1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
928 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
929 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
930 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
931 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
932 self.logger.log(record)
936 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
937 where L::Target: Logger {
938 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
939 where S::Target: SignerProvider
943 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
944 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
949 macro_rules! secp_check {
950 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
953 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
958 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
959 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
960 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
961 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
962 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
963 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
964 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
965 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
967 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
969 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
971 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
975 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
977 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
978 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
979 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
981 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
982 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
984 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
985 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
986 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
987 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
988 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
990 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
991 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
995 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1001 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1003 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1004 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1005 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1006 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1007 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1008 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1009 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1010 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1013 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1014 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1015 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1016 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1017 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1018 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1019 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1020 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1021 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1022 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1023 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1026 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1027 struct HTLCCandidate {
1029 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1032 impl HTLCCandidate {
1033 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1041 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1043 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1045 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1046 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1047 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1052 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1053 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1054 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1055 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1056 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1058 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1059 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1060 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1061 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1063 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1064 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1068 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1069 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1070 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1071 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1072 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1073 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1074 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1075 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1076 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1077 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1078 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1079 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1082 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1084 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1085 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1086 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1087 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1090 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1091 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1092 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1094 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1095 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1096 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1097 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1100 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1102 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1103 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1104 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1105 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1106 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1107 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1108 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1109 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1110 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1111 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1112 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1113 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1115 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1116 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1119 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1120 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1121 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1122 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1123 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1124 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1125 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1126 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1127 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1128 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1129 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1130 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1131 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1132 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1133 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1135 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1136 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1137 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1138 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1140 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1141 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1142 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1143 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1145 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1146 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1147 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1148 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1149 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1151 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1152 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1153 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1154 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1156 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1157 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1158 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1160 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1161 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1162 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1163 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1164 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1166 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1167 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1170 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1171 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1173 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1174 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1175 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1176 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1178 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1179 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1181 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1182 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1185 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1186 (0, update, required),
1189 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1190 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1191 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1192 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1193 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1194 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1195 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1196 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1197 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1198 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1201 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1203 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1205 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1207 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1208 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1209 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1210 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1212 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1213 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1217 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1219 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1220 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1222 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1224 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1225 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1230 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1231 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1232 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1233 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1234 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1236 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1237 /// in a timely manner.
1238 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1241 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1242 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1243 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1245 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1246 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1247 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1248 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1252 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1253 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1254 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1256 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1257 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1258 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1259 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1261 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1265 /// The current channel ID.
1266 channel_id: ChannelId,
1267 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1268 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1269 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1270 channel_state: ChannelState,
1272 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1273 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1275 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1276 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1277 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1279 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1280 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1281 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1282 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1284 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1285 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1287 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1289 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1290 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1291 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1293 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1294 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1295 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1297 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1298 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1299 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1300 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1301 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1302 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1304 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1305 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1306 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1307 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1308 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1309 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1311 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1313 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1314 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1315 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1317 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1318 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1319 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1320 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1321 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1322 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1323 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1324 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1326 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1327 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1328 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1330 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1331 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1332 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1333 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1334 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1335 /// outbound or inbound.
1336 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1338 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1340 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1341 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1342 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1343 // HTLCs with similar state.
1344 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1345 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1346 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1347 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1348 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1349 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1350 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1351 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1352 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1353 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1355 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1356 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1357 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1359 update_time_counter: u32,
1361 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1363 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1365 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1366 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1368 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1369 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1371 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1372 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1373 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1374 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1376 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1377 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1379 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1381 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1383 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1384 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1385 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1386 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1387 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1389 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1390 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1392 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1393 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1394 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1396 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1399 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1400 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1401 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1402 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1403 channel_creation_height: u32,
1405 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1408 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1410 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1413 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1415 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1418 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1420 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1422 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1423 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1426 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1428 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1430 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1431 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1433 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1435 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1436 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1437 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1439 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1441 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1442 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1443 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1445 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1446 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1447 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1449 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1451 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1453 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1454 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1455 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1456 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1458 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1459 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1460 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1462 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1463 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1464 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1466 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1467 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1468 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1469 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1471 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1472 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1473 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1475 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1476 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1477 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1478 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1479 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1481 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1482 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1484 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1485 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1486 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1487 /// unblock the state machine.
1489 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1490 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1491 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1493 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1494 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1495 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1498 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1499 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1500 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1501 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1502 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1503 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1504 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1506 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1507 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1509 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1510 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1511 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1513 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1514 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1515 // associated channel mapping.
1517 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1518 // to store all of them.
1519 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1521 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1522 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1523 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1524 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1525 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1527 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1528 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1530 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1531 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1533 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1534 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1536 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1537 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1539 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1541 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1543 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1544 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1545 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1548 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1549 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1550 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1551 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1552 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1553 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1554 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1556 config: &'a UserConfig,
1557 current_chain_height: u32,
1560 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1561 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1562 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1563 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1564 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1566 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1567 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1569 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1570 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1572 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1574 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1575 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1577 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1579 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1580 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1581 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1583 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1587 // Check sanity of message fields:
1588 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1590 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1591 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1592 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1594 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1595 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1597 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1600 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1601 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1604 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1607 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1610 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1612 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1613 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1616 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1619 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1623 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1624 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1627 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1630 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1633 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1636 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1639 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1642 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1646 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1648 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1649 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1654 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1655 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1656 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1659 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1662 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1663 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1664 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1666 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1670 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1671 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1672 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1673 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1677 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1678 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1679 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1683 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1684 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1685 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1686 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1690 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1691 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1692 &Some(ref script) => {
1693 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1694 if script.len() == 0 {
1697 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1700 Some(script.clone())
1703 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1710 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1711 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1712 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1713 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1717 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1718 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1723 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1724 Ok(script) => script,
1725 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1728 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1729 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1731 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1734 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1737 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1739 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1741 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1744 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1745 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1747 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1752 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1754 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1755 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1756 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1757 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1759 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1762 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1764 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1765 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1768 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1769 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1772 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1773 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1774 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1775 pending_update_fee: None,
1776 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1778 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1779 update_time_counter: 1,
1781 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1783 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1784 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1785 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1786 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1787 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1788 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1789 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1791 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1792 signer_pending_funding: false,
1795 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1796 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1798 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1800 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1801 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1802 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1803 closing_fee_limits: None,
1804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1806 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1807 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1808 short_channel_id: None,
1809 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1811 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1812 channel_value_satoshis,
1813 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1814 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1815 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1816 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1817 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1818 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1819 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1820 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1821 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1822 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1825 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1827 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1828 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1829 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1830 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1831 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1832 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1833 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1835 funding_outpoint: None,
1836 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1838 funding_transaction: None,
1839 is_batch_funding: None,
1841 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1842 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1843 counterparty_node_id,
1845 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1847 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1849 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1850 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1852 announcement_sigs: None,
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1857 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1859 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1860 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1862 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1863 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1865 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1866 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1868 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1869 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1874 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1876 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1882 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1883 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1884 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1885 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1886 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1887 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1888 funding_satoshis: u64,
1891 config: &'a UserConfig,
1892 current_chain_height: u32,
1893 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1894 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1895 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1896 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1897 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1898 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1899 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1905 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1906 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1908 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1910 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1913 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1916 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1917 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1920 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1924 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1925 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1927 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1928 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1930 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1932 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1934 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1935 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1936 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1940 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1941 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1943 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1944 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1945 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1946 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1950 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1951 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1952 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1956 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1957 Ok(script) => script,
1958 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1961 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1966 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1967 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1968 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1969 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1974 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1976 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1977 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1978 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1981 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1982 channel_value_satoshis,
1984 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1987 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1990 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1991 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1994 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1995 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1996 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1997 pending_update_fee: None,
1998 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1999 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2000 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2001 update_time_counter: 1,
2003 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2005 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2006 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2007 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2008 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2009 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2010 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2011 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2013 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2014 signer_pending_funding: false,
2016 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2017 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2018 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2019 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2020 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2021 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2023 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2024 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2025 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2026 closing_fee_limits: None,
2027 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2029 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2030 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2031 short_channel_id: None,
2032 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2034 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2035 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2036 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2037 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2038 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2039 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2040 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2041 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2042 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2043 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2044 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2045 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2046 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2047 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2049 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2051 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2052 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2053 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2054 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2055 counterparty_parameters: None,
2056 funding_outpoint: None,
2057 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2059 funding_transaction: None,
2060 is_batch_funding: None,
2062 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2063 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2064 counterparty_node_id,
2066 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2068 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2070 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2071 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2073 announcement_sigs: None,
2075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2076 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2078 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2080 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2081 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2083 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2084 outbound_scid_alias,
2086 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2087 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2089 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2090 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2095 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2096 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2100 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2101 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2102 self.update_time_counter
2105 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2106 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2109 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2110 self.config.announced_channel
2113 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2114 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2117 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2118 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2119 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2120 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2123 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2124 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2125 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2128 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2129 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2130 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2131 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2132 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2133 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2134 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2137 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2138 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2139 match self.channel_state {
2140 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2141 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2142 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2143 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2144 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2145 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2146 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2148 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2150 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2151 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2155 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2156 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2157 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2158 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2159 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2160 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2163 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2164 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2165 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2169 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2170 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2171 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2172 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2173 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2176 // Public utilities:
2178 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2182 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2184 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2185 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2186 self.temporary_channel_id
2189 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2193 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2194 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2195 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2199 /// Gets the channel's type
2200 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2204 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2206 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2207 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2208 self.short_channel_id
2211 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2212 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2213 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2216 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2217 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2218 self.outbound_scid_alias
2221 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2223 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2224 return &self.holder_signer
2227 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2228 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2229 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2230 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2231 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2232 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2235 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2236 /// get_funding_created.
