1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
277 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
278 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
799 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
801 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
802 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
803 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
804 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
810 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
811 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
813 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
814 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
820 macro_rules! secp_check {
821 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
824 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
829 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
830 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
831 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
832 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
834 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
837 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
838 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
840 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
843 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
845 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
848 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
849 /// required by us according to the configured or default
850 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
852 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
854 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
855 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
856 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
857 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
858 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
861 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
862 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
863 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
864 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
865 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
866 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
870 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
871 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
874 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
875 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
876 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
877 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
878 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
879 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
880 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
881 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
886 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
887 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
888 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
889 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
890 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
891 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
892 // We've exhausted our options
895 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
896 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
900 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
901 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
902 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
903 outbound_scid_alias: u64
904 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
905 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
908 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
910 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
911 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
912 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
914 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
917 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
920 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
921 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
924 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
927 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
928 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
929 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
930 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
934 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
936 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
937 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
938 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
945 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
946 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
949 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
950 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
951 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
958 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
959 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
960 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
961 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
966 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
968 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
969 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
970 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
972 channel_value_satoshis,
974 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
977 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
978 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
980 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
981 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
985 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
987 pending_update_fee: None,
988 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
989 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
990 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
991 update_time_counter: 1,
993 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
995 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
996 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
997 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
998 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
999 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1002 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1003 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1005 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1008 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1009 closing_fee_limits: None,
1010 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1012 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1014 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1015 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1016 short_channel_id: None,
1017 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1019 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1020 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1021 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1022 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1023 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1024 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1025 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1026 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1027 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1028 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1029 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1031 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1033 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1034 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1035 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1036 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1037 counterparty_parameters: None,
1038 funding_outpoint: None,
1039 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1041 funding_transaction: None,
1043 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1044 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1045 counterparty_node_id,
1047 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1049 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1051 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1052 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1054 announcement_sigs: None,
1056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1057 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1059 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1063 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1064 outbound_scid_alias,
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1069 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1073 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1074 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1076 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1077 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1078 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1079 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1080 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1081 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1082 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1085 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1086 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1087 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1088 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1089 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1090 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1096 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1097 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1098 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1099 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1100 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1101 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1102 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1103 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1104 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1107 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1108 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1110 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1111 // support this channel type.
1112 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1113 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1121 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1122 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1123 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1124 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1125 // publicly announced.
1126 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1127 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1135 channel_type.clone()
1137 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1139 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1143 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1144 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1145 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1146 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1147 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1148 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1149 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1150 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1153 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1157 // Check sanity of message fields:
1158 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1161 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1164 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1167 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1168 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1171 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1174 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1177 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1179 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1180 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1183 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1186 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1190 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1191 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1194 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1197 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1200 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1206 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1209 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1213 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1215 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1216 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1221 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1222 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1223 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1224 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1227 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1230 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1232 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1234 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1238 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1239 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1240 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1241 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1242 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1246 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1247 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1248 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1249 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1253 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1254 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1255 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1256 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1257 if script.len() == 0 {
1260 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1263 Some(script.clone())
1266 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1267 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1273 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1274 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1277 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1278 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1283 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1284 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1286 let chan = Channel {
1289 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1290 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1292 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1297 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1299 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1300 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1301 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1304 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1307 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1308 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1310 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1311 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1312 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1314 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1315 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1316 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1317 pending_update_fee: None,
1318 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1319 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1320 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1321 update_time_counter: 1,
1323 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1325 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1326 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1327 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1328 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1329 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1330 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1332 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1333 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1335 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1337 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1338 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1339 closing_fee_limits: None,
1340 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1342 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1344 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1345 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1346 short_channel_id: None,
1347 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1349 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1350 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1351 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1352 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1353 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1354 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1355 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1356 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1357 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1358 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1359 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1360 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1362 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1364 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1365 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1366 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1367 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1368 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1369 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1370 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1372 funding_outpoint: None,
1373 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1375 funding_transaction: None,
1377 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1378 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1379 counterparty_node_id,
1381 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1383 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1385 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1386 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1388 announcement_sigs: None,
1390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1391 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1393 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1395 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1397 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1398 outbound_scid_alias,
1400 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1401 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1409 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1410 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1411 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1412 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1413 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1415 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1416 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1417 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1418 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1419 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1420 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1421 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1423 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1424 where L::Target: Logger
1426 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1427 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1428 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1430 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1431 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1432 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1433 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1435 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1436 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1437 if match update_state {
1438 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1439 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1440 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1441 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1442 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1444 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1448 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1449 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1450 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1451 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1453 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1454 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1455 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1457 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1458 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1459 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1460 transaction_output_index: None
1465 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1466 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1467 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1468 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1469 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1472 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1474 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1475 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1476 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1479 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1482 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1483 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1486 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1488 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1489 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1490 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1493 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1499 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1500 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1501 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1502 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1503 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1504 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1505 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1509 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1510 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1512 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1514 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1515 if generated_by_local {
1516 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1517 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1526 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1528 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1529 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1530 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1531 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1532 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1533 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1534 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1537 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1538 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1539 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1540 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1544 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1545 preimages.push(preimage);
1549 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1550 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1552 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1554 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1555 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1558 if !generated_by_local {
1559 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1567 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1568 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1569 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1570 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1571 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1572 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1573 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1574 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1576 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1578 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1579 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1580 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1581 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1583 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1585 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1586 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1587 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1588 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1591 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1592 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1593 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1594 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1596 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1599 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1600 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1601 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1602 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1604 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1607 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1608 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1613 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1619 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1621 let channel_parameters =
1622 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1623 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1624 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1627 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1632 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1635 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1636 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1637 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1638 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1640 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1641 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1642 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1650 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1651 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1657 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1658 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1659 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1660 // outside of those situations will fail.
1661 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1665 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1670 1 + // script length (0)
1674 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1675 2 + // witness marker and flag
1676 1 + // witness element count
1677 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1678 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1679 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1680 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1681 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1682 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1684 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1685 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1686 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1692 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1693 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1694 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1695 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1697 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1698 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1699 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1701 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1702 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1703 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1704 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1705 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1706 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1709 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1710 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1713 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1714 value_to_holder = 0;
1717 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1718 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1719 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1720 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1722 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1723 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1726 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1727 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1731 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1732 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1733 /// our counterparty!)
1734 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1735 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1736 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1737 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1738 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1739 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1740 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1742 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1746 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1747 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1748 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1749 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1750 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1751 //may see payments to it!
