1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
33 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
34 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
35 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
36 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
37 use util::transaction_utils;
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::errors::APIError;
41 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
42 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
45 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
47 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
50 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
51 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
66 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
67 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
68 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
71 enum InboundHTLCState {
72 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
73 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
74 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
75 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
76 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
77 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
78 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
79 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
80 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
81 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
82 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
83 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
84 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
85 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
86 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
88 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
89 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
90 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
92 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
93 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
94 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
95 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
96 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
97 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
98 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
99 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
100 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
101 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
103 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
104 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
106 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
107 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
108 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
109 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
110 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
112 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
113 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
115 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
116 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
117 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
118 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
119 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
120 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
121 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
122 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
125 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
129 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
130 state: InboundHTLCState,
133 enum OutboundHTLCState {
134 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
135 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
136 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
137 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
138 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
139 /// money back (though we won't), and,
140 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
141 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
142 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
143 /// we'll never get out of sync).
144 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
145 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
146 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
148 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
149 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
150 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
151 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
152 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
153 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
154 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
155 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
156 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
157 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
158 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
159 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
160 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
161 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
162 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
165 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
169 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
170 state: OutboundHTLCState,
174 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
175 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
176 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
180 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
182 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
185 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
190 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
194 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
195 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
196 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
197 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
198 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
199 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
200 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
202 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
203 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
204 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
205 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
206 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
207 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
208 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
210 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
211 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
212 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
214 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
215 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
216 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
217 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
218 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
219 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
221 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
222 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
224 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
225 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
226 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
227 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
228 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
229 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
230 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
231 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
232 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
234 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
235 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
237 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
238 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
239 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
240 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
241 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
242 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
243 /// us their shutdown.
244 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
245 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
246 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
247 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
249 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
250 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
252 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
254 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
255 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
256 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
257 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
258 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
259 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
260 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
261 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
263 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
265 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
267 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
271 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
277 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
278 struct HTLCCandidate {
280 origin: HTLCInitiator,
284 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
292 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
294 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
295 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
296 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
297 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
298 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
299 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
300 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
301 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
302 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
305 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
306 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
307 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
310 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
311 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
312 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
313 config: ChannelConfig,
317 channel_id: [u8; 32],
319 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
320 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
322 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
324 holder_signer: Signer,
325 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
326 destination_script: Script,
328 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
329 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
330 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
332 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
333 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
334 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
335 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
336 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
337 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
339 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
340 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
341 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
342 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
343 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
344 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
346 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
348 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
349 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
350 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
351 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
352 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
354 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
355 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
356 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
358 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
359 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
360 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
361 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
362 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
363 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
364 // commitment_signed.
365 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
366 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
367 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
368 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
369 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
370 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
371 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
373 update_time_counter: u32,
376 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
377 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
378 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
379 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
380 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
381 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
383 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
385 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
386 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
387 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
388 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
390 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
392 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
394 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
396 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
398 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
399 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
400 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
401 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
402 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
403 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
404 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
406 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
408 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
409 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
410 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
412 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
414 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
415 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
417 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
418 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
419 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
421 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
423 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
425 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
427 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
428 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
429 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
431 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
432 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
433 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
434 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
435 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
436 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
437 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
438 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
440 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
441 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
442 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
443 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
444 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
446 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
447 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
450 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
451 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
453 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
454 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
455 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
459 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
462 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
464 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
466 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
468 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
470 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
472 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
474 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
475 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
476 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
477 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
478 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
479 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
480 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
481 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
482 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
484 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
485 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
486 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
487 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
488 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
490 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
491 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
492 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
493 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
496 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
499 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
500 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
502 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
503 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
504 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
509 macro_rules! secp_check {
510 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
513 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
518 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
519 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
520 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
521 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
524 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
527 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
528 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
529 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
530 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
534 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
535 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
536 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
538 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
539 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
540 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
542 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
543 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
545 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
546 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
547 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
549 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
552 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
553 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
557 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
559 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
560 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
564 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
566 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
567 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
569 channel_value_satoshis,
571 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
574 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
575 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
577 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
578 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
579 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
581 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
582 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
583 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
584 pending_update_fee: None,
585 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
588 update_time_counter: 1,
590 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
592 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
593 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
594 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
595 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
596 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
598 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
599 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
600 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
603 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
605 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
606 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
607 short_channel_id: None,
609 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
610 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
611 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
612 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
613 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
614 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
615 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
616 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
617 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
619 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
621 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
622 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
623 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
624 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
625 counterparty_parameters: None,
626 funding_outpoint: None
628 funding_transaction: None,
630 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
631 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
632 counterparty_node_id,
634 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
636 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
638 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
640 announcement_sigs: None,
642 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
643 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
644 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
645 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
647 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
651 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
652 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
654 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
655 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
658 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
659 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
665 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
666 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
667 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
668 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
669 F::Target: FeeEstimator
671 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
672 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
673 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
674 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
675 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
676 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
677 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
678 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
680 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
682 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
683 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
686 // Check sanity of message fields:
687 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
690 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
693 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
694 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
695 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
697 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
700 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
703 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
704 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
707 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
709 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
710 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
713 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
716 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
720 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
721 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
722 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
724 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
727 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
728 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
730 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
731 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
733 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
734 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
736 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
737 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
739 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
743 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
745 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
746 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
747 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
751 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
752 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
754 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
756 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
