1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
264 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
265 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
266 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
267 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
268 struct $flag_type(u32);
273 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
276 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
278 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
281 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
284 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
285 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
288 Ok($flag_type(flags))
293 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
296 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
299 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
301 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
303 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
305 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
307 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
308 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
310 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
312 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
314 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
315 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
318 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
319 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
321 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
322 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
323 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
325 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
327 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
328 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
330 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
332 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
334 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
335 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
337 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
338 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
340 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
341 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
346 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
349 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
350 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
351 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
352 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
353 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
354 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
355 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
356 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
357 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
358 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
359 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
360 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
361 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
362 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
366 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
368 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
369 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
370 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
371 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
372 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
373 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
374 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
375 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
376 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
377 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
382 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
383 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
384 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
385 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
386 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
387 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
392 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
393 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
394 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
395 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
396 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
397 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
398 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
399 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
400 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
401 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
402 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
407 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
408 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
409 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
410 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
411 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
412 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
413 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
417 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
419 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
420 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
421 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
422 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
423 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
425 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
426 /// funding transaction to confirm.
427 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
428 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
430 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
431 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
432 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
436 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
437 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
439 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
442 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
451 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
453 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
457 fn $clear(&mut self) {
460 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
462 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
466 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
467 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
469 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
470 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
475 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
477 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
478 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
480 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
481 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
482 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
483 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
484 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
485 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
486 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
487 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
495 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
497 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
498 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
499 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
500 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
501 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
505 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
506 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
509 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
510 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
513 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
515 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
516 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
517 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
521 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
523 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
524 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
525 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
526 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
528 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
534 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
535 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
536 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
537 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
538 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
539 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
540 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
541 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
542 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
543 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
544 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
545 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
546 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
547 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
548 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
549 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
552 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
554 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
556 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
557 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
558 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
559 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
565 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
567 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
569 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
570 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
571 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
572 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
573 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
575 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
576 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
578 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
580 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
581 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
583 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
584 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
585 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
586 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
587 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
588 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
590 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
591 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
593 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
594 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
595 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
596 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
597 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
599 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
600 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
602 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
603 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
605 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
606 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
607 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
608 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
614 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
615 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
617 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
618 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
619 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
627 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
628 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
629 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
636 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
637 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
640 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
641 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
642 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
643 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
644 self.logger.log(record)
648 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
649 where L::Target: Logger {
650 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
651 where S::Target: SignerProvider
655 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
656 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
661 macro_rules! secp_check {
662 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
665 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
670 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
671 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
672 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
673 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
674 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
675 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
676 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
677 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
679 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
681 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
683 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
687 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
689 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
690 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
691 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
693 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
694 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
696 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
697 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
698 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
699 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
700 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
702 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
703 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
707 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
713 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
716 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
717 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
718 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
719 holding_cell_msat: u64,
720 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
723 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
724 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
725 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
726 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
727 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
728 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
729 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
730 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
731 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
732 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
733 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
736 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
737 struct HTLCCandidate {
739 origin: HTLCInitiator,
743 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
751 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
753 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
755 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
756 htlc_value_msat: u64,
757 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
762 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
763 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
764 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
765 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
766 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
768 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
769 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
770 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
771 htlc_value_msat: u64,
773 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
774 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
778 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
779 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
780 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
781 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
782 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
783 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
784 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
785 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
786 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
787 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
788 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
791 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
793 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
794 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
795 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
796 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
799 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
800 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
802 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
803 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
804 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
805 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
806 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
809 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
811 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
812 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
813 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
814 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
815 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
816 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
817 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
818 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
819 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
820 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
823 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
824 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
825 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
826 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
827 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
828 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
829 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
830 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
831 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
832 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
833 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
834 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
835 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
836 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
837 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
839 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
840 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
841 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
842 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
844 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
845 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
846 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
847 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
849 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
850 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
851 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
852 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
853 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
855 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
856 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
857 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
858 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
860 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
861 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
862 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
864 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
865 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
866 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
867 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
868 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
870 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
871 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
874 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
875 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
877 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
878 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
879 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
880 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
882 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
883 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
885 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
886 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
889 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
890 (0, update, required),
893 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
894 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
895 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
896 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
897 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
901 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
903 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
905 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
907 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
908 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
913 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
915 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
916 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
923 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
924 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
925 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
926 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
928 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
929 /// in a timely manner.