1752 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1753 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1754 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1756 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1759 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1760 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1761 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1762 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1763 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1766 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1769 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1770 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1772 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1774 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1775 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1776 where L::Target: Logger {
1777 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1778 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1779 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
1780 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1781 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1782 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1783 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1784 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1788 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1789 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1790 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1791 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1793 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1794 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1796 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1798 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1800 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1801 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1802 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1804 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1805 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1806 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1807 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1808 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1810 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1811 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1812 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1814 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1815 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1817 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1820 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1821 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1825 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1829 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1830 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1831 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1832 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1833 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1834 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1837 // Now update local state:
1839 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1840 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1842 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1843 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1844 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1845 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1850 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1851 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1852 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1853 // do not not get into this branch.
1854 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1855 match pending_update {
1856 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1857 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1858 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1859 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1861 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1862 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1865 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1866 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1867 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1868 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1869 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1870 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1871 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1877 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1878 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1879 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1882 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1883 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1889 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1890 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1892 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1895 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1896 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1899 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1902 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1903 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1904 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1905 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1910 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1911 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1912 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1913 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1914 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1917 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1918 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1919 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1920 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1921 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1923 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1924 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1925 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1929 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1930 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1931 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1932 /// before we fail backwards.
1933 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1934 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1935 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1936 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1937 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1939 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1941 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1942 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1943 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1945 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1946 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1947 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1949 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1950 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1951 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1953 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1958 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1959 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1965 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1966 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1967 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1968 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1969 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1973 // Now update local state:
1974 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1975 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1976 match pending_update {
1977 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1978 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1979 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1980 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1985 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1986 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1987 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1993 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1994 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1995 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2001 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2003 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2004 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2007 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2008 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2009 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2014 // Message handlers:
2016 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2017 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2019 // Check sanity of message fields:
2020 if !self.is_outbound() {
2021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2023 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2026 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2029 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2032 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2037 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2039 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2040 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2043 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2044 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2047 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2050 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2054 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2055 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2058 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2061 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2064 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2067 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2070 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2073 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2077 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2078 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2081 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2082 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2084 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2087 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2088 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2089 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2090 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2091 if script.len() == 0 {
2094 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2097 Some(script.clone())
2100 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2101 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2107 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2108 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2109 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2110 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2111 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2113 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2114 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2116 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2119 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2120 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2121 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2122 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2123 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2124 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2127 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2128 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2129 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2132 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2133 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2135 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2136 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2141 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2142 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2144 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2145 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2147 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2148 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2149 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2150 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2152 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2153 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2154 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2155 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2158 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2159 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2161 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2162 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2164 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2166 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2167 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2169 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2170 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2173 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2174 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2177 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2178 if self.is_outbound() {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2181 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2182 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2183 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2187 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2190 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2191 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2192 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2193 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2196 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2197 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2198 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2199 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2200 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2202 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2204 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2205 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2209 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2210 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2211 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2215 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2216 initial_commitment_tx,
2219 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2220 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2223 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2224 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2226 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2228 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2229 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2230 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2231 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2232 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2233 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2234 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2235 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2236 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2238 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2240 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2242 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2243 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2244 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2245 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2247 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2249 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2250 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2252 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2255 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2256 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2257 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2258 if !self.is_outbound() {
2259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2261 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2264 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2265 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2266 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2267 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2270 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2272 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2273 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2274 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2275 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2277 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2278 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2280 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2281 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2283 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2284 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2285 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2286 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2287 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2292 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2293 initial_commitment_tx,
2296 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2297 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2300 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2301 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2304 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2305 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2306 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2307 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2308 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2309 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2310 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2311 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2312 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2313 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2315 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2317 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2319 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2320 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2321 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2322 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2324 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2326 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2329 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2330 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2332 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2333 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2334 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2338 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2339 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2340 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2341 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2342 // when routing outbound payments.
2343 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2347 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2349 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2350 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2351 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2352 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2353 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2354 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2355 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2356 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2357 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2359 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2360 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2361 let expected_point =
2362 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2363 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2365 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2367 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2368 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2369 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2370 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2371 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2373 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2381 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2382 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2384 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2386 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2389 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2390 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2391 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2392 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2398 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2399 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2400 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2401 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2402 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2403 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2404 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2405 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2406 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2409 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2412 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2413 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2414 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2416 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2417 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2418 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2419 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2420 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2421 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2423 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2424 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2430 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2431 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2432 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2433 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2434 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2435 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2436 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2437 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2438 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2441 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2444 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2445 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2446 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2448 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2449 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2450 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2451 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2452 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2453 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2455 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2456 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2460 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2461 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2462 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2463 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2464 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2465 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2466 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2468 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2469 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2471 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2478 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2479 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2480 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2481 /// corner case properly.