757 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
760 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
763 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
767 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
768 // for full fee payment
769 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
770 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
771 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
775 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
776 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
777 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
781 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
782 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
783 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
784 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
785 if script.len() == 0 {
787 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
788 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
789 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
794 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
795 &OptionalField::Absent => {
796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
801 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
802 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
806 config: local_config,
808 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
809 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
812 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
815 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
816 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
818 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
819 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
820 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
822 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
823 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
824 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
825 pending_update_fee: None,
826 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
827 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
828 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
829 update_time_counter: 1,
831 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
833 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
834 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
835 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
836 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
837 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
839 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
840 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
842 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
844 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
846 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
847 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
848 short_channel_id: None,
850 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
851 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
852 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
853 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
854 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
855 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
856 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
857 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
858 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
859 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
861 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
863 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
864 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
865 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
866 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
867 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
868 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
869 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
871 funding_outpoint: None
873 funding_transaction: None,
875 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
876 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
877 counterparty_node_id,
879 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
881 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
883 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
885 announcement_sigs: None,
887 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
888 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
889 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
890 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
892 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
898 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
899 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
900 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
901 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
902 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
904 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
905 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
906 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
907 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
908 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
909 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
910 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
911 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
912 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
913 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
914 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
916 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
917 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
918 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
919 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
921 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
922 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
923 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
924 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
926 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
927 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
928 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
929 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
931 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
932 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
933 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
935 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
936 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
937 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
938 transaction_output_index: None
943 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
944 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
945 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
946 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
947 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
948 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
949 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
951 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
952 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
955 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
956 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
957 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
958 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
960 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
961 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
967 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
968 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
969 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
970 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
971 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
972 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
973 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
977 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
978 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
980 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
982 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
983 if generated_by_local {
984 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
985 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
994 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
995 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
996 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
997 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
998 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
999 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1000 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1004 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1005 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1007 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1009 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1010 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1012 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1013 if !generated_by_local {
1014 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1022 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1023 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1024 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1025 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1026 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1027 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1028 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1029 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1031 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1033 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1034 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1035 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1036 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1038 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1040 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1041 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1042 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1043 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1046 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1047 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1048 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1050 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1053 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1054 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1056 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1057 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1062 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1063 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1068 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1070 let channel_parameters =
1071 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1072 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1073 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1078 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1081 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1082 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1083 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1084 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1086 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1090 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1091 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1092 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1096 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1101 1 + // script length (0)
1105 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1106 2 + // witness marker and flag
1107 1 + // witness element count
1108 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1109 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1110 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1111 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1112 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1113 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1115 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1116 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1117 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1123 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1125 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1127 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1128 script_sig: Script::new(),
1129 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1130 witness: Vec::new(),
1135 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1136 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1137 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1139 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1140 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1141 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1143 if value_to_self < 0 {
1144 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1145 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1146 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1147 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1148 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1151 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1152 txouts.push((TxOut {
1153 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1154 value: value_to_remote as u64
1158 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1159 txouts.push((TxOut {
1160 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1161 value: value_to_self as u64
1165 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1167 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1168 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1169 outputs.push(out.0);
1177 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1180 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1181 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1185 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1186 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1187 /// our counterparty!)
1188 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1189 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1190 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1191 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1192 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1193 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1194 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1196 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1200 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1201 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1202 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1203 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1204 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1205 //may see payments to it!
1206 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1207 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1208 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1210 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1213 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1214 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1215 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1216 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1217 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1220 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1221 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1222 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1224 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1225 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1226 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1227 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1228 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1229 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1231 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1232 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1234 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1236 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1238 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1239 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1240 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1242 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1243 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1244 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1245 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1247 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1248 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1249 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1251 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1253 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1254 return Ok((None, None));
1257 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1258 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1265 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1269 // Now update local state:
1271 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1272 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1273 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1274 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1275 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1276 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1277 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1281 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1282 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1283 match pending_update {
1284 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1285 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1286 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1287 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1288 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1289 return Ok((None, None));
1292 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1293 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1294 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1295 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1296 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1297 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1298 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1304 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1305 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1306 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1308 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1312 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1313 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1315 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1316 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1318 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1319 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1322 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1323 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1324 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1325 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1326 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1329 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1330 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1331 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1332 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1333 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1334 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1335 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1336 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1337 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1339 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1340 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1341 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1343 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1344 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1348 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1349 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1350 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1352 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1353 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1354 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1355 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1356 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1358 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1360 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1361 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1362 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1364 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1365 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1366 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1368 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1369 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1370 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1374 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1381 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1385 // Now update local state:
1386 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1387 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1388 match pending_update {
1389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1390 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1391 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1395 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1396 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1397 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1404 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1405 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1406 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1412 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1414 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1415 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1418 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1419 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1420 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1425 // Message handlers:
1427 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1428 // Check sanity of message fields:
1429 if !self.is_outbound() {
1430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1432 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1435 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1438 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1441 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1444 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1445 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1448 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1449 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1452 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1453 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1456 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1459 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1463 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1464 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1467 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1468 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1470 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1471 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1473 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1476 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1477 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1479 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1482 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1485 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1486 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1487 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1492 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1493 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1494 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1495 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1496 if script.len() == 0 {
1498 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1499 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1502 Some(script.clone())
1505 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1506 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1507 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1512 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1513 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1514 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1515 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1516 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1517 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1519 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1520 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1521 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1522 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1523 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1524 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1527 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1528 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1529 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1532 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1533 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1535 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1540 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1541 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1543 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1544 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1546 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1547 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1548 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1549 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1550 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1551 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1552 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1553 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1554 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1557 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1558 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1560 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1561 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1562 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1563 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1565 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1566 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1568 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1569 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1572 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1573 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1576 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1577 if self.is_outbound() {
