1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::errors::APIError;
41 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
42 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
50 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
53 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
54 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
55 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
57 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
61 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
64 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
66 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
68 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
69 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
70 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
71 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
72 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
73 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
75 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
79 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
80 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
81 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
82 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
85 enum InboundHTLCState {
86 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
87 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
88 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
89 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
90 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
91 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
92 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
93 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
94 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
95 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
96 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
97 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
98 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
99 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
100 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
102 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
103 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
104 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
105 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
106 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
107 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
108 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
109 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
110 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
111 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
112 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
113 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
114 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
115 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
117 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
118 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
119 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
120 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
121 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
122 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
123 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
124 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
126 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
127 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
129 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
130 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
131 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
132 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
133 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
134 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
135 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
136 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
139 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
143 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
144 state: InboundHTLCState,
147 enum OutboundHTLCState {
148 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
150 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
151 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
152 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
153 /// money back (though we won't), and,
154 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
155 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
156 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
157 /// we'll never get out of sync).
158 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
159 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
160 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
162 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
163 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
164 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
165 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
166 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
167 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
169 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
170 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
171 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
172 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
173 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
174 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
175 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
176 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
179 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
183 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
184 state: OutboundHTLCState,
188 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
189 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
190 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
194 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
196 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
199 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
204 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
208 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
209 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
210 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
211 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
212 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
213 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
214 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
216 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
217 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
218 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
219 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
220 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
221 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
222 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
224 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
225 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
226 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
228 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
229 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
230 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
231 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
232 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
233 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
235 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
236 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
238 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
239 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
240 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
241 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
242 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
243 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
244 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
245 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
246 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
248 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
249 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
250 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
251 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
252 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
253 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
254 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
255 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
256 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
257 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
258 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
259 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
261 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
262 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
264 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
266 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
267 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
268 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
269 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
270 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
271 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
272 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
273 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
275 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
277 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
279 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
283 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
289 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
292 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
293 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
294 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
297 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
298 struct HTLCCandidate {
300 origin: HTLCInitiator,
304 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
312 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
314 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
316 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
317 htlc_value_msat: u64,
318 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
323 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
324 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
325 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
326 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
327 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
329 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
330 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
331 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
332 htlc_value_msat: u64,
333 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
334 /// in the holding cell).
335 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
337 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
338 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
342 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
344 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
345 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
346 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
347 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
348 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
349 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
352 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
353 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
354 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
355 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
356 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
357 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
358 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
359 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
360 pub funding_locked: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
363 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
364 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
365 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
366 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
367 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
368 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
369 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
370 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
371 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
372 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
373 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
375 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
377 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
379 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
380 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
381 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
384 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
385 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
386 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
387 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
388 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
389 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
390 config: ChannelConfig,
394 channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
397 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
399 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
401 holder_signer: Signer,
402 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
403 destination_script: Script,
405 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
406 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
407 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
409 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
410 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
411 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
412 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
413 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
414 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
416 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
417 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
418 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
419 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
420 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
421 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
423 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
425 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
426 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
427 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
428 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
433 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
434 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
435 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
436 // HTLCs with similar state.
437 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
438 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
439 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
440 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
441 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
442 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
443 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
444 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
445 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
446 update_time_counter: u32,
449 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
450 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
451 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
452 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
453 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
454 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
456 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
457 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
459 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
460 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
461 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
462 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
464 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
465 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
467 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
469 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
471 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
472 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
473 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
474 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
476 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
478 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
480 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
482 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
484 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
485 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
486 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
487 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
488 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
489 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
490 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
492 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
494 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
495 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
496 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
498 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
500 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
501 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
503 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
504 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
505 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
507 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
509 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
511 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
512 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
513 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
514 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
516 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
517 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
518 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
520 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
521 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
522 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
524 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
525 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
526 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
527 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
528 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
529 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
530 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
531 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
533 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
534 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
535 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
536 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
537 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
539 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
540 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
542 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
543 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
544 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
545 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
546 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
547 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
548 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
549 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
552 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
553 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
555 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
556 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
557 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
561 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
564 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
566 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
576 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
578 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
579 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
580 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
581 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
582 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
583 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
585 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
586 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
588 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
589 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
590 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
591 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
592 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
594 /// See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905 for more details.