2237 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2238 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2241 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2242 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2243 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2244 if conf_height > 0 {
2251 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2252 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2253 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2256 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2257 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2258 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2259 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2263 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2266 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2267 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2270 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2271 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2274 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2275 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2276 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2279 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2283 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2284 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2285 self.counterparty_node_id
2288 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2289 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2290 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2293 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2294 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2295 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2298 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2299 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2301 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2302 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2303 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2304 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2306 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2311 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2312 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2316 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2317 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2320 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2321 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2322 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2324 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2325 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2330 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2331 self.channel_value_satoshis
2334 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2335 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2338 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2339 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2342 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2343 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2344 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2345 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2348 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2349 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2350 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2351 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2353 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2357 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2358 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2359 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2362 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2363 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2364 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2367 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2368 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2369 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2372 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2373 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2374 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2377 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2378 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2379 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2382 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2383 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2384 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2387 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2388 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2389 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2390 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2391 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2394 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2396 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2397 self.prev_config = None;
2401 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2402 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2406 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2407 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2408 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2409 let did_channel_update =
2410 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2411 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2412 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2413 if did_channel_update {
2414 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2415 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2416 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2417 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2419 self.config.options = *config;
2423 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2424 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2425 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2426 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2427 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2430 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2431 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2432 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2433 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2434 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2436 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2437 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2438 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2439 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2440 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2441 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2442 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2444 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2445 where L::Target: Logger
2447 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2448 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2449 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2451 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2452 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2453 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2454 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2456 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2457 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2458 if match update_state {
2459 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2460 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2461 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2462 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2463 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2465 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2469 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2470 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2471 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2473 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2475 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2476 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2477 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2479 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2480 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2481 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2482 transaction_output_index: None
2487 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2488 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2489 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2490 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2491 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2494 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2496 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2497 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2498 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2501 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2504 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2505 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2508 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2510 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2511 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2512 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2514 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2515 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2521 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2523 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2524 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2525 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2526 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2528 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2529 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2533 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2534 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2536 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2538 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2539 if generated_by_local {
2540 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2541 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2542 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2552 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2554 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2555 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2556 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2557 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2558 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2563 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2564 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2565 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2566 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2570 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2571 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2575 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2576 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2578 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2580 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2581 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2583 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2584 if !generated_by_local {
2585 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2593 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2594 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2595 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2596 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2597 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2598 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2599 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2600 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2602 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2604 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2605 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2606 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2607 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2609 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2611 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2612 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2613 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2614 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2617 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2618 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2619 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2620 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2622 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2625 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2626 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2627 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2628 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2630 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2633 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2634 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2639 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2640 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2645 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2647 let channel_parameters =
2648 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2649 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2650 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2657 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2660 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2661 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2662 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2663 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2671 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2672 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2673 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2674 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2679 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2680 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2681 /// our counterparty!)
2682 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2683 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2684 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2685 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2686 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2687 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2688 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2690 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2694 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2695 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2696 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2697 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2698 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2699 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2700 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2702 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2705 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2706 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2707 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2708 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2709 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2712 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2713 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2716 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2720 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2721 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2722 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2723 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2724 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2725 // which are near the dust limit.
2726 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2727 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2728 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2729 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2730 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2732 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2733 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2735 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2736 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2739 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2740 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2741 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2744 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2745 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2747 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2749 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2750 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2753 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2754 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2757 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2758 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2760 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2761 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2763 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2766 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2767 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2768 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2769 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2771 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2773 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2776 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2781 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2782 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2783 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2784 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2786 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2787 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2788 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2789 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2790 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2791 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2793 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2795 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2796 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2800 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2801 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2802 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2803 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2804 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2805 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2806 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2808 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2810 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2811 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2813 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2819 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2820 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2821 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2822 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2823 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2824 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2825 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2826 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2827 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2828 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2829 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2831 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2832 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2833 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2834 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2835 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2840 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2841 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2842 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2843 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2844 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2845 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2846 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2847 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2851 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2852 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2853 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2854 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2855 match holding_cell_update {
2856 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2857 holding_cell_states.insert(
2859 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2862 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2863 holding_cell_states.insert(
2865 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2868 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2869 holding_cell_states.insert(
2871 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2875 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2878 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2879 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2882 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2883 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2885 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2886 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2887 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2888 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2889 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2890 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2891 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2892 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2893 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2894 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2901 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2902 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2903 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2904 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2907 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2908 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2910 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2911 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2912 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2913 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2914 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2915 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2916 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2917 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2918 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2919 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2922 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2923 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2929 } = *holding_cell_update {
2930 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2932 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2933 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2934 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2935 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2936 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2937 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2944 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2945 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2946 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2947 /// corner case properly.
2948 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2949 -> AvailableBalances
2950 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2952 let context = &self;
2953 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2956 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2957 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2959 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2960 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2961 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2962 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2965 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2967 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2968 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2970 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2972 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2974 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2975 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2979 if context.is_outbound() {
2980 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2981 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2983 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2984 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2986 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2987 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2988 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2989 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2992 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2993 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2994 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2995 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2996 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2997 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2998 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3001 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3002 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3003 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3004 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3005 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3006 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3007 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3008 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3009 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3010 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3011 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3013 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3016 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3017 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3018 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3020 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3023 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3024 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3026 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3027 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3028 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3030 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3031 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3032 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3033 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3037 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3039 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3040 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3041 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3042 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3043 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3044 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3045 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3047 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3048 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3050 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3051 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3052 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3055 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3056 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3057 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3058 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3059 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3060 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3061 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3062 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3063 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3064 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3068 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3069 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3070 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3071 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3072 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3073 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3076 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3077 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3078 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3079 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3080 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3083 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3084 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3085 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3087 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3091 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3092 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3094 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3095 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3099 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3100 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3101 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3102 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3104 outbound_capacity_msat,
3105 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3106 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3111 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3112 let context = &self;
3113 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3116 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3117 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3119 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3120 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3122 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3123 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3125 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3126 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3127 let context = &self;
3128 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3130 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3133 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3134 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3136 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3137 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3139 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3140 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3142 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3143 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3147 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3148 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3154 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3155 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3156 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3159 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3160 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3161 included_htlcs += 1;
3164 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3169 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3170 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3171 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3172 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3173 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3174 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3179 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3181 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3182 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3187 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3188 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3192 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3193 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3194 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3197 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3198 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3200 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3201 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3202 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3204 total_pending_htlcs,
3205 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3206 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3207 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3209 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3210 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3211 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3213 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3215 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3220 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3221 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3223 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3224 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3226 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3227 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3229 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3230 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3231 let context = &self;
3232 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3234 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3237 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3238 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3240 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3241 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3243 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3244 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3246 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3247 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3251 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3252 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3258 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3259 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3260 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3261 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3262 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3263 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3266 included_htlcs += 1;
3269 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3270 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3273 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3274 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3276 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3277 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3278 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3283 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3284 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3285 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3288 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3289 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3291 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3292 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3294 total_pending_htlcs,
3295 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3296 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3297 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3299 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3300 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3301 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3303 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3305 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3310 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3311 match self.channel_state {
3312 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3313 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3314 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3315 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3325 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3327 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3328 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3331 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3333 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3334 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3335 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3339 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3340 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3341 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3344 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3346 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3347 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3350 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3351 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3352 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3353 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3354 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3355 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3356 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3357 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3358 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3359 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3360 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3362 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3363 // return them to fail the payment.
3364 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3365 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3366 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3368 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3369 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3374 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3375 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3376 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3377 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3378 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3379 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3380 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3381 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3382 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3383 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3384 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3385 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3386 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3387 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3388 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3392 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3393 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3395 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3396 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3400 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3401 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3402 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3403 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3404 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3405 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3406 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3407 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3411 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3412 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3413 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3414 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3416 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3417 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3418 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3419 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3421 match &self.holder_signer {
3422 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3423 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3424 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3425 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3426 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3429 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3433 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3434 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3435 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3437 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3438 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3439 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3441 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3442 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3443 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3446 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3447 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3449 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3455 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3456 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3457 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3458 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3459 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3462 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3464 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3466 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3467 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3472 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3473 // We've exhausted our options
3476 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3477 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3480 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3481 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3482 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3483 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3485 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3486 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3487 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3488 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3489 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3490 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3492 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3494 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3499 // Internal utility functions for channels
3501 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3502 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3503 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3505 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3507 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3508 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3509 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3511 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3514 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3516 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3519 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3520 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3523 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3525 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3526 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3527 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3528 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3529 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3532 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3533 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3534 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3535 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3536 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3537 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3538 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3541 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3542 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3544 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3546 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3547 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3548 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3549 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3550 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3551 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3552 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3555 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3556 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3558 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3559 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3562 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3563 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3564 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3565 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3566 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3567 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3570 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3571 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3572 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3573 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3574 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3575 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3581 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3582 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3583 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3584 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3585 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3586 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3587 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3588 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3589 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3590 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3591 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3592 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3595 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3596 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3597 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3598 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3599 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3600 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3604 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3606 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3607 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3608 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3612 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3613 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3614 trait FailHTLCContents {
3615 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3616 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3617 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3618 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3620 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3621 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3622 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3623 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3625 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3626 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3628 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3629 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3632 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3633 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3634 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3635 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3638 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3639 failure_code: self.1
3642 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3643 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3645 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3646 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3648 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3649 failure_code: self.1
3654 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3655 fn name() -> &'static str;
3657 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3658 fn name() -> &'static str {
3662 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3663 fn name() -> &'static str {
3664 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3668 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3669 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3670 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3672 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3673 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3674 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3675 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3677 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3678 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3680 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3682 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3683 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3684 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3685 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3687 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3688 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3698 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3699 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3700 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3701 // outside of those situations will fail.