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1580 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1581 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1582 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1586 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1587 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1588 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1589 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1592 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1593 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1594 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1595 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1596 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1598 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1600 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1601 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1605 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1606 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1607 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1611 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1612 initial_commitment_tx,
1615 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1616 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1619 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1621 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1622 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1623 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1624 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1625 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1626 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1627 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1628 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1630 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1632 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1634 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1635 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1636 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1637 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1639 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1641 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1642 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1644 }, channel_monitor))
1647 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1648 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1649 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1650 if !self.is_outbound() {
1651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1653 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1656 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1657 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1658 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1659 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1662 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1664 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1665 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1666 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1667 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1669 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1670 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1672 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1673 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1675 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1676 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1677 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1678 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1679 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1684 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1685 initial_commitment_tx,
1688 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1689 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1693 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1694 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1695 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1696 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1697 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1698 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1699 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1700 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1701 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1703 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1705 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1707 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1708 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1709 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1710 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1712 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1714 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1717 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1718 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1719 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1720 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1723 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1725 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1726 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1727 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1728 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1729 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1730 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1731 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1732 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1733 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1734 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1735 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1736 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1737 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1740 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1746 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1747 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1749 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1754 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1755 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1756 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1757 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1758 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1760 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1763 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1765 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1766 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1767 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1768 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1771 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1772 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1773 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1774 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1775 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1779 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1782 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1783 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1784 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1785 /// corner case properly.
1786 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1787 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1789 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1790 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1791 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1792 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1794 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1795 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1796 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1801 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1802 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1803 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1806 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1807 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1808 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1809 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1810 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1811 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1814 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1815 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1816 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1818 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1819 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1821 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1822 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1824 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1825 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1827 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1832 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1839 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1840 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1841 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1844 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1845 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1846 included_htlcs += 1;
1849 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1850 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1854 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1856 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1857 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1858 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1859 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1864 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1867 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1872 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1873 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1877 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1878 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1879 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1882 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1883 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1885 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1886 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1887 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1889 total_pending_htlcs,
1890 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1891 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1892 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1894 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1895 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1896 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1898 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1900 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1905 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1906 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1907 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1909 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1910 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1912 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1913 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1915 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1916 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1919 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1923 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1930 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1931 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1932 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1933 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1934 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1935 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1938 included_htlcs += 1;
1941 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1945 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1946 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1948 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1949 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1950 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1956 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1957 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1960 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1961 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1963 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1964 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1966 total_pending_htlcs,
1967 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1968 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1969 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1971 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1972 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1973 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1975 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1977 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1982 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1983 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1984 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1985 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1986 if local_sent_shutdown {
1987 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1989 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1990 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1991 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1997 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2000 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2003 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2007 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2008 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2011 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2012 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2015 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2016 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2017 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2018 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2019 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2020 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2021 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2022 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2023 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2024 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2025 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2027 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2028 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2029 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2030 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2031 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2032 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2036 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2037 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2038 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2039 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2040 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2044 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2045 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2046 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2047 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2048 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2050 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2054 let chan_reserve_msat =
2055 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2056 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2060 if !self.is_outbound() {
2061 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2062 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2063 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2064 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2065 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2066 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2067 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2068 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2069 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2070 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2071 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2072 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2073 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2074 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2075 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2078 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2079 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2080 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2081 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2085 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2088 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2092 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2093 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2094 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2098 // Now update local state:
2099 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2100 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2101 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2102 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2103 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2104 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2105 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2110 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2112 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2113 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2114 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2115 match check_preimage {
2117 Some(payment_hash) =>
2118 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2123 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2125 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2126 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2128 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2131 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2134 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2137 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2138 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2141 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2145 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2146 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2149 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2150 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2153 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2157 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2161 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2162 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2165 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2169 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2173 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2174 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2177 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2178 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2180 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2181 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2183 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2184 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2187 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2189 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2191 let mut update_fee = false;
2192 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2194 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2199 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2200 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2201 let commitment_txid = {
2202 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2203 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2204 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2206 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2207 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2208 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2209 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2210 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2211 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2215 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2216 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2219 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2220 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2222 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2223 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2224 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2227 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2229 if self.is_outbound() {
2230 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2231 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2232 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2233 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2234 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2235 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2236 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2237 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2238 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2239 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2245 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2246 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2249 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2250 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2251 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2252 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2253 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2254 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2255 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2257 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2258 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2259 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2260 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2261 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2262 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2263 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2265 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2267 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2271 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2274 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2275 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2276 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2279 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2280 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2282 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2283 let mut need_commitment = false;
2284 if !self.is_outbound() {
2285 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2286 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2287 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2288 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2289 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2290 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2291 need_commitment = true;
2292 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2297 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2298 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2299 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2300 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2301 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2302 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2306 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2307 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2308 Some(forward_info.clone())
2310 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2311 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2312 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2313 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2314 need_commitment = true;
2317 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2318 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2319 Some(fail_reason.take())
2321 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2322 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2323 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2324 need_commitment = true;
2328 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2329 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2330 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2331 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2333 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2334 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2335 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2336 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2337 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2338 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2339 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2340 // includes the right HTLCs.