595 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
597 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
598 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
599 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
600 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
604 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
607 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
608 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
610 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
611 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
612 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
613 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
618 macro_rules! secp_check {
619 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
622 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
627 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
628 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
629 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
630 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
633 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
636 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
637 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
638 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
639 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
643 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
644 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
647 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
648 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
649 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
651 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
652 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
654 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
655 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
656 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
658 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
659 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
661 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
662 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
663 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
666 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
668 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
669 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
671 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
672 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
675 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
676 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
677 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
683 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
685 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
686 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
688 channel_value_satoshis,
690 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
693 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
694 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
696 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
697 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
698 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
700 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
701 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
702 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
703 pending_update_fee: None,
704 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
705 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
706 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
707 update_time_counter: 1,
709 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
711 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
712 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
713 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
714 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
715 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
717 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
718 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
722 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
723 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
724 closing_fee_limits: None,
725 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
727 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
728 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
729 short_channel_id: None,
731 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
732 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
733 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
734 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
735 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
736 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
737 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
738 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
739 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
741 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
743 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
744 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
745 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
746 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
747 counterparty_parameters: None,
748 funding_outpoint: None
750 funding_transaction: None,
752 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
753 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
754 counterparty_node_id,
756 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
758 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
760 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
761 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
763 announcement_sigs: None,
765 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
766 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
768 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
770 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
773 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
777 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
778 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
780 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
781 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
784 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
785 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
786 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
787 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
788 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
789 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
790 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
796 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
797 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
798 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
799 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
800 F::Target: FeeEstimator
802 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
803 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
804 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
805 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
806 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
807 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
808 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
809 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
811 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
813 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
817 // Check sanity of message fields:
818 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
819 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
821 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
824 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
825 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
828 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
831 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
834 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
835 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
838 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
840 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
841 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
844 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
847 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
851 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
852 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
855 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
858 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
861 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
864 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
867 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
870 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
874 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
876 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
877 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
878 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
882 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
883 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
885 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
887 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
888 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
891 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
894 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
898 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
899 // for full fee payment
900 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
901 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
902 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
906 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
907 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
908 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
912 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
913 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
914 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
915 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
916 if script.len() == 0 {
919 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
925 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
926 &OptionalField::Absent => {
927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
932 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
933 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
936 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
937 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
947 config: local_config,
949 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
950 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
953 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
956 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
957 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
959 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
960 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
961 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
963 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
964 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
965 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
966 pending_update_fee: None,
967 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
968 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
969 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
970 update_time_counter: 1,
972 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
974 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
975 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
976 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
977 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
978 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
980 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
981 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
982 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
983 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
985 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
986 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
987 closing_fee_limits: None,
988 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
990 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
991 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
992 short_channel_id: None,
994 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
995 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
996 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
997 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
998 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
999 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1000 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1001 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1002 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1003 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
1005 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1007 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1008 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1009 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
1010 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1011 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1012 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1013 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1015 funding_outpoint: None
1017 funding_transaction: None,
1019 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1020 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1021 counterparty_node_id,
1023 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1025 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1027 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1028 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1030 announcement_sigs: None,
1032 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1033 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1034 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1035 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1037 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1039 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1040 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1046 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1047 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1048 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1049 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1050 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1052 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1053 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1054 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1055 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1056 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1057 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1058 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1059 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1060 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1061 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1062 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1064 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1065 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1066 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1067 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1069 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1070 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1071 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1072 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1074 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1075 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1076 if match update_state {
1077 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1078 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1079 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1080 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1081 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1083 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1087 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1088 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1089 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1090 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1092 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1093 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1094 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1096 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1097 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1098 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1099 transaction_output_index: None
1104 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1105 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1106 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1107 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1108 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1109 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1110 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1112 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1113 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1116 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1117 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1118 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1119 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1121 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1122 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1128 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1129 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1130 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1131 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1132 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1133 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1134 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1138 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1139 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1141 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1143 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1144 if generated_by_local {
1145 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1146 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1155 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1156 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1157 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1158 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1159 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1160 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1161 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1165 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1166 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1168 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1170 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1171 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1173 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1174 if !generated_by_local {
1175 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1183 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1184 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1185 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1186 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1187 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1188 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1189 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1190 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1192 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1194 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1195 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1196 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1197 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1199 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1201 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1202 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1203 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1204 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1207 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1208 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1209 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1211 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1214 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1215 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1216 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1217 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1219 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1222 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1223 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1228 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1229 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1234 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1236 let channel_parameters =
1237 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1238 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1239 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1247 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1250 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1251 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1252 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1253 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1255 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1259 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1260 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1261 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1262 // outside of those situations will fail.
1263 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1267 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1272 1 + // script length (0)
1276 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1277 2 + // witness marker and flag
1278 1 + // witness element count
1279 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1280 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1281 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1282 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1283 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1284 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1286 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1287 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1288 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1294 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1295 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1296 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1297 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1299 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1300 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1301 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1303 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1304 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1305 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1306 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1307 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1308 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1311 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1312 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1315 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1316 value_to_holder = 0;
1319 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1320 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1321 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1322 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1324 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1325 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1328 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1329 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1333 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1334 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1335 /// our counterparty!)
1336 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1337 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1338 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1339 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1340 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1341 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1342 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1344 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1348 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1349 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1350 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1351 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1352 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1353 //may see payments to it!
1354 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1355 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1356 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1358 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1361 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1362 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1363 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1364 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1365 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1368 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1369 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1370 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1371 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1373 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1374 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1376 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1378 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1380 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1381 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1382 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1384 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1385 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1386 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1387 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1388 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1390 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1391 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1392 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1394 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1395 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1397 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1400 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1401 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1405 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1409 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1410 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1411 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1412 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1413 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1414 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1417 // Now update local state:
1419 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1420 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1421 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1422 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1423 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1424 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1425 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1429 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1430 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1431 match pending_update {
1432 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1433 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1434 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1435 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1436 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1437 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1438 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1441 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1442 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1443 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1444 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1445 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1446 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1447 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1453 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1454 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1455 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1457 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1458 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1459 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1461 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1462 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1465 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1466 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1468 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1469 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1471 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1472 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1475 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1478 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1479 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1480 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1481 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1486 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1487 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1488 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1489 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1490 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1493 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1494 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1495 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1496 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1497 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1499 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1500 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1501 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1505 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1506 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1507 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1508 /// before we fail backwards.