3702 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3706 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3711 1 + // script length (0)
3715 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3716 2 + // witness marker and flag
3717 1 + // witness element count
3718 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3719 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3720 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3721 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3722 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3723 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3725 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3726 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3727 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3733 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3734 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3735 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3736 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3738 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3739 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3740 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3742 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3743 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3744 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3745 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3746 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3747 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3750 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3751 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3754 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3755 value_to_holder = 0;
3758 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3759 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3760 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3761 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3763 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3764 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3767 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3768 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3771 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3774 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3775 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3777 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3779 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3780 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3781 where L::Target: Logger {
3782 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3783 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3784 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3785 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3786 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3787 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3788 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3789 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3793 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3794 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3795 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3796 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3798 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3799 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3802 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3803 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3804 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3806 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3807 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3808 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3809 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3810 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3811 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3812 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3814 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3815 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3816 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3818 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3819 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3821 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3824 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3825 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3829 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3833 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3835 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3836 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3837 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3838 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3841 // Now update local state:
3843 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3844 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3845 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3846 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3847 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3848 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3849 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3850 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3852 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3855 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3856 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3857 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3858 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3859 // do not not get into this branch.
3860 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3861 match pending_update {
3862 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3863 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3864 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3865 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3866 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3867 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3868 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3871 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3874 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3875 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3876 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3877 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3878 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3879 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3885 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3886 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3887 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3890 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3891 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3894 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3897 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3898 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3900 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3901 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3903 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3904 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3907 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3910 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3911 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3912 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3913 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3918 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3919 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3920 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3921 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3922 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3923 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3924 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3925 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3926 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3927 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3928 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3929 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3930 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3931 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3932 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3934 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3935 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3936 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3937 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3938 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3941 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3942 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3943 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3949 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3950 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3952 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3956 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3957 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3958 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3959 /// before we fail backwards.
3961 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3962 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3963 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3964 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3965 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3966 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3967 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3970 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3971 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3973 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3974 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3975 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3976 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3977 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3978 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3981 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3982 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3983 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3984 /// before we fail backwards.
3986 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3987 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3988 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3989 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3990 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3992 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3993 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3994 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3997 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3998 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3999 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4001 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4002 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4003 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4005 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4006 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4007 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4009 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4014 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4015 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4021 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4022 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4023 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4024 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4025 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4029 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4030 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4031 force_holding_cell = true;
4034 // Now update local state:
4035 if force_holding_cell {
4036 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4037 match pending_update {
4038 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4039 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4040 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4041 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4045 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4046 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4048 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4049 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4050 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4056 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4057 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4061 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4062 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4064 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4065 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4068 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4071 // Message handlers:
4072 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4073 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4074 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4075 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4076 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4077 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4078 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4081 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4083 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4085 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4086 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4087 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4088 debug_assert!(matches!(
4089 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4091 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4092 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4095 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4096 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4098 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4099 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4100 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4101 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4103 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4106 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4107 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4108 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4111 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4112 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4113 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4114 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4115 // when routing outbound payments.
4116 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4120 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4121 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4122 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4123 match &self.context.channel_state {
4124 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4125 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4126 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4127 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4128 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4129 check_reconnection = true;
4130 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4131 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4132 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4133 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4134 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4136 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4137 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4140 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4141 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4142 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4144 if check_reconnection {
4145 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4146 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4147 let expected_point =
4148 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4149 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4151 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4152 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4153 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4154 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4155 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4156 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4158 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4159 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4160 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4161 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4162 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4164 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4170 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4171 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4173 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4175 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4178 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4179 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4180 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4181 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4182 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4185 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4186 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4189 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4192 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4195 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4198 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4202 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4203 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4204 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4207 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4211 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4212 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4213 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4214 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4215 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4216 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4217 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4218 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4219 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4220 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4221 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4223 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4224 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4225 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4226 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4227 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4228 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4232 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4233 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4234 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4235 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4236 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4240 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4241 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4243 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4244 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4245 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4247 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4248 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4252 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4255 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4260 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4261 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4265 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4266 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4267 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4268 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4269 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4273 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4276 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4280 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4281 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4282 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4286 // Now update local state:
4287 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4288 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4289 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4290 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4291 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4292 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4293 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4294 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4300 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4302 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4303 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4304 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4305 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4306 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4307 None => fail_reason.into(),
4308 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4309 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4310 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4313 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4317 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4319 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4320 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4328 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4331 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4332 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4335 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4339 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4342 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4343 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4346 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4350 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4354 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4355 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4358 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4362 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4366 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4367 where L::Target: Logger
4369 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4372 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4375 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4379 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4381 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4383 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4384 let commitment_txid = {
4385 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4386 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4387 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4389 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4390 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4391 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4392 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4393 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4398 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4400 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4401 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4402 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4403 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4406 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4407 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4408 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4414 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4415 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4416 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4417 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4418 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4419 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4420 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4421 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4422 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4423 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4424 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4430 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4434 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4435 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4436 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4437 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4438 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4439 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4440 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4441 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4442 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4443 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4444 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4445 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4446 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4449 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4450 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4451 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4452 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4453 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4454 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4455 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4457 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4458 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4459 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4460 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4461 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4462 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4463 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4466 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4467 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4470 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4472 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4473 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4474 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4477 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4480 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4481 commitment_stats.tx,
4483 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4484 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4485 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4488 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4489 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4491 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4492 let mut need_commitment = false;
4493 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4494 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4495 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4496 need_commitment = true;
4500 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4501 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4502 Some(resolution.clone())
4504 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4505 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4506 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4507 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4508 need_commitment = true;
4511 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4512 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4513 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4514 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4515 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4516 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4517 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4518 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4519 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4520 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4521 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4522 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4523 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4524 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4526 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4528 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4529 need_commitment = true;
4533 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4534 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4535 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4536 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4537 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4538 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4539 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4541 nondust_htlc_sources,
4543 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4546 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4547 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4548 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4549 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4550 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4552 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4553 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4554 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4555 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4556 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4557 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4558 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4559 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4560 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4561 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4562 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4563 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4564 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4565 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4567 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4568 &self.context.channel_id);
4569 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4572 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4573 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4574 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4575 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4576 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4577 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4578 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4579 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4580 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4584 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4585 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4586 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4587 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4590 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4591 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4592 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4593 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4594 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4595 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4596 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4598 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4599 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4600 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4603 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4604 /// for our counterparty.
4605 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4606 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4607 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4608 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4610 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4611 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4612 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4613 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4615 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4616 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4617 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4618 updates: Vec::new(),
4619 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4622 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4623 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4624 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4625 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4626 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4627 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4628 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4629 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4630 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4631 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4632 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4633 // to rebalance channels.
4634 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4635 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4636 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4637 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4639 match self.send_htlc(
4640 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4641 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4643 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4646 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4647 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4648 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4649 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4650 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4651 // into the holding cell without ever being
4652 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4653 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4654 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4657 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4664 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4665 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4666 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4667 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4668 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4669 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4670 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4671 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4672 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4673 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4674 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4675 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4678 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4679 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4680 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4682 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4683 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4684 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4687 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4689 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4690 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4691 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4692 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4693 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4694 // for a full revocation before failing.