2341 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2342 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2343 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2344 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2345 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2346 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2348 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2349 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2350 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2351 // re-send the message on restoration)
2352 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2355 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2356 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2357 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2358 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2359 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2360 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2361 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2362 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2363 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2365 } else if !need_commitment {
2366 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2367 } else { (None, None) };
2369 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2370 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2372 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2373 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2374 per_commitment_secret,
2375 next_per_commitment_point,
2376 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2379 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2380 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2381 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2382 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2383 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2384 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2385 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2386 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2389 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2390 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2391 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2392 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2393 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2394 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2395 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2397 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2399 updates: Vec::new(),
2402 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2403 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2404 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2405 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2406 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2407 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2408 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2409 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2410 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2411 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2412 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2413 // to rebalance channels.
2414 match &htlc_update {
2415 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2416 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2417 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2420 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2421 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2422 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2423 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2424 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2425 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2426 // into the holding cell without ever being
2427 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2428 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2429 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2432 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2438 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2439 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2440 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2441 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2442 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2443 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2447 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2449 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2454 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2455 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2456 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2458 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2460 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2467 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2468 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2470 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2471 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2472 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2473 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2474 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2480 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2481 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2482 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2483 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2484 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2486 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2487 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2488 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2490 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2492 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2494 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2497 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2499 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2503 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2504 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2505 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2506 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2507 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2508 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2509 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2512 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2515 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2518 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2519 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2522 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2523 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2524 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2528 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2529 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2530 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2531 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2532 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2533 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2534 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2535 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2539 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2541 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2542 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2545 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2546 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2547 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2548 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2549 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2550 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2551 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2552 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2556 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2557 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2558 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2559 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2560 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2561 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2562 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2563 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2565 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2566 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2567 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2568 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2569 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2570 let mut require_commitment = false;
2571 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2574 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2575 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2576 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2578 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2579 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2580 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2581 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2582 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2583 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2588 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2589 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2590 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2591 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2592 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2594 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2595 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2600 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2601 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2603 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2607 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2608 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2610 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2611 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2612 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2613 require_commitment = true;
2614 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2615 match forward_info {
2616 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2617 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2618 require_commitment = true;
2620 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2621 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2622 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2624 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2625 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2626 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2630 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2631 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2632 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2633 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2639 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2640 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2641 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2642 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2644 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2645 Some(fail_reason.take())
2647 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2648 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2649 require_commitment = true;
2653 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2655 if self.is_outbound() {
2656 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2657 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2660 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2661 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2662 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2663 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2664 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2665 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2666 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2667 require_commitment = true;
2668 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2673 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2674 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2675 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2676 if require_commitment {
2677 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2678 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2679 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2680 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2681 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2682 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2683 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2684 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2685 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2687 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2688 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2689 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2690 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2693 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2694 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2695 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2696 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2697 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2699 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2700 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2701 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2704 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2705 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2706 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2707 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2709 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2711 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2712 if require_commitment {
2713 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2715 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2716 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2717 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2718 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2720 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2721 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2722 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2723 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2724 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2726 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2729 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2731 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2732 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2739 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2740 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2741 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2742 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2743 if !self.is_outbound() {
2744 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2746 if !self.is_usable() {
2747 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2749 if !self.is_live() {
2750 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2753 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2754 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2758 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2759 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2761 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2762 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2767 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2768 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2769 Some(update_fee) => {
2770 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2771 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2777 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2778 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2780 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2782 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2783 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2784 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2785 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2788 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2789 // will be retransmitted.
2790 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2792 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2793 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2795 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2796 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2797 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2798 // this HTLC accordingly
2799 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2802 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2803 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2804 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2805 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2808 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2809 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2810 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2811 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2812 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2813 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2818 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2820 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2821 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2822 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2823 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2824 // the update upon reconnection.
2825 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2829 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2830 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2833 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2834 /// updates are partially paused.
2835 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2836 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2837 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2838 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2839 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2840 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2841 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2842 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2843 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2844 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2845 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2846 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2847 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2850 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2851 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2852 /// to the remote side.
