 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9994 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9995 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9999 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10000 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10001 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10002 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10006 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10007 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10008 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10010 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10011 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10013 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10014 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10016 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10018 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10019 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10020 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10021 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10022 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10023 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10024 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10026 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10027 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10028 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10029 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10031 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10032 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10033 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10035 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10037 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10038 commitment_tx.clone(),
10039 counterparty_signature,
10040 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10041 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10042 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10044 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10045 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10047 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10048 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10049 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10051 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10052 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10055 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10056 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10058 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10059 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10060 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10061 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10062 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10063 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10064 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10065 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10067 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10070 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10071 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10072 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10076 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10079 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10080 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10081 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10082 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10083 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10084 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10086 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10087 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10088 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10089 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10090 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10091 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10092 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10093 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10094 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10095 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10097 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10098 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10099 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10100 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10101 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10102 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10104 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10108 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10109 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10110 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10111 "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", {});
10113 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10114 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10116 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10117 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10118 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10120 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10121 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10122 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10123 "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", {});
10125 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10128 amount_msat: 1000000,
10130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10136 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10137 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10139 amount_msat: 2000000,
10141 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10142 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10144 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10147 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10148 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10150 amount_msat: 2000000,
10152 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10153 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10154 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10155 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10156 blinding_point: None,
10158 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10161 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10162 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10164 amount_msat: 3000000,
10166 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10167 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10168 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10169 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10170 blinding_point: None,
10172 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10175 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10176 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10178 amount_msat: 4000000,
10180 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10181 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10183 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10187 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10188 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10189 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10191 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10192 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10193 "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", {
10196 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10197 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10198 "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" },
10201 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10202 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10203 "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" },
10206 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10207 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10208 "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" },
10211 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10212 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10213 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10216 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10217 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10218 "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" }
10221 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10222 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10223 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10225 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10226 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10227 "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", {
10230 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10231 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10232 "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" },
10235 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10236 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10237 "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" },
10240 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10241 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10242 "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" },
10245 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10246 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10247 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10250 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10251 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10252 "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" }
10255 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10256 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10257 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10259 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10260 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10261 "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", {
10264 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10265 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10266 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10269 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10270 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10271 "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" },
10274 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10275 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10276 "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" },
10279 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10280 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10281 "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" }
10284 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10285 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10286 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10287 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10289 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10290 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10291 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10294 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10295 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10296 "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" },
10299 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10300 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10301 "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" },
10304 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10305 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10306 "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" },
10309 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10310 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10311 "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" }
10314 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10315 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10316 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10317 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10319 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10320 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10321 "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", {
10324 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10325 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10326 "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" },
10329 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10330 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10331 "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" },
10334 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10335 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10336 "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" },
10339 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10340 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10341 "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" }
10344 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10345 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10346 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10348 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10349 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10350 "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", {
10353 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10354 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10355 "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" },
10358 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10359 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10360 "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" },
10363 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10364 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10365 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10368 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10369 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10370 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10372 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10373 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10374 "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", {
10377 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10378 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10379 "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" },
10382 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10383 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10384 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10387 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10388 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10389 "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" }
10392 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10393 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10394 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10396 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10397 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10398 "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", {
10401 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10402 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10403 "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" },
10406 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10407 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10408 "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" }
10411 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10412 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10413 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10414 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10415 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10416 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10418 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10419 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10420 "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", {
10423 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10424 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10425 "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" },
10428 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10429 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10430 "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" }
10433 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10434 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10435 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10436 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10437 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10439 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10440 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10441 "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", {
10444 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10445 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10446 "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" },
10449 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10450 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10451 "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" }
10454 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10455 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10456 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10458 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10459 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10460 "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", {
10463 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10464 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10465 "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" }
10468 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10469 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10470 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10471 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10472 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10474 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10475 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10476 "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", {
10479 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10480 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10481 "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" }