4695 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4696 update_fail_count += 1;
4698 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4700 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4705 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4706 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4708 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4709 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4714 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4715 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4716 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4717 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4718 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4720 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4721 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4722 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4724 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4725 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4731 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4732 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4733 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4734 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4735 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4736 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4737 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4738 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4739 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4741 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4744 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4747 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4751 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4753 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4754 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4759 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4760 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4761 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4762 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4763 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4764 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4765 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4766 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4772 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4773 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4776 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4777 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4778 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4779 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4781 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4783 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4788 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4789 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4790 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4791 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4792 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4793 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4794 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4795 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4796 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4798 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4801 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4802 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4803 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4804 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4805 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4806 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4807 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4808 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4809 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4811 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4812 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4815 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4816 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4817 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4818 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4819 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4820 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4821 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4822 let mut require_commitment = false;
4823 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4826 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4827 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4828 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4829 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4831 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4832 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4833 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4834 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4835 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4836 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4838 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4842 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4843 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4844 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4845 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4846 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4848 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4849 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4850 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4855 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4856 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4858 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4862 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4863 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4865 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4866 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4867 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4868 require_commitment = true;
4869 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4871 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4872 match pending_htlc_status {
4873 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4874 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4875 require_commitment = true;
4877 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4878 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4879 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4881 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4882 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4883 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4887 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4889 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4890 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4893 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4894 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4895 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4896 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4902 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4903 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4904 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4905 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4906 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4908 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4909 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4910 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4911 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4912 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4913 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4914 require_commitment = true;
4918 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4920 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4921 match update_state {
4922 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4923 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4924 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4925 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4926 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4927 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4929 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4930 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4931 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4932 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4933 require_commitment = true;
4934 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4935 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4940 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4941 let release_state_str =
4942 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4943 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4944 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4945 if !release_monitor {
4946 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4947 update: monitor_update,
4949 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4951 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4956 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4958 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4959 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4960 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4961 if require_commitment {
4962 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4963 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4964 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4965 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4967 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4968 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4969 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4970 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4971 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4973 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4974 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4975 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4976 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4977 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4980 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4981 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4982 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4983 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4984 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4985 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4987 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4988 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4990 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4991 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4993 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4994 if require_commitment {
4995 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4997 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4998 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4999 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5000 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5002 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5003 &self.context.channel_id(),
5004 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5007 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5008 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5010 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5011 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5013 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5014 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5020 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5021 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5022 /// commitment update.
5023 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5024 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5025 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5027 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5028 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5031 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5032 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5033 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5034 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5036 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5037 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5038 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5039 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5040 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5041 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5042 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5044 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5045 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5047 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5048 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5050 if !self.context.is_live() {
5051 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5054 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5055 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5056 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5057 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5058 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5059 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5060 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5061 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5062 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5063 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5067 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5069 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5070 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5073 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5074 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5078 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5079 force_holding_cell = true;
5082 if force_holding_cell {
5083 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5087 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5088 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5090 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5091 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5096 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5097 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5099 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5101 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5102 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5103 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5104 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5108 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5109 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5110 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5114 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5115 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5118 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5119 // will be retransmitted.
5120 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5121 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5122 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5124 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5125 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5127 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5128 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5129 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5130 // this HTLC accordingly
5131 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5134 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5135 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5136 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5137 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5140 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5141 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5142 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5143 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5144 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5145 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5150 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5152 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5153 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5154 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5155 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5159 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5160 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5161 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5162 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5163 // the update upon reconnection.
5164 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5168 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5170 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5171 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5175 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5176 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5177 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5178 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5179 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5180 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5181 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5183 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5184 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5185 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5186 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5187 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5188 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5189 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5191 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5192 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5193 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5194 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5195 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5196 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5197 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5200 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5201 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5202 /// to the remote side.
5203 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5204 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5205 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5206 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5209 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5211 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5212 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5214 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5215 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5216 // first received the funding_signed.
5217 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5218 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5219 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5220 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5222 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5224 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5225 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5226 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5227 funding_broadcastable = None;
5230 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5231 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5232 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5233 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5234 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5235 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5236 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5237 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5238 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5239 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5240 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5241 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5242 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5243 next_per_commitment_point,
5244 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5248 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5250 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5251 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5252 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5253 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5254 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5255 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5256 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5257 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5259 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5260 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5261 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5262 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5263 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5264 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5265 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5269 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5270 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5272 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5273 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5275 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5276 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5279 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5280 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5281 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5282 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5283 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5284 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5285 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5286 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5287 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5288 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5292 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5293 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5295 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5298 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5301 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5303 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5304 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5305 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5306 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5307 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5308 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5309 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5311 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5313 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5315 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5320 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5322 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5323 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5324 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5325 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5327 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5328 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5330 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5331 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5334 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5335 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5336 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5337 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5339 SignerResumeUpdates {
5346 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5347 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5348 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5349 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5350 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5351 per_commitment_secret,
5352 next_per_commitment_point,
5354 next_local_nonce: None,
5358 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5359 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5360 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5361 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5362 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5363 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5365 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5366 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5367 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5368 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5369 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5370 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5371 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5372 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5373 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5374 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5375 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5380 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5381 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5383 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5384 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5385 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5386 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5387 reason: err_packet.clone()
5390 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5391 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5392 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5393 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5394 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5395 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5398 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5399 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5400 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5401 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5402 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5409 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5410 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5412 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5416 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5417 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5418 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5419 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5420 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5421 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5422 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5426 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5427 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5429 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5430 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5431 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5432 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5437 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5438 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5443 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5444 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5445 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5446 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5447 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5448 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5449 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5454 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5455 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5457 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5458 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5459 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5460 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5461 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5462 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5463 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5464 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5467 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5469 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5470 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5471 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5472 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5476 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5477 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5478 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5481 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5482 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5483 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5484 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5485 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5486 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5489 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5490 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5491 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5492 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5493 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5496 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5497 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5498 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5499 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5500 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5501 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5502 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5503 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5507 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5508 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5509 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5511 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5512 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5513 our_commitment_transaction
5517 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5518 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5519 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5520 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5522 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5524 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5526 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5527 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5528 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5529 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5530 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5533 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5534 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5535 channel_ready: None,
5536 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5537 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5538 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5542 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5543 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5544 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5545 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5546 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5547 next_per_commitment_point,
5548 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5550 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5551 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5552 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5556 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5557 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5558 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5560 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5561 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5562 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5565 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5568 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5569 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5570 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5571 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5572 our_commitment_transaction
5576 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5577 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5578 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5579 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5580 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5581 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5582 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5584 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5586 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5587 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5588 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5589 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5590 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5591 next_per_commitment_point,
5592 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5596 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5597 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5598 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5600 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5603 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5604 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5605 raa: required_revoke,
5606 commitment_update: None,
5607 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5609 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5610 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5611 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5613 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5616 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5617 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5618 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5619 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5620 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5621 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5624 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5625 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5626 raa: required_revoke,
5627 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5628 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5631 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5632 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5633 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5634 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5635 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5638 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5639 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5640 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5641 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5646 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5647 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5648 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5649 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5651 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5653 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5655 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5656 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5657 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5658 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5659 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5660 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5661 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5662 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5664 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5665 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5666 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5667 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5668 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5670 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5671 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5672 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5673 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5676 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5677 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5678 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5679 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5680 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5681 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5682 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5683 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5684 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5685 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5686 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5687 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5688 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5689 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5690 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5692 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5695 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5696 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5699 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5700 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5701 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5702 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5703 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5704 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5707 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5708 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5709 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5710 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5711 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5712 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5713 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5715 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5721 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5722 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5723 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5724 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5726 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5727 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5728 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5729 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5730 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5731 return Ok((None, None, None));
5734 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5735 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5736 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5738 return Ok((None, None, None));
5741 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5742 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5743 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5744 return Ok((None, None, None));
5747 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5749 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5750 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5751 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5752 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5754 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5755 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5757 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5758 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5760 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5761 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5762 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5763 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5765 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5766 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5767 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5771 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5777 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5778 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5780 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5781 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5784 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5785 /// within our expected timeframe.
5787 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5788 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5789 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5792 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5795 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5796 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5800 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5801 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5803 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5806 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5807 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5808 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5809 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5812 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5813 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5817 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5819 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5823 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5824 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5828 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5831 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5832 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5833 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5834 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5836 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5839 assert!(send_shutdown);
5840 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5841 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5842 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5844 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5847 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5852 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5854 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5855 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5857 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5859 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5860 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5861 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5862 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5863 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5865 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5867 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5868 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5870 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5871 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5872 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5873 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5877 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5878 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5879 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5880 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5881 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5882 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5884 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5885 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5892 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5893 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5895 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5898 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5899 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5901 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5903 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5904 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5905 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5906 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5907 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5908 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5909 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5910 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5911 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5913 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5914 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5917 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5921 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5922 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5923 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5924 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5926 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5929 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5932 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5935 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5939 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5943 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5944 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5945 return Ok((None, None, None));
5948 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5949 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5950 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5953 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5955 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5958 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5959 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5960 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5961 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5962 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5966 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5967 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5972 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5973 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5975 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5978 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5979 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5980 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5981 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5983 monitor_update: None,
5984 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5985 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5986 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5987 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5988 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5989 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5990 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5991 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5993 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5994 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5995 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5996 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6000 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6002 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6003 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6004 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6005 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6007 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6010 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6011 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6013 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6014 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6015 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6016 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6018 monitor_update: None,
6019 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6020 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6021 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6022 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6023 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6024 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6025 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6026 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6028 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6029 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6030 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6031 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6036 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6037 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6038 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6039 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6041 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6042 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6043 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6045 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6047 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6054 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6055 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6058 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6061 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6062 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6065 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6066 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6067 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6068 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6069 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6071 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6073 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6075 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6076 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6079 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6080 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6081 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6082 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6083 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6084 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6085 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6086 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6091 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6092 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6093 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6094 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6100 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6101 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6102 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6103 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6105 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6111 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6112 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6113 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6114 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6115 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6116 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6117 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6119 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6120 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6123 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6125 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6126 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6132 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6133 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6134 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6135 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6136 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6137 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6138 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6140 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6141 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6148 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6149 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6150 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6155 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6156 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6159 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6160 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6161 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6162 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6165 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6166 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6167 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6169 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6170 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6171 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6172 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6173 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6174 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6175 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6178 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6179 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6180 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6181 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6182 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6183 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6184 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6185 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6189 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6190 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6191 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6192 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6193 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6194 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6195 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6199 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6200 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6205 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6206 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6207 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6208 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6209 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6210 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6214 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6215 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6216 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6217 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6219 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6220 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6221 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6222 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6223 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6224 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6225 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6226 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6227 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6229 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6230 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6231 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6238 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6239 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6242 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6243 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6246 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6247 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6251 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6252 &self.context.holder_signer
6256 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6258 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6259 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6260 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6261 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6262 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6263 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6265 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6275 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6276 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6280 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6281 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6282 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6283 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6286 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6287 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6288 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6289 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6292 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6293 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6294 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6295 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6296 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6297 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6300 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6301 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6302 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6303 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6304 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6305 if !release_monitor {
6306 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6315 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6316 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6317 /// here after logging them.
