1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
713 Close((String, ClosureReason)),
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close((err.clone(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err }))
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
943 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
944 /// commitment points from our signer.
945 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
946 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
947 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
948 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
949 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
950 /// will not be used.
951 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
952 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
953 /// and we are not pending a new one.
954 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
957 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
958 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
959 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
961 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
962 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
963 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
964 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
968 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
969 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
972 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
974 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
975 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
979 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
981 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
982 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
986 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
988 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
989 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
993 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
994 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
996 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
997 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
998 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1003 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1004 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1005 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1006 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1011 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1012 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1013 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1014 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1015 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1016 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1017 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1018 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1019 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1020 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1021 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1022 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1023 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1024 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1025 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1027 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1028 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1029 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1030 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1032 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1033 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1034 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1035 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1037 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1038 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1039 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1040 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1041 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1043 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1044 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1045 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1046 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1048 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1049 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1050 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1052 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1053 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1054 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1055 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1056 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1058 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1059 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1062 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1063 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1065 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1066 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1067 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1068 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1070 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1071 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1073 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1074 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1077 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1078 (0, update, required),
1081 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1082 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1083 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1084 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1085 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1086 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1087 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1088 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1089 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1090 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1093 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1095 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1097 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1099 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1100 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1102 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1104 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1105 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1109 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1111 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1112 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1114 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1115 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1116 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1122 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1123 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1124 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1125 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1126 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1128 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1129 /// in a timely manner.
1130 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1133 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1134 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1135 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1137 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1138 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1139 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1140 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1144 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1145 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1146 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1148 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1149 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1150 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1151 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1153 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1157 /// The current channel ID.
1158 channel_id: ChannelId,
1159 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1160 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1161 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1162 channel_state: ChannelState,
1164 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1165 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1167 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1168 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1169 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1173 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1174 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1176 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1177 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1179 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1181 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1182 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1183 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1185 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1186 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1187 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1189 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1190 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1191 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1192 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1193 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1194 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1196 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1197 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1198 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1199 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1200 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1201 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1203 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1205 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1206 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1207 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1209 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1210 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1211 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1212 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1213 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1214 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1215 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1216 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1218 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1219 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1220 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1222 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1223 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1224 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1225 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1226 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1227 /// outbound or inbound.
1228 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1230 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1232 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1233 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1234 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1235 // HTLCs with similar state.
1236 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1237 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1238 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1239 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1240 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1241 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1242 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1243 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1244 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1245 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1247 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1248 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1249 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1251 update_time_counter: u32,
1253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1254 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1255 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1256 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1257 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1258 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1260 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1261 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1263 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1264 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1265 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1266 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1268 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1269 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1271 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1273 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1275 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1276 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1277 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1278 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1279 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1281 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1282 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1284 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1285 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1286 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1288 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1289 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1290 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1291 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1292 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1293 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1294 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1295 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1297 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1300 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1302 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1305 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1307 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1310 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1312 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1314 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1315 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1318 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1320 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1322 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1323 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1325 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1327 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1328 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1329 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1331 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1333 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1334 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1335 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1337 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1338 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1339 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1341 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1343 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1345 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1346 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1347 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1348 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1350 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1351 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1352 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1354 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1355 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1356 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1358 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1359 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1360 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1361 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1363 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1365 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1367 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1368 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1369 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1370 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1371 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1373 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1374 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1376 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1377 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1378 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1379 /// unblock the state machine.
1381 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1382 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1383 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1385 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1386 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1387 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1390 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1391 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1392 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1393 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1394 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1395 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1396 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1398 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1399 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1401 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1402 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1403 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1405 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1406 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1407 // associated channel mapping.
1409 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1410 // to store all of them.
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1413 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1414 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1415 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1416 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1417 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1419 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1420 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1422 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1423 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1425 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1426 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1428 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1429 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1431 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1433 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1435 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1436 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1437 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1440 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1441 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1442 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1443 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1444 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1445 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1446 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1448 config: &'a UserConfig,
1449 current_chain_height: u32,
1452 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1453 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1454 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1455 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1456 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1458 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1459 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1461 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1464 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1466 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1467 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1469 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1471 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1472 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1473 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1475 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1476 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1479 // Check sanity of message fields:
1480 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1481 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
1482 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1483 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1484 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1486 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1487 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1489 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1492 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1493 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1494 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1496 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1497 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1499 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1500 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1502 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1504 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1505 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1506 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1508 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1509 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1511 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1512 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1515 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1516 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1517 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1519 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1520 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1522 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1523 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1525 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1526 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1528 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1529 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1531 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1532 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1534 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1535 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1538 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1540 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1541 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1546 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1547 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1548 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1549 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1551 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1554 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1555 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1556 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1558 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1562 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1563 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1564 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1565 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1569 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1570 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1571 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1575 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1576 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1577 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1578 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1579 return Err(ChannelError::close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1582 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1583 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1584 &Some(ref script) => {
1585 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1586 if script.len() == 0 {
1589 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1592 Some(script.clone())
1595 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1597 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1602 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1603 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1604 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1605 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1609 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1610 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1615 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1616 Ok(script) => script,
1617 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1623 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1626 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1629 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1631 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1632 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1634 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1636 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1639 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1640 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1642 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1647 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1649 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1650 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1651 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1652 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1657 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1660 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1663 holder_commitment_point,
1664 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1667 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1668 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1669 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1670 pending_update_fee: None,
1671 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1672 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1673 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1674 update_time_counter: 1,
1676 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1678 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1679 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1680 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1681 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1682 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1683 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1684 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1686 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1687 signer_pending_funding: false,
1690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1696 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1697 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1698 closing_fee_limits: None,
1699 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1701 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1702 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1703 short_channel_id: None,
1704 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1706 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1707 channel_value_satoshis,
1708 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1709 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1710 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1711 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1712 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1713 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1714 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1715 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1716 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1717 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1720 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1722 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1723 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1724 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1725 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1726 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1727 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1728 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1730 funding_outpoint: None,
1731 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1733 funding_transaction: None,
1734 is_batch_funding: None,
1736 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1737 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1738 counterparty_node_id,
1740 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1742 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1744 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1745 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1747 announcement_sigs: None,
1749 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1750 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1752 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1754 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1755 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1757 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1758 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1760 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1761 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1764 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1769 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1771 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1777 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1778 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1779 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1780 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1781 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1782 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1783 funding_satoshis: u64,
1786 config: &'a UserConfig,
1787 current_chain_height: u32,
1788 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1789 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1790 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1791 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1792 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1793 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1794 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1796 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1797 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1798 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1800 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1801 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1803 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1805 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1808 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1811 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1812 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1815 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1819 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1820 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1822 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1823 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1825 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1827 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1829 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1830 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1831 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1835 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1836 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1838 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1839 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1840 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1841 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1845 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1846 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1847 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1851 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1852 Ok(script) => script,
1853 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1856 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1858 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1859 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1864 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1865 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1866 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1867 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1872 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1874 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1875 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1876 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1877 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1879 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1880 channel_value_satoshis,
1882 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1885 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1888 holder_commitment_point,
1889 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1892 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1893 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1894 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1895 pending_update_fee: None,
1896 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1897 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1898 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1899 update_time_counter: 1,
1901 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1903 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1904 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1905 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1906 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1907 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1908 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1909 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1911 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1912 signer_pending_funding: false,
1914 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1915 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1916 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1917 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1918 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1919 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1921 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1922 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1923 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1924 closing_fee_limits: None,
1925 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1927 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1928 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1929 short_channel_id: None,
1930 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1932 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1933 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1934 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1935 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1936 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1937 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1938 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1939 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1940 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1941 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1942 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1943 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1944 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1945 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1947 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1949 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1950 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1951 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1952 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1953 counterparty_parameters: None,
1954 funding_outpoint: None,
1955 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1957 funding_transaction: None,
1958 is_batch_funding: None,
1960 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1961 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1962 counterparty_node_id,
1964 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1966 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1968 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1969 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1971 announcement_sigs: None,
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1974 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1975 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1976 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1978 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1979 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1981 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1982 outbound_scid_alias,
1984 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1985 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1993 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1994 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1999 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2000 self.update_time_counter
2003 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2004 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2007 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2008 self.config.announced_channel
2011 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2012 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2015 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2017 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2018 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2021 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2022 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2023 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2026 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2027 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2028 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2029 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2030 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2031 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2032 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2035 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2036 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2037 match self.channel_state {
2038 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2039 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2040 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2041 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2042 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2043 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2044 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2046 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2048 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2049 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2053 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2054 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2055 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2056 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2057 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2058 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2061 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2062 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2063 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2067 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2068 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2069 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2070 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2071 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2074 // Public utilities:
2076 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2080 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2082 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2083 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2084 self.temporary_channel_id
2087 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2091 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2092 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2093 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2097 /// Gets the channel's type
2098 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2102 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2104 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2105 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2106 self.short_channel_id
2109 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2110 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2111 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2114 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2115 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2116 self.outbound_scid_alias
2119 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2121 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2122 return &self.holder_signer
2125 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2126 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2127 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2128 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2129 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2130 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2133 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2134 /// get_funding_created.