2482 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2483 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2484 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2486 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2487 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2488 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2489 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2492 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2494 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2495 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2496 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2499 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2500 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2501 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2502 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2504 outbound_capacity_msat,
2505 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2506 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2507 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2513 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2514 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2517 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2518 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2519 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2520 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2521 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2522 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2525 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2526 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2528 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2529 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2532 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2533 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2534 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2536 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2537 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2539 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2542 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2543 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2545 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2546 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2548 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2549 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2551 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2552 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2556 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2557 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2563 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2564 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2568 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2569 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2570 included_htlcs += 1;
2573 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2574 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2578 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2579 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2580 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2581 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2582 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2583 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2588 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2590 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2591 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2597 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2601 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2602 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2606 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2607 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2609 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2610 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2611 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2613 total_pending_htlcs,
2614 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2615 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2616 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2618 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2619 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2620 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2622 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2624 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2629 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2630 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2631 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2633 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2634 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2636 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2640 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2642 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2643 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2646 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2648 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2653 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2654 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2660 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2661 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2662 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2663 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2664 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2668 included_htlcs += 1;
2671 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2675 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2676 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2678 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2679 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2680 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2685 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2686 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2690 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2691 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2693 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2694 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2696 total_pending_htlcs,
2697 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2698 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2699 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2701 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2702 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2703 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2705 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2707 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2712 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2713 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2714 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2715 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2716 if local_sent_shutdown {
2717 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2719 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2720 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2721 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2724 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2727 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2730 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2733 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2734 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2737 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2738 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2739 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2742 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2745 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2746 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2747 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2748 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2749 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2750 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2751 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2752 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2753 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2754 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2755 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2757 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2758 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2759 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2760 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2761 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2762 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2766 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2769 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2770 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2771 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2773 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2774 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2775 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2776 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2777 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2778 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2779 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2783 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2784 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2785 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2786 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2787 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2788 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2789 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2793 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2794 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2795 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2796 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2797 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2801 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2802 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2803 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2804 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2805 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2807 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2811 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2815 if !self.is_outbound() {
2816 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2817 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2818 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2819 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2820 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2821 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2822 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2823 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2824 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2825 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2826 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2827 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2828 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2829 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2830 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2833 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2834 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2835 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2836 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2840 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2843 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2847 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2848 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2849 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2853 // Now update local state:
2854 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2855 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2856 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2857 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2858 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2859 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2860 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2865 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2867 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2868 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2869 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2870 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2871 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2872 None => fail_reason.into(),
2873 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2874 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2875 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2878 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2882 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2885 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2887 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2893 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2896 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2897 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2904 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2907 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2915 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2919 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2920 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2927 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2931 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2932 where L::Target: Logger
2934 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2935 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2938 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2940 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2941 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2944 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2946 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2948 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2949 let commitment_txid = {
2950 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2951 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2952 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2954 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2955 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2956 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2957 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2958 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2959 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2963 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2965 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2966 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2967 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2968 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2971 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2972 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2973 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2974 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2977 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2979 if self.is_outbound() {
2980 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2981 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2982 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2983 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2984 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2985 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2986 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2987 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2988 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2989 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2995 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2996 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2999 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3000 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3001 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3002 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3003 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3004 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3005 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3007 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3008 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3009 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3010 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3011 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3012 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3013 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3014 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3016 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3018 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3022 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3023 commitment_stats.tx,
3025 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3026 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3027 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3030 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3031 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3032 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3033 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3035 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3036 let mut need_commitment = false;
3037 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3038 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3039 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3040 need_commitment = true;
3044 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3045 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3046 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3047 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3048 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3049 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3053 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3054 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3055 Some(forward_info.clone())
3057 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3058 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3059 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3060 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3061 need_commitment = true;
3064 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3065 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3066 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3067 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3068 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3069 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3070 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3071 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3072 need_commitment = true;
3076 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3077 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3078 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3079 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3081 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3082 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3083 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3084 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3085 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3086 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3087 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3088 // includes the right HTLCs.
3089 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3090 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3091 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3092 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3093 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3094 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3096 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3097 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3098 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3101 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3102 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3103 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3104 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3105 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3106 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3107 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3108 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3109 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3113 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3114 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3116 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3117 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3118 per_commitment_secret,
3119 next_per_commitment_point,
3120 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3123 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3124 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3125 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3126 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3127 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3128 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3129 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3130 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3133 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3134 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3135 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3136 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3137 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3139 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3141 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3142 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3143 updates: Vec::new(),
3146 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3147 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3148 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3149 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3150 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3151 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3152 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3153 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3154 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3155 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3156 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3157 // to rebalance channels.
3158 match &htlc_update {
3159 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3160 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3161 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3164 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3165 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3166 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3167 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3168 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3169 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3170 // into the holding cell without ever being
3171 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3172 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3173 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3176 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3182 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3183 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3184 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3185 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3186 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3187 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3188 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3189 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3190 (msg, monitor_update)
3191 } else { unreachable!() };
3192 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3193 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3195 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3196 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3197 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3198 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3199 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3200 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3201 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3202 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3203 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3206 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3208 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3215 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3216 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3218 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3219 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3224 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3225 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3226 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3227 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3228 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3230 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3231 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3232 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3234 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3236 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3238 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3241 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3243 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3247 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3248 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3249 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3250 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3251 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3252 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3253 where L::Target: Logger,
3255 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3258 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3261 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3265 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3267 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3268 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3273 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3274 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3275 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3276 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3277 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3278 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3279 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3280 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3284 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3286 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3287 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3290 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3291 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3293 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3295 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3296 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3297 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3298 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3299 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3300 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3301 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3302 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3306 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3307 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3308 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3309 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3310 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3311 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3312 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3313 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3315 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3316 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3319 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3320 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3321 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3322 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3323 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3324 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3325 let mut require_commitment = false;
3326 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3329 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3330 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3331 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3333 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3334 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3335 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3336 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3337 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3338 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3343 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3344 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3345 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3346 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3347 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3349 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3350 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3351 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3356 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3357 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3359 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3363 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3364 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3366 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3367 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3368 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3369 require_commitment = true;
3370 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3371 match forward_info {
3372 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3373 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3374 require_commitment = true;
3376 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3377 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3378 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3380 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3381 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3382 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3386 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3387 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3388 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3389 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3395 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3396 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3397 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3398 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3400 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3401 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3402 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3403 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3404 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3405 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3406 require_commitment = true;
3410 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3412 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3413 match update_state {
3414 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3415 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3416 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3417 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3418 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3420 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3421 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3422 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3423 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3424 require_commitment = true;
3425 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3426 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3431 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3432 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3433 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3434 if require_commitment {
3435 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3436 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3437 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3438 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3439 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3440 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3441 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3442 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3443 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3445 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3446 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3447 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3449 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3450 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3451 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3453 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3457 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3458 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3459 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3460 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3461 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3463 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3464 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3465 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3468 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3469 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3470 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3471 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3474 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3475 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3476 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3477 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3479 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3482 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3483 if require_commitment {
3484 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3486 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3487 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3488 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3489 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3491 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3492 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3494 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3495 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3496 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3502 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3503 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3504 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3509 commitment_update: None,
3510 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3511 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3512 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3519 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3520 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3521 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3522 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3523 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3524 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3525 if !self.is_outbound() {
3526 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3528 if !self.is_usable() {
3529 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3531 if !self.is_live() {
3532 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3535 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3536 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3537 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3538 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3539 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3540 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3541 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3542 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3543 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3544 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3548 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3549 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3550 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3551 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3552 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3555 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3560 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3561 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3565 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3566 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3568 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3569 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3574 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3575 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3576 Some(update_fee) => {
3577 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3578 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3584 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3585 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3587 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3589 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3590 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3591 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3592 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3596 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3597 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3598 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3602 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3603 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3606 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3607 // will be retransmitted.