6318 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6319 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6320 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6321 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6324 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6325 update.update.update_id,
6335 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6336 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6339 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6340 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6341 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6343 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6344 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6346 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6347 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6349 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6350 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6351 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6354 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6355 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6356 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6357 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6358 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6359 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6361 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6362 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6363 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6365 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6366 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6367 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6368 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6369 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6370 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6376 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6377 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6378 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6379 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6382 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6383 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6384 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6387 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6388 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6389 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6392 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6393 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6394 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6397 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6398 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6399 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6400 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6401 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6404 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6405 self.context.channel_update_status
6408 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6409 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6410 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6413 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6415 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6416 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6417 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6421 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6422 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6423 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6426 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6430 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6431 // channel_ready yet.
6432 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6436 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6437 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6438 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6439 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6441 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6442 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6443 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6445 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6446 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6449 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6450 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6452 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6453 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6454 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6455 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6456 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6457 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6458 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6459 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6461 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6465 if need_commitment_update {
6466 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6467 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6468 let next_per_commitment_point =
6469 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6470 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6471 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6472 next_per_commitment_point,
6473 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6477 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6483 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6484 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6485 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6486 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6487 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6488 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6489 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6491 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6494 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6495 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6496 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6497 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6498 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6499 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6500 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6501 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6502 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6503 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6504 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6505 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6506 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6507 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6508 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6509 // channel and move on.
6510 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6511 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6513 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6514 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6515 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6517 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6518 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6519 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6520 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6521 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6522 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6523 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6524 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6529 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6530 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6531 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6532 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6533 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6536 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6537 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6538 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6539 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6540 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6541 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6544 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6545 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6546 // may have already happened for this block).
6547 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6548 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6549 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6550 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6553 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6554 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6555 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6556 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6564 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6565 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6566 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6567 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6569 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6570 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6573 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6575 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6576 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6577 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6578 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6580 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6583 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6586 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6587 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6588 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6589 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6591 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6594 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6595 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6596 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6598 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6599 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6601 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6602 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6603 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6611 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6613 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6614 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6615 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6617 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6618 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6621 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6622 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6623 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6624 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6625 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6626 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6627 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6628 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6631 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6632 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6633 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6634 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6636 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6637 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6638 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6640 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6641 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6642 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6643 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6645 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6646 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6647 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6648 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6649 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6650 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6651 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6654 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6655 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6657 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6660 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6661 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6662 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6663 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6664 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6665 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6666 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6667 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6668 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6669 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6670 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6671 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6672 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6673 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6674 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6675 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6676 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6682 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6687 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6688 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6690 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6691 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6692 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6693 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6695 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6698 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6700 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6701 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6702 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6703 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6704 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6705 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6707 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6708 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6711 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6712 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6713 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6714 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6715 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6716 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6718 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6719 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6722 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6723 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6724 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6725 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6726 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6732 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6733 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6734 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6735 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6740 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6744 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6748 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6749 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6753 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6757 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6758 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6761 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6765 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6767 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6772 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6773 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6774 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6776 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6781 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6783 None => return None,
6786 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6788 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6791 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6792 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6795 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6801 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6803 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6804 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6805 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6806 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6807 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6808 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6809 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6811 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6812 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6813 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6814 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6815 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6816 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6817 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6818 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6819 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6820 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6821 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6822 contents: announcement,
6825 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6830 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6834 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6835 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6836 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6837 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6838 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6839 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6840 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6841 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6843 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6845 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6847 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6848 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6850 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6852 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6853 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6856 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6857 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6858 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6859 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6862 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6865 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6866 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6867 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6868 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6869 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6870 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6873 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6875 Err(_) => return None,
6877 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6878 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6883 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6884 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6885 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6886 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6887 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6888 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6889 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6890 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6891 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6892 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6893 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6894 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6895 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6896 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6897 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6898 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6901 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6904 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6905 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6906 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6907 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6908 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6909 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6910 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6911 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6912 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6914 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6915 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6916 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6917 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6918 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6919 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6920 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6921 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6922 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6924 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6925 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6926 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6927 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6928 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6929 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6930 next_funding_txid: None,
6935 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6937 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6938 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6939 /// commitment update.
6941 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6942 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6943 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6944 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6945 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6946 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6947 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6950 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6951 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6952 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6954 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6955 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6960 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6961 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6963 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6965 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6966 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6968 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6969 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6970 /// regenerate them.
6972 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6973 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6975 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6976 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6977 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6978 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6979 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6980 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6981 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6982 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6984 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6985 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6986 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6988 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6990 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6991 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6992 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6995 if amount_msat == 0 {
6996 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6999 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7000 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7001 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7002 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7005 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7006 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7007 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7010 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7011 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7012 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7013 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7014 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7015 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7016 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7017 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7020 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7021 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7022 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7023 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7024 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7025 else { "to peer" });
7027 if need_holding_cell {
7028 force_holding_cell = true;
7031 // Now update local state:
7032 if force_holding_cell {
7033 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7038 onion_routing_packet,
7045 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7046 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7048 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7050 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7056 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7057 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7058 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7062 onion_routing_packet,
7066 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7071 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7072 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7073 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7074 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7076 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7077 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7078 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7080 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7081 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7085 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7086 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7087 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7088 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7089 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7090 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7091 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7094 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7095 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7096 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7097 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7098 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7099 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7102 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7104 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7105 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7106 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7107 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7108 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7110 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7111 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7114 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7115 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7116 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7117 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7118 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7119 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7120 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7121 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7122 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7123 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7124 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7125 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7127 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7129 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7133 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7134 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7135 where L::Target: Logger
7137 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7138 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7139 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7141 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7143 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7144 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7145 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7146 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7147 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7148 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7149 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7150 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7151 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7152 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7153 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7159 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7162 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7163 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7164 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7165 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7167 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7169 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7170 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7171 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7173 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7174 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7175 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7178 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7179 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7183 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7184 &commitment_stats.tx,
7185 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7186 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7187 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7188 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7190 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7192 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7193 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7194 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7195 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7197 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7198 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7199 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7200 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7201 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7202 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7206 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7207 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7211 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7212 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7214 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7220 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7221 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7223 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7224 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7225 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7226 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7227 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7228 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7229 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7230 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7232 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7233 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7234 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7237 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7238 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7239 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7245 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7247 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7248 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7249 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7250 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7251 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7253 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7255 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7261 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7262 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7263 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7264 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7265 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7267 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7268 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7269 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7272 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7273 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7275 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7276 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7278 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7279 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7281 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7282 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7283 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7286 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7289 // use override shutdown script if provided
7290 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7291 Some(script) => script,
7293 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7294 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7295 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7296 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7300 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7301 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7303 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7308 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7309 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7310 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7311 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7312 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7314 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7315 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7316 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7317 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7318 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7319 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7320 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7322 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7324 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7325 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7327 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7328 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7329 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7332 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7333 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7334 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7335 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7336 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7339 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7346 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7347 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7349 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7352 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7353 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7354 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7356 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7357 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7361 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7365 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7366 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7367 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7368 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7371 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7372 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7373 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7374 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7375 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7376 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7377 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7378 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7380 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7381 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7382 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7383 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7385 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7388 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7389 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7390 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7393 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7397 counterparty_node_id,
7399 channel_value_satoshis,
7403 current_chain_height,
7404 outbound_scid_alias,
7405 temporary_channel_id,
7406 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7411 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7416 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7417 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7418 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7419 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7420 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7421 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7422 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7423 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7424 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7426 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7431 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7432 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7433 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7436 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7437 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7438 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7439 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7442 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7444 next_local_nonce: None,
7448 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7449 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7450 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7451 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7452 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7453 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7454 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7455 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7456 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7457 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7458 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7461 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7462 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7464 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7466 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7467 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7468 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7469 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7472 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7473 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7475 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7477 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7478 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7480 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7481 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7482 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7483 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7484 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7485 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7488 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7489 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7491 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7492 if funding_created.is_none() {
7493 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7494 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7496 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7497 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7498 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7499 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7507 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7508 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7509 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7510 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7511 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7512 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7514 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7516 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7517 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7520 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7521 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7522 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7524 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7525 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7528 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7529 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7532 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7533 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7536 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7538 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7539 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7540 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7541 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7542 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7543 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7544 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7545 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7546 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7547 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7548 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7549 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7550 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7551 first_per_commitment_point,
7552 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7553 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7554 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7555 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7557 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7559 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7560 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7565 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7566 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7568 // Check sanity of message fields:
7569 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7572 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7575 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7576 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7578 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7579 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7581 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7584 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7586 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7588 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7589 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7592 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7593 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7596 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7599 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7603 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7604 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7607 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7610 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7611 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7613 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7616 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7619 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7622 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7626 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7627 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7630 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7631 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7633 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7634 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7635 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7637 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7638 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7641 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7642 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7643 &Some(ref script) => {
7644 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7645 if script.len() == 0 {
7648 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7651 Some(script.clone())
7654 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7661 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7662 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7663 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7664 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7665 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7667 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7668 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7670 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7673 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7674 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7675 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7676 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7677 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7678 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7681 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7682 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7683 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7686 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7687 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7689 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7690 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7692 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7697 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7698 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7699 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7700 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7701 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7705 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7706 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7708 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7709 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7711 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7712 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7713 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7714 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7717 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7719 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7720 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7721 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7722 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7724 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7725 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7727 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7728 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7730 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7731 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7732 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7733 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7734 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7735 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7739 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7740 initial_commitment_tx,
7743 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7744 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7748 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7749 if validated.is_err() {
7750 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7753 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7754 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7755 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7756 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7757 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7758 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7759 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7760 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7761 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7762 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7763 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7764 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7766 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7767 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7768 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7769 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7770 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7771 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7772 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7773 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7775 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7776 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7777 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7779 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7781 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7782 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7784 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7786 let mut channel = Channel {
7787 context: self.context,
7788 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7789 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7792 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7793 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7794 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7797 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7799 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7800 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7801 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7802 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7803 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7808 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7809 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7810 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7811 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7814 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7815 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7816 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7817 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7818 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7819 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7820 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7821 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7825 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7826 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7827 // `static_remote_key`.