1509 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1510 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1511 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1512 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1513 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1515 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1517 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1518 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1519 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1521 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1522 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1523 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1525 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1526 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1527 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1529 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1534 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1541 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1542 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1543 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1544 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1545 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1549 // Now update local state:
1550 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1551 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1552 match pending_update {
1553 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1554 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1555 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1556 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1560 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1561 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1562 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1569 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1570 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1571 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1577 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1579 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1580 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1583 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1584 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1585 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1590 // Message handlers:
1592 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1593 // Check sanity of message fields:
1594 if !self.is_outbound() {
1595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1597 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1600 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1603 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1606 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1609 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1610 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1613 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1614 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1617 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1618 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1621 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1624 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1628 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1629 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1632 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1633 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1635 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1636 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1638 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1639 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1641 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1644 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1647 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1650 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1651 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1652 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1657 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1658 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1659 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1660 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1661 if script.len() == 0 {
1664 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
1667 Some(script.clone())
1670 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1671 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1677 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1678 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1679 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1680 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1681 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1682 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1684 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1685 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1686 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1687 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1688 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1689 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1692 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1693 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1694 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1697 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1698 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1700 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1705 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1706 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1708 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1709 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1711 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1712 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1713 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1714 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1715 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1716 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1717 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1718 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1719 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1722 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1723 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1725 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1726 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1727 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1728 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1730 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1731 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1733 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1734 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1737 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1738 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1741 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1742 if self.is_outbound() {
1743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1745 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1746 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1747 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1751 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1752 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1753 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1754 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1757 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1758 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1759 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1760 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1761 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1763 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1765 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1766 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1770 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1771 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1772 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1776 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1777 initial_commitment_tx,
1780 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1781 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1784 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1785 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1787 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1789 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1790 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1791 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1792 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1793 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1794 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1795 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1796 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1797 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1799 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1801 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1803 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1804 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1805 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1806 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1808 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1810 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1811 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1813 }, channel_monitor))
1816 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1817 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1818 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1819 if !self.is_outbound() {
1820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1822 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1825 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1826 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1827 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1828 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1831 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1833 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1834 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1835 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1836 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1838 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1839 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1841 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1842 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1844 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1845 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1846 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1847 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1848 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1853 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1854 initial_commitment_tx,
1857 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1858 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1861 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1862 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1865 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1866 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1867 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1868 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1869 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1870 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1871 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1872 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1873 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1874 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1876 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1878 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1880 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1881 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1882 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1883 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1885 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1887 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1890 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1891 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1892 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1893 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1896 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1898 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1899 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1900 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1901 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1902 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1903 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1904 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1905 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1906 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1907 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1908 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1909 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1910 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1913 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1919 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1920 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1922 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1928 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1929 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1930 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1936 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1937 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1938 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1939 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1940 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1941 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1942 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1945 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1946 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1947 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1948 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1949 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1950 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1952 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1953 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1959 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1960 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1961 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1962 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1963 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1964 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1965 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1968 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1969 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1970 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1971 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1972 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1973 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1975 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1976 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1980 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1981 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1982 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1983 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1984 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1985 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1987 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1988 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1995 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1996 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1997 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1998 /// corner case properly.
1999 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
2000 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2002 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2003 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2004 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2005 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
2007 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2008 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2009 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2014 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2015 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2016 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2019 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2020 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2021 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
2022 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2023 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2024 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2027 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2028 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2029 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2031 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2032 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2034 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2035 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2037 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2038 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2040 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2041 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2045 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2046 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2052 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2053 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2054 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2057 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2058 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2059 included_htlcs += 1;
2062 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2063 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2067 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2068 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2069 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2070 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2071 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2072 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2077 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2079 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2080 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2085 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2086 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2090 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2091 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2092 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2095 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2096 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2098 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2099 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2100 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2102 total_pending_htlcs,
2103 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2104 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2105 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2107 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2108 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2109 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2111 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2113 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2118 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2119 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2120 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2122 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2123 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2125 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2126 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2128 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2129 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2131 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2132 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2136 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2137 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2143 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2144 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2145 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2146 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2147 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2148 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2151 included_htlcs += 1;
2154 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2155 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2158 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2159 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2161 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2162 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2163 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2168 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2169 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2170 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2173 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2174 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2176 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2177 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2179 total_pending_htlcs,
2180 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2181 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2182 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2184 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2185 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2186 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2188 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2190 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2195 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2196 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2197 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2198 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2199 if local_sent_shutdown {
2200 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2202 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2203 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2204 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2207 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2210 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2213 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2216 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2220 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2221 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2222 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2225 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2226 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2229 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2230 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2231 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2232 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2233 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2234 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2235 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2236 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2237 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2238 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2239 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2241 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2242 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2243 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2244 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2245 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2246 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2250 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2251 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2252 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2253 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2254 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2255 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2256 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2260 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2261 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2262 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2263 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2264 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2265 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2266 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2270 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2271 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2272 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2273 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2274 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2278 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2279 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2280 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2281 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2282 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2284 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2288 let chan_reserve_msat =
2289 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2290 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2294 if !self.is_outbound() {
2295 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2296 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2297 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2298 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2299 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2300 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2301 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2302 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2303 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2304 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2305 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2306 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2307 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2308 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2309 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2312 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2313 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2314 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2315 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2319 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2322 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2326 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2327 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2328 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2332 // Now update local state:
2333 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2334 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2335 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2336 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2337 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2338 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2339 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2344 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2346 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2347 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2348 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2349 match check_preimage {
2351 Some(payment_hash) =>
2352 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2357 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2358 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2359 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2360 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2368 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2371 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2372 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2375 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2379 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2380 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2383 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2384 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2387 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2391 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2395 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2396 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2399 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2403 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2407 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2408 where L::Target: Logger
2410 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2411 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2413 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2414 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2416 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2417 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2420 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2422 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2424 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2425 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2426 let commitment_txid = {
2427 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2428 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2429 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2431 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2432 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2433 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2434 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2435 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2436 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2440 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2441 (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2444 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2445 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2446 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2447 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2449 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2450 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2452 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2453 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2454 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2457 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2459 if self.is_outbound() {
2460 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2461 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2462 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2463 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2464 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2465 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2466 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2467 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2468 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2469 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2475 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2476 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2479 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2480 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2481 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2482 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2483 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2484 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2485 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2487 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2488 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2489 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2490 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2491 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2492 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2493 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2495 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2497 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2501 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2504 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2505 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2506 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2509 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2510 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
2511 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2512 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2514 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2515 let mut need_commitment = false;
2516 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2517 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2518 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2519 need_commitment = true;
2523 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2524 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2525 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2526 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2527 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2528 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2532 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2533 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2534 Some(forward_info.clone())
2536 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2537 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2538 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2539 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2540 need_commitment = true;
2543 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2544 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2545 Some(fail_reason.take())
2547 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2548 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2549 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2550 need_commitment = true;
2554 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2555 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2556 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2557 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2559 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2560 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2561 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2562 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2563 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2564 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2565 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2566 // includes the right HTLCs.