3608 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3609 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3610 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3612 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3613 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3615 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3616 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3617 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3618 // this HTLC accordingly
3619 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3622 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3623 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3624 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3625 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3628 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3629 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3630 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3631 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3632 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3633 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3638 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3640 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3641 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3642 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3643 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3647 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3648 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3649 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3650 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3651 // the update upon reconnection.
3652 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3656 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3657 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3660 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3661 /// updates are partially paused.
3662 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3663 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3664 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3665 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3666 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3667 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3668 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3669 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3671 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3672 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3673 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3674 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3675 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3676 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3677 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3680 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3681 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3682 /// to the remote side.
3683 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3684 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3685 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3687 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3688 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3689 // first received the funding_signed.
3690 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3691 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3692 self.funding_transaction.take()
3694 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3695 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3696 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3697 funding_broadcastable = None;
3700 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3701 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3702 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3703 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3704 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3705 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3706 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3707 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3708 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3709 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3710 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3711 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3712 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3713 next_per_commitment_point,
3714 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3718 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3720 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3721 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3722 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3723 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3724 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3725 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3727 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3728 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3729 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3730 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3731 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3732 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3736 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3737 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3739 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3740 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3743 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3744 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3745 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3746 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3747 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3748 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3749 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3750 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3751 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3755 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3756 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3758 if self.is_outbound() {
3759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3761 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3764 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3765 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3767 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3768 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3769 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3770 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3771 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3772 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3773 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3774 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3775 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3776 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3777 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3779 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3781 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3783 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3789 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3790 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3791 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3792 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3793 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3794 per_commitment_secret,
3795 next_per_commitment_point,
3799 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3800 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3801 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3802 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3803 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3805 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3806 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3807 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3808 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3809 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3810 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3811 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3812 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3813 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3818 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3819 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3821 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3822 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3823 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3824 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3825 reason: err_packet.clone()
3828 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3829 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3830 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3831 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3832 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3833 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3836 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3837 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3838 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3839 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3847 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3848 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3849 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3850 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3854 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3855 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3856 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3857 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3858 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3859 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3863 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3864 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3866 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3867 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3868 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3869 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3870 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3871 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3872 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3873 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3874 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3875 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3876 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3880 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3881 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3885 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3886 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3887 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3888 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3889 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3890 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3891 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3894 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3895 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3896 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3897 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3898 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3901 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3902 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3903 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3904 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3905 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3906 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3907 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3908 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3911 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3915 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3916 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3917 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3918 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3920 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3924 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3925 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3926 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3928 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3929 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3930 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3931 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3932 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3936 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3938 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3939 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3941 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3942 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3945 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3946 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3947 channel_ready: None,
3948 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3949 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3950 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3951 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3955 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3956 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3957 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3958 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3960 next_per_commitment_point,
3961 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3963 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3964 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3965 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3966 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3970 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3971 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3972 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3974 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3975 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3976 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3979 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3985 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3986 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3987 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3988 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3989 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3991 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3992 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
3993 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3994 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3995 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3996 next_per_commitment_point,
3997 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4001 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4002 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4003 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4005 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4008 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
4009 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
4010 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
4011 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
4013 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4014 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
4015 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
4016 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
4017 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4018 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4019 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4020 raa: required_revoke,
4021 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
4022 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4023 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
4024 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4027 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4028 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4029 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4030 raa: required_revoke,
4031 commitment_update: None,
4032 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4034 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4039 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4040 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4041 raa: required_revoke,
4042 commitment_update: None,
4043 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4045 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4048 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4049 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4050 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4052 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4056 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4057 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4058 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4059 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4060 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4061 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4064 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4065 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4066 raa: required_revoke,
4067 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4068 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4070 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4074 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4078 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4079 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4080 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4081 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4083 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4085 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4087 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4088 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4089 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4090 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4091 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4092 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4094 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4095 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4096 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4097 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4098 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4100 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4101 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4102 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4103 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4106 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4107 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4108 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4109 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4110 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4111 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4112 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4113 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4114 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4115 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4116 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4117 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4118 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4119 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4120 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4122 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4125 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4126 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4129 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4130 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4131 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4132 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4133 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4134 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4135 self.channel_state &
4136 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4137 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
4138 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4139 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4142 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4143 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4144 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4145 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4146 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4147 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4150 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4156 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4157 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4158 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4159 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4161 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4162 return Ok((None, None));
4165 if !self.is_outbound() {
4166 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4167 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4169 return Ok((None, None));
4172 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4174 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4175 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4176 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4177 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4179 let sig = self.holder_signer
4180 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4181 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4183 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4184 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4185 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4186 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4188 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4189 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4190 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4195 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4196 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4197 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4198 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4200 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4203 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4204 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4205 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4206 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4209 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4210 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4214 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4216 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4220 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4221 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4225 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4228 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4229 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4230 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4231 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4233 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4236 assert!(send_shutdown);
4237 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4238 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4241 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4246 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4248 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4249 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4251 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4252 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4253 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4254 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4256 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4260 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4261 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4262 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4263 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4267 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4268 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4269 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4270 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4271 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4272 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4274 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4275 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4282 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4283 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4285 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4288 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4289 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4291 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4293 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4294 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4295 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4296 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4297 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4298 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4299 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4300 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4301 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4303 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4304 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4307 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4311 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4312 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4313 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4314 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4316 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4319 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4322 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4325 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4329 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4333 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
4334 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4335 return Ok((None, None));
4338 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4339 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4340 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4343 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4345 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4348 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4349 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4350 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4351 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4352 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4356 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4357 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4362 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4363 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4364 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4365 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4366 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4367 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4368 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4372 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4374 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4375 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4376 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4377 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4379 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4382 let sig = self.holder_signer
4383 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4384 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4386 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4387 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4388 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4389 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4393 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4394 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4395 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4396 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4398 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4399 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4400 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4406 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4407 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4410 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4413 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4417 if !self.is_outbound() {
4418 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4419 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4420 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4421 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4425 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4427 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4428 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4431 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4432 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4433 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4435 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4436 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4437 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4438 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4443 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4444 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4445 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4446 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4452 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4453 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4454 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4455 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4457 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4463 // Public utilities:
4465 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4469 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4473 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4474 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4475 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4479 /// Gets the channel's type
4480 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4484 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4485 /// is_usable() returns true).