7828 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7831 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7832 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7835 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7836 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7839 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7841 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7842 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7849 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7850 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7851 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7852 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7853 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7854 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7855 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7856 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7857 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7858 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7862 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7864 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7865 // support this channel type.
7866 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7868 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7869 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7870 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7871 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7872 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7873 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7874 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7878 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7882 counterparty_node_id,
7886 current_chain_height,
7891 counterparty_pubkeys,
7893 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7894 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7896 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7898 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7903 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7904 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7906 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7907 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7908 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7909 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7912 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7913 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7915 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7917 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7918 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7921 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7924 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7925 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7926 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7928 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7929 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7930 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7931 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7933 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7934 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7935 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7936 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7937 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7938 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7939 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7940 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7941 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7942 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7943 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7944 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7945 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7946 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7947 first_per_commitment_point,
7948 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7949 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7950 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7952 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7954 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7956 next_local_nonce: None,
7960 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7961 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7963 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7965 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7966 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7969 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7970 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7972 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7973 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7974 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7975 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7976 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7977 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7978 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7979 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7980 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7981 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7982 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7984 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7987 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7988 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7989 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7993 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7994 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7997 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7998 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8000 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
8001 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
8003 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
8005 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
8006 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
8007 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8008 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
8011 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
8012 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
8013 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
8014 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
8015 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8017 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
8019 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
8020 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
8021 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
8024 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
8025 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
8026 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
8030 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8031 initial_commitment_tx,
8034 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8035 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8038 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
8039 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
8042 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
8044 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
8045 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
8046 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8047 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8049 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
8051 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8052 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
8053 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8054 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8055 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8056 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8057 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8058 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8059 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8060 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8061 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8063 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8064 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8065 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8066 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8067 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8068 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8069 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8071 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8072 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8074 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8075 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8076 let mut channel = Channel {
8077 context: self.context,
8078 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8079 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8081 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
8082 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8084 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8088 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8089 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8090 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8091 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8092 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8093 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8094 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8097 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8098 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8099 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8100 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8101 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8102 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8103 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8104 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8105 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8108 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8109 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8110 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8112 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8114 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8115 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8117 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8118 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8121 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8125 counterparty_node_id,
8131 current_chain_height,
8132 outbound_scid_alias,
8133 temporary_channel_id,
8134 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8139 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8140 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8141 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8142 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8143 funding_tx_locktime,
8144 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8150 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8151 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8152 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8153 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8154 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8155 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8157 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8159 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8160 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8163 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8164 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8165 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8168 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8169 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8172 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8173 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8174 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8175 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8176 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8177 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8178 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8180 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8181 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8183 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8184 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8185 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8186 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8187 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8188 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8189 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8190 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8191 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8192 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8193 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8194 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8195 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8196 first_per_commitment_point,
8197 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8198 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8199 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8200 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8202 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8204 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8205 second_per_commitment_point,
8206 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8207 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8212 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8213 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8214 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8215 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8216 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8217 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8220 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8221 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8222 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8223 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8224 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8225 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8226 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8227 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8228 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8229 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8230 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8231 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8234 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8235 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8236 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8237 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8238 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8240 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8241 // support this channel type.
8242 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8244 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8246 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8248 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8249 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8250 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8251 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8252 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8253 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8256 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8260 counterparty_node_id,
8264 current_chain_height,
8270 counterparty_pubkeys,
8272 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8273 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8274 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8275 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8277 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8278 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8279 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8280 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8284 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8285 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8286 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8287 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8288 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8289 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8296 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8297 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8299 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8300 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8301 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8302 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8305 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8306 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8308 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8310 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8311 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8314 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8317 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8318 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8319 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8321 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8322 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8323 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8324 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8325 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8326 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8327 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8329 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8330 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8331 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8332 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8333 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8334 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8335 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8336 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8337 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8338 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8339 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8340 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8341 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8342 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8343 first_per_commitment_point,
8344 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8345 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8346 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8348 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8350 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8351 second_per_commitment_point,
8352 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8356 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8357 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8359 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8361 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8362 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8366 // Unfunded channel utilities
8368 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8369 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8370 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8371 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8372 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8373 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8374 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8375 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8376 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8377 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8380 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8381 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8382 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8383 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8384 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8385 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8391 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8392 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8394 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8400 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8401 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8402 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8403 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8404 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8406 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8407 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8408 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8409 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8415 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8416 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8417 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8418 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8419 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8420 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8425 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8426 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8427 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8428 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8430 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8431 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8432 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8433 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8438 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8439 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8440 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8441 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8442 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8448 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8449 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8450 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8453 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8454 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8455 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8456 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8460 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8462 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8464 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8466 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8467 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8468 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8469 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8470 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8472 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8473 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8474 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8475 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8477 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8479 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8480 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8481 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8483 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8485 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8487 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8489 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8491 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8492 // deserialized from that format.
8493 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8494 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8495 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8497 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8499 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8500 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8501 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8503 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8504 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8505 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8506 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8509 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8510 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8511 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8514 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8515 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8516 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8517 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8519 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8520 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8522 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8523 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8524 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8529 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8532 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8534 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8535 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8536 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8541 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8544 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8547 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8549 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8554 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8555 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8556 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8558 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8559 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8560 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8561 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8562 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8563 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8564 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8566 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8568 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8570 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8573 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8574 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8575 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8578 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8580 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8581 preimages.push(preimage);
8583 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8584 reason.write(writer)?;
8586 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8588 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8589 preimages.push(preimage);
8591 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8592 reason.write(writer)?;
8595 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8596 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8599 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8600 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8601 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8602 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8603 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8604 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8606 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8607 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8608 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8611 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8612 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8613 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8614 source.write(writer)?;
8615 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8617 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8618 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8620 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8622 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8623 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8628 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8630 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8631 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8633 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8634 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8635 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8637 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8639 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8640 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8645 match self.context.resend_order {
8646 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8647 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8650 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8651 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8652 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8654 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8655 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8656 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8657 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8660 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8661 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8662 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8663 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8664 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8667 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8668 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8669 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8670 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8672 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8673 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8674 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8676 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8678 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8679 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8680 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8681 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8683 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8684 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8685 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8686 // consider the stale state on reload.
8689 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8690 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8691 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8693 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8694 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8695 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8697 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8698 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8700 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8701 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8702 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8704 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8705 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8707 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8710 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8711 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8712 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8714 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8717 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8718 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8720 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8721 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8722 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8724 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8726 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8728 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8731 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8732 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8733 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8734 htlc.write(writer)?;
8737 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8738 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8739 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8741 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8742 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8744 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8745 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8746 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8747 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8748 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8749 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8750 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8752 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8753 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8754 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8755 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8756 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8758 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8759 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8761 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8762 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8763 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8764 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8766 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8768 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8769 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8770 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8773 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8774 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8775 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8776 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8777 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8778 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8779 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8781 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8782 (2, chan_type, option),
8783 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8784 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8785 (5, self.context.config, required),
8786 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8787 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8788 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8789 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8790 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8791 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8792 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8793 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8794 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8795 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8796 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8797 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8798 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8799 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8800 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8801 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8802 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8803 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8804 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8805 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8806 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8807 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8808 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8809 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8810 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8817 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8818 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8820 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8821 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8823 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8824 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8825 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8827 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8828 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8829 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8830 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8832 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8834 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8835 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8837 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8838 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8840 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8841 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8844 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8845 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8846 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8848 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8850 let mut keys_data = None;
8852 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8853 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8854 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8855 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8856 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8857 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8858 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8859 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8860 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8861 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8865 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8866 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8867 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8870 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8872 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8873 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8874 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8876 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8878 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8879 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8880 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8881 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8882 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8883 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8884 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8885 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8887 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8888 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8890 Readable::read(reader)?
