1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
713 Close((String, ClosureReason)),
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close((err.clone(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err }))
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
943 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
944 /// commitment points from our signer.
945 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
946 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
947 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
948 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
949 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
950 /// will not be used.
951 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
952 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
953 /// and we are not pending a new one.
954 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
957 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
958 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
959 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
961 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
962 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
963 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
964 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
968 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
969 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
972 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
974 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
975 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
979 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
981 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
982 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
986 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
988 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
989 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
993 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
994 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
996 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
997 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
998 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1003 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1004 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1005 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1006 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1011 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1012 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1013 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1014 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1015 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1016 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1017 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1018 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1019 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1020 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1021 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1022 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1023 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1024 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1025 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1027 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1028 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1029 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1030 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1032 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1033 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1034 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1035 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1037 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1038 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1039 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1040 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1041 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1043 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1044 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1045 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1046 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1048 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1049 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1050 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1052 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1053 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1054 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1055 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1056 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1058 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1059 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1062 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1063 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1065 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1066 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1067 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1068 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1070 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1071 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1073 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1074 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1077 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1078 (0, update, required),
1081 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1082 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1083 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1084 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1085 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1086 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1087 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1088 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1089 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1090 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1093 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1095 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1097 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1099 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1100 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1102 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1104 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1105 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1109 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1111 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1112 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1114 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1115 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1116 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1122 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1123 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1124 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1125 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1126 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1128 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1129 /// in a timely manner.
1130 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1133 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1134 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1135 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1137 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1138 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1139 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1140 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1144 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1145 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1146 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1148 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1149 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1150 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1151 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1153 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1157 /// The current channel ID.
1158 channel_id: ChannelId,
1159 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1160 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1161 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1162 channel_state: ChannelState,
1164 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1165 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1167 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1168 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1169 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1173 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1174 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1176 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1177 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1179 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1181 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1182 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1183 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1185 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1186 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1187 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1189 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1190 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1191 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1192 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1193 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1194 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1196 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1197 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1198 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1199 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1200 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1201 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1203 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1205 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1206 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1207 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1209 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1210 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1211 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1212 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1213 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1214 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1215 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1216 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1218 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1219 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1220 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1222 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1223 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1224 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1225 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1226 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1227 /// outbound or inbound.
1228 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1230 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1232 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1233 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1234 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1235 // HTLCs with similar state.
1236 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1237 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1238 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1239 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1240 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1241 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1242 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1243 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1244 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1245 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1247 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1248 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1249 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1251 update_time_counter: u32,
1253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1254 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1255 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1256 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1257 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1258 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1260 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1261 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1263 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1264 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1265 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1266 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1268 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1269 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1271 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1273 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1275 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1276 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1277 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1278 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1279 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1281 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1282 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1284 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1285 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1286 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1288 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1289 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1290 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1291 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1292 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1293 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1294 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1295 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1297 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1300 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1302 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1305 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1307 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1310 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1312 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1314 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1315 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1318 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1320 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1322 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1323 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1325 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1327 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1328 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1329 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1331 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1333 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1334 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1335 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1337 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1338 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1339 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1341 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1343 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1345 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1346 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1347 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1348 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1350 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1351 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1352 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1354 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1355 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1356 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1358 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1359 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1360 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1361 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1363 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1365 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1367 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1368 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1369 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1370 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1371 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1373 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1374 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1376 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1377 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1378 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1379 /// unblock the state machine.
1381 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1382 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1383 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1385 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1386 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1387 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1390 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1391 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1392 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1393 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1394 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1395 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1396 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1398 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1399 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1401 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1402 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1403 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1405 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1406 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1407 // associated channel mapping.
1409 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1410 // to store all of them.
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1413 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1414 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1415 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1416 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1417 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1419 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1420 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1422 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1423 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1425 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1426 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1428 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1429 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1431 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1433 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1435 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1436 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1437 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1440 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1441 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1442 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1443 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1444 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1445 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1446 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1448 config: &'a UserConfig,
1449 current_chain_height: u32,
1452 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1453 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1454 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1455 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1456 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1458 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1459 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1461 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1464 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1466 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1467 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1469 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1471 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1472 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1473 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1475 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1476 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1479 // Check sanity of message fields:
1480 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1481 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
1482 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1483 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1484 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1486 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1487 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1489 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1492 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1493 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1494 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1496 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1497 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1499 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1500 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1502 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1504 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1505 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1506 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1508 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1509 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1511 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1512 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1515 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1516 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1517 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1519 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1520 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1522 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1523 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1525 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1526 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1528 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1529 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1531 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1532 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1534 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1535 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1538 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1540 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1541 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1546 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1547 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1548 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1549 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1551 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1554 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1555 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1556 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1558 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1562 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1563 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1564 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1565 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1569 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1570 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1571 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1575 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1576 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1577 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1578 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1579 return Err(ChannelError::close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1582 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1583 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1584 &Some(ref script) => {
1585 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1586 if script.len() == 0 {
1589 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1592 Some(script.clone())
1595 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1597 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1602 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1603 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1604 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1605 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1609 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1610 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1615 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1616 Ok(script) => script,
1617 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1623 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1626 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1629 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1631 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1632 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1634 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1636 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1639 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1640 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1642 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1647 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1649 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1650 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1651 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1652 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1657 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1660 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1663 holder_commitment_point,
1664 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1667 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1668 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1669 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1670 pending_update_fee: None,
1671 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1672 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1673 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1674 update_time_counter: 1,
1676 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1678 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1679 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1680 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1681 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1682 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1683 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1684 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1686 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1687 signer_pending_funding: false,
1690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1696 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1697 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1698 closing_fee_limits: None,
1699 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1701 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1702 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1703 short_channel_id: None,
1704 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1706 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1707 channel_value_satoshis,
1708 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1709 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1710 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1711 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1712 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1713 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1714 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1715 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1716 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1717 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1720 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1722 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1723 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1724 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1725 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1726 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1727 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1728 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1730 funding_outpoint: None,
1731 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1733 funding_transaction: None,
1734 is_batch_funding: None,
1736 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1737 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1738 counterparty_node_id,
1740 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1742 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1744 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1745 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1747 announcement_sigs: None,
1749 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1750 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1752 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1754 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1755 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1757 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1758 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1760 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1761 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1764 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1769 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1771 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1777 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1778 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1779 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1780 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1781 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1782 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1783 funding_satoshis: u64,
1786 config: &'a UserConfig,
1787 current_chain_height: u32,
1788 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1789 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1790 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1791 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1792 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1793 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1794 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1796 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1797 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1798 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1800 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1801 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1803 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1805 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1808 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1811 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1812 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1815 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1819 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1820 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1822 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1823 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1825 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1827 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1829 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1830 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1831 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1835 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1836 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1838 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1839 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1840 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1841 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1845 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1846 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1847 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1851 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1852 Ok(script) => script,
1853 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1856 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1858 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1859 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1864 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1865 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1866 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1867 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1872 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1874 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1875 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1876 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1877 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1879 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1880 channel_value_satoshis,
1882 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1885 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1888 holder_commitment_point,
1889 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1892 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1893 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1894 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1895 pending_update_fee: None,
1896 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1897 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1898 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1899 update_time_counter: 1,
1901 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1903 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1904 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1905 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1906 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1907 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1908 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1909 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1911 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1912 signer_pending_funding: false,
1914 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1915 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1916 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1917 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1918 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1919 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1921 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1922 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1923 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1924 closing_fee_limits: None,
1925 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1927 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1928 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1929 short_channel_id: None,
1930 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1932 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1933 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1934 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1935 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1936 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1937 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1938 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1939 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1940 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1941 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1942 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1943 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1944 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1945 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1947 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1949 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1950 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1951 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1952 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1953 counterparty_parameters: None,
1954 funding_outpoint: None,
1955 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1957 funding_transaction: None,
1958 is_batch_funding: None,
1960 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1961 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1962 counterparty_node_id,
1964 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1966 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1968 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1969 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1971 announcement_sigs: None,
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1974 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1975 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1976 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1978 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1979 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1981 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1982 outbound_scid_alias,
1984 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1985 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1993 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1994 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1999 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2000 self.update_time_counter
2003 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2004 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2007 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2008 self.config.announced_channel
2011 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2012 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2015 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2017 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2018 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2021 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2022 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2023 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2026 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2027 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2028 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2029 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2030 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2031 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2032 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2035 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2036 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2037 match self.channel_state {
2038 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2039 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2040 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2041 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2042 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2043 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2044 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2046 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2048 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2049 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2053 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2054 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2055 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2056 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2057 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2058 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2061 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2062 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2063 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2067 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2068 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2069 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2070 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2071 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2074 // Public utilities:
2076 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2080 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2082 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2083 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2084 self.temporary_channel_id
2087 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2091 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2092 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2093 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2097 /// Gets the channel's type
2098 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2102 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2104 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2105 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2106 self.short_channel_id
2109 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2110 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2111 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2114 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2115 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2116 self.outbound_scid_alias
2119 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2121 pub fn get_mut_signer(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2122 return &mut self.holder_signer
2125 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2126 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2127 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2128 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2129 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2130 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2133 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2134 /// get_funding_created.
2135 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2136 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2139 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2140 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2141 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2142 if conf_height > 0 {
2149 /// Performs checks against necessary constraints after receiving either an `accept_channel` or
2150 /// `accept_channel2` message.