4486 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4487 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4488 self.short_channel_id
4491 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4492 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4493 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4496 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4497 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4498 self.outbound_scid_alias
4500 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4501 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4502 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4503 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4504 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4507 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4508 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4509 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4510 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4513 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4514 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4517 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4518 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4521 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4522 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4523 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4526 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4527 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4530 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4531 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4532 self.counterparty_node_id
4535 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4536 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4537 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4540 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4541 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4542 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4545 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4546 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4548 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4549 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4550 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4551 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4553 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4557 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4558 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4559 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4562 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4563 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4564 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4567 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4568 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4569 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4571 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4572 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4577 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4578 self.channel_value_satoshis
4581 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4582 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4585 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4586 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4589 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4590 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4593 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4594 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4595 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4598 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4599 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4600 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4601 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4602 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4605 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4607 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4608 self.prev_config = None;
4612 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4613 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4617 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4618 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4619 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4620 let did_channel_update =
4621 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4622 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4623 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4624 if did_channel_update {
4625 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4626 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4627 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4628 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4630 self.config.options = *config;
4634 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4635 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4636 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4637 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4638 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4639 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4640 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4642 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4643 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4646 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4648 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4649 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4655 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4656 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4657 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4658 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4659 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4660 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4661 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4663 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4664 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4671 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4675 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4676 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4677 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4678 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4679 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4680 // which are near the dust limit.
4681 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4682 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4683 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4684 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4685 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4687 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4688 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4690 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4693 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4694 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4697 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4698 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4701 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4702 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4706 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4711 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4713 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4714 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4715 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4716 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4717 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4718 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4720 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4722 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4730 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4731 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4735 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4736 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4737 self.update_time_counter
4740 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4741 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4744 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4745 self.config.announced_channel
4748 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4749 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4752 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4753 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4754 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4755 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4758 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4759 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4760 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4763 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4764 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4765 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4766 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4767 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4770 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4771 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4772 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4773 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4774 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4777 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4779 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4780 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4783 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4784 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4785 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4788 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4789 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4790 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4793 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4794 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4795 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4798 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4799 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4800 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4803 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4804 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4805 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4806 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4807 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4808 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4813 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4814 self.channel_update_status
4817 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4818 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4819 self.channel_update_status = status;
4822 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4824 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4825 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4826 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4830 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4831 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4832 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4835 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4839 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4840 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4841 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4843 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4844 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4845 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4847 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4848 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4851 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4852 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4853 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4854 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4855 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4856 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4857 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4858 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4859 self.channel_state);
4861 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4865 if need_commitment_update {
4866 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4867 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4868 let next_per_commitment_point =
4869 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4870 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4871 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4872 next_per_commitment_point,
4873 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4877 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4883 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4884 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4885 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4886 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4887 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4888 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4889 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4890 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4891 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4892 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4893 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4894 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4895 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4896 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4897 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4898 if self.is_outbound() {
4899 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4900 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4901 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4902 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4903 // channel and move on.
4904 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4905 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4907 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4908 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4909 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4911 if self.is_outbound() {
4912 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4913 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4914 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4915 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4916 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4917 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4921 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4922 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4923 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4924 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4925 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4929 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4930 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4931 // may have already happened for this block).
4932 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4933 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4934 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4935 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4938 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4939 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4940 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4941 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4949 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4950 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4951 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4952 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4954 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4955 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4958 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4960 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4961 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4962 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4965 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4966 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4967 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4968 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4969 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4971 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4972 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4974 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4975 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4976 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4984 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4986 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4987 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4988 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4990 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4991 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4994 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4995 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4996 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4997 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4998 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4999 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5000 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5001 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5002 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5005 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5006 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5007 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5008 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5010 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5011 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5012 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5014 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5015 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5016 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5017 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5019 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5020 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5021 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5022 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5023 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
5024 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5025 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5028 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5029 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5031 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5034 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5035 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5036 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5037 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5038 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5039 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5040 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5041 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5042 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5043 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5044 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5045 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5046 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5047 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5048 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5049 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5050 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5056 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5061 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5062 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5064 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5065 if !self.is_outbound() {
5066 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5068 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5069 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5072 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5073 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5076 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5077 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5081 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5082 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5083 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5084 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5085 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5086 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5087 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5088 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5089 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5090 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5091 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5092 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5093 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5094 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5095 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5096 first_per_commitment_point,
5097 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5098 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5099 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5100 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5102 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5106 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5107 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5110 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5111 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5112 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5113 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5116 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5117 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5119 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5120 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5121 if self.is_outbound() {
5122 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5124 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5125 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5127 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5128 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5130 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5131 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5134 self.user_id = user_id;
5135 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5137 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5140 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5141 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5142 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5144 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5145 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5146 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5147 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5149 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5150 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5151 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5152 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5153 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5154 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5155 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5156 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5157 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5158 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5159 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5160 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5161 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5162 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5163 first_per_commitment_point,
5164 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5165 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5166 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5168 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5172 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5173 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5175 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5177 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5178 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5181 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5182 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5183 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5184 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5185 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5186 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5189 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5190 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5191 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5192 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5193 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5194 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5195 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5196 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5197 if !self.is_outbound() {
5198 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5200 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5201 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5203 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5204 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5205 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5206 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5209 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5210 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5212 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5215 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5216 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5221 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5223 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5225 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5226 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5227 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5229 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5230 temporary_channel_id,
5231 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5232 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5237 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5238 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5239 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5240 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5242 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5245 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5246 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5247 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5248 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5250 if !self.is_usable() {
5251 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5254 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5256 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5257 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5259 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5260 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5261 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5262 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5263 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5264 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5270 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5271 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5272 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5276 if !self.is_usable() {
5280 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5281 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5285 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5289 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5290 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5293 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5297 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5299 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5304 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5306 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5307 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5308 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5309 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5310 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5314 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5316 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5317 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5318 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5320 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5321 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5322 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5323 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5324 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5325 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5326 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5327 contents: announcement,
5330 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5334 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5335 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5336 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5337 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5338 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5340 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5342 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5344 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5345 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5347 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5348 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5349 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5350 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5353 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5354 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5356 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5359 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5362 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5363 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5364 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5365 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5368 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5370 Err(_) => return None,
5372 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5373 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5378 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5379 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5380 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5381 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5382 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5383 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5384 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5385 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5386 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5387 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5388 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5389 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5390 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5391 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5392 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5393 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5394 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5395 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5396 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5399 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5400 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5401 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5402 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5405 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5406 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5407 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5408 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5409 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5410 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5411 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5412 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5414 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5415 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5416 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5417 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5418 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5419 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5420 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5421 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5422 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5424 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5430 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5432 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5433 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5435 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5437 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5438 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5440 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