2853 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2854 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2855 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2857 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2858 self.funding_transaction.take()
2861 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2862 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2863 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2864 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2865 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2866 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2867 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2868 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2869 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2870 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2871 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2872 next_per_commitment_point,
2876 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2877 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2878 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2879 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2882 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2883 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2884 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2887 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2888 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2890 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2891 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2894 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2895 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2896 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2897 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2898 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2899 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2900 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2901 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2904 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2905 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2907 if self.is_outbound() {
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2913 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2914 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2915 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2919 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2920 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2921 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2922 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2923 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2924 per_commitment_secret,
2925 next_per_commitment_point,
2929 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2930 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2931 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2932 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2933 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2935 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2936 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2937 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2938 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2939 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2940 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2941 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2942 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2943 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2948 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2949 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2951 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2952 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2953 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2954 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2955 reason: err_packet.clone()
2958 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2959 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2960 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2961 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2962 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2963 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2966 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2967 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2968 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2969 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2970 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2977 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2978 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2979 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2980 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2982 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2986 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2987 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2988 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2989 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2990 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2991 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2992 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2996 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2997 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3001 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3002 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3003 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3004 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3005 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3006 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3007 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3010 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3011 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3012 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3016 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3020 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3021 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3022 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3024 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3025 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3026 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3027 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3031 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3032 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3033 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3034 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3035 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3038 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3039 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3042 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3043 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3044 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3045 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3046 next_per_commitment_point,
3047 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3050 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3051 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3052 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3054 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3056 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3059 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3065 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3066 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3067 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3068 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3069 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3071 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3072 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3073 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3074 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3075 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3076 next_per_commitment_point,
3080 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3081 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3082 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3084 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3088 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3089 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3090 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3092 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3093 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3094 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3095 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3096 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3098 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3099 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3103 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3105 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3106 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3107 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3109 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3112 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3113 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3114 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3117 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3123 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3124 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3126 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3127 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3128 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3132 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3133 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3134 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3136 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3137 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3139 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3140 let sig = self.holder_signer
3141 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3143 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3144 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3146 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3147 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3148 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3149 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3150 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3154 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3155 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3157 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3160 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3161 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3162 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3163 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3166 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3167 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3171 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3173 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3177 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3178 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3182 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3185 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3187 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3188 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3190 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3191 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3192 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3193 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3194 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3195 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3197 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3198 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3204 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3205 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3206 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3208 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3211 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3212 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3213 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3217 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3218 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3220 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3223 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3224 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3225 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3226 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3228 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3230 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3231 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3232 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3233 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3234 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3236 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3237 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3239 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3240 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3242 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3245 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3246 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3248 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3251 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3254 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3257 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3261 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3262 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3263 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3266 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3268 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3271 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3272 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3273 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3274 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3275 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3279 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3280 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3281 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3282 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3283 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3284 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3285 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3286 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3287 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3288 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3289 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3293 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3294 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3295 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3296 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3297 let sig = self.holder_signer
3298 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3299 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3300 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3301 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3302 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3303 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3304 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3310 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3311 if self.is_outbound() {
3312 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3313 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3314 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3315 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3319 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3322 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3324 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3325 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3326 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3330 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3333 let sig = self.holder_signer
3334 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3335 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3336 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3337 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3338 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3340 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3341 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3343 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3344 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3345 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3347 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3350 // Public utilities:
3352 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3356 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3360 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3361 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3362 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3366 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3367 /// is_usable() returns true).
3368 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3369 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3370 self.short_channel_id
3373 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3374 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3375 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3376 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3379 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3380 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3383 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3384 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3387 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3388 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3389 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3392 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3393 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3396 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3397 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3398 self.counterparty_node_id
3401 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3403 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3404 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3407 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3408 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3410 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3411 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3412 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3413 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3415 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3419 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3420 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3421 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3424 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3425 self.channel_value_satoshis
3428 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3429 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3432 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3433 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3437 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3441 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3442 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3445 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3446 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3449 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3450 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3454 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3459 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3461 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3462 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3463 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3464 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3465 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3466 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3468 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3470 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3478 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3479 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3483 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3484 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3485 self.update_time_counter
3488 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3489 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3492 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3493 self.config.announced_channel
3496 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3497 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3500 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3501 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3502 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3503 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3506 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3507 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3508 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3511 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3512 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3513 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3514 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3515 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3518 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3519 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3520 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3521 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3522 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3525 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3526 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3527 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3528 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3531 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3532 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3533 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3536 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3537 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3538 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3539 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3540 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3541 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3546 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3547 self.channel_update_status
3550 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3551 self.channel_update_status = status;
3554 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3555 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3559 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3560 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3561 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3564 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3568 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3569 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3570 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3572 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3573 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3574 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3576 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3577 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3579 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3580 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3582 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3586 if need_commitment_update {
3587 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3588 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3589 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3590 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3591 next_per_commitment_point,
3594 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3600 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3601 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3602 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3603 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3604 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3605 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3606 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3607 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3608 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3609 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3610 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3611 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3612 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3613 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3614 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3615 if self.is_outbound() {
3616 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3617 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3618 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3619 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3620 // channel and move on.
3621 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3622 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3624 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3625 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3626 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3627 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3630 if self.is_outbound() {
3631 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3632 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3633 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3634 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3635 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3636 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3640 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3641 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3642 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3643 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3644 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3648 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3649 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3650 // may have already happened for this block).