2151 pub fn do_accept_channel_checks(
2152 &mut self, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures,
2153 common_fields: &msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields, channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
2154 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2155 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2157 // Check sanity of message fields:
2158 if !self.is_outbound() {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2161 if !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2164 if common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2167 if channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2170 if common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2171 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2173 if channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2175 channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2177 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2178 if common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2181 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2182 if common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, common_fields.to_self_delay)));
2185 if common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2188 if common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2192 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2193 if common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2196 if common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2199 if channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2200 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2202 if common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2205 if common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2208 if common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2211 if common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, common_fields.minimum_depth)));
2215 if let Some(ty) = &common_fields.channel_type {
2216 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2219 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2220 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2222 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2223 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2226 self.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
2227 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
2230 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2231 match &common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2232 &Some(ref script) => {
2233 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2234 if script.len() == 0 {
2237 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2238 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2240 Some(script.clone())
2243 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2245 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2250 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
2251 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2252 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(channel_reserve_satoshis);
2253 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
2254 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
2256 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2257 self.minimum_depth = Some(common_fields.minimum_depth);
2259 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, common_fields.minimum_depth));
2262 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2263 funding_pubkey: common_fields.funding_pubkey,
2264 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
2265 payment_point: common_fields.payment_basepoint,
2266 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
2267 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
2270 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2271 selected_contest_delay: common_fields.to_self_delay,
2272 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2275 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
2276 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2278 self.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
2279 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
2281 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2286 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2287 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2288 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2291 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2292 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2293 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2294 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2298 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2301 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2302 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2305 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2306 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2309 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2310 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2311 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2314 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2315 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2318 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2319 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2320 self.counterparty_node_id
2323 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2324 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2325 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2328 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2329 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2330 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2333 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2334 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2336 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2337 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2338 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2339 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2341 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2345 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2346 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2347 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2351 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2352 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2355 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2356 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2357 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2359 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2360 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2365 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2366 self.channel_value_satoshis
2369 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2370 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2373 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2374 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2377 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2378 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2379 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2380 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2383 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2384 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2385 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2386 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2388 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2392 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2393 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2394 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2397 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2398 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2399 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2402 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2403 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2404 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2407 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2408 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2409 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2412 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2413 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2414 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2417 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2418 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2419 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2422 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2423 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2424 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2425 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2426 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2429 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2431 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2432 self.prev_config = None;
2436 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2437 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2441 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2442 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2443 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2444 let did_channel_update =
2445 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2446 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2447 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2448 if did_channel_update {
2449 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2450 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2451 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2452 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2454 self.config.options = *config;
2458 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2459 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2460 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2461 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2462 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2465 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2466 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2467 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2468 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2469 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2471 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2472 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2473 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2474 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2475 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2476 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2477 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2479 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2480 where L::Target: Logger
2482 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2483 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2484 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2486 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2487 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2488 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2489 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2491 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2492 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2493 if match update_state {
2494 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2495 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2496 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2497 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2498 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2500 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2504 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2505 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2506 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2508 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2510 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2511 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2512 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2514 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2515 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2516 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2517 transaction_output_index: None
2522 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2523 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2524 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2525 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2526 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2529 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2531 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2532 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2533 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2535 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2536 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2539 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2540 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2543 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2545 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2546 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2547 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2549 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2550 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2556 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2574 if generated_by_local {
2575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2576 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2577 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2587 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2589 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2590 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2591 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2592 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2593 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2594 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2595 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2598 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2599 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2600 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2601 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2605 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2606 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2610 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2611 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2615 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2616 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2618 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2619 if !generated_by_local {
2620 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2628 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2629 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2630 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2631 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2632 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2633 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2634 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2635 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2637 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2639 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2640 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2641 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2642 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2644 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2648 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2649 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2652 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2653 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2654 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2657 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2660 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2661 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2662 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2663 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2665 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2668 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2669 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2674 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2675 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2680 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2682 let channel_parameters =
2683 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2684 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2685 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2692 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2695 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2696 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2697 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2698 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2706 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2707 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2708 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2709 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2714 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2715 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2716 /// our counterparty!)
2717 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2718 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2719 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2720 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
2721 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2722 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2723 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2725 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2729 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2730 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2731 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2732 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2733 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2734 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2735 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2737 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2740 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2741 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2742 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2743 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2744 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2747 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2748 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2751 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2755 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2756 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2757 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2758 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2759 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2760 // which are near the dust limit.
2761 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2762 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2763 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2764 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2765 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2767 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2768 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2770 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2771 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw.saturating_add(2530), feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::MAX))
2774 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2775 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2776 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2779 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2780 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2782 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2784 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2785 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2788 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2789 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2792 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2793 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2795 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2796 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2798 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2801 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2802 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2803 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2804 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2805 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2806 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2808 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2810 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2811 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2816 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2817 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2818 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2819 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2821 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2822 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2823 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2824 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2825 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2826 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2828 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2830 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2835 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2836 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2837 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2838 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2839 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2840 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2841 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2843 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2845 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2846 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2848 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2854 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2855 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2856 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2857 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2858 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2859 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2860 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2861 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2862 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2863 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2864 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2865 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2866 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2867 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2868 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2869 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2870 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2875 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2876 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2877 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2878 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2879 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2880 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2881 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2882 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2886 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2887 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2888 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2889 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2890 match holding_cell_update {
2891 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2892 holding_cell_states.insert(
2894 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2897 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2898 holding_cell_states.insert(
2900 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2903 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2904 holding_cell_states.insert(
2906 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2910 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2913 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2914 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2917 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2918 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2920 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2921 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2922 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2923 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2924 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2925 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2926 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2927 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2928 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2929 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2936 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2937 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2938 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2939 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2942 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2943 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2945 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2946 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2947 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2948 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2949 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2950 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2951 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2952 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2953 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2954 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2957 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2958 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2964 } = *holding_cell_update {
2965 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2967 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2968 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2969 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2970 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2971 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2972 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2979 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2980 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2981 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2982 /// corner case properly.
2983 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2984 -> AvailableBalances
2985 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2987 let context = &self;
2988 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2991 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2992 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2994 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2995 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2996 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2997 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3000 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
3002 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
3003 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
3005 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
3007 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
3009 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3010 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3014 if context.is_outbound() {
3015 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
3016 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
3018 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
3019 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
3021 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
3022 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3023 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3024 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3027 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3028 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
3029 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3030 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
3031 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3032 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3033 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3036 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3037 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3038 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3039 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3040 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3041 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3042 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3043 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3044 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3045 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3046 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3048 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3051 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3052 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3053 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3054 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3055 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3058 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3059 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3061 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3062 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3063 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3065 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3066 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3067 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3068 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3072 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3074 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3075 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3076 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3077 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3078 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3079 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3080 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3082 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3083 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3085 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3086 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3087 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3090 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3091 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3092 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3093 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3094 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3095 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3096 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3097 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3098 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3099 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3103 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3104 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3105 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3106 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3107 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3108 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3111 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3112 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3113 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3114 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3115 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3118 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3119 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3120 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3122 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3126 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3127 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3129 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3130 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3134 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3135 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3136 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3137 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3139 outbound_capacity_msat,
3140 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3141 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3146 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3147 let context = &self;
3148 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3151 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3152 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3154 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3155 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3157 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3158 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3160 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3161 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3162 let context = &self;
3163 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3165 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3168 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3169 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3171 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3172 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3174 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3175 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3177 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3178 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3182 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3183 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3189 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3190 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3191 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3194 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3195 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3196 included_htlcs += 1;
3199 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3200 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3204 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3205 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3206 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3207 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3208 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3209 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3214 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3216 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3217 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3222 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3223 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3227 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3228 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3232 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3233 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3235 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3236 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3237 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3239 total_pending_htlcs,
3240 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3241 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3242 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3244 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3245 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3246 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3248 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3250 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3255 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3256 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3258 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3259 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3261 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3262 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3264 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3265 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3266 let context = &self;
3267 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3269 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3272 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3273 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3275 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3276 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3278 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3279 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3281 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3282 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3286 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3287 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3293 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3294 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3295 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3296 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3297 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3298 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3301 included_htlcs += 1;
3304 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3305 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3308 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3309 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3311 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3312 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3313 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3318 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3319 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3323 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3324 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3326 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3327 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3329 total_pending_htlcs,
3330 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3331 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3332 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3334 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3335 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3336 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3338 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3340 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3345 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3346 match self.channel_state {
3347 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3348 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3349 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3350 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3360 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3362 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3363 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3366 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3368 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3369 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3370 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3374 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3375 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3376 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3379 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3381 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3382 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3385 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3386 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3387 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3388 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3389 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3390 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3391 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3392 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3393 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3394 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3395 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3397 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3398 // return them to fail the payment.