930 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
933 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
935 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
937 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
938 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
939 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
940 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
944 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
945 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
946 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
948 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
949 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
950 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
951 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
953 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
957 /// The current channel ID.
958 channel_id: ChannelId,
959 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
960 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
961 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
962 channel_state: ChannelState,
964 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
965 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
967 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
968 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
969 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
971 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
972 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
973 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
974 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
976 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
977 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
979 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
981 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
982 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
983 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
985 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
986 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
987 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
989 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
990 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
991 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
996 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
997 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
998 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
999 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1000 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1001 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1003 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1005 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1006 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1007 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1009 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1010 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1011 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1012 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1013 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1014 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1015 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1017 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1018 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1019 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1021 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1022 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1023 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1024 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1025 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1026 /// outbound or inbound.
1027 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1029 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1031 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1032 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1033 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1034 // HTLCs with similar state.
1035 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1036 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1037 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1038 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1039 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1040 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1041 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1042 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1043 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1044 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1046 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1047 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1048 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1050 update_time_counter: u32,
1052 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1053 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1054 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1055 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1056 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1057 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1059 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1060 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1062 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1063 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1064 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1065 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1067 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1068 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1070 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1072 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1074 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1075 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1076 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1077 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1078 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1080 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1081 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1083 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1084 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1085 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1087 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1088 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1089 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1090 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1091 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1092 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1093 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1094 channel_creation_height: u32,
1096 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1099 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1101 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1106 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1113 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1114 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1117 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1119 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1121 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1122 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1124 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1126 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1127 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1128 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1130 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1132 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1133 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1134 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1136 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1137 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1138 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1140 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1142 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1144 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1145 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1146 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1147 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1149 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1150 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1151 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1153 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1154 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1155 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1157 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1158 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1159 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1160 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1161 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1162 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1164 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1166 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1167 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1168 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1169 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1170 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1172 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1173 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1175 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1176 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1177 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1178 /// unblock the state machine.
1180 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1181 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1182 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1184 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1185 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1186 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1188 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1189 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1190 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1191 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1192 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1193 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1194 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1195 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1197 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1198 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1200 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1201 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1202 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1204 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1205 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1206 // associated channel mapping.
1208 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1209 // to store all of them.
1210 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1212 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1213 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1214 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1215 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1216 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1218 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1219 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1221 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1222 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1224 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1225 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1226 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1228 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1229 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1230 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1233 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1234 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1235 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1236 self.update_time_counter
1239 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1240 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1243 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1244 self.config.announced_channel
1247 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1251 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1252 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1253 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1254 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1257 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1258 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1259 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1262 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1263 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1264 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1265 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1266 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1267 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1268 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1271 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1272 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1273 match self.channel_state {
1274 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1275 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1276 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1277 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1278 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1279 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1280 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1282 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1284 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1285 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1289 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1290 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1291 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1292 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1293 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1294 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1297 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1298 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1299 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1303 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1304 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1305 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1306 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1307 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1310 // Public utilities:
1312 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1316 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1318 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1319 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1320 self.temporary_channel_id
1323 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1327 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1328 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1329 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1333 /// Gets the channel's type
1334 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1338 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1340 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1341 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1342 self.short_channel_id
1345 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1346 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1352 self.outbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1357 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1358 return &self.holder_signer
1361 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1362 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1363 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1364 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1365 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1366 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1369 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1370 /// get_funding_created.