3651 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3652 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3653 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3656 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3657 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3658 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3659 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3660 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3661 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3670 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3671 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3672 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3673 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3675 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3676 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3679 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3681 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3682 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3683 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3684 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3685 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3687 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3688 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3689 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3697 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3699 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3700 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3701 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3704 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3705 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3706 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3707 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3708 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3709 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3710 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3711 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3712 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3715 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3716 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3717 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3718 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3719 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3720 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3721 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3722 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3727 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3730 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3731 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3732 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3733 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3734 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3735 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3736 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3737 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3738 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3739 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3740 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3741 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3742 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3743 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3744 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3745 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3751 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3756 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3757 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3759 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3760 if !self.is_outbound() {
3761 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3763 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3764 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3767 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3768 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3771 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3772 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3776 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3777 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3778 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3779 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3780 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3781 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3782 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3783 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3784 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3785 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3786 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3787 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3788 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3789 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3790 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3791 first_per_commitment_point,
3792 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3793 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3797 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3798 if self.is_outbound() {
3799 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3801 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3802 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3804 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3805 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3808 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3809 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3811 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3812 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3813 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3814 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3815 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3816 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3817 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
3818 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3819 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3820 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3821 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3822 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3823 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3824 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3825 first_per_commitment_point,
3826 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3830 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3831 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3832 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3833 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3834 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3835 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3838 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3839 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3840 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3841 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3842 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3843 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3844 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3845 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3846 if !self.is_outbound() {
3847 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3849 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3850 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3852 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3853 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3854 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3855 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3858 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3859 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3861 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3864 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3865 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3870 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3872 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3874 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3875 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3876 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3878 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3879 temporary_channel_id,
3880 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3881 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3886 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3887 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3888 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3889 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3890 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3892 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3893 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3895 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
3896 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3897 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3898 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3901 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3903 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3904 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3907 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3909 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3910 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3912 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3913 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3914 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3915 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3916 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3917 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3920 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3926 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
3928 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3929 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
3930 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3932 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
3933 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3934 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
3935 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
3936 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
3937 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3938 contents: announcement,
3941 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
3945 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
3946 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
3947 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
3948 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3949 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
3951 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3953 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
3954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3955 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
3956 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
3958 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
3959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3960 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
3961 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
3964 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
3966 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
3969 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
3970 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
3971 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
3972 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
3974 Err(_) => return None,
3976 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3977 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
3978 Ok(res) => Some(res),
3983 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3984 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3985 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3986 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3987 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3988 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3989 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3990 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3991 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3992 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3993 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3994 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3995 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3996 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3997 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3998 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3999 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4000 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4001 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4004 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4005 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4006 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4007 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4010 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4011 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4012 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4013 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4014 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4015 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4016 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4017 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4019 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4020 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4021 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4022 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4023 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4024 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4025 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4026 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4027 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4029 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4035 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4037 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4038 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4040 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4042 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4043 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4045 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4046 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4049 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4051 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4052 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4053 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4054 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4056 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4057 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4061 if amount_msat == 0 {
4062 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4065 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4066 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4069 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4070 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4071 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4072 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4073 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4074 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4075 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4079 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4080 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4083 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4084 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4085 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4088 if !self.is_outbound() {
4089 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4090 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4091 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
4092 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4093 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4094 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4095 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4099 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4100 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4101 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4104 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4105 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4106 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4107 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4109 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4113 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4114 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4115 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4116 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4117 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4120 // Now update local state:
4121 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4122 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4127 onion_routing_packet,
4132 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4133 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4135 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4137 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4141 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4142 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4143 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4147 onion_routing_packet,
4149 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4154 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4155 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4156 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4157 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4158 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4159 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4160 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4162 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4163 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4165 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4166 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4168 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4169 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4171 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4172 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4173 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4174 have_updates = true;
4176 if have_updates { break; }
4178 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4179 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4180 have_updates = true;
4182 if have_updates { break; }
4185 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4187 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4189 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4190 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4191 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4192 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4194 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4195 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4196 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4198 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4202 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4203 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4204 Some(fail_reason.take())
4206 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4209 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4211 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4212 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4213 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4214 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4215 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4216 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4218 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4221 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4222 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4223 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4224 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4225 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4226 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4227 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4228 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4231 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4232 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4235 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4236 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4237 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4238 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4239 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4240 if self.is_outbound() {
4241 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4245 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4246 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4247 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4248 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4250 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4252 if !self.is_outbound() {
4253 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4254 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4255 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4256 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4257 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4258 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4259 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4260 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4261 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4262 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4269 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4270 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4274 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4275 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4277 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4279 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4280 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4281 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4282 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4284 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4285 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4286 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4287 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4288 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4289 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4293 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4294 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4297 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4300 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4301 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4302 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4304 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4305 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4306 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4307 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4308 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4314 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4315 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4316 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4319 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4320 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4323 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4324 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4325 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4326 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4332 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4333 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4334 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4335 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4336 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4337 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4340 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4341 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4342 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4344 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4345 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4348 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4349 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4350 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4353 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4355 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4356 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4357 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4359 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4361 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4363 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4364 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4365 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4366 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4367 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4370 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4377 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4378 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4379 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4380 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4383 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4384 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4385 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4386 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4387 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4388 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4389 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4390 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4391 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4392 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4393 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4395 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4396 // return them to fail the payment.