2135 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2136 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2139 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2140 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2141 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2142 if conf_height > 0 {
2149 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2150 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2151 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2154 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2155 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2156 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2157 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2161 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2164 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2165 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2168 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2169 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2172 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2173 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2174 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2177 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2178 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2181 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2182 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2183 self.counterparty_node_id
2186 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2187 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2188 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2191 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2192 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2193 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2196 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2197 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2199 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2200 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2201 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2202 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2204 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2208 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2209 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2210 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2213 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2214 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2215 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2218 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2219 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2220 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2222 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2223 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2228 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2229 self.channel_value_satoshis
2232 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2236 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2237 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2240 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2241 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2242 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2243 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2246 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2247 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2248 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2249 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2251 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2255 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2256 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2257 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2260 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2261 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2262 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2265 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2266 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2267 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2270 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2271 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2272 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2275 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2276 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2277 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2280 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2281 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2282 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2285 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2286 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2287 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2288 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2289 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2292 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2294 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2295 self.prev_config = None;
2299 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2300 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2304 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2305 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2306 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2307 let did_channel_update =
2308 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2309 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2310 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2311 if did_channel_update {
2312 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2313 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2314 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2315 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2317 self.config.options = *config;
2321 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2322 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2323 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2324 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2325 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2328 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2329 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2330 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2331 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2332 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2334 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2335 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2336 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2337 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2338 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2339 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2340 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2342 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2343 where L::Target: Logger
2345 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2346 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2347 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2349 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2350 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2351 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2352 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2354 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2355 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2356 if match update_state {
2357 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2358 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2359 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2360 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2361 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2363 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2367 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2368 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2369 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2371 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2373 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2374 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2375 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2377 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2378 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2379 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2380 transaction_output_index: None
2385 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2386 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2387 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2388 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2389 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2392 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2394 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2395 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2396 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2399 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2402 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2403 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2406 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2408 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2409 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2410 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2412 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2413 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2419 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2421 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2422 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2423 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2424 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2425 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2426 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2427 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2431 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2432 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2434 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2436 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2437 if generated_by_local {
2438 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2439 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2440 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2450 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2452 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2453 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2454 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2455 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2456 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2457 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2458 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2461 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2462 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2463 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2464 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2468 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2469 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2473 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2474 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2476 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2478 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2479 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2481 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2482 if !generated_by_local {
2483 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2491 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2492 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2493 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2494 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2495 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2496 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2497 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2498 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2500 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2502 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2503 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2504 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2505 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2507 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2509 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2510 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2511 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2512 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2515 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2516 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2517 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2518 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2520 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2523 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2524 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2525 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2526 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2528 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2531 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2532 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2537 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2538 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2543 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2545 let channel_parameters =
2546 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2547 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2548 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2555 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2558 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2559 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2560 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2561 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2569 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2570 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2571 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2572 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2577 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2578 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2579 /// our counterparty!)
2580 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2581 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2582 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2583 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
2584 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2585 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2586 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2588 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2592 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2593 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2594 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2595 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2596 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2597 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2598 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2600 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2603 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2604 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2605 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2606 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2607 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2610 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2611 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2614 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2618 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2619 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2620 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2621 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2622 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2623 // which are near the dust limit.
2624 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2625 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2626 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2627 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2628 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2630 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2631 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2633 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2634 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2637 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2638 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2639 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2642 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2643 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2645 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2647 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2648 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2651 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2652 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2655 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2656 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2658 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2659 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2661 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2664 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2665 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2666 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2667 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2668 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2669 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2671 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2673 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2674 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2679 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2680 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2681 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2682 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2684 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2685 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2686 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2687 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2688 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2691 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2693 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2694 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2698 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2699 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2700 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2701 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2702 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2703 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2704 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2706 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2708 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2709 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2711 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2717 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2718 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2719 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2720 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2721 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2722 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2723 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2724 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2725 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2726 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2727 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2728 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2729 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2730 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2731 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2732 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2733 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2738 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2739 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2740 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2741 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2742 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2743 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2744 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2745 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2749 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2750 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2751 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2752 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2753 match holding_cell_update {
2754 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2755 holding_cell_states.insert(
2757 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2760 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2761 holding_cell_states.insert(
2763 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2766 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2767 holding_cell_states.insert(
2769 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2773 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2776 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2777 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2780 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2781 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2783 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2784 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2785 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2786 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2787 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2788 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2789 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2790 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2791 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2792 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2799 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2800 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2801 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2802 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2805 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2806 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2808 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2809 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2810 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2811 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2812 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2813 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2814 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2815 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2816 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2817 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2820 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2821 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2827 } = *holding_cell_update {
2828 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2830 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2831 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2832 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2833 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2834 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2835 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2842 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2843 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2844 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2845 /// corner case properly.
2846 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2847 -> AvailableBalances
2848 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2850 let context = &self;
2851 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2854 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2855 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2857 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2858 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2859 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2860 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2863 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2865 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2866 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2868 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2870 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2872 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2873 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2877 if context.is_outbound() {
2878 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2879 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2881 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2882 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2884 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2885 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2886 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2887 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2890 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2891 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2892 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2893 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2894 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2895 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2896 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2899 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2900 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2901 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2902 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2903 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2904 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2905 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2906 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2907 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2908 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2909 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2911 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2914 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2915 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2916 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2917 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2918 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2921 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2922 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2924 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2925 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2926 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2928 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2929 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2930 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2931 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2935 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2937 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2938 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2939 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2940 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2941 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2942 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2943 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2945 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2946 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2948 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2949 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2950 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2953 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2954 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2955 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2956 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2957 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2958 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2959 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2960 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2961 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2962 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2966 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2967 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2968 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2969 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2970 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2971 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2974 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2975 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2976 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2977 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2978 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2981 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2982 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2983 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2985 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2989 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2990 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2992 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2993 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2997 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2998 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2999 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3000 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3002 outbound_capacity_msat,
3003 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3004 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3009 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3010 let context = &self;
3011 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3014 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3015 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3017 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3018 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3020 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3021 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3023 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3024 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3025 let context = &self;
3026 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3028 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3031 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3032 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3034 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3035 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3037 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3038 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3040 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3041 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3045 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3046 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3052 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3053 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3054 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3057 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3058 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3059 included_htlcs += 1;
3062 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3063 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3067 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3068 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3069 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3070 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3071 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3072 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3077 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3079 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3080 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3085 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3086 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3090 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3091 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3095 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3096 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3098 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3099 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3100 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3102 total_pending_htlcs,
3103 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3104 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3105 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3107 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3108 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3109 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3111 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3113 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3118 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3119 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3121 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3122 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3124 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3125 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3127 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3128 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3129 let context = &self;
3130 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3132 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3135 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3136 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3138 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3139 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3141 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3142 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3144 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3145 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3149 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3150 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3156 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3157 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3158 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3159 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3160 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3161 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3164 included_htlcs += 1;
3167 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3168 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3171 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3172 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3174 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3175 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3176 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3181 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3182 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3183 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3186 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3187 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3189 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3190 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3192 total_pending_htlcs,
3193 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3194 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3195 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3197 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3198 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3199 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3201 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3203 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3208 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3209 match self.channel_state {
3210 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3211 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3212 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3213 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3223 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3225 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3226 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3229 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3231 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3232 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3233 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3237 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3238 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3239 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3242 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3244 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3245 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3248 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3249 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3250 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3251 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3252 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3253 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3254 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3255 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3256 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3257 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3258 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3260 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3261 // return them to fail the payment.
3262 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3263 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3264 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3266 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3267 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3272 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3273 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3274 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3275 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3276 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3277 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3278 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3279 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3280 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3281 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3282 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3283 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3284 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3285 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3286 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3290 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3291 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3293 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3294 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3298 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3299 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3300 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3301 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3302 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3303 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3304 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3305 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3309 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3310 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3311 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3312 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3314 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3315 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3316 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3317 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3319 match &self.holder_signer {
3320 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3321 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3322 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3323 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3324 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3327 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3331 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3332 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3333 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3335 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3336 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3337 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3339 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3340 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3341 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3344 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3345 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3347 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3353 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3354 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3355 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3356 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3357 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3360 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3362 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3364 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3365 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3370 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3371 // We've exhausted our options
3374 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3375 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3378 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3379 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3380 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3381 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3383 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3384 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3385 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3386 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3387 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3388 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3390 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3392 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3397 // Internal utility functions for channels
3399 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3400 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3401 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3403 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3405 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3406 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3407 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3409 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3412 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3414 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3417 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3418 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3419 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3421 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3423 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3424 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3425 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3426 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3427 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3430 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3431 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3432 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3433 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3434 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3435 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3436 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3439 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3440 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3442 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3444 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3445 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3446 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3447 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3448 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3449 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3450 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3453 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3454 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3456 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3457 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3460 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3461 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3462 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3463 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3464 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3465 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3468 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3469 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3470 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3471 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3472 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3473 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3479 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3480 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3481 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3482 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3483 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3484 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3485 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3486 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3487 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3488 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3489 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3490 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3493 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3494 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3495 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3496 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3497 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3498 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3502 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3504 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3505 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3506 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3510 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3511 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3512 trait FailHTLCContents {
3513 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3514 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3515 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3516 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3518 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3519 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3520 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3521 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3523 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3524 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3526 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3527 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3530 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3531 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3532 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3533 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3536 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3537 failure_code: self.1
3540 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3541 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3543 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3544 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3546 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3547 failure_code: self.1
3552 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3553 fn name() -> &'static str;
3555 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3556 fn name() -> &'static str {
3560 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3561 fn name() -> &'static str {
3562 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3566 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3567 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3568 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3570 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3571 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3572 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3573 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3575 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3576 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3578 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3580 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3581 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3582 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3583 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3585 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3586 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3590 return Err(ChannelError::Close((format!(
3591 "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit
3592 ), ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
3593 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
3594 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: lower_limit,
3601 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3602 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3603 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3604 // outside of those situations will fail.