5441 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
5444 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5446 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5447 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5448 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5449 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5451 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5452 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5453 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5456 if amount_msat == 0 {
5457 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5460 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5461 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5464 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5465 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5466 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5467 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5468 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5469 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5470 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5471 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5474 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5475 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5476 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5477 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5479 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5480 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5481 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5484 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5485 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5486 if !self.is_outbound() {
5487 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5488 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5489 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5490 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5491 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5492 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5496 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5499 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5500 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5501 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5503 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5504 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5505 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5506 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5507 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5508 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5512 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5513 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5514 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5515 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5516 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5517 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5521 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5522 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5526 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5527 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5528 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5529 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5531 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5532 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5535 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5536 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5537 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5538 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5539 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5542 // Now update local state:
5543 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
5544 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5549 onion_routing_packet,
5554 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5555 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5557 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5559 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5563 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5564 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5565 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5569 onion_routing_packet,
5571 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5576 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5577 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5578 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5579 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5580 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5581 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5582 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5584 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5585 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5587 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5588 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5590 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
5591 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5593 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5594 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5595 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5596 have_updates = true;
5598 if have_updates { break; }
5600 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5601 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5602 have_updates = true;
5604 if have_updates { break; }
5607 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5609 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5611 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5612 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5613 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5614 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5615 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5617 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5618 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5619 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5621 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5622 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5626 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5627 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5628 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5629 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5630 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5631 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5632 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5635 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5636 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5637 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5638 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5639 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5640 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5643 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5645 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5646 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5647 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5648 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5649 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5650 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5652 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5655 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5656 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5659 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5660 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5661 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5662 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5663 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5664 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5665 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5666 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5669 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5670 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5673 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5674 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5675 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5676 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5677 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5678 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5679 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5683 if !self.is_outbound() {
5684 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5685 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5686 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5687 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5688 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5689 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5690 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5691 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5692 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5693 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5700 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5701 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5705 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5706 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5708 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5710 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5711 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5712 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5713 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5715 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5716 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5717 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5718 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5719 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5720 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5724 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5725 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5728 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5731 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5732 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5733 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5735 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5736 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5737 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5738 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5739 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5745 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5746 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5747 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5750 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5751 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5754 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5755 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5756 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5757 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5763 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5764 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5765 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5766 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5767 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5768 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5769 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5773 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5774 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5775 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5777 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5778 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5781 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5782 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5783 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5786 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5789 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5790 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5791 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5793 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5798 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5799 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5800 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5801 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5803 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5805 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5807 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5808 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5809 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5810 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5811 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5812 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5816 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5817 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5818 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5821 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5822 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5823 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5824 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5825 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5827 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5828 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5835 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5838 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5839 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5840 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5841 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5842 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5843 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5844 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5845 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5846 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5847 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5848 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5850 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5851 // return them to fail the payment.
5852 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5853 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5854 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5856 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5857 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5862 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5863 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5864 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5865 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5866 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5867 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5868 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5869 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5870 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5871 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5872 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5873 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5874 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5879 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5880 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5881 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5885 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5886 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5888 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5894 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5895 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5896 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5897 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5898 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5900 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5901 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5902 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5903 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5909 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5910 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5911 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5912 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5913 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5919 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5920 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5921 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5922 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5924 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5925 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5926 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5927 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5932 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5933 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5934 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5935 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5936 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5937 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5942 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5943 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5944 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5947 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5949 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5951 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5952 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5953 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5954 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5956 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5957 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5958 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5960 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5962 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5963 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5964 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5965 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5966 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5967 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5969 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5970 // deserialized from that format.
5971 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5972 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5973 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5975 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5977 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5978 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5979 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5981 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5982 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5983 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5984 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5987 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5988 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5989 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5992 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5993 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5994 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5995 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5997 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5998 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6000 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6002 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6004 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6006 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6009 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6011 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6016 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6018 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6019 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6020 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6021 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6022 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6023 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6024 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6026 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6028 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6030 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6033 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6034 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6035 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6038 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6040 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6041 preimages.push(preimage);
6043 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6044 reason.write(writer)?;
6046 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6048 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6049 preimages.push(preimage);
6051 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6052 reason.write(writer)?;
6057 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6058 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6060 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6062 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6063 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6064 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6065 source.write(writer)?;
6066 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6068 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6070 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6071 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6075 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6076 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6081 match self.resend_order {
6082 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6083 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6086 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6087 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6088 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6090 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6091 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6092 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6093 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6096 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6097 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6098 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6099 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6100 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6103 if self.is_outbound() {
6104 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6105 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6106 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6108 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6109 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6110 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6112 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6114 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6115 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6116 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6117 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6119 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6120 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6121 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6122 // consider the stale state on reload.
6125 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6126 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6127 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6129 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6130 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6131 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6133 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6134 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6136 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6137 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6138 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6140 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6141 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6143 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6146 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6147 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6148 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6150 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6153 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6154 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6156 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6157 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6158 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6160 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6162 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6164 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6167 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6169 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6170 htlc.write(writer)?;
6173 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6174 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6175 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6177 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6178 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6180 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6181 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6182 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6183 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6184 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6185 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6186 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6188 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6189 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6190 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6191 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6192 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6194 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6195 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6196 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6197 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6198 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6199 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6200 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6202 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6203 (2, chan_type, option),
6204 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6205 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6206 (5, self.config, required),
6207 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6208 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6209 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6210 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6211 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6212 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6213 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6214 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6215 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6222 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6223 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6224 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6225 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6226 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6227 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6229 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6231 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6233 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6234 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6235 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6236 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6237 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6239 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6240 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6243 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6244 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6245 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6247 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6249 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6250 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6251 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6252 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6253 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6254 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6255 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6256 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6258 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6260 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6261 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6262 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6265 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6267 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6268 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6269 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6271 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6272 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6273 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6274 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6275 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6276 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6277 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6278 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6279 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6280 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6281 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6282 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6283 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6284 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6289 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6290 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6291 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6292 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6293 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6294 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6295 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6296 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6297 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6298 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6299 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6300 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6302 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6303 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6306 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6310 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6313 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6318 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6319 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6320 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6321 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6322 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6323 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6324 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6325 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6326 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6327 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6329 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6330 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6331 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6333 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6334 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6335 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6341 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6342 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6343 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6344 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6347 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6353 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6354 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6357 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6358 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6359 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6360 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6363 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6365 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6368 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6372 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6373 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6374 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6375 // consider the stale state on reload.