3399 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3400 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3401 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3403 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3404 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3409 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3410 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3411 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3412 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3413 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3414 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3415 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3416 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3417 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3418 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3419 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3420 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3421 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3422 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3423 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3427 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3428 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3430 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3431 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3435 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3436 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3437 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3438 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3439 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3440 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3441 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3442 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3446 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3447 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3448 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3449 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3451 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3452 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3453 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3454 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3456 match &self.holder_signer {
3457 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3458 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3459 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3460 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3461 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3464 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3468 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3469 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3470 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3472 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3473 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3474 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3476 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3477 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3478 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3481 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3482 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3484 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3490 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3491 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3492 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3493 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3494 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3497 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3499 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3501 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3502 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3507 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3508 // We've exhausted our options
3511 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3512 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3515 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3516 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3517 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3518 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3520 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3521 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3522 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3523 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3524 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3525 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3527 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3529 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3534 // Internal utility functions for channels
3536 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3537 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3538 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3540 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3542 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3543 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3544 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3546 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3549 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3551 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3554 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3555 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3556 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3558 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3560 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3561 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3562 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3563 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3564 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3567 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3568 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3569 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3570 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3571 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3572 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3573 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3576 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3577 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3579 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3581 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3582 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3583 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3584 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3585 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3586 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3587 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3590 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3591 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3593 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3594 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3597 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3598 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3599 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3600 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3601 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3602 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3605 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3606 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3607 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3608 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3609 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3610 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3616 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3617 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3618 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3619 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3620 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3621 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3622 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3623 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3624 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3625 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3626 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3627 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3630 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3631 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3632 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3633 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3634 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3635 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3638 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3639 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3641 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3642 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3643 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3647 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3648 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3649 trait FailHTLCContents {
3650 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3651 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3652 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3653 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3655 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3656 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3657 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3658 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3660 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3661 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3663 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3664 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3667 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3668 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3669 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3670 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3673 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3674 failure_code: self.1
3677 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3678 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3680 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3681 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3683 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3684 failure_code: self.1
3689 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3690 fn name() -> &'static str;
3692 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3693 fn name() -> &'static str {
3697 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3698 fn name() -> &'static str {
3699 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3703 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3704 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3705 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3707 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3708 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3709 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3710 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3712 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3713 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3715 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3717 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3718 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3719 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3720 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3722 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3723 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3727 return Err(ChannelError::Close((format!(
3728 "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit
3729 ), ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
3730 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
3731 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: lower_limit,
3738 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3739 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3740 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3741 // outside of those situations will fail.
3742 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3746 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3751 1 + // script length (0)
3755 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3756 2 + // witness marker and flag
3757 1 + // witness element count
3758 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3759 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3760 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3761 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3762 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3763 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3765 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3766 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3767 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3773 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3774 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3775 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3776 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3778 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3779 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3780 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3782 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3783 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3784 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3785 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3786 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3787 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3790 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3791 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3794 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3795 value_to_holder = 0;
3798 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3799 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3800 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3801 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3803 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3804 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3807 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3808 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3811 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3814 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3815 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3817 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3819 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3820 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3821 where L::Target: Logger {
3822 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3823 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3824 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3825 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3826 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3827 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3828 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3829 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3833 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3834 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3835 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3836 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3838 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3839 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3842 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3843 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3844 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3846 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3847 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3848 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3849 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3850 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3851 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3852 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3854 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3855 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3856 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3858 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3859 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3861 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3864 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3865 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3869 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3873 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3875 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3876 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3877 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3881 // Now update local state:
3883 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3884 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3885 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3886 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3887 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3888 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3889 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3890 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3892 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3895 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3896 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3897 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3898 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3899 // do not not get into this branch.
3900 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3901 match pending_update {
3902 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3903 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3904 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3905 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3907 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3908 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3911 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3912 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3914 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3915 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3916 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3917 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3918 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3925 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3926 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3927 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3930 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3931 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3934 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3937 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3938 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3940 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3941 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3943 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3944 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3947 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3950 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3951 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3952 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3953 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3958 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3959 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3960 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3961 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3962 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3963 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3964 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3965 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3966 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3967 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3968 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3969 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3970 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3971 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3972 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3974 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3975 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3976 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3977 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3978 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3981 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3982 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3983 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3989 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3990 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3999 /// before we fail backwards.
4001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
4005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
4007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4010 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
4011 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
4013 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
4014 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
4015 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
4016 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4017 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
4018 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4021 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4022 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4023 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4024 /// before we fail backwards.
4026 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4027 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4028 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4029 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
4030 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4032 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4033 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4034 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
4037 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
4038 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
4039 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4041 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4042 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4043 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4045 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4046 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4047 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4049 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4054 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4055 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4061 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4062 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4063 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4064 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4065 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4069 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4070 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4071 force_holding_cell = true;
4074 // Now update local state:
4075 if force_holding_cell {
4076 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4077 match pending_update {
4078 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4079 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4080 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4081 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4085 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4086 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4088 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4089 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4090 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4096 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4097 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4101 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4102 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4104 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4105 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4108 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4111 // Message handlers:
4112 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4113 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4114 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4115 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4116 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4117 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4118 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4121 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4123 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4125 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4126 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4127 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4128 debug_assert!(matches!(
4129 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4131 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4132 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4135 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4136 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4138 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4139 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4140 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4141 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4143 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4146 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4147 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4151 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4152 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4153 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4154 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4155 // when routing outbound payments.
4156 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4160 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4161 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4162 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4163 match &self.context.channel_state {
4164 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4165 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4166 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4167 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4168 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4169 check_reconnection = true;
4170 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4171 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4172 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4173 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4174 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4176 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4177 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4180 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4181 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4182 _ => return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4184 if check_reconnection {
4185 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4186 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4187 let expected_point =
4188 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4189 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4191 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4192 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4193 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4194 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4195 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4196 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4198 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4199 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4200 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4201 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4202 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4204 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4210 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4211 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4213 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4215 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4218 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4219 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4220 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4221 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4222 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4223 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4225 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4226 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4229 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4230 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4232 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4235 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4236 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4238 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4242 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4243 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4244 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4245 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4247 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4251 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4252 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4253 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4254 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4255 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4256 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4257 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4258 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4259 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4260 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4261 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4263 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4264 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4265 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4266 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4267 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4268 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4272 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4273 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4274 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4275 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4276 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4280 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4281 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4283 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4284 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4285 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4287 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4288 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4292 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4295 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4300 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4301 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4305 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4306 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4307 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4308 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4309 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4313 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4314 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4316 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4320 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4321 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4322 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4326 // Now update local state:
4327 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4328 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4329 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4330 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4331 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4332 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4333 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4334 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4340 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4342 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4343 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4344 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4345 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4346 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4347 None => fail_reason.into(),
4348 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4349 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4350 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4353 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4357 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4358 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4359 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4360 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4363 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4368 Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4371 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4372 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4375 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4379 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4382 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4383 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4384 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4386 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4387 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4390 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4394 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4395 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4398 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4402 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4406 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4407 where L::Target: Logger
4409 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4412 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4415 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4419 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4421 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4423 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4424 let commitment_txid = {
4425 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4426 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4427 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4429 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4430 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4431 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4432 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4433 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4438 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4440 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4441 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4442 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4443 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4446 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4447 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4448 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4449 return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4452 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4454 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4455 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4456 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4457 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4458 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4459 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4460 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4461 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4462 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4463 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4464 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4470 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4471 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4474 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4475 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4476 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4477 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4478 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4479 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4480 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4481 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4482 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4483 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4484 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4485 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4486 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4489 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4490 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4491 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4492 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4493 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4494 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4495 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4497 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4498 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4499 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4500 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4501 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4502 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4503 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4504 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4506 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4507 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4510 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4512 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4513 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4514 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4517 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4520 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4521 commitment_stats.tx,
4523 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4524 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4525 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4528 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4529 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4531 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4532 let mut need_commitment = false;
4533 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4534 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4535 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4536 need_commitment = true;
4540 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4541 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4542 Some(resolution.clone())
4544 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4545 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4546 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4547 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4548 need_commitment = true;
4551 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4552 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4553 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4554 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4555 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4556 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4557 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4558 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4559 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4560 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4561 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4562 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4563 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4564 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4566 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4568 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4569 need_commitment = true;
4573 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4574 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4575 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4576 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4577 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4578 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4579 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4581 nondust_htlc_sources,
4583 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4586 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4587 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4588 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4589 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4590 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4592 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4593 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4594 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4595 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4596 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4597 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4598 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4599 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4600 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4601 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4602 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4603 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4604 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4605 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4607 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4608 &self.context.channel_id);
4609 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4612 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4613 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4614 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4615 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4616 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4617 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4618 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4619 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4620 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4624 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4625 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4626 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4627 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4630 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4631 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4632 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4633 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4634 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4635 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4636 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4638 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4639 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4640 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4643 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4644 /// for our counterparty.
4645 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4646 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4647 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4648 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4650 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4651 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4652 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4653 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4655 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4656 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4657 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4658 updates: Vec::new(),
4659 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4662 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4663 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4664 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4665 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4666 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4667 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4668 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4669 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4670 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4671 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4672 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4673 // to rebalance channels.
4674 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4675 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4676 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4677 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4679 match self.send_htlc(
4680 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4681 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4683 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4686 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4687 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4688 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4689 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4690 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4691 // into the holding cell without ever being
4692 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4693 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4694 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4697 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4704 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4705 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4706 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4707 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4708 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4709 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4710 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4711 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4712 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4713 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4714 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4715 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4718 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4719 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4720 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4722 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4723 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4724 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4727 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4729 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4730 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4731 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4732 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4733 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4734 // for a full revocation before failing.