3605 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3609 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3614 1 + // script length (0)
3618 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3619 2 + // witness marker and flag
3620 1 + // witness element count
3621 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3622 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3623 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3624 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3625 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3626 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3628 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3629 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3630 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3636 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3637 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3638 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3639 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3641 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3642 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3643 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3645 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3646 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3647 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3648 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3649 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3650 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3653 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3654 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3657 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3658 value_to_holder = 0;
3661 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3662 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3663 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3664 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3666 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3667 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3670 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3671 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3674 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3677 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3678 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3680 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3682 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3683 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3684 where L::Target: Logger {
3685 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3686 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3687 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3688 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3689 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3690 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3691 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3692 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3696 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3697 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3698 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3699 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3701 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3702 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3705 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3706 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3707 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3709 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3710 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3711 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3712 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3713 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3714 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3715 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3717 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3718 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3719 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3721 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3722 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3724 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3727 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3728 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3732 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3736 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3738 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3739 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3740 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3741 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3744 // Now update local state:
3746 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3747 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3748 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3749 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3750 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3751 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3752 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3753 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3755 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3758 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3759 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3760 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3761 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3762 // do not not get into this branch.
3763 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3764 match pending_update {
3765 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3766 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3767 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3768 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3769 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3770 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3771 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3774 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3775 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3777 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3778 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3779 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3780 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3781 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3782 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3788 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3789 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3790 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3792 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3793 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3794 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3796 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3797 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3800 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3801 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3803 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3804 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3806 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3807 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3810 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3813 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3814 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3815 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3816 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3821 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3822 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3823 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3824 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3825 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3826 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3827 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3828 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3829 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3830 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3831 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3832 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3833 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3834 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3835 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3837 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3838 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3839 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3840 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3841 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3844 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3845 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3846 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3852 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3853 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3855 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3859 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3860 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3861 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3862 /// before we fail backwards.
3864 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3865 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3866 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3867 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3868 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3869 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3870 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3873 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3874 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3876 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3877 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3878 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3879 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3880 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3881 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3884 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3885 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3886 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3887 /// before we fail backwards.
3889 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3890 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3891 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3892 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3893 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3895 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3896 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3897 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3900 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3901 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3902 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3904 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3905 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3906 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3908 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3909 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3910 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3912 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3917 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3924 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3925 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3926 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3927 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3928 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3932 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3933 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3934 force_holding_cell = true;
3937 // Now update local state:
3938 if force_holding_cell {
3939 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3940 match pending_update {
3941 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3942 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3944 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3948 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3951 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3952 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3953 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3959 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3960 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3964 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3965 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3967 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3968 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3971 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3974 // Message handlers:
3975 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3976 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3977 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3978 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3979 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3980 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3981 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3984 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3986 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3988 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3989 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3990 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3991 debug_assert!(matches!(
3992 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3994 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3995 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3998 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3999 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4001 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4002 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4003 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4004 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4006 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4009 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4010 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4011 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4014 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4015 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4016 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4017 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4018 // when routing outbound payments.
4019 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4023 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4024 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4025 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4026 match &self.context.channel_state {
4027 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4028 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4029 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4030 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4031 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4032 check_reconnection = true;
4033 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4034 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4035 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4036 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4037 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4039 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4040 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4043 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4044 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4045 _ => return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4047 if check_reconnection {
4048 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4049 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4050 let expected_point =
4051 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4052 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4054 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4055 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4056 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4057 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4058 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4059 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4061 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4062 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4063 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4064 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4065 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4067 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4073 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4074 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4076 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4078 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4081 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4082 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4083 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4084 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4085 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4086 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4088 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4089 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4090 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4092 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4093 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4095 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4096 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4098 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4099 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4101 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4105 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4106 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4107 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4108 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4110 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4111 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4114 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4115 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4116 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4117 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4118 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4119 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4120 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4121 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4122 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4123 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4124 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4126 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4127 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4128 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4129 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4130 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4131 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4135 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4136 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4137 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4138 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4139 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4143 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4144 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4146 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4147 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4148 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4150 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4151 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4155 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4158 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4159 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4163 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4164 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4168 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4169 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4170 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4171 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4172 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4173 return Err(ChannelError::close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4176 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4177 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4179 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4183 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4184 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4185 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4189 // Now update local state:
4190 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4191 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4192 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4193 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4194 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4195 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4196 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4197 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4203 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4205 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4206 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4207 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4208 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4209 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4210 None => fail_reason.into(),
4211 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4212 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4213 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4220 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4221 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4222 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4223 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4225 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4226 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4231 Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4234 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4235 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4236 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4238 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4242 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4245 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4246 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4247 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4249 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4250 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4253 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4257 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4258 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4261 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4265 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4269 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4270 where L::Target: Logger
4272 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4275 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4278 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4282 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4284 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4286 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4287 let commitment_txid = {
4288 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4289 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4290 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4292 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4293 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4294 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4295 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4296 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4301 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4303 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4304 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4305 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4306 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4309 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4310 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4311 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4315 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4317 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4318 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4319 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4320 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4321 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4322 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4323 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4324 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4325 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4326 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4327 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4333 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4337 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4338 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4339 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4340 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4341 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4342 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4343 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4344 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4345 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4346 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4347 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4348 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4349 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4352 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4353 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4354 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4355 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4356 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4357 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4358 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4360 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4361 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4362 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4363 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4364 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4365 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4366 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4367 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4369 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4370 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4373 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4375 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4376 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4377 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4380 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4383 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4384 commitment_stats.tx,
4386 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4387 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4388 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4391 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4394 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4395 let mut need_commitment = false;
4396 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4397 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4398 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4399 need_commitment = true;
4403 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4404 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4405 Some(resolution.clone())
4407 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4408 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4409 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4410 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4411 need_commitment = true;
4414 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4415 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4416 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4417 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4418 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4419 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4420 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4421 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4422 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4423 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4424 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4425 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4426 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4427 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4429 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4431 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4432 need_commitment = true;
4436 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4437 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4438 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4439 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4440 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4441 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4442 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4444 nondust_htlc_sources,
4446 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4449 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4450 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4451 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4452 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4453 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4455 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4456 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4457 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4458 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4459 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4460 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4461 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4462 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4463 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4464 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4465 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4466 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4467 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4468 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4470 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4471 &self.context.channel_id);
4472 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4475 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4476 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4477 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4478 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4479 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4480 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4481 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4482 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4483 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4487 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4488 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4489 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4490 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4493 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4494 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4495 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4496 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4497 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4498 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4499 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4501 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4502 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4503 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4506 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4507 /// for our counterparty.
4508 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4509 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4510 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4511 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4513 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4514 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4515 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4516 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4518 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4519 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4520 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4521 updates: Vec::new(),
4522 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4525 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4526 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4527 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4528 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4529 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4530 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4531 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4532 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4533 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4534 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4535 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4536 // to rebalance channels.
4537 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4538 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4539 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4540 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4542 match self.send_htlc(
4543 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4544 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4546 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4549 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4550 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4551 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4552 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4553 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4554 // into the holding cell without ever being
4555 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4556 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4557 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4560 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4567 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4568 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4569 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4570 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4571 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4572 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4573 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4574 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4575 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4576 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4577 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4578 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4581 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4582 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4583 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4585 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4586 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4587 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4590 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4592 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4593 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4594 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4595 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4596 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4597 // for a full revocation before failing.
4598 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4599 update_fail_count += 1;
4601 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4603 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4608 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4609 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4611 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4612 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4617 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4618 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4619 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4620 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4621 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4623 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4624 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4625 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4627 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4628 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4634 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4635 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4636 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4637 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4638 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4639 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4640 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4641 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4642 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4644 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4645 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4647 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4648 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4650 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4654 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4656 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4657 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4658 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4662 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4663 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4664 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4665 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4666 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4667 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4668 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4669 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4670 return Err(ChannelError::close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4675 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4676 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4679 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4680 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4681 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4682 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4684 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4686 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4691 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4692 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4693 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4694 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4695 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4696 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4697 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4698 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4699 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4701 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4704 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4705 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4706 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4707 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4708 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4709 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4710 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4711 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4712 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4714 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4715 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4718 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4719 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4720 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4721 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4722 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4723 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4724 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4725 let mut require_commitment = false;
4726 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4729 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4730 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4731 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4732 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4734 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4735 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4736 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4737 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4738 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4739 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4741 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4745 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4746 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4747 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4748 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4749 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4751 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4752 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4753 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4758 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4759 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4761 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4765 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4766 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4768 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4769 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4770 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4771 require_commitment = true;
4772 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4774 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4775 match pending_htlc_status {
4776 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4777 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4778 require_commitment = true;
4780 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4781 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4782 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4784 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4785 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4786 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4790 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4791 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4792 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4793 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4796 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4797 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4798 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4799 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4805 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4806 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4807 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4808 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4809 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4811 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4812 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4813 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4814 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4815 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4816 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4817 require_commitment = true;
4821 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4823 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4824 match update_state {
4825 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4826 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4827 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4828 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4829 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4830 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4832 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4833 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4834 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4835 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4836 require_commitment = true;
4837 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4838 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4843 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4844 let release_state_str =
4845 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4846 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4847 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4848 if !release_monitor {
4849 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4850 update: monitor_update,
4852 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4854 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4859 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4861 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4862 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4863 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4864 if require_commitment {
4865 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4866 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4867 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4868 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4870 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4871 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4872 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4873 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4874 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4876 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4877 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4878 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4879 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4880 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4883 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4884 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4885 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4886 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4887 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4888 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4890 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4891 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4893 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4894 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4896 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4897 if require_commitment {
4898 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4900 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4901 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4902 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4903 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4905 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4906 &self.context.channel_id(),
4907 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4910 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4911 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4913 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4914 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4916 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4917 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4923 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4924 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4925 /// commitment update.