2567 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2568 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2569 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2570 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2571 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2572 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2574 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2575 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2576 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2579 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2580 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2581 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2582 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2583 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2584 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2585 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2586 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2587 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2591 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2592 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2594 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2595 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2596 per_commitment_secret,
2597 next_per_commitment_point,
2598 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
2601 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2602 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2603 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2604 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2605 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2606 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2607 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2608 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2611 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2612 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2613 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2614 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2615 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2616 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2617 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2619 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2620 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2621 updates: Vec::new(),
2624 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2625 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2626 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2627 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2628 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2629 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2630 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2631 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2632 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2633 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2634 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2635 // to rebalance channels.
2636 match &htlc_update {
2637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2638 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2639 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2642 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2643 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2644 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2645 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2646 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2647 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2648 // into the holding cell without ever being
2649 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2650 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2651 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2654 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2660 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2661 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2662 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2663 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2664 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2665 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2666 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2667 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2668 (msg, monitor_update)
2669 } else { unreachable!() };
2670 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2671 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2673 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2674 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2675 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2676 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2677 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2678 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2679 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2680 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2681 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2684 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2686 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2693 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2694 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2696 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2697 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2698 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2699 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2700 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2701 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2707 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2708 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2709 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2710 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2711 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2713 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2714 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2715 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2717 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2719 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2721 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2724 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2726 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2730 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2731 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2732 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2733 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2734 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2735 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
2736 where L::Target: Logger,
2738 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2741 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2744 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2748 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
2750 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2751 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2756 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2757 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2758 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2759 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2760 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2761 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2762 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2763 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2769 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2770 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2773 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
2774 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2776 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
2778 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2779 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2780 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2781 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2782 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2783 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2784 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2785 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2789 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2790 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2791 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2792 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2793 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2794 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2795 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2796 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2798 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2799 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2800 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2801 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2802 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2803 let mut require_commitment = false;
2804 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2807 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2808 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2809 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2811 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2812 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2813 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2814 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2815 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2816 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2821 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2822 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2823 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2824 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2825 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2827 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2828 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2833 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2834 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2836 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2840 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2841 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2843 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2845 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2846 require_commitment = true;
2847 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2848 match forward_info {
2849 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2850 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2851 require_commitment = true;
2853 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2854 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2855 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2857 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2858 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2859 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2863 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2864 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2865 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2866 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2872 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2873 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2874 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2875 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2877 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2878 Some(fail_reason.take())
2880 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2881 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2882 require_commitment = true;
2886 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2888 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2889 match update_state {
2890 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2891 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2892 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2893 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2894 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2896 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2897 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2898 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2899 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2900 require_commitment = true;
2901 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2902 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2907 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2908 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2909 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2910 if require_commitment {
2911 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2912 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2913 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2914 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2915 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2916 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2917 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2918 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2919 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2921 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2922 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2923 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2924 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
2925 commitment_update: None,
2926 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2928 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
2932 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2933 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2934 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2935 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2936 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2938 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2939 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2940 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2943 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2944 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2945 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2946 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2949 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
2950 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
2951 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
2953 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
2956 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2957 if require_commitment {
2958 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2960 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2961 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2962 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2963 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2965 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2966 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2968 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2969 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2970 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2972 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2976 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
2977 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
2980 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2982 commitment_update: None,
2983 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
2984 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
2991 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2992 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2993 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2994 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2995 if !self.is_outbound() {
2996 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2998 if !self.is_usable() {
2999 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3001 if !self.is_live() {
3002 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3005 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3006 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3010 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3011 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3013 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3014 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3019 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3020 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
3021 Some(update_fee) => {
3022 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3023 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3029 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3030 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3032 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3034 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3035 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3036 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3037 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3040 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3041 // will be retransmitted.
3042 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3043 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3044 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3046 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3047 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3049 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3050 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3051 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3052 // this HTLC accordingly
3053 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3056 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3057 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3058 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3059 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3062 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3063 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3064 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3065 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3066 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3067 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3072 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3074 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3075 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3076 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3077 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3081 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3082 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3083 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3084 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3085 // the update upon reconnection.
3086 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3090 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3091 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3094 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3095 /// updates are partially paused.
3096 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3097 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3098 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3099 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3100 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3101 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3102 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3103 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3104 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3105 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3108 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3109 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3110 /// to the remote side.