4735 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4736 update_fail_count += 1;
4738 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4740 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4745 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4746 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4748 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4749 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4754 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4755 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4756 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4757 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4758 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4760 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4761 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4762 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4764 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4765 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4771 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4772 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4773 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4774 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4775 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4776 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4777 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4778 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4779 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4781 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4782 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4784 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4785 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4787 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4788 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4791 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4793 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4794 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4795 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4799 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4800 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4801 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4802 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4803 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4804 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4805 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4806 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4807 return Err(ChannelError::close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4812 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4813 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4816 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4817 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4818 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4819 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4821 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4823 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4828 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4829 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4830 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4831 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4832 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4833 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4834 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4835 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4836 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4838 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4841 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4842 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4843 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4844 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4845 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4846 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4847 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4848 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4849 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4851 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4852 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4855 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4856 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4857 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4858 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4859 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4860 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4861 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4862 let mut require_commitment = false;
4863 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4866 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4867 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4868 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4869 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4871 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4872 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4873 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4874 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4875 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4876 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4878 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4882 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4883 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4884 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4885 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4886 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4888 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4889 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4890 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4895 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4896 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4898 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4902 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4903 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4905 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4906 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4907 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4908 require_commitment = true;
4909 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4911 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4912 match pending_htlc_status {
4913 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4914 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4915 require_commitment = true;
4917 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4918 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4919 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4921 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4922 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4923 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4927 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4928 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4929 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4930 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4933 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4934 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4935 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4936 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4942 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4943 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4944 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4945 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4946 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4949 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4950 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4951 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4952 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4953 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4954 require_commitment = true;
4958 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4960 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4961 match update_state {
4962 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4963 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4964 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4965 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4966 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4967 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4969 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4970 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4971 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4972 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4973 require_commitment = true;
4974 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4975 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4980 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4981 let release_state_str =
4982 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4983 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4984 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4985 if !release_monitor {
4986 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4987 update: monitor_update,
4989 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4991 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4996 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4998 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4999 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
5000 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
5001 if require_commitment {
5002 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5003 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
5004 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
5005 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
5007 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5008 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5009 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5010 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5011 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5013 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
5014 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
5015 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5016 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
5017 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
5020 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
5021 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
5022 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
5023 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5024 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5025 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5027 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
5028 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5030 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5031 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5033 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
5034 if require_commitment {
5035 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5037 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5038 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5039 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5040 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5042 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5043 &self.context.channel_id(),
5044 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5047 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5048 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5050 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5051 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5053 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5054 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5060 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5061 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5062 /// commitment update.
5063 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5064 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5065 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5067 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5068 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5071 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5072 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5073 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5074 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5076 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5077 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5078 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5079 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5080 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5081 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5082 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5084 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5085 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5087 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5088 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5090 if !self.context.is_live() {
5091 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5094 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5095 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5096 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5097 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
5098 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
5099 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5100 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5101 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5102 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5103 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5107 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5108 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5109 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5110 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5113 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5114 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5118 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5119 force_holding_cell = true;
5122 if force_holding_cell {
5123 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5127 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5128 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5130 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5131 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5136 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5137 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5139 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5141 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5142 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5143 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5144 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5148 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5149 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5150 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5154 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5155 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5158 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5159 // will be retransmitted.
5160 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5161 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5162 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5164 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5165 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5167 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5168 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5169 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5170 // this HTLC accordingly
5171 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5174 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5175 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5176 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5177 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5180 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5181 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5182 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5183 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5184 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5185 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5190 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5192 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5193 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5194 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5195 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5199 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5200 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5201 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5202 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5203 // the update upon reconnection.
5204 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5208 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5210 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5211 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5215 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5216 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5217 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5218 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5219 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5220 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5221 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5223 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5224 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5225 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5226 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5227 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5228 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5229 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5231 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5232 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5233 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5234 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5235 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5236 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5237 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5240 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5241 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5242 /// to the remote side.
5243 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5244 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5245 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5246 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5249 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5251 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5252 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5254 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5255 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5256 // first received the funding_signed.
5257 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5258 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5259 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5260 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5262 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5264 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5265 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5266 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5267 funding_broadcastable = None;
5270 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5271 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5272 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5273 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5274 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5275 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5276 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5277 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5278 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5279 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5280 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5283 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5285 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5286 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5287 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5288 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5289 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5290 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5291 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5292 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5294 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5295 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5296 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5297 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5298 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5299 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5300 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5304 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5305 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5307 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5308 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5310 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5311 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5314 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5315 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5316 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5317 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5318 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5319 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5320 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5321 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5322 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5323 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5327 pub fn check_for_stale_feerate<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, min_feerate: u32) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> {
5328 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5329 // While its possible our fee is too low for an outbound channel because we've been
5330 // unable to increase the fee, we don't try to force-close directly here.
5333 if self.context.feerate_per_kw < min_feerate {
5335 "Closing channel as feerate of {} is below required {} (the minimum required rate over the past day)",
5336 self.context.feerate_per_kw, min_feerate
5338 Err(ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
5339 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
5340 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: min_feerate,
5347 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5348 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5350 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5351 return Err(ChannelError::close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5353 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5354 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5356 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5358 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5359 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5360 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5361 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5362 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5363 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5364 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5365 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5366 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5368 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5370 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5375 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5377 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5378 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5379 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5380 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5382 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5383 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5385 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5386 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5389 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5390 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5391 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5392 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5394 SignerResumeUpdates {
5401 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5402 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() <= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER + 2);
5403 // TODO: handle non-available case when get_per_commitment_point becomes async
5404 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
5405 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
5406 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5407 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5408 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5409 per_commitment_secret,
5410 next_per_commitment_point,
5412 next_local_nonce: None,
5416 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5417 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5418 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5419 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5420 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5421 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5423 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5424 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5425 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5426 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5427 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5428 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5429 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5430 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5431 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5432 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5433 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5438 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5439 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5441 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5442 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5443 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5444 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5445 reason: err_packet.clone()
5448 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5450 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5451 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5452 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5453 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5456 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5457 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5458 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5459 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5460 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5467 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5468 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5469 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5470 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5474 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5475 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5476 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5477 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5478 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5479 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5480 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5484 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5485 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5487 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5488 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5489 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5490 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5495 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5496 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5501 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5502 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5503 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5504 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5505 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5506 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5507 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5512 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5513 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5515 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5516 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5517 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5518 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5519 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5520 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5521 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5522 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5525 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5527 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5528 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5529 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5530 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5531 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5534 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5535 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5539 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5540 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5541 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5542 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5543 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5544 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5545 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5547 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5548 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5549 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5550 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5551 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5554 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5555 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5556 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5557 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5558 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5559 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5560 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5561 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5565 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5566 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5567 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5569 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5570 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5571 our_commitment_transaction
5575 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5576 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5577 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5578 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5580 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5582 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5584 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5585 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5586 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5587 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5588 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5589 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5591 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5592 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5593 channel_ready: None,
5594 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5595 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5596 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5600 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5601 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5602 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5603 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5604 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5605 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5609 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5610 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5611 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5613 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5614 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5615 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5618 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5621 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5622 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5623 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5624 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5625 our_commitment_transaction
5629 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5630 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5631 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5632 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5633 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5634 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5635 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5637 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5639 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5640 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5641 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5644 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5645 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5646 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5648 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5651 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5652 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5653 raa: required_revoke,
5654 commitment_update: None,
5655 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5657 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5658 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5659 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5661 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5664 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5665 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5666 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5667 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5668 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5669 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5672 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5673 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5674 raa: required_revoke,
5675 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5676 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5679 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5680 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5681 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5682 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5683 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5686 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5687 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5688 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5689 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5694 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5695 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5696 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5697 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5699 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5701 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5703 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5704 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5705 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5706 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5707 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5708 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5709 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5710 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5712 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5713 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5714 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5715 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5716 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5718 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5719 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5720 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5721 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5724 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5725 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5726 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5727 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5728 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5729 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5730 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5731 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5732 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5733 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5734 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5735 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5736 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5737 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5738 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5740 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5743 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5744 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5747 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5748 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5749 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5750 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5751 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5752 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5755 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5756 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5757 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5758 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5759 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5760 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5761 return Err(ChannelError::close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5763 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5769 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5770 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5771 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5772 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5774 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5775 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5776 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5777 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5778 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5779 return Ok((None, None, None));
5782 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5783 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5784 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5786 return Ok((None, None, None));
5789 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5790 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5791 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5792 return Ok((None, None, None));
5795 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5797 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5798 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5799 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5800 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5802 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5803 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5805 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5806 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5808 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5809 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5810 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5811 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5813 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5814 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5815 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5819 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5825 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5826 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5828 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5829 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5832 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5833 /// within our expected timeframe.