10484 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10487 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10488 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10490 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10491 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10492 "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", {
10495 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10496 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10497 "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" }
10500 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10501 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10502 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10503 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10505 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10506 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10507 "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", {});
10509 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10510 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10511 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10512 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10513 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10515 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10516 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10517 "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", {});
10519 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10520 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10521 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10522 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10523 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10525 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10526 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10527 "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", {});
10529 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10530 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10531 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10533 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10534 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10535 "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", {});
10537 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10538 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10539 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10540 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10541 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10543 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10544 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10545 "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", {});
10547 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10548 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10549 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10550 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10551 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10553 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10554 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10555 "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", {});
10557 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10558 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10559 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10560 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10561 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10562 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10564 amount_msat: 2000000,
10566 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10567 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10569 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10572 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10573 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10574 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10576 amount_msat: 5000001,
10578 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10579 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10580 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10581 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10582 blinding_point: None,
10584 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10587 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10588 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10590 amount_msat: 5000000,
10592 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10593 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10594 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10595 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10596 blinding_point: None,
10598 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10602 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10603 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10604 "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", {
10607 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10608 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10609 "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" },
10611 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10612 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10613 "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" },
10615 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10616 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10617 "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" }
10620 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10621 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10622 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10623 "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", {
10626 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10627 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10628 "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" },
10630 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10631 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10632 "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" },
10634 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10635 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10636 "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" }
10641 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10642 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10644 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10645 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10646 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10647 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10649 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10650 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10651 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10653 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10654 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10656 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10657 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10659 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10660 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10661 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10665 fn test_key_derivation() {
10666 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10667 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10669 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10670 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10672 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10673 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10675 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10676 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10678 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10679 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10681 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10682 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10684 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10685 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10689 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10690 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10692 let seed = [42; 32];
10693 let network = Network::Testnet;
10694 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10697 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10698 let config = UserConfig::default();
10699 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10700 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10702 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10703 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10705 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10706 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10707 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10708 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10709 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10710 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10711 assert!(res.is_ok());
10715 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10716 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10717 // resulting `channel_type`.
10718 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10719 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10720 let network = Network::Testnet;
10721 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10722 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10724 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10725 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10727 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10728 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10730 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10731 // need to signal it.
10732 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10733 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10734 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10735 &config, 0, 42, None
10737 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10739 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10740 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10741 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10743 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10744 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10745 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10749 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10750 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10751 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10752 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10753 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10756 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10757 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10761 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10762 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10763 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10764 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10765 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10766 let network = Network::Testnet;
10767 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10768 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10770 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10771 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10773 let config = UserConfig::default();
10775 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10776 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10777 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10778 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10779 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10781 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10782 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10783 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10787 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10788 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10789 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10791 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10792 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10793 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10794 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10795 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10796 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10798 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10802 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10803 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10806 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10807 let network = Network::Testnet;
10808 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10809 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10811 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10812 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10814 let config = UserConfig::default();
10816 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10817 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10818 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10819 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10820 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10821 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10822 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10823 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10825 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10826 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10827 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10828 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10829 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10830 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10834 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10835 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10837 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10838 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10839 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10840 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10842 assert!(res.is_err());
10844 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10845 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10846 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10848 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10849 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10850 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10853 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10855 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10856 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10857 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10858 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10861 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10862 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10864 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10865 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10867 assert!(res.is_err());
10871 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10872 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10873 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10874 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10875 let seed = [42; 32];
10876 let network = Network::Testnet;
10877 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10878 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10879 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10881 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10882 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10883 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10884 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10886 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10887 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10888 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10893 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10903 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10904 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10905 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10910 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10911 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10917 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10920 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10921 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10922 &accept_channel_msg,
10923 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10924 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10927 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10928 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10929 let tx = Transaction {
10930 version: Version::ONE,
10931 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10935 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10938 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10941 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10942 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10943 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10944 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10945 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10946 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10950 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10951 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10959 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10960 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10961 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10962 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10964 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10965 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10972 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10973 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10974 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10975 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10976 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10978 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10979 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10980 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10988 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10989 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10992 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10993 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10994 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10995 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());