4926 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4927 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4928 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4930 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4931 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4934 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4935 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4936 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4937 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4939 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4940 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4941 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4942 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4943 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4944 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4945 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4947 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4948 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4950 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4951 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4953 if !self.context.is_live() {
4954 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4957 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4958 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4959 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4960 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4961 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
4962 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4963 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4964 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4965 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4966 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4970 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4971 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4972 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4973 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4976 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4977 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4981 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4982 force_holding_cell = true;
4985 if force_holding_cell {
4986 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4990 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4991 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4993 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4994 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4999 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5000 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5002 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5004 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5005 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5006 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5007 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5011 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5012 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5013 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5017 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5018 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5021 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5022 // will be retransmitted.
5023 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5024 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5025 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5027 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5028 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5030 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5031 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5032 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5033 // this HTLC accordingly
5034 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5037 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5038 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5039 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5040 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5043 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5044 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5045 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5046 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5047 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5048 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5053 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5055 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5056 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5057 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5058 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5062 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5063 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5064 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5065 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5066 // the update upon reconnection.
5067 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5071 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5073 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5074 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5078 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5079 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5080 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5081 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5082 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5083 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5084 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5086 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5087 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5088 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5089 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5090 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5091 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5092 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5094 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5095 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5096 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5097 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5098 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5099 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5100 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5103 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5104 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5105 /// to the remote side.
5106 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5107 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5108 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5109 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5112 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5114 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5115 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5117 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5118 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5119 // first received the funding_signed.
5120 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5121 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5122 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5123 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5125 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5127 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5128 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5129 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5130 funding_broadcastable = None;
5133 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5134 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5135 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5136 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5137 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5138 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5139 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5140 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5141 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5142 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5143 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5146 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5148 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5149 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5150 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5151 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5152 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5153 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5154 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5155 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5157 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5158 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5159 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5160 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5161 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5162 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5163 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5167 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5168 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5170 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5171 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5173 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5174 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5177 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5178 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5179 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5180 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5181 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5182 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5183 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5184 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5185 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5186 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5190 pub fn check_for_stale_feerate<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, min_feerate: u32) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> {
5191 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5192 // While its possible our fee is too low for an outbound channel because we've been
5193 // unable to increase the fee, we don't try to force-close directly here.
5196 if self.context.feerate_per_kw < min_feerate {
5198 "Closing channel as feerate of {} is below required {} (the minimum required rate over the past day)",
5199 self.context.feerate_per_kw, min_feerate
5201 Err(ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
5202 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
5203 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: min_feerate,
5210 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5211 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5213 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5214 return Err(ChannelError::close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5216 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5217 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5219 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5221 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5222 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5223 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5224 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5225 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5226 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5227 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5228 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5229 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5231 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5232 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5233 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5238 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5240 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5241 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5242 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5243 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5245 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5246 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5248 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5249 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5252 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5253 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5254 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5255 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5257 SignerResumeUpdates {
5264 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5265 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() <= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER + 2);
5266 // TODO: handle non-available case when get_per_commitment_point becomes async
5267 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
5268 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
5269 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5270 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5272 per_commitment_secret,
5273 next_per_commitment_point,
5275 next_local_nonce: None,
5279 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5280 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5281 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5282 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5283 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5284 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5286 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5287 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5288 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5289 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5290 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5291 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5292 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5293 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5294 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5295 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5296 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5301 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5302 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5304 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5305 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5306 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5307 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5308 reason: err_packet.clone()
5311 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5312 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5313 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5314 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5315 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5316 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5319 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5320 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5321 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5322 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5323 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5330 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5331 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5332 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5333 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5337 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5338 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5339 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5340 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5341 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5342 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5343 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5347 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5348 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5350 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5351 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5352 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5353 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5358 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5359 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5364 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5365 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5366 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5367 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5368 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5370 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5375 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5376 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5378 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5379 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5380 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5381 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5382 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5383 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5384 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5385 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5388 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5390 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5391 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5392 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5393 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5394 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5397 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5398 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5399 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5402 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5403 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5404 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5405 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5406 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5407 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5408 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5410 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5411 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5412 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5413 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5414 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5417 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5418 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5419 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5420 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5421 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5422 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5423 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5424 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5428 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5429 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5430 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5431 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5432 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5433 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5434 our_commitment_transaction
5438 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5439 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5440 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5441 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5443 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5445 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5447 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5448 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5449 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5450 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5451 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5452 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5454 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5455 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5456 channel_ready: None,
5457 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5458 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5459 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5463 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5464 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5465 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5466 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5467 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5468 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5472 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5473 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5474 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5476 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5477 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5478 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5481 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5484 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5485 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5486 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5487 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5488 our_commitment_transaction
5492 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5493 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5494 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5495 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5496 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5497 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5498 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5500 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5502 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5503 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5504 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5507 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5508 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5509 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5511 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5514 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5515 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5516 raa: required_revoke,
5517 commitment_update: None,
5518 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5520 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5521 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5522 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5524 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5527 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5528 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5529 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5530 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5531 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5532 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5535 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5536 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5537 raa: required_revoke,
5538 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5539 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5542 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5543 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5544 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5545 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5546 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5549 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5550 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5551 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5552 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5557 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5558 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5559 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5560 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5562 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5564 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5566 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5567 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5568 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5569 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5570 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5571 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5572 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5573 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5575 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5576 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5577 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5578 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5579 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5581 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5582 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5583 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5584 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5587 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5588 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5589 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5590 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5591 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5592 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5593 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5594 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5595 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5596 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5597 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5598 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5599 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5600 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5601 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5603 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5606 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5607 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5610 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5611 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5612 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5613 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5614 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5615 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5618 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5619 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5620 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5621 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5622 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5623 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5624 return Err(ChannelError::close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5626 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5632 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5633 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5634 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5635 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5637 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5638 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5639 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5640 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5641 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5642 return Ok((None, None, None));
5645 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5646 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5647 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5649 return Ok((None, None, None));
5652 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5653 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5654 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5655 return Ok((None, None, None));
5658 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5660 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5661 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5662 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5663 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5665 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5666 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5668 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5669 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5671 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5672 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5673 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5674 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5676 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5677 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5678 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5682 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5688 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5689 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5691 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5692 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5695 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5696 /// within our expected timeframe.
5698 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5699 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5700 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5703 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5706 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5707 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5711 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5712 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5714 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5717 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5718 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5719 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5720 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5721 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5723 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5724 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5725 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5728 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5730 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5734 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5735 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5736 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5739 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5742 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5743 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5744 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5745 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5747 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5750 assert!(send_shutdown);
5751 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5752 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5753 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5755 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5758 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5763 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5765 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5766 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5768 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5769 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5770 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5771 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5772 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5773 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5774 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5776 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5778 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5779 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5781 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5782 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5783 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5784 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5788 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5789 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5790 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5791 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5792 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5793 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5795 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5796 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5803 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5804 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5806 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5809 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5810 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5812 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5814 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5815 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5816 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5817 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5818 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5819 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5820 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5821 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5822 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5824 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5825 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5828 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5832 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5833 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5834 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5835 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5837 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5840 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5841 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5843 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5846 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5847 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5850 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5854 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5855 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5856 return Ok((None, None, None));
5859 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5860 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5861 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5864 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5866 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5869 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5870 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5871 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5872 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5873 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5877 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5878 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5883 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5884 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5886 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5889 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5890 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5891 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5892 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5894 monitor_update: None,
5895 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5896 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5897 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5898 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5899 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5900 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5901 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5902 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5904 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5905 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5906 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5907 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5911 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5913 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5914 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5915 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5916 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5918 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5921 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5922 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5924 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5926 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5927 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5929 monitor_update: None,
5930 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5931 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5932 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5933 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5934 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5935 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5936 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5937 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5939 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5940 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5941 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5942 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5947 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5948 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5950 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5952 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5953 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5954 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5956 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5958 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5965 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5966 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5969 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5970 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5972 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5976 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5977 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5978 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5979 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5980 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5982 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5983 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5984 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5986 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5987 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5990 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5991 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5992 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5993 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5994 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5995 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5996 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5997 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5999 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6002 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6003 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6004 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6005 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6007 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6011 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6012 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6013 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6014 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6016 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6022 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6023 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6024 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6025 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6026 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6027 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6028 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6030 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6031 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6034 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6036 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6037 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6043 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6044 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6045 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6046 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6047 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6048 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6049 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6051 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6052 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6059 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6060 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6061 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6066 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6067 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6070 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6071 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6072 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6073 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6076 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6077 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6078 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6080 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6081 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6082 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6083 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6084 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6085 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6086 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6089 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6090 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6091 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6092 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6093 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6094 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6095 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6096 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6100 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6101 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6102 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6103 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6104 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6105 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6106 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6110 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6111 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6116 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6117 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6118 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6119 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6120 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6121 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6125 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6126 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6127 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6128 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6130 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6131 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6132 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6133 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6134 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6135 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6136 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6137 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6138 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6140 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6141 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6142 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6149 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6150 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6153 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6154 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6157 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6158 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6162 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6163 &self.context.holder_signer
6167 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6169 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6170 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6171 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6172 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6173 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6174 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6176 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6178 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6186 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6187 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6191 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6192 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6193 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6194 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6197 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6198 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6199 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6200 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6203 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6204 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6205 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6206 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6207 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6208 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6211 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6212 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6213 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6214 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6215 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6216 if !release_monitor {
6217 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6226 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6227 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6228 /// here after logging them.