5835 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5836 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5837 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5840 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5843 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5844 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5848 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5849 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5851 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5852 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5854 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5855 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5856 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5857 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5858 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5860 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5861 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5865 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5867 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5868 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5871 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5872 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5876 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5879 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5880 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5881 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5882 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5884 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5887 assert!(send_shutdown);
5888 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5889 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5890 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5892 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5893 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5895 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5900 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5902 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5903 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5905 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5906 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5907 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5908 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5909 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5910 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5911 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5913 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5915 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5916 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5918 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5919 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5920 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5921 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5925 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5926 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5927 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5928 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5929 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5930 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5932 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5933 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5940 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5941 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5943 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5946 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5947 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5949 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5951 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5952 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5953 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5954 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5955 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5956 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5957 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5958 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5959 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5961 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5962 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5965 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5969 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5970 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5971 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5972 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5974 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5977 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5980 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5983 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5984 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5987 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5988 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5991 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5992 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5993 return Ok((None, None, None));
5996 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5997 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5998 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
6001 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6003 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6006 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
6007 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
6008 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
6009 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6010 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
6014 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
6015 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
6016 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
6020 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
6021 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6023 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6026 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
6027 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6028 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6029 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6031 monitor_update: None,
6032 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6033 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6034 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6035 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6036 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6037 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6038 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6039 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6041 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6042 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6043 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6044 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6048 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6050 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6051 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6052 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6053 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6055 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6058 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6059 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6061 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6062 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6063 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6064 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6066 monitor_update: None,
6067 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6068 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6069 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6070 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6071 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6072 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6073 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6074 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6076 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6077 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6078 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6079 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6084 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6085 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6086 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6087 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6089 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6090 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6091 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6093 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6095 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6102 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6103 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6106 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6109 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6113 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6114 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6115 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6116 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6117 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6119 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6121 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6123 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6124 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6127 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6128 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6129 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6130 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6131 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6132 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6133 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6134 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6136 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6139 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6140 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6141 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6142 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6144 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6148 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6149 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6150 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6151 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6153 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6159 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6160 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6161 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6162 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6163 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6164 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6165 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6167 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6168 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6171 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6173 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6174 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6180 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6181 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6182 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6183 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6184 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6185 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6186 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6188 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6189 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6196 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6197 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6198 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6200 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6203 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6204 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6207 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6208 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6209 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6210 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6213 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6214 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6215 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6217 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6218 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6219 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6220 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6221 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6222 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6223 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6226 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6227 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6228 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6229 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6230 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6231 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6232 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6233 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6237 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6238 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6239 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6240 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6241 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6242 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6243 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6247 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6248 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6253 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6254 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6255 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6256 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6257 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6258 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6262 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6263 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6264 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6265 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6267 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6268 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6269 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6270 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6271 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6272 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6273 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6274 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6275 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6277 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6278 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6279 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6286 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6287 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6290 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6291 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6294 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6295 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6299 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6300 &self.context.holder_signer
6304 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6306 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6307 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6308 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6309 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6310 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6311 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6313 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6315 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6323 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6324 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6328 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6329 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6330 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6331 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6334 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6335 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6336 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6337 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6340 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6341 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6342 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6343 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6344 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6345 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6348 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6349 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6350 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6351 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6352 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6353 if !release_monitor {
6354 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6363 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6364 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6365 /// here after logging them.
6366 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6367 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6368 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6369 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6372 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6373 update.update.update_id,
6383 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6384 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6387 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6388 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6389 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6391 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6392 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6394 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6395 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6397 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6398 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6399 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6402 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6403 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6404 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6405 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6406 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6407 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6409 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6410 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6411 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6413 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6414 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6415 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6416 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6417 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6418 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6424 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6425 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6426 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6427 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6430 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6431 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6432 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6435 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6436 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6437 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6440 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6441 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6442 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6445 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6446 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6447 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6448 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6449 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6452 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6453 self.context.channel_update_status
6456 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6457 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6458 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6461 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6462 where L::Target: Logger
6465 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6466 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6467 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6471 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6472 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6473 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6476 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6480 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6481 // channel_ready yet.
6482 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6483 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6484 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6488 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6489 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6490 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6491 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6493 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6494 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6495 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6497 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6498 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6501 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6502 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6504 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6505 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6506 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6507 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6508 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6509 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6510 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6511 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6513 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6517 if !need_commitment_update {
6518 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6522 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6523 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6524 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6528 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6529 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6533 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6534 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6536 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6539 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6540 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6541 msgs::ChannelReady {
6542 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6543 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6544 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6548 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6549 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6550 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6551 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6552 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6553 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6554 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6559 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6560 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6561 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6562 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6563 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6564 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6565 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6566 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6567 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6568 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6569 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6570 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6571 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6572 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6573 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6574 // channel and move on.
6575 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6576 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6578 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6579 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6580 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6582 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6583 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6584 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6585 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6586 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6587 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6588 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6589 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6594 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6595 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6596 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6597 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6598 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6601 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6602 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6603 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6604 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6605 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6606 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6609 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6610 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6611 // may have already happened for this block).
6612 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6613 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6614 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6615 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6618 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6619 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6620 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6621 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6629 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6630 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6631 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6632 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6634 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6635 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6638 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6640 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6641 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6642 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6643 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6645 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6648 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6651 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6652 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6653 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6654 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6656 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6659 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6660 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6661 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6663 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6664 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6666 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6667 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6668 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6676 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6678 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6679 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6680 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6682 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6683 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6686 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6687 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6688 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6689 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6690 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6691 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6692 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6693 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6696 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6697 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6698 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6699 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6701 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6702 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6703 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6705 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6706 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6707 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6708 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6710 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6711 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6712 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6713 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6714 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6715 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6716 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6719 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6720 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6722 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6725 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6726 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6727 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6728 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6729 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6730 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6731 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6732 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6733 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6734 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6735 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6736 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6737 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6738 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6739 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6740 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6741 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6747 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6752 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6753 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6755 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6756 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6757 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6758 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6760 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6763 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6765 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6766 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6767 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6768 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6769 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6770 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6772 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6773 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6776 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6777 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6778 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6779 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6780 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6781 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6783 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6784 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6787 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6788 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6789 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6790 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6791 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6797 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6798 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6799 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6800 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6802 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6805 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6809 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6813 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6814 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6818 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6822 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6823 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6826 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6830 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6832 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6837 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6838 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6839 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6841 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6846 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6848 None => return None,
6851 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6853 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6854 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6856 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6857 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6860 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6866 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6868 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6869 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6870 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6871 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6872 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6873 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6874 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6876 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6877 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6878 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6879 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6880 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6881 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6882 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6883 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6884 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6885 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6886 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6887 contents: announcement,
6890 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6895 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6899 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6900 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6901 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6902 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6903 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6904 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6905 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6906 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6908 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6910 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6911 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6912 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6913 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6915 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6916 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6917 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6918 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6921 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6922 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6923 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6924 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6927 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6930 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6931 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6932 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6933 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6934 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6935 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6938 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6940 Err(_) => return None,
6942 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6943 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6948 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6949 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6950 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6951 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6952 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6953 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6954 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6955 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6956 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6957 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6958 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6959 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6960 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6961 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6962 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6963 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6966 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6969 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6970 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6971 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6972 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6973 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6974 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6975 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6976 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6977 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6979 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6980 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6981 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
6982 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6983 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6984 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6985 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6986 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6987 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6989 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6990 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6991 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6992 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6993 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6994 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6995 next_funding_txid: None,
7000 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
7002 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
7003 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
7004 /// commitment update.
7006 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7007 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7008 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7009 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7010 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7011 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
7012 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7015 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
7016 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
7017 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
7019 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
7020 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
7025 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
7026 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
7028 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
7030 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
7031 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
7033 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
7034 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
7035 /// regenerate them.
7037 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
7038 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
7040 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7041 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7042 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7043 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
7044 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
7045 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7046 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
7047 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7049 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
7050 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
7051 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
7053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
7055 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7056 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
7057 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
7060 if amount_msat == 0 {
7061 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
7064 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7065 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7066 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7067 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7070 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7071 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7072 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7075 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7076 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7077 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7078 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7079 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7080 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7081 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7082 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7085 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7086 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7087 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7088 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7089 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7090 else { "to peer" });
7092 if need_holding_cell {
7093 force_holding_cell = true;
7096 // Now update local state:
7097 if force_holding_cell {
7098 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7103 onion_routing_packet,
7110 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7111 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7113 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7115 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7121 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7122 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7123 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7127 onion_routing_packet,
7131 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7136 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7137 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7138 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7139 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7141 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7142 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7143 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7145 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7146 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7150 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7151 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7152 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7153 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7154 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7155 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7156 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7159 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7160 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7161 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7162 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7163 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7164 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7167 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7169 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7170 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7171 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7172 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7173 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7175 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7176 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7179 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7180 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7181 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7182 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7183 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7184 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7185 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7186 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7187 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7188 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7189 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7190 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7192 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7194 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7198 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7199 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7200 where L::Target: Logger
7202 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7203 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7204 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7206 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7208 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7209 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7210 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7211 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7212 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7213 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7214 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7215 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7216 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7217 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7218 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7224 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7227 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7228 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7229 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7230 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7231 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7232 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7234 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7235 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7236 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7238 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7239 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7240 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7243 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7244 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7248 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7249 &commitment_stats.tx,
7250 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7251 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7252 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7253 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7255 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7257 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7258 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7259 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7260 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7262 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7263 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7264 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7265 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7266 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7267 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7271 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7272 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7276 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7277 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7279 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7285 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7286 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7288 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7289 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7290 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7291 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7292 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7293 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7294 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7295 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7297 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7298 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7299 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7302 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7303 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7304 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7310 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7312 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7313 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7314 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7315 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7316 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7318 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7320 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7326 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7327 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7328 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7329 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7330 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7332 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7333 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7334 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7337 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7338 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7340 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7343 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7344 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7346 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7347 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7348 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7351 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7354 // use override shutdown script if provided
7355 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7356 Some(script) => script,
7358 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7361 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7365 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7366 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7368 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7373 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7374 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7375 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7376 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7377 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7379 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7380 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7381 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7382 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7383 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7384 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7385 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7387 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7389 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7390 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7392 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7393 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7394 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7397 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7398 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7399 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7400 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7401 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7403 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7404 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7411 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7412 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7414 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7417 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7418 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7419 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7421 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7422 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7426 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7430 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7431 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7432 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7433 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7436 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7437 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7438 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7439 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7440 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7441 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7442 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7443 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7445 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7446 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7447 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7448 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7449 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7450 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7453 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7454 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7455 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7458 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7462 counterparty_node_id,
7464 channel_value_satoshis,
7468 current_chain_height,
7469 outbound_scid_alias,
7470 temporary_channel_id,
7471 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7476 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7481 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7482 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7483 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7484 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7485 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7486 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7487 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7488 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7489 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7491 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7496 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7497 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7498 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7501 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7502 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7503 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7504 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7507 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7509 next_local_nonce: None,
7513 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7514 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7515 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7516 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7517 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7518 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7519 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7520 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7521 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7522 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7523 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7526 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7527 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7529 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7531 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7532 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7533 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7534 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7537 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7538 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7540 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7542 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7543 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7545 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7546 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7547 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7548 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7549 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7550 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7553 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7554 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7556 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7557 if funding_created.is_none() {
7558 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7559 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7561 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7562 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7563 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7564 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7572 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7573 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7574 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7575 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7576 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7577 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7579 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7581 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7582 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7585 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7586 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7587 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7588 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7591 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7592 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7593 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7595 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7596 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7599 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7600 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7603 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7604 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7605 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7608 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7610 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7611 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7612 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7613 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7614 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7615 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7616 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7617 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7618 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7619 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7620 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7621 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7622 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7623 first_per_commitment_point,
7624 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7625 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7626 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7627 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7629 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7631 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7632 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7637 pub fn accept_channel(
7638 &mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits,
7639 their_features: &InitFeatures
7640 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7641 self.context.do_accept_channel_checks(default_limits, their_features, &msg.common_fields, msg.channel_reserve_satoshis)
7644 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7645 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7646 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7647 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7648 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7652 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7653 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7655 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7656 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7658 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7659 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7660 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7661 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7664 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7666 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7667 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7668 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7669 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7671 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7672 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7674 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7675 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7677 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7678 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7679 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7680 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7681 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7682 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7686 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7687 initial_commitment_tx,
7690 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7691 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7695 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7696 if validated.is_err() {
7697 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7700 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7701 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7702 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7703 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7704 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7705 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7706 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7707 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7708 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7709 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7710 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7711 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7713 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7714 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7715 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7716 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7717 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7718 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7719 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7720 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7722 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7723 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7724 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7726 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7728 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7729 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7731 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7733 let mut channel = Channel {
7734 context: self.context,
7735 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7736 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7739 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7740 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7741 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7744 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7746 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7747 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7748 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7749 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7750 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7755 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7756 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7757 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7758 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7761 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7762 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7763 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7764 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7765 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7766 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7767 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7768 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7769 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7772 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7773 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7774 // `static_remote_key`.