4397 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4398 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4400 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4401 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4406 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4407 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4408 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4409 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4410 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4411 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4412 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4413 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4414 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4415 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4416 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4417 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4418 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4423 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4424 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4425 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4429 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4430 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4432 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4433 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4434 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4435 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4436 if is_script_too_long {
4440 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4444 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4447 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4448 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4456 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4457 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4458 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4459 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4460 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4462 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4463 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4464 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4465 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4471 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4472 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4473 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4474 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4475 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4476 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4481 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4482 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4483 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4486 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4488 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4490 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4491 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4492 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4493 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4494 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4495 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4497 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4498 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4499 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4501 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4503 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4504 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4505 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4506 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4507 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4508 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4510 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4511 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4513 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4514 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4515 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4517 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4518 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4519 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4520 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4523 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4524 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4525 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4528 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4529 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4530 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4531 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4533 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4534 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4536 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4538 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4540 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4542 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4545 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4547 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4552 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4553 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4554 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4555 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4556 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4557 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4558 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4560 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4562 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4564 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4567 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4568 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4569 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4572 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4574 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4576 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4578 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4583 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4584 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4586 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4588 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4589 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4590 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4591 source.write(writer)?;
4592 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4594 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4596 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4597 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4599 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4601 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4602 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4607 match self.resend_order {
4608 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4609 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4612 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4613 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4614 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4616 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4617 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4618 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4619 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4622 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4623 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4624 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4625 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4626 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4629 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4630 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4632 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4633 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4634 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4635 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4637 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4638 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4640 feerate.write(writer)?;
4644 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4647 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4648 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4649 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4651 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4652 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4653 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4655 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4656 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4658 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4659 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4660 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4662 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4663 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4665 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4668 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4669 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4670 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4672 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4675 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4676 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4678 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4679 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4680 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4682 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4684 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4686 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4688 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4689 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4690 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4691 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4692 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4693 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4694 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4696 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4697 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4698 (5, self.config, required),
4705 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4706 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4707 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4708 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4709 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4711 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4713 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
4715 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
4716 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
4717 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
4718 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
4719 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4721 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
4722 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4725 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4726 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4727 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4729 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4731 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4732 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4733 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4734 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4735 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4736 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4737 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4738 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4740 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4742 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4743 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4745 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4746 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4747 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4749 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4750 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4751 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4752 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4753 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4754 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4755 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4756 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4757 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4758 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4759 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4760 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4761 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4762 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4767 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4768 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4769 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4770 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4771 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4772 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4773 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4774 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4775 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4776 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4777 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4778 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4779 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4780 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4781 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4782 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4787 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4788 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4789 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4790 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4791 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4792 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4793 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4794 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4795 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4796 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4798 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4799 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4800 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4802 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4803 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4804 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4806 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4810 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4811 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4812 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4813 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4816 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4817 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4818 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4820 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4821 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4822 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4823 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4826 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4827 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4828 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4829 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4832 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4833 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4835 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4836 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4837 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4838 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4840 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4842 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4843 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4846 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4847 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4848 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4850 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4851 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4852 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4853 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
4855 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
4856 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
4858 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
4859 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4861 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4862 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4863 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4865 let mut minimum_depth = None;
4867 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
4868 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
4870 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
4871 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4874 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4876 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4877 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4878 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4879 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4881 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4884 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4885 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4887 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4889 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4890 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4892 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4893 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4895 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4897 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
4898 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4899 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
4900 (1, minimum_depth, option),
4901 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4902 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
4905 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4906 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4911 config: config.unwrap(),
4915 channel_value_satoshis,
4917 latest_monitor_update_id,
4923 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4924 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4927 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4928 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4929 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4933 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4934 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4935 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4936 monitor_pending_forwards,
4937 monitor_pending_failures,
4940 holding_cell_update_fee,
4941 next_holder_htlc_id,
4942 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4943 update_time_counter,
4946 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4947 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4948 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4949 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4951 last_sent_closing_fee,
4953 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4954 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4957 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4958 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4959 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4960 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4961 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4962 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4963 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4966 counterparty_forwarding_info,
4968 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4969 funding_transaction,
4971 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4972 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4973 counterparty_node_id,
4975 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4979 channel_update_status,
4983 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4984 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4985 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4986 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4988 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
4995 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4996 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4997 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4998 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4999 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5000 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5001 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5002 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5004 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5005 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5006 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5007 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5008 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5009 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5011 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5012 use chain::BestBlock;
5013 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5014 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5015 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5016 use util::config::UserConfig;
5017 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5018 use util::test_utils;
5019 use util::logger::Logger;
5020 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5021 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5022 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5023 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5024 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5025 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5026 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5030 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5033 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5034 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5040 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5041 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5042 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5046 signer: InMemorySigner,
5048 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5049 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5051 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5052 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5053 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5054 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5055 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5056 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5059 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
5060 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5061 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5062 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
5065 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5068 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5069 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5070 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5073 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5074 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5077 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5078 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5080 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5081 let original_fee = 253;
5082 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5083 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5084 let seed = [42; 32];
5085 let network = Network::Testnet;
5086 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5088 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5089 let config = UserConfig::default();
5090 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5092 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5093 // same as the old fee.
5094 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5095 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5096 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5100 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5101 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5102 // dust limits are used.
5103 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5104 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5105 let seed = [42; 32];
5106 let network = Network::Testnet;
5107 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5109 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5110 // they have different dust limits.
5112 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5113 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5114 let config = UserConfig::default();
5115 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5117 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5118 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5119 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5120 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5121 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5123 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5124 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5125 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5126 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5127 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5129 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5130 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5131 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5133 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5134 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5135 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5136 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5139 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5141 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5142 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5143 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5144 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5145 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5147 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5148 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5152 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5153 // the dust limit check.
5154 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5155 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5156 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5157 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5159 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5160 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5161 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5162 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5163 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5164 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5165 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5169 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5170 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5171 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5172 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5173 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5174 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5175 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5176 let seed = [42; 32];
5177 let network = Network::Testnet;
5178 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5180 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5181 let config = UserConfig::default();
5182 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5184 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5185 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5187 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5188 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5189 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5190 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5191 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5192 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5194 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5195 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5196 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5197 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5198 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5200 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5202 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5203 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5204 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5205 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5206 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5208 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5209 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5210 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5211 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5212 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5216 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5217 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5218 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5219 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5220 let seed = [42; 32];
5221 let network = Network::Testnet;
5222 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5223 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5226 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5228 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5229 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5230 let config = UserConfig::default();
5231 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5233 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5234 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5235 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5236 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5238 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5239 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5240 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5242 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5243 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5244 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5245 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5247 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5248 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5249 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5251 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5252 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5254 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5255 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5256 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5257 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5258 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5259 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5260 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5261 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5262 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5267 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5269 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5270 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5271 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5272 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5273 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5274 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5275 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5282 fn channel_update() {
5283 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5285 let seed = [42; 32];
5286 let network = Network::Testnet;
5287 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5288 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5290 // Create a channel.