6229 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6230 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6231 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6232 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6235 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6236 update.update.update_id,
6246 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6247 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6250 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6251 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6252 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6254 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6255 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6257 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6258 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6260 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6261 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6262 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6265 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6266 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6267 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6268 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6269 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6270 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6272 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6273 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6274 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6276 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6277 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6278 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6279 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6280 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6281 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6287 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6288 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6289 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6290 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6293 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6294 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6295 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6298 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6299 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6300 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6303 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6304 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6305 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6308 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6309 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6310 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6311 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6312 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6315 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6316 self.context.channel_update_status
6319 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6320 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6321 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6324 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6325 where L::Target: Logger
6328 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6329 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6330 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6334 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6335 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6336 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6339 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6343 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6344 // channel_ready yet.
6345 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6346 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6347 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6351 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6352 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6353 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6354 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6356 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6357 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6358 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6360 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6361 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6364 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6365 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6367 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6368 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6369 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6370 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6371 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6372 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6373 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6374 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6376 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6380 if !need_commitment_update {
6381 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6385 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6386 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6387 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6391 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6392 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6396 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6397 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6399 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6402 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6403 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6404 msgs::ChannelReady {
6405 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6406 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6407 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6411 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6412 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6413 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6414 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6415 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6416 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6417 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6419 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6422 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6423 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6424 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6425 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6426 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6427 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6428 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6429 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6430 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6431 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6432 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6433 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6434 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6435 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6436 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6437 // channel and move on.
6438 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6439 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6441 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6442 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6443 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6445 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6446 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6447 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6448 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6449 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6450 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6451 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6452 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6457 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6458 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6459 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6460 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6461 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6464 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6465 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6466 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6467 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6468 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6469 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6472 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6473 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6474 // may have already happened for this block).
6475 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6476 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6477 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6478 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6481 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6482 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6483 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6484 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6492 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6493 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6494 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6495 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6497 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6498 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6501 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6503 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6504 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6505 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6506 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6508 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6511 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6514 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6515 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6516 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6517 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6519 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6522 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6523 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6524 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6526 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6527 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6529 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6530 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6531 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6539 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6541 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6542 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6543 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6545 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6546 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6549 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6550 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6551 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6552 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6553 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6554 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6555 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6556 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6559 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6560 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6561 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6562 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6564 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6565 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6566 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6568 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6569 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6570 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6571 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6573 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6574 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6575 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6576 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6577 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6578 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6579 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6582 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6583 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6585 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6588 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6589 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6590 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6591 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6592 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6593 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6594 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6595 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6596 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6597 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6598 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6599 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6600 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6601 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6602 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6603 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6604 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6610 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6615 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6616 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6618 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6619 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6620 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6621 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6623 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6626 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6628 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6629 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6630 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6631 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6632 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6633 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6635 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6636 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6639 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6640 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6641 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6642 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6643 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6644 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6646 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6647 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6650 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6651 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6652 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6653 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6654 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6660 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6661 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6662 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6663 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6665 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6668 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6672 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6676 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6677 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6681 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6685 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6686 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6689 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6693 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6695 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6700 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6701 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6702 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6704 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6709 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6711 None => return None,
6714 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6716 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6719 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6720 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6723 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6729 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6731 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6732 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6733 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6734 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6735 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6736 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6737 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6739 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6740 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6741 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6742 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6743 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6744 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6745 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6746 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6747 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6748 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6749 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6750 contents: announcement,
6753 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6758 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6762 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6763 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6764 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6765 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6766 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6767 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6768 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6769 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6771 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6773 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6774 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6775 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6776 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6778 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6779 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6780 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6781 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6784 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6785 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6786 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6787 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6790 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6793 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6794 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6795 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6796 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6797 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6798 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6801 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6803 Err(_) => return None,
6805 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6806 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6811 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6812 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6813 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6814 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6815 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6816 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6817 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6818 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6819 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6820 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6821 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6822 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6823 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6824 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6825 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6826 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6829 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6832 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6833 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6834 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6835 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6836 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6837 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6838 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6839 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6840 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6842 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6843 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6844 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
6845 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6846 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6847 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6848 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6849 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6850 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6852 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6853 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6854 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6855 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6856 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6857 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6858 next_funding_txid: None,
6863 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6865 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6866 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6867 /// commitment update.
6869 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6870 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6871 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6872 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6873 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6874 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6875 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6878 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6879 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6880 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6882 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6883 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6888 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6889 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6891 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6893 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6894 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6896 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6897 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6898 /// regenerate them.
6900 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6901 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6903 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6904 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6905 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6906 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6907 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6908 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6909 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6910 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6912 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6913 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6914 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6916 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6918 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6919 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6920 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6923 if amount_msat == 0 {
6924 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6927 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6928 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6929 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6930 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6933 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6934 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6935 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6938 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6939 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6940 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6941 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6942 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6943 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6944 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6945 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6948 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6949 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6950 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6951 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6952 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6953 else { "to peer" });
6955 if need_holding_cell {
6956 force_holding_cell = true;
6959 // Now update local state:
6960 if force_holding_cell {
6961 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6966 onion_routing_packet,
6973 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6974 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6976 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6978 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6984 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6985 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6986 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6990 onion_routing_packet,
6994 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6999 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7000 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7001 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7002 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7004 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7005 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7006 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7008 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7009 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7013 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7014 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7015 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7016 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7017 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7018 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7019 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7022 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7023 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7024 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7025 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7026 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7027 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7030 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7032 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7033 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7034 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7035 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7036 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7038 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7039 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7042 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7043 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7044 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7045 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7046 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7047 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7048 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7049 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7050 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7051 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7052 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7053 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7055 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7057 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7061 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7062 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7063 where L::Target: Logger
7065 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7066 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7067 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7071 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7072 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7073 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7074 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7075 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7076 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7077 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7078 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7079 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7080 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7081 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7087 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7090 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7091 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7092 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7093 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7094 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7095 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7097 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7098 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7099 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7101 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7102 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7103 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7106 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7107 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7111 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7112 &commitment_stats.tx,
7113 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7114 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7115 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7116 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7118 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7120 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7121 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7122 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7123 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7125 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7126 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7127 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7128 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7129 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7130 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7134 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7135 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7139 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7140 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7142 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7148 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7149 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7151 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7152 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7153 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7154 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7155 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7156 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7157 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7158 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7160 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7161 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7162 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7165 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7166 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7167 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7173 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7175 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7176 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7177 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7178 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7179 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7181 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7183 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7189 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7190 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7191 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7192 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7193 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7195 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7196 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7197 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7200 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7201 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7203 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7204 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7206 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7209 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7210 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7211 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7214 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7217 // use override shutdown script if provided
7218 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7219 Some(script) => script,
7221 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7222 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7223 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7224 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7228 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7229 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7231 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7236 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7237 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7238 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7239 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7240 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7242 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7243 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7244 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7245 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7246 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7247 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7248 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7250 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7252 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7253 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7255 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7257 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7260 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7261 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7262 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7263 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7264 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7266 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7267 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7274 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7275 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7277 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7280 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7281 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7282 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7284 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7285 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7289 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7293 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7294 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7295 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7296 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7299 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7300 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7301 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7302 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7303 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7304 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7305 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7306 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7308 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7309 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7310 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7311 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7312 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7313 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7316 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7317 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7318 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7321 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7325 counterparty_node_id,
7327 channel_value_satoshis,
7331 current_chain_height,
7332 outbound_scid_alias,
7333 temporary_channel_id,
7334 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7339 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7344 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7345 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7346 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7347 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7348 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7349 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7350 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7351 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7352 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7354 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7359 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7360 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7361 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7364 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7365 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7366 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7367 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7370 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7372 next_local_nonce: None,
7376 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7377 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7378 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7379 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7380 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7381 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7382 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7383 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7384 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7385 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7386 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7389 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7390 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7392 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7394 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7395 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7396 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7397 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7400 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7401 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7403 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7405 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7406 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7408 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7409 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7410 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7411 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7412 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7413 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7416 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7417 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7419 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7420 if funding_created.is_none() {
7421 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7422 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7424 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7425 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7426 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7427 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7435 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7436 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7437 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7438 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7439 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7440 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7442 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7444 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7445 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7448 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7449 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7450 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7451 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7454 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7455 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7456 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7458 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7459 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7462 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7463 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7466 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7467 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7468 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7471 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7473 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7474 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7475 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7476 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7477 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7478 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7479 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7480 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7481 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7482 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7483 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7484 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7485 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7486 first_per_commitment_point,
7487 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7488 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7489 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7490 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7492 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7494 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7495 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7500 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7501 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7503 // Check sanity of message fields:
7504 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7505 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7507 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7508 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7510 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7511 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7513 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7514 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7516 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7517 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7519 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7520 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7521 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7523 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7524 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7525 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7527 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7528 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7529 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7531 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7532 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7534 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7535 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7538 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7539 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7540 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7542 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7543 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7545 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7546 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7548 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7549 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7551 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7552 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7554 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7555 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7557 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7558 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7561 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7562 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7563 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7565 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7566 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7568 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7569 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7570 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7572 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7573 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7576 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7577 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7578 &Some(ref script) => {
7579 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7580 if script.len() == 0 {
7583 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7584 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7586 Some(script.clone())
7589 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7591 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7596 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7597 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7598 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7599 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7600 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7602 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7603 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7605 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7608 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7609 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7610 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7611 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7612 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7613 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7616 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7617 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7618 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7621 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7622 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7624 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7625 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7627 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7632 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7633 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7634 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7635 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7636 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7640 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7641 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7643 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7644 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7646 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7647 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7648 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7649 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7652 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7654 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7655 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7656 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7657 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7659 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7660 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7662 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7663 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7665 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7666 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7667 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7668 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7669 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7670 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7674 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7675 initial_commitment_tx,
7678 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7679 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7683 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7684 if validated.is_err() {
7685 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7688 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7689 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7690 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7691 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7692 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7693 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7694 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7695 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7696 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7697 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7698 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7699 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7701 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7702 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7703 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7704 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7705 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7706 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7707 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7708 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7710 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7711 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7712 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7714 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7716 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7717 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7719 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7721 let mut channel = Channel {
7722 context: self.context,
7723 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7724 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7727 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7728 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7729 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7732 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7734 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7735 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7736 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7737 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7738 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7743 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7744 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7745 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7746 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7749 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7750 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7751 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7752 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7753 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7754 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7755 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7756 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7757 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7760 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7761 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7762 // `static_remote_key`.