7775 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7776 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7778 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7779 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7780 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7782 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7783 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7784 return Err(ChannelError::close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7786 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7788 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7789 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7790 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7796 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7797 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7798 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7799 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7800 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7801 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7802 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7803 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7804 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7805 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7809 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7811 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7812 // support this channel type.
7813 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7815 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7816 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7817 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7818 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7819 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7820 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7821 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7825 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7829 counterparty_node_id,
7833 current_chain_height,
7838 counterparty_pubkeys,
7840 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7841 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7843 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7845 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7850 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7851 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7853 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7854 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7855 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7856 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7859 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7860 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7862 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7864 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7865 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7868 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7871 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7872 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7873 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7875 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7876 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7877 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7878 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7879 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7881 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7882 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7883 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7884 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7885 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7886 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7887 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7888 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7889 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7890 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7891 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7892 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7893 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7894 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7895 first_per_commitment_point,
7896 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7897 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7898 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7900 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7902 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7904 next_local_nonce: None,
7908 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7909 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7911 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7913 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7914 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7917 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7918 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7920 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7921 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7922 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7923 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7924 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7925 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7926 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7927 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7928 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7929 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7930 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7932 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7935 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7936 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7937 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7941 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7942 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7945 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7946 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7948 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7949 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7951 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7953 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7954 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7955 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7956 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7959 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7960 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7961 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7962 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7963 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7965 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7967 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7968 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7969 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7972 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7973 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7974 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7978 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7979 initial_commitment_tx,
7982 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7983 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7986 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7987 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7990 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7992 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7993 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7994 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7995 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7997 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7999 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8000 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
8001 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8002 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8003 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8004 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8005 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8006 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8007 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8008 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8009 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8011 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8012 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8013 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8014 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8015 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8016 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8017 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8019 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8020 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8022 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8023 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8024 let mut channel = Channel {
8025 context: self.context,
8026 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8027 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8029 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
8030 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8032 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8036 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8037 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8038 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8039 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8040 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8041 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8042 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8045 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8046 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8047 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8048 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8049 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8050 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8051 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8052 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8053 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8054 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8057 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8058 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8060 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8062 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8063 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8065 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8066 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8069 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8073 counterparty_node_id,
8079 current_chain_height,
8080 outbound_scid_alias,
8081 temporary_channel_id,
8082 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8087 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8088 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8089 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8090 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8091 funding_tx_locktime,
8092 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8098 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8099 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8100 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8101 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8102 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8103 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8105 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8107 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8108 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8111 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8112 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8113 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8116 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8117 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8120 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8121 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8122 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8123 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8124 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8125 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8126 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8128 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8129 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8131 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8132 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8133 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8134 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8135 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8136 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8137 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8138 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8139 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8140 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8141 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8142 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8143 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8144 first_per_commitment_point,
8145 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8146 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8147 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8148 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8150 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8152 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8153 second_per_commitment_point,
8154 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8155 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8160 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8161 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8162 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8163 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8164 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8165 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8168 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8169 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8170 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8171 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8172 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8173 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8174 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8175 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8176 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8177 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8178 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8182 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8183 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8184 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8185 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8186 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8188 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8189 // support this channel type.
8190 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8191 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8192 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8194 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8196 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8197 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8198 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8199 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8200 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8201 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8204 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8208 counterparty_node_id,
8212 current_chain_height,
8218 counterparty_pubkeys,
8220 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8221 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8222 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8223 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8225 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8226 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8227 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8228 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8232 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8233 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8234 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8235 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8236 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8237 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8244 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8245 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8247 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8248 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8249 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8250 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8253 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8254 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8256 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8258 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8259 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8262 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8265 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8266 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8267 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8269 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8270 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8271 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8272 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8273 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8274 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8275 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8277 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8278 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8279 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8280 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8281 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8282 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8283 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8284 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8285 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8286 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8287 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8288 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8289 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8290 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8291 first_per_commitment_point,
8292 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8293 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8294 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8296 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8298 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8299 second_per_commitment_point,
8300 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8304 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8305 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8307 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8309 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8310 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8314 // Unfunded channel utilities
8316 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8317 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8318 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8319 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8320 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8321 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8322 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8323 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8324 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8325 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8328 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8329 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8330 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8331 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8332 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8333 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8339 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8340 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8342 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8348 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8349 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8350 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8351 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8352 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8354 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8355 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8356 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8357 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8363 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8364 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8365 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8366 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8367 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8368 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8373 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8374 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8375 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8376 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8378 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8379 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8380 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8381 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8386 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8387 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8388 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8389 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8390 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8391 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8396 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8398 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8401 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8402 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8403 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8404 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8408 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8410 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8412 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8414 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8415 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8416 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8417 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8418 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8420 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8421 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8422 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8423 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8425 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8427 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8428 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8429 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8431 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8433 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8435 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8437 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8439 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8440 // deserialized from that format.
8441 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8442 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8443 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8445 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8447 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8448 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8449 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8451 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8452 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8453 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8454 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8457 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8458 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8459 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8462 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8463 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8464 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8465 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8467 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8468 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8470 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8471 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8472 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8477 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8480 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8482 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8483 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8484 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8489 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8492 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8495 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8497 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8502 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8503 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8504 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8506 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8507 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8508 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8509 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8510 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8511 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8512 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8514 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8516 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8518 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8521 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8522 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8523 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8526 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8528 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8529 preimages.push(preimage);
8531 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8532 reason.write(writer)?;
8534 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8536 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8537 preimages.push(preimage);
8539 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8540 reason.write(writer)?;
8543 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8544 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8547 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8548 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8549 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8550 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8551 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8552 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8554 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8555 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8556 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8559 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8560 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8561 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8562 source.write(writer)?;
8563 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8565 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8566 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8568 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8570 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8571 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8573 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8575 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8576 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8578 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8579 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8581 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8582 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8583 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8585 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8587 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8588 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8593 match self.context.resend_order {
8594 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8595 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8598 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8599 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8600 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8602 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8603 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8604 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8605 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8608 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8609 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8610 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8611 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8612 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8615 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8616 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8617 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8618 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8620 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8621 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8622 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8624 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8626 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8627 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8628 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8629 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8631 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8632 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8633 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8634 // consider the stale state on reload.
8637 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8638 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8639 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8641 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8642 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8643 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8645 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8646 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8648 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8649 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8650 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8652 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8653 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8655 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8658 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8659 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8660 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8662 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8665 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8666 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8668 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8669 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8670 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8672 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8674 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8676 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8678 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8679 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8680 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8681 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8682 htlc.write(writer)?;
8685 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8686 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8687 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8689 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8690 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8692 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8693 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8694 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8695 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8696 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8697 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8698 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8700 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8701 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8702 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8703 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8704 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8706 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8707 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8709 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8710 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8711 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8712 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8714 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8716 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8717 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8718 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8721 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8722 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8723 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8725 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8726 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8727 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8728 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8729 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8730 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8731 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8733 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8734 (2, chan_type, option),
8735 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8736 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8737 (5, self.context.config, required),
8738 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8739 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8740 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8741 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8742 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8743 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8744 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8745 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8746 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8747 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8748 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8749 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8750 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8751 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8752 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8753 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8754 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8755 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8756 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8757 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8758 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8759 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8760 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8761 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8762 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8763 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8770 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8771 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8773 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8774 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8776 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8777 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8778 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8780 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8781 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8782 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8783 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8785 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8787 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8788 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8789 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8790 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8791 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8793 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8794 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8798 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8799 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8801 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8803 let mut keys_data = None;
8805 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8806 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8807 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8808 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8809 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8810 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8811 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8812 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8813 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8814 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8818 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8819 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8820 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8823 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8825 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8826 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8827 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8829 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8831 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8832 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8833 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8834 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8835 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8836 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8837 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8838 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8840 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8841 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8843 Readable::read(reader)?