3111 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3112 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3113 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3115 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3116 self.funding_transaction.take()
3119 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3120 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3121 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3122 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3123 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3124 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3125 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3126 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3127 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3128 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3129 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3130 next_per_commitment_point,
3134 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3135 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3136 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3137 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3139 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3140 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3141 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3142 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3143 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3144 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3148 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3149 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3151 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3152 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3155 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3156 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3157 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3158 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3159 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3160 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3161 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3162 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3163 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3167 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3168 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3170 if self.is_outbound() {
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3173 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3176 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3177 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3179 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3180 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3181 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3182 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3183 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3184 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3185 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3186 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3187 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3188 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3189 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3191 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3193 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3195 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3201 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3202 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3203 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3204 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3205 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3206 per_commitment_secret,
3207 next_per_commitment_point,
3211 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3212 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3213 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3214 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3215 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3217 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3218 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3219 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3220 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3221 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3222 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3223 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3224 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3225 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3230 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3231 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3233 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3234 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3235 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3236 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3237 reason: err_packet.clone()
3240 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3241 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3242 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3243 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3244 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3245 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3248 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3249 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3250 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3251 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3252 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3259 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3260 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3261 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3262 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3266 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3267 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3268 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3269 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3270 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3271 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3275 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3276 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3277 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3278 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3279 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3280 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3281 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3285 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3286 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3290 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3291 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3292 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3293 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3294 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3295 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3296 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3299 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3300 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3301 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3305 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3309 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3310 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3311 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3313 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3314 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3315 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3316 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3317 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3321 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3322 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3323 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3324 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3325 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3328 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3329 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3332 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3333 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3334 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3335 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3336 next_per_commitment_point,
3337 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3340 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3341 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3342 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3344 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3345 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3346 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3349 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3355 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3356 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3357 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3358 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3359 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3361 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3362 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3363 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3364 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3365 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3366 next_per_commitment_point,
3370 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3371 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3372 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3374 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3377 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3378 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3379 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3380 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3382 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3383 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3384 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) =>
3385 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3386 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3387 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3389 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3390 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3394 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3396 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3397 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3398 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3400 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3403 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3404 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3405 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3408 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3414 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3415 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3416 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3417 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
3418 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3420 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3422 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3423 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3424 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3425 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3426 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3427 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3429 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3430 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3431 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3432 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3433 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3435 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3436 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3437 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3438 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3441 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3442 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3443 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3444 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3445 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3446 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3447 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3448 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3449 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3450 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
3451 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3452 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3453 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3454 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3455 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3457 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3460 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3461 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3464 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3465 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3466 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3467 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3468 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3469 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3470 self.channel_state &
3471 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3472 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
3473 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3474 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3477 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3478 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3479 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3480 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3481 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3482 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3485 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3491 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
3492 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3493 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3495 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3496 return Ok((None, None));
3499 if !self.is_outbound() {
3500 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3501 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3503 return Ok((None, None));
3506 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3508 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3509 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
3510 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
3511 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
3513 let sig = self.holder_signer
3514 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3515 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
3517 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
3518 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3519 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3520 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3522 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3523 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3524 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3529 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
3530 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3531 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3532 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3534 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3537 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3538 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3539 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3540 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3543 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3544 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3548 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3550 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
3551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3554 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3555 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3559 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3562 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3563 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3564 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3565 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3567 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3570 assert!(send_shutdown);
3571 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3572 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3575 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3580 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3582 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3583 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3585 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3586 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3587 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3588 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3589 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3590 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3594 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3595 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3596 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3597 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3601 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3602 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3603 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3604 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3605 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3606 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3608 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3609 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3616 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3617 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3619 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3622 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
3623 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
3625 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3627 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3628 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3629 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3630 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3631 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3633 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3634 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3636 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3637 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3639 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3643 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3644 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3646 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3649 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3652 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3655 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3659 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
3660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
3663 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
3664 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
3665 return Ok((None, None));
3668 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3669 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3670 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
3673 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3675 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3678 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3679 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3680 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3681 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3682 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3686 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
3687 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
3688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
3692 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3693 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3694 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3695 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3696 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3697 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3698 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
3702 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3704 macro_rules! propose_fee {
3705 ($new_fee: expr) => {
3706 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3707 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
3709 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
3712 let sig = self.holder_signer
3713 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3714 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3716 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3717 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3718 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3719 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3723 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
3724 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3725 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3726 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
3728 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3729 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3730 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3736 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
3737 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
3738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
3740 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3743 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3744 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3747 if !self.is_outbound() {
3748 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
3749 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
3750 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
3751 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
3753 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
3755 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
3757 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
3758 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3761 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
3762 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
3763 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3764 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
3765 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
3766 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3767 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
3768 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3773 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
3774 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3775 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
3776 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3782 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3783 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3784 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3785 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3787 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3793 // Public utilities:
3795 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3799 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3803 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3804 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3805 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3809 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3810 /// is_usable() returns true).
3811 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3812 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3813 self.short_channel_id
3816 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3817 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3818 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3819 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3822 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3823 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3826 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3827 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3830 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3831 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3832 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3835 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3836 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3839 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3840 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3841 self.counterparty_node_id
3844 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3846 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3847 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3850 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3851 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3853 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3854 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3855 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3856 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3858 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3862 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3863 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3864 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3867 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3868 self.channel_value_satoshis
3871 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3872 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3875 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3876 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3879 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3880 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3883 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3887 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3888 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3889 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3890 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3891 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3892 // which are near the dust limit.
3893 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3894 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
3895 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
3896 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3897 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3899 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3902 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3903 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3906 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3907 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3910 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3911 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3915 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3920 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3922 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3923 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3924 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3925 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3926 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3927 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3929 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3931 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3939 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3940 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3946 self.update_time_counter
3949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3954 self.config.announced_channel
3957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3964 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3969 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3979 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3980 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3982 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3983 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3986 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3987 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3988 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3989 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3992 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3993 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3994 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3997 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
3998 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3999 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4002 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4003 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4004 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4007 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4008 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4009 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4010 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4011 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4012 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4017 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4018 self.channel_update_status
4021 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4022 self.channel_update_status = status;
4025 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
4026 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4030 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4031 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4032 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4035 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4039 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4040 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4041 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
4043 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
4044 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4045 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4047 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
4048 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4050 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4051 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
4053 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4057 if need_commitment_update {
4058 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4059 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4060 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
4061 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4062 next_per_commitment_point,
4065 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
4071 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4072 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4073 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4074 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
4075 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4076 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4077 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4078 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4079 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
4080 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
4081 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4082 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4083 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4084 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4085 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4086 if self.is_outbound() {
4087 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4088 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4089 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4090 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4091 // channel and move on.
4092 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4093 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4095 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4096 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4098 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
4101 if self.is_outbound() {
4102 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4103 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4104 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4105 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4106 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4107 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4111 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4112 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4113 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4114 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4115 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4119 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
4120 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4121 // may have already happened for this block).