7763 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7764 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7766 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7767 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7768 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7770 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7771 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7772 return Err(ChannelError::close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7774 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7776 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7777 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7778 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7784 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7785 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7786 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7787 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7788 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7789 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7790 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7791 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7792 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7793 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7794 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7797 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7799 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7800 // support this channel type.
7801 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7803 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7804 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7805 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7806 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7807 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7808 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7809 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7813 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7817 counterparty_node_id,
7821 current_chain_height,
7826 counterparty_pubkeys,
7828 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7829 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7831 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7833 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7838 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7839 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7841 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7842 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7843 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7844 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7847 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7848 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7850 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7852 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7853 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7856 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7859 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7860 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7861 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7863 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7864 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7865 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7866 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7867 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7869 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7870 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7871 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7872 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7873 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7874 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7875 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7876 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7877 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7878 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7879 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7880 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7881 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7882 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7883 first_per_commitment_point,
7884 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7885 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7886 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7888 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7890 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7892 next_local_nonce: None,
7896 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7897 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7899 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7901 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7902 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7905 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7906 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7908 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7909 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7910 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7911 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7912 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7913 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7914 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7915 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7916 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7917 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7918 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7920 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7923 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7924 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7925 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7929 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7930 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7933 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7934 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7936 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7937 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7939 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7941 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7942 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7943 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7944 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7947 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7948 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7949 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7950 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7951 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7953 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7955 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7956 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7957 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7960 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7961 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7962 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7966 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7967 initial_commitment_tx,
7970 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7971 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7974 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7975 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7978 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7980 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7981 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7982 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7983 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7985 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7987 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7988 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7989 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7990 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7991 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7992 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7993 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7994 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7995 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7996 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7997 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7999 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8000 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8001 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8002 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8003 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8004 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8005 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8007 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8008 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8010 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8011 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8012 let mut channel = Channel {
8013 context: self.context,
8014 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8015 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8017 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
8018 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8020 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8024 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8025 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8026 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8027 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8028 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8029 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8030 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8033 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8034 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8035 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8036 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8037 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8038 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8039 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8040 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8041 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8042 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8044 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8045 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8046 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8048 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8050 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8051 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8053 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8054 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8057 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8061 counterparty_node_id,
8067 current_chain_height,
8068 outbound_scid_alias,
8069 temporary_channel_id,
8070 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8075 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8076 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8077 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8078 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8079 funding_tx_locktime,
8080 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8086 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8087 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8088 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8089 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8090 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8091 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8093 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8095 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8096 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8099 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8100 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8101 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8104 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8105 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8108 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8109 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8110 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8111 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8112 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8113 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8114 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8116 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8117 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8119 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8120 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8121 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8122 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8123 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8124 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8125 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8126 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8127 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8128 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8129 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8130 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8131 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8132 first_per_commitment_point,
8133 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8134 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8135 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8136 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8138 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8140 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8141 second_per_commitment_point,
8142 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8143 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8148 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8149 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8150 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8151 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8152 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8153 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8156 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8157 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8158 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8159 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8160 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8161 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8162 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8163 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8164 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8165 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8166 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8170 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8171 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8172 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8173 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8174 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8176 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8177 // support this channel type.
8178 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8179 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8180 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8182 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8184 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8185 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8186 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8187 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8188 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8189 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8192 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8196 counterparty_node_id,
8200 current_chain_height,
8206 counterparty_pubkeys,
8208 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8209 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8210 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8211 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8213 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8214 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8215 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8216 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8220 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8221 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8222 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8223 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8224 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8225 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8232 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8233 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8235 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8236 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8237 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8238 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8241 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8242 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8244 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8246 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8247 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8250 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8253 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8254 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8255 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8257 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8258 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8259 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8260 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8261 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8262 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8263 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8265 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8266 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8267 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8268 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8269 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8270 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8271 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8272 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8273 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8274 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8275 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8276 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8277 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8278 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8279 first_per_commitment_point,
8280 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8281 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8282 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8284 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8286 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8287 second_per_commitment_point,
8288 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8292 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8293 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8295 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8297 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8298 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8302 // Unfunded channel utilities
8304 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8305 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8306 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8307 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8308 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8309 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8310 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8311 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8312 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8313 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8316 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8317 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8318 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8319 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8320 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8321 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8327 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8328 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8330 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8336 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8337 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8338 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8339 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8340 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8342 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8343 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8344 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8345 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8351 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8352 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8353 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8354 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8355 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8356 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8361 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8362 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8363 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8364 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8366 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8367 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8368 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8369 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8374 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8375 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8376 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8377 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8378 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8379 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8384 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8385 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8386 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8389 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8390 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8391 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8392 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8396 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8398 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8400 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8402 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8403 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8404 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8405 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8406 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8408 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8409 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8410 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8411 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8413 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8415 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8416 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8417 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8419 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8421 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8423 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8427 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8428 // deserialized from that format.
8429 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8430 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8431 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8433 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8435 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8436 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8437 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8439 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8440 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8441 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8442 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8445 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8446 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8447 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8450 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8451 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8452 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8453 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8455 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8456 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8458 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8459 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8460 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8465 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8468 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8470 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8471 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8472 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8477 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8480 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8483 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8485 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8490 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8491 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8492 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8494 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8495 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8496 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8497 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8498 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8499 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8500 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8502 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8504 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8506 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8509 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8510 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8511 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8514 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8516 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8517 preimages.push(preimage);
8519 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8520 reason.write(writer)?;
8522 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8524 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8525 preimages.push(preimage);
8527 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8528 reason.write(writer)?;
8531 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8532 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8535 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8536 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8537 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8538 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8539 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8540 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8543 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8544 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8547 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8548 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8549 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8550 source.write(writer)?;
8551 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8553 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8554 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8556 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8558 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8559 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8561 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8563 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8564 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8566 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8567 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8569 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8570 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8571 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8573 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8575 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8576 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8581 match self.context.resend_order {
8582 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8583 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8586 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8587 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8588 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8590 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8591 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8592 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8593 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8596 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8597 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8598 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8599 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8600 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8603 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8604 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8605 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8606 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8608 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8609 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8610 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8612 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8614 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8615 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8616 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8617 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8619 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8620 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8621 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8622 // consider the stale state on reload.
8625 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8626 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8627 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8629 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8630 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8631 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8633 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8634 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8636 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8637 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8638 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8640 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8641 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8643 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8646 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8647 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8648 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8650 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8653 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8654 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8656 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8657 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8658 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8660 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8662 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8664 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8666 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8667 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8668 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8669 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8670 htlc.write(writer)?;
8673 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8674 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8675 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8677 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8678 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8680 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8681 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8682 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8683 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8684 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8685 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8686 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8688 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8689 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8690 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8691 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8692 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8694 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8695 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8697 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8698 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8699 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8700 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8702 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8704 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8705 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8706 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8709 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8710 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8711 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8713 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8714 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8715 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8716 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8717 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8718 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8719 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8721 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8722 (2, chan_type, option),
8723 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8724 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8725 (5, self.context.config, required),
8726 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8727 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8728 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8729 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8730 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8731 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8732 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8733 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8734 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8735 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8736 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8737 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8738 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8739 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8740 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8741 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8742 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8743 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8744 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8745 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8746 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8747 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8748 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8749 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8750 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8751 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8758 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8759 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8761 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8762 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8764 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8765 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8766 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8768 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8769 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8770 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8771 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8773 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8775 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8776 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8777 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8778 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8779 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8781 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8782 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8785 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8786 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8787 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8789 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8791 let mut keys_data = None;
8793 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8794 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8795 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8796 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8797 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8798 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8799 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8800 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8801 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8802 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8806 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8807 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8808 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8811 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8813 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8814 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8815 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8817 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8819 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8820 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8821 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8822 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8823 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8824 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8825 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8826 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8828 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8829 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8831 Readable::read(reader)?