8845 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8848 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8849 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8851 Readable::read(reader)?
8853 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8855 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8856 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8857 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8862 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8863 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8864 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8865 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8866 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8867 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8868 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8869 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8870 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8871 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8872 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8873 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8875 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8876 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8879 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8883 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8884 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8886 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8888 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8889 blinding_point: None,
8893 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8894 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8895 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8896 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8897 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8898 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8899 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8900 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8901 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8902 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8903 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8904 blinding_point: None,
8906 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8907 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8908 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8910 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8911 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8912 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8918 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8919 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8920 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8921 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8924 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8925 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8926 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8928 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8929 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8930 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8931 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8934 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8935 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8936 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8937 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8940 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8942 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8944 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8945 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8947 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8949 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8950 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8951 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8952 // consider the stale state on reload.
8953 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8956 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8957 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8958 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8960 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8963 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8965 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8967 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8969 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8970 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8972 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8973 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8975 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8976 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8978 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8979 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8980 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8982 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8984 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8985 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8987 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8988 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8991 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8993 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8994 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8995 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8996 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8998 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9001 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9002 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9004 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9006 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9007 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9009 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9010 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9012 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9014 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9015 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9016 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9018 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9019 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9020 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9024 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9025 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9026 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9028 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9034 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9035 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9036 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9037 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9038 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9039 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9040 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9041 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9042 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9043 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9045 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9046 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9047 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9048 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9049 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9050 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9051 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9053 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9054 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9055 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9056 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9058 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9060 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9061 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9063 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9065 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9067 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9068 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9070 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9071 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9073 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9074 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9076 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9077 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9078 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9079 (2, channel_type, option),
9080 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9081 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9082 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9083 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9084 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9085 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9086 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9087 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9088 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9089 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9090 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9091 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9092 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9093 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9094 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9095 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9096 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9097 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9098 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9099 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9100 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9101 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9102 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9103 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9104 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9105 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9106 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9107 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9108 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9111 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9112 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9113 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9114 // required channel parameters.
9115 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9116 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9118 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9120 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9121 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9122 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9123 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9126 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9127 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9128 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9130 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9131 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9133 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9139 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9140 if iter.next().is_some() {
9141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9145 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9146 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9147 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9148 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9149 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9152 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9153 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9154 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9156 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9157 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9159 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9160 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9161 // separate u64 values.
9162 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9164 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9166 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9167 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9168 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9169 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9171 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9172 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9174 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9175 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9176 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9177 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9178 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9181 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9182 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9184 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9185 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9186 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9187 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9189 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9190 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9192 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9193 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9194 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9195 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9196 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9199 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9200 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9203 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9204 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9205 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9206 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9207 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9208 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9211 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9212 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9213 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9215 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9219 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9220 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9221 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9222 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9223 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9224 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9226 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9227 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9228 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9230 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9231 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9232 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9233 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9238 context: ChannelContext {
9241 config: config.unwrap(),
9245 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9246 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9247 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9250 temporary_channel_id,
9252 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9254 channel_value_satoshis,
9256 latest_monitor_update_id,
9258 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9259 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9262 holder_commitment_point,
9263 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9266 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9267 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9268 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9269 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9273 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9274 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9275 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9276 monitor_pending_forwards,
9277 monitor_pending_failures,
9278 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9279 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9281 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9282 signer_pending_funding: false,
9285 holding_cell_update_fee,
9286 next_holder_htlc_id,
9287 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9288 update_time_counter,
9291 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9292 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9293 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9294 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9296 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9297 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9298 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9299 closing_fee_limits: None,
9300 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9302 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9303 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9305 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9307 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9308 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9309 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9310 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9311 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9312 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9313 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9314 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9315 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9318 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9320 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9321 funding_transaction,
9324 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9325 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9326 counterparty_node_id,
9328 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9332 channel_update_status,
9333 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9338 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9339 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9340 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9342 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9343 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9345 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9346 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9347 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9349 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9350 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9352 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9353 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9355 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9358 local_initiated_shutdown,
9360 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9362 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9363 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9371 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9372 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9373 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9374 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9375 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9376 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9377 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9378 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9379 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9380 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9381 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9382 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9383 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9384 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9385 use crate::ln::msgs;
9386 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9387 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9388 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9389 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9390 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9391 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9392 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9393 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9394 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9395 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9396 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9397 use crate::util::test_utils;
9398 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9399 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9400 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9401 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9402 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9403 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9404 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9405 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9406 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9407 use crate::prelude::*;
9410 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9411 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9412 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9413 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9415 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9416 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9417 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9418 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9421 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9424 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9425 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9431 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9432 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9433 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9434 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9438 signer: InMemorySigner,
9441 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9442 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9445 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9446 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9448 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9450 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9451 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9454 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9458 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9460 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9462 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9463 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9464 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9467 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9469 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9470 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9474 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9475 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9476 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9480 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9481 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9482 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9483 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9486 let seed = [42; 32];
9487 let network = Network::Testnet;
9488 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9489 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9490 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9494 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9495 let config = UserConfig::default();
9496 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9497 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9498 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9500 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9501 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9505 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9506 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9508 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9509 let original_fee = 253;
9510 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9511 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9512 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9513 let seed = [42; 32];
9514 let network = Network::Testnet;
9515 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9517 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9518 let config = UserConfig::default();
9519 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9521 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9522 // same as the old fee.
9523 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9524 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9525 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9529 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9530 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9531 // dust limits are used.
9532 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9533 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9534 let seed = [42; 32];
9535 let network = Network::Testnet;
9536 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9537 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9538 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9540 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9541 // they have different dust limits.
9543 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9544 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9545 let config = UserConfig::default();
9546 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9548 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9549 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9550 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9551 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9552 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9554 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9555 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9556 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9557 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9558 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9560 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9561 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9562 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9563 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9565 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9566 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9567 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9569 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9570 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9571 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9573 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9574 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9575 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9577 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9578 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9579 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9580 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9583 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9585 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9586 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9587 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9588 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9589 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9590 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9591 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9592 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9593 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9595 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9596 blinding_point: None,
9599 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9600 // the dust limit check.
9601 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9602 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9603 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9604 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9606 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9607 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9608 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9609 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9610 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9611 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9612 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9616 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9617 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9618 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9619 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9620 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9621 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9622 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9623 let seed = [42; 32];
9624 let network = Network::Testnet;
9625 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9627 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9628 let config = UserConfig::default();
9629 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9631 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9632 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9634 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9635 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9636 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9637 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9638 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9639 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9641 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9642 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9643 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9644 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9645 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9647 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9649 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9650 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9651 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9652 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9653 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9655 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9656 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9657 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9658 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9659 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9663 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9664 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9665 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9666 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9667 let seed = [42; 32];
9668 let network = Network::Testnet;
9669 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9670 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9671 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9673 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9675 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9676 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9677 let config = UserConfig::default();
9678 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9680 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9681 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9682 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9683 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9685 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9686 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9687 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9689 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9690 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9691 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9692 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9694 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9695 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9696 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9698 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9699 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9700 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9702 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9703 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9704 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9705 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9706 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9707 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9708 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9710 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9712 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9713 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9714 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9715 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9716 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9720 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9721 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9722 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9723 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9724 let seed = [42; 32];
9725 let network = Network::Testnet;
9726 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9727 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9728 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9730 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9731 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9732 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9733 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9734 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9735 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9736 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9737 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9739 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9740 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9741 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9742 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9743 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9744 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9746 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9747 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9748 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9749 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9751 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9753 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9754 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9755 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9756 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9757 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9758 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9760 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9761 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9762 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9763 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9765 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9766 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9767 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9768 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9769 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9771 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9772 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9774 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9775 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9776 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9778 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9779 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9780 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9781 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9782 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9784 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9785 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9787 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9788 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9789 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9793 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9795 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9796 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9797 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9799 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9800 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9801 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9802 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9804 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9805 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9806 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9808 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9810 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9811 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9814 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9815 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9816 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9817 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9818 let seed = [42; 32];
9819 let network = Network::Testnet;
9820 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9821 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9822 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9825 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9826 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9827 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9829 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9830 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9832 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9833 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9834 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9836 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9837 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9839 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9841 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9842 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9844 // Channel Negotiations failed
9845 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9846 assert!(result.is_err());
9851 fn channel_update() {
9852 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9853 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9854 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9855 let seed = [42; 32];
9856 let network = Network::Testnet;
9857 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9858 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9861 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9862 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9863 let config = UserConfig::default();
9864 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9866 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9867 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9868 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9869 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9870 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9872 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9873 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9874 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9875 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9876 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9878 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9879 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9880 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9881 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9883 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9884 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9885 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9887 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9888 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9889 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9891 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9892 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9893 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9895 short_channel_id: 0,
9898 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9899 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9900 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9902 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9903 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9905 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9907 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9909 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9910 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9911 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9912 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9914 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9915 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9916 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9918 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9921 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9925 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9926 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9928 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9929 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9931 let seed = [42; 32];
9932 let network = Network::Testnet;
9933 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9934 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9936 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9937 let config = UserConfig::default();
9938 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9939 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9940 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9942 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9943 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9944 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9946 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9947 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9948 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9950 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9951 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9952 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9953 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9954 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9957 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9959 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9960 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9961 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9962 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9966 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9967 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9968 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9970 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9973 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9975 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9976 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9977 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9978 blinding_point: None,
9980 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9981 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9983 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9986 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9989 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9991 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9994 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9995 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9996 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9998 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9999 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10002 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10003 blinding_point: None,
10005 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10006 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10009 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10010 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10012 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10013 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10015 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10018 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10019 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10020 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10021 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10022 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10023 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10024 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10025 } = &mut dummy_add {
10026 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10027 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10028 } else { panic!() }
10029 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10030 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10031 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10033 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10036 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10038 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10039 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10040 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10041 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10042 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10043 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10044 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10045 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10048 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10050 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10051 use bitcoin::sighash;
10052 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10053 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10054 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10055 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10056 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10057 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10058 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10059 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10060 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10061 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10062 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10063 use crate::sync::Arc;
10064 use core::str::FromStr;
10065 use hex::DisplayHex;
10067 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10068 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10069 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10070 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10072 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10074 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10075 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10076 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10077 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10078 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10080 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10081 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10087 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10088 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10089 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10091 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10092 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10093 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10094 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10095 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10096 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10098 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10100 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10101 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10102 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10103 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10104 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10105 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10107 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10108 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10109 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10110 selected_contest_delay: 144
10112 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10113 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10115 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10116 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10118 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10119 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10121 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10122 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10124 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10125 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10126 // build_commitment_transaction.