6376 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6379 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6381 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6386 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6387 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6390 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6391 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6393 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6395 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6396 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6398 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6399 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6401 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6402 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6403 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6405 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6407 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6408 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6410 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6411 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6414 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6416 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6417 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6418 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6419 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6421 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6424 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6430 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6433 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6438 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6439 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6441 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6443 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6447 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6448 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6449 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6451 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6457 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6458 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6459 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6460 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6461 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6462 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6463 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6464 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6465 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6466 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6468 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6469 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6470 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6471 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6472 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6474 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6475 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6476 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6477 (2, channel_type, option),
6478 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6479 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6480 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6481 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6482 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6483 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6484 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6485 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6486 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6487 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6488 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6489 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6492 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6493 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6494 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6496 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6497 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6499 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6500 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6505 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6506 if iter.next().is_some() {
6507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6511 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6512 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6513 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6514 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6515 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6518 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6519 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6523 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6524 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6529 config: config.unwrap(),
6533 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6534 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6535 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6539 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6541 channel_value_satoshis,
6543 latest_monitor_update_id,
6546 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6549 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6550 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6553 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6554 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6555 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6559 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6560 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6561 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6562 monitor_pending_forwards,
6563 monitor_pending_failures,
6564 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6567 holding_cell_update_fee,
6568 next_holder_htlc_id,
6569 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6570 update_time_counter,
6573 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6574 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6575 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6576 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6578 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6579 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6580 closing_fee_limits: None,
6581 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6583 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6585 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6586 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6588 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6590 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6591 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6592 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6593 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6594 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6595 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6596 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6597 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6598 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6601 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6603 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6604 funding_transaction,
6606 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6607 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6608 counterparty_node_id,
6610 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6614 channel_update_status,
6615 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6620 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6622 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6624 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6626 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6627 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6628 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6630 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6631 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6633 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6641 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6642 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6643 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6644 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6645 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6647 use ln::PaymentHash;
6648 use ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6649 use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6650 use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6651 use ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6652 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6653 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6655 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6656 use chain::BestBlock;
6657 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6658 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6659 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6660 use util::config::UserConfig;
6661 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6662 use util::errors::APIError;
6663 use util::test_utils;
6664 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6665 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6666 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6667 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6668 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6669 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6670 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6671 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6672 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6673 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6674 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6675 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6678 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6681 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6682 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6688 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6689 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6690 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6691 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6695 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6696 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6697 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6698 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6699 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6700 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6704 signer: InMemorySigner,
6706 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6707 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6709 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6710 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6711 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6712 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6713 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6714 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6715 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6716 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6719 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6721 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6722 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6725 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6728 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6729 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6730 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6733 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6734 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6735 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6739 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6740 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6741 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6742 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6744 let seed = [42; 32];
6745 let network = Network::Testnet;
6746 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6747 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6748 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6752 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6753 let config = UserConfig::default();
6754 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6755 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6756 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6758 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6759 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6763 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6764 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6766 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6767 let original_fee = 253;
6768 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6769 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6770 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6771 let seed = [42; 32];
6772 let network = Network::Testnet;
6773 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6775 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6776 let config = UserConfig::default();
6777 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6779 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6780 // same as the old fee.
6781 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6782 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6783 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6787 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6788 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6789 // dust limits are used.
6790 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6792 let seed = [42; 32];
6793 let network = Network::Testnet;
6794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6797 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6798 // they have different dust limits.
6800 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6801 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6802 let config = UserConfig::default();
6803 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6805 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6806 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6807 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6808 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6809 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6811 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6812 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6813 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6814 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6815 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6817 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6818 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6819 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6821 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6822 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6823 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6824 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6827 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6829 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6830 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6831 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6832 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6833 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6835 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6836 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6837 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6838 payment_secret: None,
6839 payment_params: None,
6843 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6844 // the dust limit check.
6845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6846 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6847 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6848 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6850 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6851 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6852 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6853 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6854 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6855 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6856 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6860 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6861 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6862 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6863 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6864 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6865 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6867 let seed = [42; 32];
6868 let network = Network::Testnet;
6869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6871 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6872 let config = UserConfig::default();
6873 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6875 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6876 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6878 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6879 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6880 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6881 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6882 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6883 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6885 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6886 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6888 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6889 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6891 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6893 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6894 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6895 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6896 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6897 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6899 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6900 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6901 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6902 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6903 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6907 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6908 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6909 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6910 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6911 let seed = [42; 32];
6912 let network = Network::Testnet;
6913 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6914 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6915 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6917 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6919 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6920 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6921 let config = UserConfig::default();
6922 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6924 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6925 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6926 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6927 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6929 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6930 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6931 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6933 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6934 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6935 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6936 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6938 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6939 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6940 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6942 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6943 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6945 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6946 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6947 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6948 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6949 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6950 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6951 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6952 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6953 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6958 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6960 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6961 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6962 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6963 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6964 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6965 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6966 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6973 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6974 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6975 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6977 let seed = [42; 32];
6978 let network = Network::Testnet;
6979 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6980 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6981 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6983 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
6984 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
6985 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
6986 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
6987 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
6988 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
6989 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
6990 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
6992 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
6993 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6994 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6995 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6996 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6997 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6999 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7000 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7001 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7002 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7004 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7006 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7007 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7008 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7009 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7010 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7011 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7013 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7014 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7015 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7016 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7018 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7019 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7020 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7021 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7022 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7024 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7025 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7027 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7028 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7029 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7031 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7032 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7033 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7034 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7035 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7037 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7038 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7040 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7041 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7042 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7046 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7048 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7049 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7050 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7052 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7053 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7054 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7055 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7057 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7058 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7059 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7061 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7063 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7064 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7067 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7068 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7069 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7070 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7071 let seed = [42; 32];
7072 let network = Network::Testnet;
7073 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7074 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7075 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7078 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7079 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7080 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7082 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7083 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7085 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7086 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7087 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7089 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7090 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7092 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7094 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7095 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7097 // Channel Negotiations failed
7098 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7099 assert!(result.is_err());
7104 fn channel_update() {
7105 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7106 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7107 let seed = [42; 32];
7108 let network = Network::Testnet;
7109 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7110 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7112 // Create a channel.