8833 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8836 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8837 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8839 Readable::read(reader)?
8841 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8843 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8844 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8845 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8850 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8851 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8852 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8853 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8854 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8855 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8856 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8857 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8858 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8859 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8860 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8861 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8863 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8864 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8867 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8868 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8871 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8872 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8874 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8876 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8877 blinding_point: None,
8881 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8882 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8883 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8884 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8885 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8886 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8887 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8888 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8889 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8890 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8891 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8892 blinding_point: None,
8894 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8895 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8896 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8898 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8899 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8900 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8902 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8906 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8907 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8908 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8909 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8912 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8913 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8914 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8916 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8917 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8918 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8919 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8922 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8923 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8924 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8925 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8928 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8930 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8932 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8933 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8934 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8935 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8937 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8938 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8939 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8940 // consider the stale state on reload.
8941 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8944 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8945 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8948 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8951 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8952 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8953 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8955 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8956 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8957 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8958 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8960 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8961 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8963 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8964 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8966 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8967 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8970 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8972 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8973 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8975 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8976 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8979 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8981 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8982 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8983 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8984 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8986 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8989 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8990 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8992 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8994 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8995 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8997 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8998 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9000 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9003 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9004 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9006 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9007 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9008 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9012 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9013 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9014 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9016 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9022 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9023 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9024 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9025 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9026 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9027 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9028 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9029 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9030 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9031 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9033 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9034 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9035 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9036 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9037 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9038 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9039 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9041 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9042 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9043 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9044 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9046 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9048 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9049 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9051 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9053 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9055 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9056 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9058 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9059 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9061 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9062 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9064 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9065 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9066 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9067 (2, channel_type, option),
9068 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9069 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9070 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9071 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9072 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9073 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9074 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9075 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9076 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9077 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9078 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9079 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9080 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9081 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9082 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9083 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9084 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9085 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9086 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9087 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9088 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9089 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9090 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9091 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9092 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9093 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9094 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9095 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9096 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9099 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9100 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9101 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9102 // required channel parameters.
9103 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9104 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9106 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9108 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9109 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9110 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9111 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9114 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9115 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9116 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9118 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9119 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9121 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9122 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9127 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9128 if iter.next().is_some() {
9129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9133 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9134 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9135 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9136 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9137 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9140 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9141 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9142 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9144 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9145 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9147 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9148 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9149 // separate u64 values.
9150 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9152 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9154 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9155 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9156 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9157 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9159 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9160 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9162 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9163 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9164 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9165 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9166 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9169 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9170 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9172 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9173 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9174 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9175 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9177 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9178 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9180 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9181 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9182 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9183 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9184 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9187 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9188 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9191 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9192 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9193 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9194 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9195 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9196 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9199 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9200 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9201 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9203 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9207 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9208 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9209 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9210 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9211 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9212 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9214 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9215 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9216 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9218 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9219 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9220 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9221 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9226 context: ChannelContext {
9229 config: config.unwrap(),
9233 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9234 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9235 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9238 temporary_channel_id,
9240 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9242 channel_value_satoshis,
9244 latest_monitor_update_id,
9246 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9247 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9250 holder_commitment_point,
9251 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9254 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9255 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9256 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9257 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9261 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9262 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9263 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9264 monitor_pending_forwards,
9265 monitor_pending_failures,
9266 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9267 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9269 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9270 signer_pending_funding: false,
9273 holding_cell_update_fee,
9274 next_holder_htlc_id,
9275 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9276 update_time_counter,
9279 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9280 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9281 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9282 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9284 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9285 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9286 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9287 closing_fee_limits: None,
9288 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9290 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9291 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9293 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9295 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9296 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9297 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9298 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9299 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9300 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9301 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9302 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9303 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9306 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9308 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9309 funding_transaction,
9312 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9313 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9314 counterparty_node_id,
9316 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9320 channel_update_status,
9321 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9325 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9326 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9327 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9328 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9330 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9331 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9333 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9334 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9335 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9337 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9338 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9340 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9341 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9343 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9346 local_initiated_shutdown,
9348 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9350 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9351 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9359 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9360 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9361 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9362 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9363 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9364 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9365 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9366 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9367 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9368 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9369 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9370 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9371 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9372 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9373 use crate::ln::msgs;
9374 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9375 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9376 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9377 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9378 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9379 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9380 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9381 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9382 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9383 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9384 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9385 use crate::util::test_utils;
9386 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9387 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9388 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9389 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9390 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9391 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9392 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9393 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9394 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9395 use crate::prelude::*;
9398 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9399 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9400 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9401 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9403 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9404 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9405 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9406 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9409 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9412 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9413 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9419 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9420 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9421 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9422 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9426 signer: InMemorySigner,
9429 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9430 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9433 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9434 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9436 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9438 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9439 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9442 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9446 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9448 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9450 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9451 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9452 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9455 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9457 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9458 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9462 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9463 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9464 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9468 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9469 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9470 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9471 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9474 let seed = [42; 32];
9475 let network = Network::Testnet;
9476 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9477 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9478 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9482 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9483 let config = UserConfig::default();
9484 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9485 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9486 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9488 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9489 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9493 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9494 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9496 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9497 let original_fee = 253;
9498 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9499 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9500 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9501 let seed = [42; 32];
9502 let network = Network::Testnet;
9503 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9505 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9506 let config = UserConfig::default();
9507 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9509 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9510 // same as the old fee.
9511 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9512 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9513 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9517 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9518 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9519 // dust limits are used.
9520 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9522 let seed = [42; 32];
9523 let network = Network::Testnet;
9524 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9525 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9526 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9528 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9529 // they have different dust limits.
9531 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9532 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9533 let config = UserConfig::default();
9534 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9536 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9537 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9538 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9539 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9540 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9542 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9543 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9544 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9545 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9546 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9548 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9549 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9550 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9551 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9553 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9554 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9555 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9557 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9558 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9559 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9561 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9562 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9563 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9565 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9566 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9567 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9568 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9571 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9573 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9574 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9575 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9576 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9577 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9578 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9579 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9580 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9581 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9583 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9584 blinding_point: None,
9587 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9588 // the dust limit check.
9589 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9590 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9591 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9592 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9594 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9595 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9596 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9597 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9598 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9599 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9600 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9604 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9605 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9606 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9607 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9608 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9609 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9611 let seed = [42; 32];
9612 let network = Network::Testnet;
9613 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9615 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9616 let config = UserConfig::default();
9617 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9619 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9620 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9622 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9623 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9624 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9625 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9626 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9627 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9629 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9630 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9631 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9632 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9633 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9635 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9637 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9638 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9639 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9640 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9641 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9643 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9644 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9645 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9646 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9647 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9651 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9652 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9653 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9655 let seed = [42; 32];
9656 let network = Network::Testnet;
9657 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9658 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9659 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9661 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9663 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9664 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9665 let config = UserConfig::default();
9666 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9668 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9669 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9670 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9671 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9673 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9674 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9675 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9677 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9678 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9679 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9680 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9682 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9683 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9684 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9686 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9687 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9688 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9690 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9691 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9692 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9693 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9694 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9695 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9696 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9698 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9700 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9701 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9702 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9703 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9704 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9708 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9709 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9710 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9712 let seed = [42; 32];
9713 let network = Network::Testnet;
9714 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9715 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9716 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9718 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9719 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9720 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9721 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9722 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9723 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9724 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9725 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9727 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9728 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9729 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9730 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9731 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9732 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9734 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9735 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9736 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9737 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9739 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9741 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9742 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9743 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9744 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9745 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9746 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9748 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9749 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9750 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9751 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9753 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9754 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9755 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9756 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9757 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9759 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9760 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9762 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9763 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9764 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9766 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9767 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9768 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9769 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9770 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9772 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9773 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9775 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9776 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9777 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9781 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9783 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9784 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9785 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9787 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9788 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9789 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9790 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9792 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9793 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9794 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9796 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9798 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9799 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9802 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9803 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9806 let seed = [42; 32];
9807 let network = Network::Testnet;
9808 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9809 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9810 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9813 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9814 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9815 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9817 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9818 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9820 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9821 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9822 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9824 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9825 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9827 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9829 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9830 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9832 // Channel Negotiations failed
9833 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9834 assert!(result.is_err());
9839 fn channel_update() {
9840 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9841 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9842 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9843 let seed = [42; 32];
9844 let network = Network::Testnet;
9845 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9846 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9847 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9849 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9850 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9851 let config = UserConfig::default();
9852 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9854 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9855 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9856 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9857 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9858 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9860 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9861 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9862 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9863 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9864 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9866 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9867 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9868 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9869 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9871 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9872 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9873 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9875 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9876 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9877 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9879 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9880 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9881 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9883 short_channel_id: 0,
9886 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9887 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9888 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9890 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9891 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9893 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9895 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9897 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9898 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9899 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9900 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9902 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9903 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9904 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9906 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9909 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9913 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9914 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9916 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9917 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9919 let seed = [42; 32];
9920 let network = Network::Testnet;
9921 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9922 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9924 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9925 let config = UserConfig::default();
9926 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9927 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9928 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9930 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9931 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9932 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9934 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9935 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9936 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9938 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9939 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9940 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9941 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9942 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9945 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9947 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9948 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9949 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9950 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9954 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9955 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9956 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9958 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9961 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9963 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9964 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9965 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9966 blinding_point: None,
9968 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9969 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9971 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9974 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9977 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9979 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9982 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9983 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9984 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9986 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9987 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9990 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9991 blinding_point: None,
9993 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9994 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9997 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9998 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10000 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10001 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10003 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10006 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10007 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10008 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10009 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10010 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10011 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10012 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10013 } = &mut dummy_add {
10014 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10015 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10016 } else { panic!() }
10017 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10018 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10019 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10021 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10024 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10026 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10027 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10028 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10029 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10030 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10031 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10032 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10033 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10036 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10038 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10039 use bitcoin::sighash;
10040 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10041 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10042 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10043 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10044 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10045 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10046 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10047 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10048 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10049 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10050 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10051 use crate::sync::Arc;
10052 use core::str::FromStr;
10053 use hex::DisplayHex;
10055 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10056 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10057 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10058 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10060 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10062 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10063 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10064 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10065 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10066 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10068 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10069 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10075 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10076 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10077 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10079 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10080 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10081 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10082 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10083 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10084 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10086 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10088 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10089 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10090 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10091 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10092 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10093 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10095 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10096 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10097 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10098 selected_contest_delay: 144
10100 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10101 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10103 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10104 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10106 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10107 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10109 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10110 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10112 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10113 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10114 // build_commitment_transaction.