10127 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10128 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10129 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10130 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10131 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10133 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10134 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10135 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10136 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10140 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10141 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10142 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10143 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10147 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10148 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10149 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10151 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10152 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10154 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10155 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10157 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10159 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10160 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10161 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10162 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10163 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10164 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10165 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10167 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10168 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10169 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10170 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10172 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10173 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10174 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10176 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10178 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10179 commitment_tx.clone(),
10180 counterparty_signature,
10181 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10182 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10183 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10185 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10186 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10188 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10189 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10190 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10192 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10193 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10196 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10197 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10199 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10200 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10201 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10202 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10203 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10204 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10205 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10206 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10208 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10211 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10212 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10213 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10217 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10220 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10221 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10222 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10223 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10224 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10225 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10227 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10228 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10229 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10230 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10231 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10232 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10233 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10234 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10235 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10236 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10238 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10239 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10240 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10241 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10242 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10243 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10245 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10249 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10250 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10251 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10252 "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", {});
10254 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10255 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10257 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10258 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10259 "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", {});
10261 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10262 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10263 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10264 "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", {});
10266 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10267 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10269 amount_msat: 1000000,
10271 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10272 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10274 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10277 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10278 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10280 amount_msat: 2000000,
10282 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10283 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10285 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10288 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10289 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10291 amount_msat: 2000000,
10293 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10294 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10295 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10296 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10297 blinding_point: None,
10299 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10302 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10303 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10305 amount_msat: 3000000,
10307 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10308 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10309 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10310 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10311 blinding_point: None,
10313 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10316 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10317 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10319 amount_msat: 4000000,
10321 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10322 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10324 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10328 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10329 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10330 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10332 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10333 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10334 "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", {
10337 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10338 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10339 "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" },
10342 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10343 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10344 "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" },
10347 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10348 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10349 "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" },
10352 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10353 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10354 "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" },
10357 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10358 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10359 "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" }
10362 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10363 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10364 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10366 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10367 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10368 "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", {
10371 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10372 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10373 "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" },
10376 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10377 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10378 "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" },
10381 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10382 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10383 "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" },
10386 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10387 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10388 "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" },
10391 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10392 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10393 "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" }
10396 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10400 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10401 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10402 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10405 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10406 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10407 "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" },
10410 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10411 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10412 "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" },
10415 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10416 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10417 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10420 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10421 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10422 "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" }
10425 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10428 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10430 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10431 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10432 "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", {
10435 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10436 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10437 "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" },
10440 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10441 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10442 "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" },
10445 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10446 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10447 "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" },
10450 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10451 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10452 "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" }
10455 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10458 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10460 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10461 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10462 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10465 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10466 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10467 "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" },
10470 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10471 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10472 "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" },
10475 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10476 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10477 "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" },
10480 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10481 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10482 "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" }
10485 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10486 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10487 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10489 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10490 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10491 "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", {
10494 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10495 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10496 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10499 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10500 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10501 "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" },
10504 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10505 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10506 "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" }
10509 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10510 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10511 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10513 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10514 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10515 "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", {
10518 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10519 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10520 "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" },
10523 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10524 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10525 "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" },
10528 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10529 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10530 "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" }
10533 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10535 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10537 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10538 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10539 "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", {
10542 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10543 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10544 "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" },
10547 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10548 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10549 "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" }
10552 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10555 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10556 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10557 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10559 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10560 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10561 "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", {
10564 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10565 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10566 "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" },
10569 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10570 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10571 "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" }
10574 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10575 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10576 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10577 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10578 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10580 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10581 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10582 "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", {
10585 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10586 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10587 "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" },
10590 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10591 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10592 "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" }
10595 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10599 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10600 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10601 "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", {
10604 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10605 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10606 "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" }
10609 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10610 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10611 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10612 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10613 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10615 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10616 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10617 "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", {
10620 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10621 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10622 "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" }
10625 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10626 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10627 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10628 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10629 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10631 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10632 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10633 "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", {
10636 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10637 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10638 "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" }
10641 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10642 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10643 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10644 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10646 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10647 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10648 "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", {});
10650 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10651 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10652 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10653 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10654 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10656 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10657 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10658 "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", {});
10660 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10661 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10662 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10663 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10664 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10666 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10667 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10668 "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", {});
10670 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10671 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10672 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10674 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10675 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10676 "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", {});
10678 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10679 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10680 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10681 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10682 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10684 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10685 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10686 "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", {});
10688 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10689 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10690 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10691 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10692 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10694 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10695 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10696 "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", {});
10698 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10699 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10700 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10701 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10702 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10703 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10705 amount_msat: 2000000,
10707 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10708 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10710 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10713 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10714 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10715 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10717 amount_msat: 5000001,
10719 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10720 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10721 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10722 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10723 blinding_point: None,
10725 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10728 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10729 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10731 amount_msat: 5000000,
10733 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10734 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10735 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10736 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10737 blinding_point: None,
10739 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10743 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10744 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10745 "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", {
10748 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10749 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10750 "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" },
10752 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10753 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10754 "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" },
10756 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10757 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10758 "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" }
10761 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10762 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10763 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10764 "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", {
10767 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10768 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10769 "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" },
10771 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10772 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10773 "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" },
10775 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10776 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10777 "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" }
10782 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10783 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10785 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10786 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10787 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10788 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10790 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10791 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10792 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10794 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10795 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10797 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10798 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10800 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10801 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10802 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10806 fn test_key_derivation() {
10807 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10808 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10810 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10811 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10813 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10814 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10816 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10817 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10819 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10820 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10822 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10823 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10825 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10826 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10830 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10831 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10832 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10833 let seed = [42; 32];
10834 let network = Network::Testnet;
10835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10836 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10838 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10839 let config = UserConfig::default();
10840 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10841 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10843 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10844 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10846 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10847 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10848 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10849 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10850 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10851 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10852 assert!(res.is_ok());
10856 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10857 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10858 // resulting `channel_type`.
10859 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10860 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10861 let network = Network::Testnet;
10862 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10863 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10865 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10866 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10868 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10869 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10871 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10872 // need to signal it.
10873 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10874 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10875 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10876 &config, 0, 42, None
10878 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10880 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10881 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10882 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10884 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10885 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10886 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10890 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10891 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10892 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10893 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10894 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10897 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10898 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10902 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10903 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10904 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10906 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10907 let network = Network::Testnet;
10908 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10909 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10911 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10912 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10914 let config = UserConfig::default();
10916 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10917 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10918 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10919 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10920 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10922 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10923 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10924 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10928 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10929 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10930 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10932 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10933 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10934 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10935 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10936 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10937 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10939 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10943 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10944 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10946 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10947 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10948 let network = Network::Testnet;
10949 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10950 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10952 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10953 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10955 let config = UserConfig::default();
10957 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10958 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10959 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10960 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10961 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10962 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10963 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10964 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10966 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10967 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10968 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10969 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10970 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10971 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10975 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10976 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10978 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10979 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10980 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10981 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10983 assert!(res.is_err());
10985 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10986 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10987 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10989 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10990 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10991 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10994 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10996 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10997 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10998 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10999 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11002 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11003 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11005 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11006 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11008 assert!(res.is_err());
11012 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11013 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11014 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11015 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11016 let seed = [42; 32];
11017 let network = Network::Testnet;
11018 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11019 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11020 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11022 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11023 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11024 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11025 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11027 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11028 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11029 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11034 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11044 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11045 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11046 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11051 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11052 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11058 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11061 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11062 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11063 &accept_channel_msg,
11064 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11065 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11068 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11069 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11070 let tx = Transaction {
11071 version: Version::ONE,
11072 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11076 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11079 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11082 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11083 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11084 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11085 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11086 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11087 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11091 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11092 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11100 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11101 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11102 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11103 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11105 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11106 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11113 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11114 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11115 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11116 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11117 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11119 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11120 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11121 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11129 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11130 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11133 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11134 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11135 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11136 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());