4122 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4123 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4124 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
4127 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4128 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4129 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4130 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4131 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4132 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
4141 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4142 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4143 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4144 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4146 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4147 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4150 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4152 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
4153 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4154 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4155 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
4156 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4158 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4159 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4160 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4168 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4170 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4171 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4172 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
4175 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4176 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4177 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
4178 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4179 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4180 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4181 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4182 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
4183 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4186 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
4187 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
4188 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4189 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4190 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
4191 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4192 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4193 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4198 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4201 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4202 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4203 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4204 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4205 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4206 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4207 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4208 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4209 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4210 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4211 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4212 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4213 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4214 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4215 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4216 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4222 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4227 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4228 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4230 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4231 if !self.is_outbound() {
4232 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4234 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4235 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4238 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4239 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4242 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4243 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4247 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4248 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4249 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4250 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4251 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4252 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4253 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4254 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4255 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4256 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4257 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4258 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4259 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4260 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4261 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4262 first_per_commitment_point,
4263 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4264 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4265 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4266 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4271 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4272 if self.is_outbound() {
4273 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4275 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4276 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4278 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4279 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4282 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4283 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4285 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4286 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4287 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4288 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4289 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4290 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4291 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4292 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4293 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4294 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4295 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4296 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4297 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4298 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4299 first_per_commitment_point,
4300 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4301 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4302 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4307 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4308 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4309 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4310 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4311 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4315 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4316 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4317 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4318 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4319 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4320 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4321 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4322 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4323 if !self.is_outbound() {
4324 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4326 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4327 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4329 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4330 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4331 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4332 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4335 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4336 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4338 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4341 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4347 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4349 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4351 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4352 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4353 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4355 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4356 temporary_channel_id,
4357 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4358 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4363 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4364 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4365 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4366 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4367 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4369 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4370 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4372 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4373 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4374 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4377 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4380 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4381 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4384 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4386 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4387 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4389 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4390 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4391 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4392 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4393 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4394 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4397 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4398 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4403 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4405 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4406 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4407 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4409 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4410 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4411 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4412 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4413 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4414 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4415 contents: announcement,
4418 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4422 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4423 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4424 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4425 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4426 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4428 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4430 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4432 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4433 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4435 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4437 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4438 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4441 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4443 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4446 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4447 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4448 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4449 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4451 Err(_) => return None,
4453 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4454 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4455 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4460 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4461 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4462 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4463 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4464 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4465 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4466 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4467 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4468 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4469 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4470 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4471 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4472 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4473 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4474 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4475 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4476 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4477 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4478 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4481 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4482 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4483 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4484 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4487 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4488 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4489 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4490 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4491 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4492 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4493 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4494 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4496 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4497 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4498 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4499 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4500 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4501 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4502 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4503 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4504 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4506 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4512 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4514 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4515 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4517 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4519 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4520 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4522 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4523 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4526 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4528 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4529 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4530 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4533 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4534 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4538 if amount_msat == 0 {
4539 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4542 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4543 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4546 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4547 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4548 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4549 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4550 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4551 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4552 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4556 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4557 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4558 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4561 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4562 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4566 if !self.is_outbound() {
4567 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4568 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4569 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4570 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4571 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4572 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4577 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4578 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4579 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4580 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4581 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4582 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4586 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4587 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4588 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4589 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4591 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4595 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4596 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4597 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4600 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4601 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4602 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4603 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4605 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4606 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4609 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4610 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4611 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4612 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4613 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4616 // Now update local state:
4617 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4618 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4623 onion_routing_packet,
4628 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4629 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4631 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4633 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4637 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4638 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4639 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4643 onion_routing_packet,
4645 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4650 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4651 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4652 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4653 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4654 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4655 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4656 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4658 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4659 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4661 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4662 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4664 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4665 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4667 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4668 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4669 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4670 have_updates = true;
4672 if have_updates { break; }
4674 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4675 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4676 have_updates = true;
4678 if have_updates { break; }
4681 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4683 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4685 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4686 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4687 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4688 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4689 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4691 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4692 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4693 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4695 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4696 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4700 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4701 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4702 Some(fail_reason.take())
4704 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4705 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4708 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4709 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4710 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4711 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4712 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4713 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4716 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4718 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4719 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4720 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4721 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4722 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4723 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4725 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4728 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4729 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4730 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4731 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4732 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4733 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4734 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4735 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4738 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4739 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4742 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4743 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4744 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4745 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4746 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4747 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4748 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4749 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4751 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4753 if !self.is_outbound() {
4754 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4755 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4756 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4757 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4758 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4759 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4760 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4761 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4762 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4763 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4770 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4771 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4775 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4776 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4778 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4780 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4781 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4782 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4783 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4785 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4786 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4787 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4788 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4789 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4790 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4794 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4795 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4798 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4801 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4802 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4803 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4805 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4806 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4807 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4808 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4809 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4815 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4816 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4817 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4820 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4821 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4824 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4825 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4826 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4827 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4833 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4834 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4835 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
4836 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4837 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4838 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4839 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4843 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4844 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4847 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4848 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4851 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4853 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4856 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4859 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4860 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4861 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4863 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4868 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4869 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
4870 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4871 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4873 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4875 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4877 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4878 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4879 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4880 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4881 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4882 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4886 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4887 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4888 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4891 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4892 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4893 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4894 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4895 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4897 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4898 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4905 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4908 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4909 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4910 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4911 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4912 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4913 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4914 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4915 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4916 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4917 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4918 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4920 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4921 // return them to fail the payment.
4922 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4923 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4925 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4926 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4931 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4932 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4933 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4934 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4935 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4936 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4937 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4938 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4940 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4941 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4942 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4943 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4948 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4949 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4950 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4954 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4955 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4957 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4963 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4964 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4965 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4966 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4967 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4969 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4970 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4971 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4972 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4978 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4979 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4980 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4981 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4982 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4983 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4988 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4990 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4993 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4995 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4997 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4998 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4999 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5000 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5001 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
5002 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5004 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5005 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5006 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5008 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5010 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5011 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5012 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5013 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5014 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5015 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5017 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5018 // deserialized from that format.
5019 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5020 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5021 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5023 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5025 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5026 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5027 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5029 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5030 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5031 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5032 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5035 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5036 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5037 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5040 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5041 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5042 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5043 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5045 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5046 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5048 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5050 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5052 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5054 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5057 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5059 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5064 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5065 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5066 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5067 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5068 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5069 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5070 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5072 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5074 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5076 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5079 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5080 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5081 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5084 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
5086 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5088 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
5090 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5095 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5096 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5098 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5100 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5101 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5102 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5103 source.write(writer)?;
5104 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5106 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5108 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5109 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5111 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5113 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5114 err_packet.write(writer)?;
5119 match self.resend_order {
5120 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5121 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5124 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
5125 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
5126 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
5128 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5129 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
5130 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
5131 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5134 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5135 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
5136 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
5137 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5138 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5141 if self.is_outbound() {
5142 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
5143 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5144 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
5146 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
5147 // commitment_signed, drop it.