8892 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8895 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8896 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8898 Readable::read(reader)?
8900 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8902 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8903 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8904 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8909 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8910 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8911 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8912 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8913 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8914 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8915 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8916 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8917 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8918 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8919 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8920 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8922 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8923 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8926 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8927 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8930 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8931 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8933 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8935 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8936 blinding_point: None,
8940 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8942 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8943 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8944 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8945 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8946 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8947 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8948 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8949 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8950 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8951 blinding_point: None,
8953 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8954 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8955 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8957 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8958 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8959 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8961 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8965 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8966 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8967 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8971 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8972 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8973 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8975 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8976 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8977 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8978 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8981 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8982 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8983 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8984 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8987 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8989 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8991 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8992 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8993 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8994 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8996 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8997 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8998 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8999 // consider the stale state on reload.
9000 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9003 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9004 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9005 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
9007 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9010 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
9011 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
9012 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9014 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9015 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9016 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9017 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
9019 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9020 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9022 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9023 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9025 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9026 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9027 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
9029 let mut minimum_depth = None;
9031 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9032 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9034 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9035 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9038 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9040 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
9041 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9042 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
9043 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
9045 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9048 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9049 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9051 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9053 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9054 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9056 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9057 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9059 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9062 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9065 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9066 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9067 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9071 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9072 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9073 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9075 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9081 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9082 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9083 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9084 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9085 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9086 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9087 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9088 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9089 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9090 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9092 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9093 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9094 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9095 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9096 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9097 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9098 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9100 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9101 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9102 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9103 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9105 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9107 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9108 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9110 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9112 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9114 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9115 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9117 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9118 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9120 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9121 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9122 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9123 (2, channel_type, option),
9124 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9125 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9126 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9127 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9128 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9129 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9130 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9131 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9132 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9133 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9134 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9135 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9136 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9137 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9138 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9139 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9140 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9141 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9142 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9143 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9144 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9145 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9146 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9147 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9148 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9149 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9150 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
9151 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9154 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9155 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9156 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9157 // required channel parameters.
9158 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9159 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9161 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9163 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9164 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9165 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9166 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9169 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9170 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9171 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9173 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9174 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9176 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9177 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9182 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9183 if iter.next().is_some() {
9184 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9188 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9189 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9190 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9191 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9192 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9195 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9196 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9197 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9199 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9200 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9202 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9203 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9204 // separate u64 values.
9205 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9207 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9209 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9210 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9211 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9212 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9214 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9215 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9217 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9218 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9219 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9220 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9221 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9224 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9225 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9227 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9228 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9229 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9230 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9232 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9233 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9235 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9236 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9237 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9238 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9239 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9242 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9243 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9246 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9247 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9248 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9249 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9250 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9251 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9254 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9255 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9256 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9258 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9263 context: ChannelContext {
9266 config: config.unwrap(),
9270 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9271 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9272 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9275 temporary_channel_id,
9277 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9279 channel_value_satoshis,
9281 latest_monitor_update_id,
9283 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9284 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9287 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9288 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9291 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9292 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9293 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9294 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9298 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9299 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9300 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9301 monitor_pending_forwards,
9302 monitor_pending_failures,
9303 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9304 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9306 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9307 signer_pending_funding: false,
9310 holding_cell_update_fee,
9311 next_holder_htlc_id,
9312 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9313 update_time_counter,
9316 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9317 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9319 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9321 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9322 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9323 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9324 closing_fee_limits: None,
9325 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9327 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9328 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9330 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9332 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9333 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9334 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9335 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9336 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9337 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9338 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9339 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9340 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9343 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9345 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9346 funding_transaction,
9349 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9350 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9351 counterparty_node_id,
9353 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9357 channel_update_status,
9358 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9363 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9365 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9367 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9368 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9370 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9371 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9372 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9374 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9375 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9377 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9378 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9380 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9383 local_initiated_shutdown,
9385 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9387 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9388 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9396 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9397 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9398 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9399 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9400 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9401 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9402 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9403 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9404 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9405 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9406 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9407 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9408 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9409 use crate::ln::msgs;
9410 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9411 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9412 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9413 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9414 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9415 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9416 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9417 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9418 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9419 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9420 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9421 use crate::util::test_utils;
9422 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9423 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9424 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9425 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9426 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9427 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9428 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9429 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9430 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9431 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9432 use crate::prelude::*;
9435 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9436 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9437 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9438 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9440 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9441 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9442 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9443 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9446 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9449 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9450 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9456 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9457 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9458 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9459 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9463 signer: InMemorySigner,
9466 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9467 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9470 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9471 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9473 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9475 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9476 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9479 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9483 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9485 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9486 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9487 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9488 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9489 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9492 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9494 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9495 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9499 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9500 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9501 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9505 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9506 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9507 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9508 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9511 let seed = [42; 32];
9512 let network = Network::Testnet;
9513 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9514 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9515 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9518 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9519 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9520 let config = UserConfig::default();
9521 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9522 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9523 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9525 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9526 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9530 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9531 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9533 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9534 let original_fee = 253;
9535 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9536 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9538 let seed = [42; 32];
9539 let network = Network::Testnet;
9540 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9542 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9543 let config = UserConfig::default();
9544 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9546 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9547 // same as the old fee.
9548 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9549 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9550 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9554 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9555 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9556 // dust limits are used.
9557 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9559 let seed = [42; 32];
9560 let network = Network::Testnet;
9561 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9562 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9563 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9565 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9566 // they have different dust limits.
9568 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9569 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9570 let config = UserConfig::default();
9571 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9573 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9574 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9575 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9576 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9577 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9579 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9580 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9581 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9582 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9583 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9585 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9586 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9587 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9588 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9590 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9591 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9592 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9594 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9595 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9596 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9598 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9599 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9600 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9602 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9603 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9604 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9605 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9608 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9610 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9611 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9612 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9613 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9614 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9615 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9616 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9617 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9618 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9620 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9621 blinding_point: None,
9624 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9625 // the dust limit check.
9626 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9627 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9628 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9629 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9631 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9632 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9633 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9634 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9635 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9636 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9637 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9641 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9642 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9643 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9644 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9645 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9646 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9647 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9648 let seed = [42; 32];
9649 let network = Network::Testnet;
9650 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9652 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9653 let config = UserConfig::default();
9654 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9656 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9657 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9659 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9660 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9661 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9662 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9663 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9664 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9666 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9667 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9668 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9669 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9670 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9672 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9674 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9675 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9676 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9677 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9678 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9680 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9681 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9682 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9683 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9684 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9688 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9689 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9690 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9692 let seed = [42; 32];
9693 let network = Network::Testnet;
9694 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9695 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9696 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9698 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9700 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9701 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9702 let config = UserConfig::default();
9703 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9705 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9706 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9707 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9708 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9710 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9711 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9712 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9714 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9715 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9716 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9717 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9719 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9720 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9721 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9723 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9724 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9725 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9727 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9728 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9729 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9730 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9731 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9732 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9733 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9735 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9737 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9738 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9739 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9740 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9741 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9745 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9746 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9747 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9748 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9749 let seed = [42; 32];
9750 let network = Network::Testnet;
9751 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9752 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9753 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9755 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9756 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9757 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9758 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9759 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9760 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9761 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9762 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9764 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9765 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9766 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9767 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9768 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9769 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9771 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9772 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9773 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9774 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9776 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9778 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9779 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9780 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9781 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9782 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9783 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9785 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9786 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9787 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9788 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9790 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9791 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9792 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9793 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9794 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9796 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9797 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9799 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9800 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9801 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9803 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9804 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9805 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9806 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9807 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9809 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9810 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9812 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9813 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9814 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9818 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9820 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9821 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9822 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9824 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9825 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9826 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9827 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9829 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9830 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9831 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9833 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9835 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9836 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9839 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9840 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9841 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9842 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9843 let seed = [42; 32];
9844 let network = Network::Testnet;
9845 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9846 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9847 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9850 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9851 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9852 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9854 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9855 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9857 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9858 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9859 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9861 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9862 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9864 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9866 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9867 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9869 // Channel Negotiations failed
9870 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9871 assert!(result.is_err());
9876 fn channel_update() {
9877 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9878 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9880 let seed = [42; 32];
9881 let network = Network::Testnet;
9882 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9883 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9884 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9886 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9887 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9888 let config = UserConfig::default();
9889 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9891 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9892 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9893 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9894 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9895 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9897 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9898 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9899 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9900 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9901 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9903 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9904 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9905 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9906 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9908 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9909 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9910 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9912 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9913 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9914 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9916 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9917 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9918 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9920 short_channel_id: 0,
9923 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9924 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9925 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9927 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9928 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9930 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9932 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9934 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9935 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9936 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9937 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9939 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9940 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9941 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9943 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9946 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9950 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9951 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9953 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9954 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9956 let seed = [42; 32];
9957 let network = Network::Testnet;
9958 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9959 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9961 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9962 let config = UserConfig::default();
9963 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9964 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9965 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9967 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9968 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9969 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9971 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9972 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9973 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9975 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9976 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9977 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9978 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9979 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9982 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9984 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9985 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9986 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9987 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9991 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9992 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9993 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9995 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9998 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10000 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10001 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10002 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10003 blinding_point: None,
10005 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
10006 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
10008 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
10011 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
10014 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
10016 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10019 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10020 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10021 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
10023 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
10024 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10027 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10028 blinding_point: None,
10030 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10031 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10034 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10035 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10037 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10038 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10040 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10043 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10044 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10045 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10046 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10047 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10048 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10049 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10050 } = &mut dummy_add {
10051 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10052 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10053 } else { panic!() }
10054 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10055 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10056 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10058 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10061 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10063 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10064 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10065 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10066 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10067 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10068 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10069 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10070 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10073 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10075 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10076 use bitcoin::sighash;
10077 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10078 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10079 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10080 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10081 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10082 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10083 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10084 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10085 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10086 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10087 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10088 use crate::sync::Arc;
10089 use core::str::FromStr;
10090 use hex::DisplayHex;
10092 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10093 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10094 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10095 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10097 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10099 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10100 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10101 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10102 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10103 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10105 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10106 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10112 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10113 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10114 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10116 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10117 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10118 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10119 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10120 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10121 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10123 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10125 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10126 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10127 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10128 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10129 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10130 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10132 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10133 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10134 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10135 selected_contest_delay: 144
10137 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10138 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10140 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10141 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10143 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10144 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10146 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10147 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10149 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10150 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10151 // build_commitment_transaction.