7113 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7114 let config = UserConfig::default();
7115 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7116 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7117 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7118 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7120 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7121 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7122 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7124 short_channel_id: 0,
7127 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7128 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7129 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7131 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7132 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7134 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7136 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7138 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7139 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7140 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7141 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7143 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7144 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7145 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7147 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7151 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7153 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7154 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7155 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7156 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7157 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7158 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7159 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7160 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7161 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
7162 use ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7163 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7164 use util::logger::Logger;
7167 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7168 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7169 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7170 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7172 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7174 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7175 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7176 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7177 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7178 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7179 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7181 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7182 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7187 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7188 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7189 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7191 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7192 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7193 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7194 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7195 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7196 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7198 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7200 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7201 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7202 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7203 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7204 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7205 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7207 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7208 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7209 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7210 selected_contest_delay: 144
7212 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7213 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7215 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7216 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7218 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7219 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7221 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7222 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7224 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7225 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7226 // build_commitment_transaction.
7227 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7228 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7229 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7230 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7231 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7233 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7234 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7235 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7236 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7240 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7241 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7242 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7243 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7247 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7248 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7249 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7251 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7252 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7254 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7255 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7257 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7259 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7260 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7261 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7262 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7263 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7264 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7265 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7267 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7268 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7269 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7270 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7272 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7273 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7274 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7276 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7278 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7279 commitment_tx.clone(),
7280 counterparty_signature,
7281 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7282 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7283 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7285 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7286 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7288 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7289 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7290 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7292 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7293 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7296 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7297 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7299 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7300 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7301 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7302 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7303 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7304 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7305 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7306 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7308 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7311 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7312 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7313 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7317 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7320 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7321 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7322 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7324 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7325 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7326 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7327 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7328 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7329 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7330 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7331 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7333 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7337 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7338 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7340 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7341 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7342 "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", {});
7344 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7345 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7346 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7347 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7349 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7350 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7352 amount_msat: 1000000,
7354 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7355 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7357 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7360 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7361 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7363 amount_msat: 2000000,
7365 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7366 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7368 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7371 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7372 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7374 amount_msat: 2000000,
7376 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7377 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7378 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7380 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7383 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7384 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7386 amount_msat: 3000000,
7388 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7389 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7390 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7392 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7395 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7396 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7398 amount_msat: 4000000,
7400 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7401 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7403 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7407 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7408 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7409 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7411 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7412 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7413 "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", {
7416 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7417 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7418 "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" },
7421 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7422 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7423 "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" },
7426 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7427 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7428 "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" },
7431 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7432 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7433 "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" },
7436 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7437 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7438 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7441 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7442 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7443 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7445 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7446 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7447 "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", {
7450 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7451 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7452 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7455 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7456 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7457 "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" },
7460 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7461 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7462 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7465 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7466 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7467 "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" },
7470 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7471 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7472 "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" }
7475 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7476 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7477 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7479 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7480 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7481 "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", {
7484 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7485 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7486 "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" },
7489 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7490 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7491 "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" },
7494 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7495 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7496 "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" },
7499 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7500 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7501 "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" }
7504 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7505 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7506 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7507 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7509 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7510 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7511 "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", {
7514 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7515 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7516 "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" },
7519 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7520 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7521 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7524 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7525 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7526 "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" },
7529 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7530 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7531 "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" }
7534 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7535 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7536 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7537 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7539 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7540 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7541 "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", {
7544 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7545 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7546 "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" },
7549 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7550 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7551 "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" },
7554 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7555 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7556 "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" },
7559 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7560 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7561 "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" }
7564 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7565 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7566 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7568 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7569 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7570 "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", {
7573 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7574 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7575 "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" },
7578 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7579 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7580 "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" },
7583 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7584 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7585 "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" }
7588 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7589 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7590 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7592 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7593 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7594 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7597 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7598 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7599 "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" },
7602 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7603 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7604 "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" },
7607 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7608 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7609 "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" }
7612 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7613 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7614 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7616 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7617 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7618 "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", {
7621 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7622 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7623 "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" },
7626 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7627 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7628 "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" }
7631 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7632 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7633 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7634 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7636 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7637 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7638 "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", {
7641 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7642 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7643 "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" },
7646 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7647 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7648 "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" }
7651 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7652 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7653 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7654 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7656 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7657 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7658 "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", {
7661 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7662 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7663 "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" },
7666 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7667 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7668 "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" }
7671 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7672 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7673 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7675 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7676 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7677 "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", {
7680 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7681 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7682 "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" }
7685 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7686 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7687 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7688 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7690 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7691 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7692 "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", {
7695 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7696 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7697 "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" }
7700 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7701 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7702 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7703 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7705 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7706 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7707 "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", {
7710 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7711 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7712 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7715 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7716 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7717 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7718 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7720 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7721 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7722 "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", {});
7724 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7725 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7726 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7727 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7730 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7731 "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", {});
7733 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7734 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7735 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7736 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7738 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7739 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7740 "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", {});
7742 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7743 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7744 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7746 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7747 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7748 "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", {});
7750 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7751 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7752 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7753 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7755 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7756 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7757 "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", {});
7759 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7760 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7761 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7762 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7764 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7765 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7766 "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", {});
7768 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7769 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7770 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7771 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7772 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7773 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7775 amount_msat: 2000000,
7777 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7778 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7780 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7783 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7784 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7785 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7787 amount_msat: 5000000,
7789 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7790 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7791 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7793 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7796 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7797 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7799 amount_msat: 5000000,
7801 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7802 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7803 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7805 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7809 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7810 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7811 "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", {
7814 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7815 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7816 "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" },
7818 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7819 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7820 "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" },
7822 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7823 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7824 "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" }
7827 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7828 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7829 "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", {
7832 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7833 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7834 "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" },
7836 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7837 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7838 "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" },
7840 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7841 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7842 "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" }
7847 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7848 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7850 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7851 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7852 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7853 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7855 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7856 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7857 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7859 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7860 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7862 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7863 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7865 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7866 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7867 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7871 fn test_key_derivation() {
7872 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7873 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7875 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7876 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7878 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7879 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7881 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7882 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7884 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7885 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7887 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7888 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7890 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7891 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7893 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7894 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7898 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7899 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7901 let seed = [42; 32];
7902 let network = Network::Testnet;
7903 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7904 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7906 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7907 let config = UserConfig::default();
7908 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7909 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7911 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7912 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7914 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7915 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7916 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7917 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7918 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7919 assert!(res.is_ok());