10115 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10116 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10117 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10118 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10119 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10121 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10122 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10123 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10124 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10128 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10129 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10130 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10131 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10135 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10136 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10137 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10139 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10140 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10142 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10143 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10145 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10147 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10148 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10149 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10150 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10151 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10152 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10153 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10155 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10156 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10157 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10158 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10160 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10161 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10162 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10164 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10166 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10167 commitment_tx.clone(),
10168 counterparty_signature,
10169 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10170 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10171 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10173 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10174 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10176 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10177 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10178 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10180 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10181 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10184 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10185 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10187 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10188 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10189 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10190 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10191 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10192 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10193 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10194 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10196 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10199 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10200 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10201 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10205 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10208 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10209 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10210 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10211 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10212 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10213 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10215 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10216 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10217 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10218 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10219 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10220 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10221 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10222 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10223 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10224 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10226 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10227 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10228 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10229 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10230 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10231 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10233 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10237 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10238 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10239 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10240 "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", {});
10242 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10243 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10245 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10246 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10247 "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", {});
10249 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10250 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10251 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10252 "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", {});
10254 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10255 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10257 amount_msat: 1000000,
10259 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10260 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10262 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10265 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10266 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10268 amount_msat: 2000000,
10270 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10271 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10273 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10276 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10277 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10279 amount_msat: 2000000,
10281 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10282 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10283 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10284 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10285 blinding_point: None,
10287 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10290 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10291 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10293 amount_msat: 3000000,
10295 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10296 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10297 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10298 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10299 blinding_point: None,
10301 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10304 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10305 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10307 amount_msat: 4000000,
10309 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10310 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10312 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10316 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10317 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10318 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10320 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10321 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10322 "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", {
10325 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10326 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10327 "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" },
10330 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10331 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10332 "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" },
10335 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10336 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10337 "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" },
10340 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10341 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10342 "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" },
10345 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10346 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10347 "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" }
10350 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10351 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10352 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10354 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10355 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10356 "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", {
10359 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10360 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10361 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
10364 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10365 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10366 "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" },
10369 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10370 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10371 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10374 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10375 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10376 "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" },
10379 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10380 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10381 "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" }
10384 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10385 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10386 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10388 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10389 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10390 "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", {
10393 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10394 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10395 "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" },
10398 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10399 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10400 "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" },
10403 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10404 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10405 "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" },
10408 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10409 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10410 "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" }
10413 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10416 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10418 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10419 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10420 "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", {
10423 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10424 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10425 "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" },
10428 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10429 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10430 "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" },
10433 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10434 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10435 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
10438 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10439 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10440 "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" }
10443 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10448 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10449 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10450 "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", {
10453 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10454 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10455 "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" },
10458 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10459 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10460 "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" },
10463 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10464 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10465 "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" },
10468 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10469 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10470 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10473 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10474 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10475 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10477 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10478 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10479 "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", {
10482 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10483 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10484 "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" },
10487 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10488 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10489 "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" },
10492 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10493 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10494 "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" }
10497 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10501 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10502 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10503 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10506 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10507 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10508 "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" },
10511 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10512 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10513 "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" },
10516 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10517 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10518 "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" }
10521 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10522 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10523 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10525 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10526 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10527 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10530 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10531 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10532 "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" },
10535 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10536 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10537 "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" }
10540 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10542 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10543 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10544 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10545 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10547 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10548 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10549 "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", {
10552 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10553 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10554 "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" },
10557 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10558 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10559 "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" }
10562 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10564 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10565 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10566 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10568 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10569 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10570 "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", {
10573 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10574 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10575 "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" },
10578 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10579 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10580 "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" }
10583 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10584 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10585 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10587 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10588 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10589 "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", {
10592 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10593 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10594 "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" }
10597 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10598 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10599 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10600 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10601 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10603 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10604 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10605 "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", {
10608 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10609 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10610 "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" }
10613 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10616 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10617 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10619 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10620 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10621 "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", {
10624 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10625 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10626 "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" }
10629 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10630 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10631 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10632 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10634 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10635 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10636 "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", {});
10638 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10639 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10640 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10641 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10642 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10644 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10645 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10646 "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", {});
10648 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10649 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10650 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10651 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10652 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10654 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10655 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10656 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10658 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10659 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10660 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10662 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10663 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10664 "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", {});
10666 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10667 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10668 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10669 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10670 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10672 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10673 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10674 "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", {});
10676 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10677 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10678 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10679 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10680 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10682 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10683 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10684 "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", {});
10686 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10687 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10688 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10689 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10690 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10691 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10693 amount_msat: 2000000,
10695 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10696 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10698 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10701 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10702 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10703 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10705 amount_msat: 5000001,
10707 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10708 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10709 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10710 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10711 blinding_point: None,
10713 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10716 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10717 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10719 amount_msat: 5000000,
10721 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10722 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10723 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10724 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10725 blinding_point: None,
10727 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10731 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10732 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10733 "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", {
10736 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10737 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10738 "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" },
10740 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10741 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10742 "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" },
10744 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10745 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10746 "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" }
10749 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10750 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10751 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10752 "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", {
10755 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10756 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10757 "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" },
10759 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10760 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10761 "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" },
10763 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10764 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10765 "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" }
10770 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10771 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10773 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10774 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10775 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10776 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10778 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10779 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10780 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10782 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10783 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10785 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10786 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10788 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10790 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10794 fn test_key_derivation() {
10795 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10798 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10799 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10801 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10802 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10804 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10805 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10807 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10808 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10810 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10811 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10813 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10814 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10818 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10819 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10820 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10821 let seed = [42; 32];
10822 let network = Network::Testnet;
10823 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10824 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10826 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10827 let config = UserConfig::default();
10828 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10829 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10831 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10832 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10834 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10835 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10836 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10837 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10838 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10839 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10840 assert!(res.is_ok());
10844 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10845 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10846 // resulting `channel_type`.
10847 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10848 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10849 let network = Network::Testnet;
10850 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10851 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10853 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10854 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10856 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10857 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10859 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10860 // need to signal it.
10861 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10862 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10863 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10864 &config, 0, 42, None
10866 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10868 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10869 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10870 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10872 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10873 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10874 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10878 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10879 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10880 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10881 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10882 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10885 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10886 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10890 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10891 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10892 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10894 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10895 let network = Network::Testnet;
10896 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10897 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10899 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10900 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10902 let config = UserConfig::default();
10904 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10905 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10906 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10907 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10908 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10910 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10911 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10912 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10916 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10917 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10918 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10920 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10921 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10922 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10923 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10924 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10925 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10927 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10931 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10932 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10935 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10936 let network = Network::Testnet;
10937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10940 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10941 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10943 let config = UserConfig::default();
10945 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10946 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10947 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10948 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10949 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10950 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10951 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10952 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10954 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10955 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10956 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10957 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10958 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10959 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10963 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10964 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10966 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10967 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10968 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10969 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10971 assert!(res.is_err());
10973 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10974 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10975 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10977 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10978 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10979 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10982 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10984 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10985 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10986 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10987 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10990 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10991 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10993 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10994 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10996 assert!(res.is_err());
11000 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11001 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11002 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11003 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11004 let seed = [42; 32];
11005 let network = Network::Testnet;
11006 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11007 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11008 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11010 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11011 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11012 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11013 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11015 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11016 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11017 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11022 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11032 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11033 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11034 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11039 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11040 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11046 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11049 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11050 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11051 &accept_channel_msg,
11052 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11053 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11056 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11057 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11058 let tx = Transaction {
11059 version: Version::ONE,
11060 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11064 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11067 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11070 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11071 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11072 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11073 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11074 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11075 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11079 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11080 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11088 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11089 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11090 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11091 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11093 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11094 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11101 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11102 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11103 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11104 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11105 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11107 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11108 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11109 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11117 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11118 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11121 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11122 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11123 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11124 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());