10152 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10153 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10154 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10155 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10156 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10158 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10159 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10160 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10161 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10165 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10166 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10167 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10168 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10172 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10173 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10174 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10176 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10177 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10179 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10180 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10182 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10184 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10185 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10186 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10187 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10188 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10189 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10190 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10192 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10193 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10194 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10195 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10197 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10198 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10199 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10201 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10203 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10204 commitment_tx.clone(),
10205 counterparty_signature,
10206 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10207 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10208 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10210 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10211 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10213 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10214 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10215 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10217 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10218 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10221 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10222 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10224 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10225 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10226 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10227 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10228 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10229 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10230 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10231 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10233 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10236 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10237 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10238 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10242 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10245 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10246 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10247 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10248 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10249 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10250 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10252 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10253 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10254 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10255 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10256 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10257 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10258 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10259 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10260 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10261 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10263 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10264 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10265 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10266 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10267 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10268 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10270 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10274 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10275 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10276 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10277 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10279 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10282 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10283 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10284 "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", {});
10286 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10287 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10288 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10289 "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", {});
10291 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10292 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10294 amount_msat: 1000000,
10296 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10297 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10299 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10302 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10303 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10305 amount_msat: 2000000,
10307 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10308 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10310 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10313 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10314 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10316 amount_msat: 2000000,
10318 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10319 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10320 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10321 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10322 blinding_point: None,
10324 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10327 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10328 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10330 amount_msat: 3000000,
10332 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10333 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10334 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10335 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10336 blinding_point: None,
10338 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10341 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10342 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10344 amount_msat: 4000000,
10346 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10347 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10349 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10353 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10354 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10355 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10357 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10358 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10359 "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", {
10362 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10363 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10364 "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" },
10367 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10368 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10369 "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" },
10372 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10373 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10374 "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" },
10377 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10378 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10379 "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" },
10382 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10383 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10384 "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" }
10387 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10388 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10389 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10391 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10392 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10393 "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", {
10396 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10397 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10398 "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" },
10401 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10402 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10403 "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" },
10406 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10407 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10408 "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" },
10411 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10412 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10413 "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" },
10416 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10417 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10418 "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" }
10421 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10422 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10423 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10425 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10426 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10427 "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", {
10430 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10431 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10432 "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" },
10435 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10436 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10437 "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" },
10440 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10441 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10442 "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" },
10445 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10446 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10447 "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" }
10450 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10451 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10452 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10453 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10455 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10456 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10457 "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", {
10460 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10461 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10462 "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" },
10465 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10466 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10467 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
10470 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10471 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10472 "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" },
10475 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10476 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10477 "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" }
10480 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10481 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10482 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10483 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10485 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10486 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10487 "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", {
10490 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10491 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10492 "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" },
10495 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10496 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10497 "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" },
10500 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10501 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10502 "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" },
10505 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10506 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10507 "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" }
10510 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10511 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10512 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10514 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10515 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10516 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10519 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10520 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10521 "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" },
10524 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10525 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10526 "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" },
10529 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10530 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10531 "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" }
10534 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10535 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10536 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10538 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10539 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10540 "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", {
10543 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10544 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10545 "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" },
10548 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10549 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10550 "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" },
10553 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10554 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10555 "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" }
10558 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10559 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10560 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10562 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10563 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10564 "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", {
10567 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10568 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10569 "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" },
10572 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10573 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10574 "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" }
10577 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10578 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10579 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10580 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10581 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10582 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10584 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10585 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10586 "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", {
10589 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10590 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10591 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
10594 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10595 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10596 "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" }
10599 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10602 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10603 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10605 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10606 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10607 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10610 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10611 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10612 "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" },
10615 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10616 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10617 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10620 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10621 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10622 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10624 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10625 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10626 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10629 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10630 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10631 "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" }
10634 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10637 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10638 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10640 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10641 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10642 "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", {
10645 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10646 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10647 "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" }
10650 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10651 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10652 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10653 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10654 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10656 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10657 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10658 "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", {
10661 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10662 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10663 "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" }
10666 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10667 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10668 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10669 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10671 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10672 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10673 "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", {});
10675 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10676 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10677 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10678 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10679 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10681 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10682 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10683 "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", {});
10685 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10686 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10687 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10688 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10689 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10691 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10692 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10693 "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", {});
10695 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10696 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10697 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10699 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10700 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10701 "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", {});
10703 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10704 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10705 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10706 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10707 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10709 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10710 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10711 "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", {});
10713 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10714 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10715 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10716 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10717 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10719 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10720 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10721 "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", {});
10723 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10724 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10725 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10726 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10727 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10728 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10730 amount_msat: 2000000,
10732 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10733 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10735 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10738 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10739 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10740 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10742 amount_msat: 5000001,
10744 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10745 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10746 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10747 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10748 blinding_point: None,
10750 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10753 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10754 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10756 amount_msat: 5000000,
10758 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10759 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10760 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10761 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10762 blinding_point: None,
10764 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10768 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10769 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10770 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10773 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10774 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10775 "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" },
10777 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10778 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10779 "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" },
10781 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10782 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10783 "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" }
10786 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10787 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10788 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10789 "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", {
10792 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10793 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10794 "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" },
10796 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10797 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10798 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
10800 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10801 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10802 "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" }
10807 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10808 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10810 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10811 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10812 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10813 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10815 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10816 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10817 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10819 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10820 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10822 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10823 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10825 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10826 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10827 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10831 fn test_key_derivation() {
10832 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10835 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10836 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10838 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10839 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10841 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10842 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10844 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10845 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10847 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10848 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10850 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10851 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10855 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10856 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10857 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10858 let seed = [42; 32];
10859 let network = Network::Testnet;
10860 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10861 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10863 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10864 let config = UserConfig::default();
10865 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10866 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10868 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10869 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10871 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10872 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10873 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10874 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10875 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10876 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10877 assert!(res.is_ok());
10881 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10882 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10883 // resulting `channel_type`.
10884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10885 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10886 let network = Network::Testnet;
10887 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10888 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10890 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10891 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10893 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10894 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10896 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10897 // need to signal it.
10898 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10899 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10900 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10901 &config, 0, 42, None
10903 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10905 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10906 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10907 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10909 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10910 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10911 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10915 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10916 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10917 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10918 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10919 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10922 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10923 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10927 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10928 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10929 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10931 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10932 let network = Network::Testnet;
10933 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10934 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10936 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10937 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10939 let config = UserConfig::default();
10941 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10942 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10943 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10944 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10945 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10947 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10948 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10949 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10953 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10954 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10955 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10957 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10958 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10959 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10960 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10961 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10962 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10964 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10968 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10969 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10972 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10973 let network = Network::Testnet;
10974 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10975 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10977 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10978 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10980 let config = UserConfig::default();
10982 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10983 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10984 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10985 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10986 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10987 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10988 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10989 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10991 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10992 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10993 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10994 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10995 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10996 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11000 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11001 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11003 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11004 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11005 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
11006 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11008 assert!(res.is_err());
11010 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
11011 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
11012 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
11014 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11015 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
11016 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
11019 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11021 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11022 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11023 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11024 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11027 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11028 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11030 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11031 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11033 assert!(res.is_err());
11037 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11038 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11039 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11040 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11041 let seed = [42; 32];
11042 let network = Network::Testnet;
11043 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11044 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11045 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11047 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11048 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11049 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11050 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11052 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11053 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11054 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11059 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11069 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11070 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11071 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11076 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11077 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11083 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11086 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11087 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11088 &accept_channel_msg,
11089 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11090 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11093 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11094 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11095 let tx = Transaction {
11097 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11101 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11104 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11107 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11108 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11109 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11110 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11111 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11112 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11116 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11117 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11125 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11126 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11127 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11128 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11130 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11131 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11138 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11139 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11140 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11141 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11142 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11144 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11145 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11146 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11154 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11155 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11158 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11159 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11160 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11161 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());