5291 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5292 let config = UserConfig::default();
5293 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5294 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5295 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5296 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5298 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5299 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5300 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5302 short_channel_id: 0,
5305 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5306 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5307 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5309 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5310 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5312 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5314 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5316 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5317 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5318 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5319 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5321 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5322 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5323 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5325 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5330 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5331 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5332 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5333 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5334 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5336 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5338 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5339 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5340 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5341 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5342 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5344 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5345 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5350 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5351 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5352 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5354 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5355 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5356 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5357 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5358 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5359 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5361 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5363 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5364 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5365 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5366 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5367 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5368 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5370 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5371 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5372 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5373 selected_contest_delay: 144
5375 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5376 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5378 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5379 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5381 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5382 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5384 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5385 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5387 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5388 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5389 // build_commitment_transaction.
5390 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5391 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5392 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5393 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5394 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5396 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5397 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5398 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5400 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5401 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5403 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5404 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5408 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5409 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5410 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5411 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5412 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5413 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5415 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5416 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5417 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5418 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5420 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5421 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5422 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5424 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5426 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5427 commitment_tx.clone(),
5428 counterparty_signature,
5429 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5430 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5431 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5433 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5434 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5436 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5437 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5438 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5440 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5441 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5444 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5446 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5447 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5448 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5449 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5450 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5451 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5452 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5454 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5457 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5458 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5459 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5463 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5466 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5467 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5469 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5470 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5471 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5472 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5473 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5474 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5475 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5477 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5481 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5482 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5484 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5485 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5486 "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", {});
5488 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5489 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5491 amount_msat: 1000000,
5493 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5494 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5496 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5499 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5500 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5502 amount_msat: 2000000,
5504 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5505 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5507 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5510 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5511 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5513 amount_msat: 2000000,
5515 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5516 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5517 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5519 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5522 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5523 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5525 amount_msat: 3000000,
5527 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5528 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5529 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5531 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5534 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5535 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5537 amount_msat: 4000000,
5539 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5540 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5542 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5546 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5547 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5548 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5550 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5551 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5552 "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", {
5555 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5556 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5557 "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" },
5560 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5561 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5562 "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" },
5565 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5566 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5567 "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" },
5570 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5571 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5572 "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" },
5575 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5576 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5577 "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" }
5580 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5581 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5582 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5584 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5585 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5586 "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", {
5589 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5590 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5591 "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" },
5594 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5595 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5596 "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" },
5599 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5600 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5601 "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" },
5604 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5605 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5606 "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" },
5609 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5610 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5611 "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" }
5614 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5615 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5616 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5618 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5619 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5620 "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", {
5623 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5624 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5625 "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" },
5628 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5629 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5630 "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" },
5633 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5634 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5635 "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" },
5638 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5639 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5640 "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" }
5643 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5644 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5645 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5647 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5648 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5649 "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", {
5652 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5653 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5654 "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" },
5657 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5658 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5659 "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" },
5662 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5663 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5664 "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" },
5667 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5668 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5669 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5672 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5673 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5674 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5676 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5677 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5678 "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", {
5681 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5682 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5683 "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" },
5686 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5687 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5688 "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" },
5691 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5692 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5693 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5696 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5697 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5698 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5700 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5701 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5702 "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", {
5705 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5706 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5707 "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" },
5710 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5711 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5712 "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" },
5715 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5716 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5717 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5720 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5721 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5722 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5724 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5725 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5726 "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", {
5729 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5730 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5731 "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" },
5734 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5735 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5736 "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" }
5739 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5743 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5744 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5745 "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", {
5748 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5749 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5750 "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" },
5753 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5754 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5755 "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" }
5758 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5759 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5760 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5762 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5763 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5764 "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", {
5767 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5768 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5769 "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" }
5772 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5773 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5774 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5776 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5777 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5778 "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", {
5781 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5782 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5783 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5786 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5787 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5788 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5790 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5791 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5792 "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", {});
5794 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5795 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5796 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5798 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5799 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5800 "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", {});
5802 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5803 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5804 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5806 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5807 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5808 "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", {});
5810 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5811 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5812 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5814 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5815 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5816 "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", {});
5818 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5819 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5820 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5821 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5822 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5823 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5825 amount_msat: 2000000,
5827 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5828 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5830 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5833 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5834 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5835 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5837 amount_msat: 5000000,
5839 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5840 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5841 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5843 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5846 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5847 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5849 amount_msat: 5000000,
5851 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5852 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5853 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5855 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5859 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5860 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5861 "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", {
5864 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5865 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5866 "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" },
5868 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5869 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5870 "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" },
5872 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5873 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5874 "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" }
5879 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5880 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5882 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5883 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5884 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5885 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5887 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5888 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5889 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5891 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5892 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5894 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5895 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5897 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5898 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5899 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5903 fn test_key_derivation() {
5904 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5907 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5908 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5910 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5911 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5913 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5914 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5916 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5917 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5919 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5920 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5922 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5923 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5925 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5926 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());