5148 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
5150 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
5152 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5153 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5154 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
5155 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
5157 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5158 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5159 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5160 // consider the stale state on reload.
5163 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
5164 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
5165 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5167 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5168 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5169 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
5171 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5172 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5174 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5175 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5176 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
5178 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5179 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5181 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5184 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
5185 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5186 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5188 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
5191 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
5192 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5194 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5195 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5196 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5198 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5200 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5202 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5204 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5205 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5206 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5207 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5208 htlc.write(writer)?;
5211 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5212 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5213 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5214 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5215 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5216 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5217 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5219 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5220 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5221 (5, self.config, required),
5222 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5223 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5230 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5231 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5232 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5233 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5234 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5236 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5238 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5240 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5241 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5242 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5243 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5244 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5246 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5247 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5250 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5251 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5252 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5254 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5256 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5257 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5258 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5259 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5260 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5261 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5262 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5263 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5265 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5267 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5268 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5269 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5272 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5274 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5275 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5276 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5278 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5279 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5280 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5281 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5282 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5283 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5284 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5285 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5286 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5287 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5288 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5289 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5290 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5291 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5296 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5297 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5298 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5299 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5300 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5301 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5302 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5303 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5304 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5305 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5306 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5307 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5308 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5309 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5310 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5316 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5317 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5318 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5319 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5320 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5321 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5322 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5323 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5324 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5325 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5327 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5328 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5329 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5331 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5332 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5333 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5335 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5339 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5340 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5341 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5345 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5346 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5347 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5349 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5350 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5351 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5352 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5355 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5356 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5357 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5358 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5361 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5363 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5365 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5366 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5367 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5368 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5370 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5371 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5372 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5373 // consider the stale state on reload.
5374 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5377 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5378 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5379 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
5381 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5384 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5385 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5386 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5388 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5389 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5390 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5391 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5393 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5394 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5396 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5397 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5399 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5400 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5401 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5403 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5405 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5406 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5408 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5409 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5412 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5414 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5415 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5416 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5417 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5419 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5422 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5423 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5425 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5427 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5428 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5430 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5431 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5433 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5435 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5436 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5437 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5439 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5440 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5441 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5445 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5446 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5447 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5449 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5455 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5456 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
5457 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5458 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5459 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5460 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5461 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5462 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5463 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5466 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5467 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5472 config: config.unwrap(),
5476 channel_value_satoshis,
5478 latest_monitor_update_id,
5481 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5484 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5485 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5488 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5489 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5490 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5494 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5495 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5496 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5497 monitor_pending_forwards,
5498 monitor_pending_failures,
5501 holding_cell_update_fee,
5502 next_holder_htlc_id,
5503 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5504 update_time_counter,
5507 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5508 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5509 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5510 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5512 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5513 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5514 closing_fee_limits: None,
5515 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
5517 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5518 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5521 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5522 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5523 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5524 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5525 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5526 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5527 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5530 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5532 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5533 funding_transaction,
5535 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5536 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5537 counterparty_node_id,
5539 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5543 channel_update_status,
5544 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5548 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5549 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5550 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5551 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5553 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5555 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5556 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5563 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5564 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5565 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5566 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5567 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5568 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5569 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5570 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5572 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5573 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
5574 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5575 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5576 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5577 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5578 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5580 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5581 use chain::BestBlock;
5582 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5583 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5584 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5585 use util::config::UserConfig;
5586 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5587 use util::errors::APIError;
5588 use util::test_utils;
5589 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5590 use util::logger::Logger;
5591 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5592 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5593 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5594 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5595 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5596 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5597 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5598 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5602 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5605 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5606 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5612 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5613 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5614 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5618 signer: InMemorySigner,
5620 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5621 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5623 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5624 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5625 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5626 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5627 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5628 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5631 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5633 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5634 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5637 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5640 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5641 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5642 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5645 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5646 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5650 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5651 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5652 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5653 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5655 let seed = [42; 32];
5656 let network = Network::Testnet;
5657 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5658 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5659 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5662 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5664 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5665 let config = UserConfig::default();
5666 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5667 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5668 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5670 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5671 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5675 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5676 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5678 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5679 let original_fee = 253;
5680 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5681 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5682 let seed = [42; 32];
5683 let network = Network::Testnet;
5684 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5686 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5687 let config = UserConfig::default();
5688 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5690 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5691 // same as the old fee.
5692 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5693 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5694 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5698 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5699 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5700 // dust limits are used.
5701 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5703 let seed = [42; 32];
5704 let network = Network::Testnet;
5705 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5707 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5708 // they have different dust limits.
5710 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5711 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5712 let config = UserConfig::default();
5713 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5715 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5716 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5717 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5718 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5719 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5721 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5722 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5723 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5724 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5725 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5727 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5728 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5729 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5731 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5732 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5733 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5734 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5737 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5739 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5740 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5741 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5742 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5743 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5745 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5746 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5747 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
5751 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5752 // the dust limit check.
5753 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5754 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5755 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5756 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5758 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5759 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5760 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5761 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5762 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5763 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5764 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5768 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5769 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5770 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5771 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5772 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5773 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5774 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5775 let seed = [42; 32];
5776 let network = Network::Testnet;
5777 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5779 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5780 let config = UserConfig::default();
5781 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5783 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5784 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5786 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5787 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5788 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5789 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5790 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5791 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5793 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5794 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5795 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5796 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5797 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5799 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5801 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5802 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5803 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5804 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5805 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5807 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5808 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5809 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5810 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5811 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5815 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5816 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5818 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5819 let seed = [42; 32];
5820 let network = Network::Testnet;
5821 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5822 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5823 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5825 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5827 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5828 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5829 let config = UserConfig::default();
5830 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5832 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5833 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5834 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5835 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5837 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5838 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5839 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5841 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5842 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5843 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5844 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5846 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5847 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5848 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5850 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5851 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5853 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5854 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5855 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5856 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5857 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5858 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5859 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5860 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5861 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5866 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5868 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5869 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5870 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5871 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5872 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5873 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5874 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5881 fn channel_update() {
5882 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5883 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5884 let seed = [42; 32];
5885 let network = Network::Testnet;
5886 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5887 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5889 // Create a channel.
5890 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5891 let config = UserConfig::default();
5892 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5893 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5894 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5895 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5897 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5898 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5899 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5901 short_channel_id: 0,
5904 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5905 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5906 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5908 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5909 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5911 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5913 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5915 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5916 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5917 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5918 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5920 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5921 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5922 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5924 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5929 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5930 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5931 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5932 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5933 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5935 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5937 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5938 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5939 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5940 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5941 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5943 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5944 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5949 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5950 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5951 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5953 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5954 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5955 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5956 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5957 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5958 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5960 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5962 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5963 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5964 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5965 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5966 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5967 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5969 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5970 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5971 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5972 selected_contest_delay: 144
5974 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5975 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5977 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5978 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5980 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5981 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5983 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5984 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5986 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5987 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5988 // build_commitment_transaction.
5989 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5990 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5991 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5992 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5993 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5995 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5996 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5997 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5999 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
6000 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
6002 let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
6003 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
6007 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
6008 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6009 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6010 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6011 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
6012 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
6014 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
6015 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6016 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
6017 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6019 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6020 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
6021 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
6023 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
6025 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6026 commitment_tx.clone(),
6027 counterparty_signature,
6028 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
6029 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6030 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6032 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
6033 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
6035 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6036 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
6037 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
6039 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
6040 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
6043 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6045 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
6046 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
6047 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
6048 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
6049 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
6050 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
6051 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
6053 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6056 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
6057 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
6058 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
6062 assert!(preimage.is_some());
6065 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
6066 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
6068 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6069 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
6070 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
6071 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
6072 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
6073 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
6074 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
6076 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
6080 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6081 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
6083 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
6084 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
6085 "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", {});
6087 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6088 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6090 amount_msat: 1000000,
6092 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6093 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6095 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
6098 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6099 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6101 amount_msat: 2000000,
6103 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6104 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6106 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6109 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6110 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6112 amount_msat: 2000000,
6114 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6115 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6116 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6118 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
6121 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6122 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6124 amount_msat: 3000000,
6126 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6127 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6128 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6130 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
6133 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6134 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6136 amount_msat: 4000000,
6138 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6139 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6141 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
6145 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6146 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6147 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
6149 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
6150 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
6151 "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", {
6154 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
6155 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
6156 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
6159 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
6160 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
6161 "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" },
6164 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
6165 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
6166 "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" },
6169 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
6170 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
6171 "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" },
6174 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
6175 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
6176 "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" }
6179 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6180 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6181 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
6183 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
6184 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
6185 "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", {
6188 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
6189 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
6190 "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" },
6193 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
6194 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
6195 "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" },
6198 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
6199 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
6200 "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" },
6203 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
6204 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
6205 "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" },
6208 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6209 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6210 "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" }
6213 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6214 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6215 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6217 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6218 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6219 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6222 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6223 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6224 "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" },
6227 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6228 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6229 "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" },
6232 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6233 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6234 "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" },
6237 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6238 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6239 "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" }
6242 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6243 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6244 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6246 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6247 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6248 "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", {
6251 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6252 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6253 "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" },
6256 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6257 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6258 "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" },
6261 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6262 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6263 "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" },
6266 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6267 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6268 "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" }
6271 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6272 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6273 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6275 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6276 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6277 "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", {
6280 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6281 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6282 "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" },
6285 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6286 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6287 "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" },
6290 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6291 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6292 "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" }
6295 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6296 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6297 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6299 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6300 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6301 "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", {
6304 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6305 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6306 "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" },
6309 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6310 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6311 "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" },
6314 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6315 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6316 "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" }
6319 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6320 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6321 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6323 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6324 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6325 "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", {
6328 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6329 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6330 "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" },
6333 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6334 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6335 "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" }
6338 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6339 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6340 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6342 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6343 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6344 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6347 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6348 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6349 "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" },
6352 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6353 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6354 "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" }
6357 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6358 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6359 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6361 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6362 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6363 "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", {
6366 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6367 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6368 "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" }
6371 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6372 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6373 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6375 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6376 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6377 "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", {
6380 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6381 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6382 "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" }
6385 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6386 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6387 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6389 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6390 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6391 "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", {});
6393 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6394 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6395 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6397 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6398 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6399 "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", {});
6401 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6402 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6403 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6405 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6406 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6407 "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", {});
6409 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6410 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6411 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6413 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6414 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6415 "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", {});
6417 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6418 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6419 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6420 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6421 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6422 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6424 amount_msat: 2000000,
6426 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6427 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6429 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6432 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6433 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6434 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6436 amount_msat: 5000000,
6438 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6439 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6440 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6442 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6445 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6446 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6448 amount_msat: 5000000,
6450 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6451 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6452 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6454 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6458 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6459 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6460 "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", {
6463 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6464 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6465 "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" },
6467 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6468 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6469 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
6471 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6472 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6473 "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" }
6478 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6479 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6481 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6482 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6483 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6484 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6486 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6487 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6488 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6490 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6491 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6493 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6494 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6496 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6497 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6498 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6502 fn test_key_derivation() {
6503 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6506 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6507 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6509 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6510 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6512 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6513 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6515 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6516 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6518 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6519 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6521 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6522 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6524 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6525 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());