1371 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1372 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1375 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1376 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1377 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1378 if conf_height > 0 {
1385 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1387 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1390 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1392 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1393 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1397 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1400 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1401 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1404 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1408 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1409 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1410 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1413 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1414 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1417 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1419 self.counterparty_node_id
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1424 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1429 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1435 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1436 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1437 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1438 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1440 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1444 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1445 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1446 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1451 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1454 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1455 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1456 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1458 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1459 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1464 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1465 self.channel_value_satoshis
1468 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1469 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1472 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1473 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1476 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1477 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1478 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1480 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1481 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1482 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1483 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1484 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1490 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1491 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1492 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1495 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1496 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1497 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1500 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1502 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1510 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1512 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1520 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1521 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1522 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1523 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1524 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1527 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1529 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1530 self.prev_config = None;
1534 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1535 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1539 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1540 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1541 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1542 let did_channel_update =
1543 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1544 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1545 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1546 if did_channel_update {
1547 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1548 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1549 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1550 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1552 self.config.options = *config;
1556 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1557 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1558 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1559 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1560 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1563 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1564 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1565 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1566 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1567 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1569 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1570 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1571 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1572 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1573 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1574 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1575 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1577 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1578 where L::Target: Logger
1580 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1581 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1582 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1584 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1585 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1586 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1587 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1589 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1590 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1591 if match update_state {
1592 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1593 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1594 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1595 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1596 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1598 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1602 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1603 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1604 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1606 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1608 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1609 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1610 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1612 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1613 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1614 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1615 transaction_output_index: None
1620 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1621 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1622 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1623 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1624 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1627 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1629 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1631 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1634 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1637 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1638 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1641 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1643 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1644 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1645 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1648 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1654 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1656 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1657 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1658 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1659 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1660 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1661 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1662 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1666 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1667 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1669 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1671 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1672 if generated_by_local {
1673 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1674 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1675 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1685 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1687 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1688 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1689 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1690 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1691 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1692 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1693 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1696 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1697 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1699 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1704 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1708 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1709 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1711 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1713 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1714 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1716 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1717 if !generated_by_local {
1718 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1727 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1728 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1729 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1730 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1731 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1732 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1733 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1735 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1737 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1738 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1739 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1740 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1742 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1744 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1745 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1746 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1747 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1750 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1751 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1752 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1753 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1755 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1758 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1759 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1760 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1761 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1763 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1766 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1767 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1772 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1773 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1778 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1780 let channel_parameters =
1781 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1782 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1783 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1790 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1793 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1794 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1795 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1796 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1798 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1799 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1800 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1808 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1809 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1810 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1811 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1817 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1818 /// our counterparty!)
1819 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1820 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1821 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1822 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1823 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1824 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1825 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1827 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1831 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1832 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1833 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1834 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1835 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1836 //may see payments to it!
1837 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1838 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1839 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1841 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1844 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1845 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1846 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1847 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1848 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1851 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1852 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1855 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1859 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1860 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1861 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1862 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1863 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1864 // which are near the dust limit.
1865 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1866 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1867 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1868 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1869 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1871 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1872 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1874 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1877 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1878 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1879 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1882 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1883 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1885 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1886 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1887 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1888 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1889 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1890 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1891 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1894 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1897 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1898 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1899 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1901 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1902 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1903 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1904 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1906 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1909 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1915 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1916 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1918 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1919 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1920 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1921 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1922 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1923 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1924 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1927 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1930 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1931 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1932 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1934 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1935 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1937 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1942 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1947 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1948 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1949 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1950 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1951 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1952 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1954 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1955 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1957 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1964 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1965 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1966 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1967 /// corner case properly.
1968 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1969 -> AvailableBalances
1970 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1972 let context = &self;
1973 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1974 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1975 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1977 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1978 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1979 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1980 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1983 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1985 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1986 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1988 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1990 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1992 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1993 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1997 if context.is_outbound() {
1998 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1999 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2001 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2002 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2004 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2005 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2006 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2007 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2010 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2011 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2012 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2013 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2014 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2015 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2016 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2019 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2020 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2021 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2022 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2023 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2024 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2025 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2026 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2027 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2028 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2029 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2031 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2034 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2035 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2036 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2037 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2038 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2041 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2042 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2044 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2045 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2046 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2048 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2049 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2050 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2051 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2055 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2057 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2058 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2059 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2060 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2061 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2062 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2063 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2065 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2066 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2068 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2069 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2070 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2072 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2073 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2074 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2075 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2076 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2079 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2080 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2081 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2082 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2083 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2084 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2087 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2088 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2089 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2091 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2095 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2096 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2098 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2099 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2103 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2104 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2105 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2106 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2108 outbound_capacity_msat,
2109 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2110 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2115 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2116 let context = &self;
2117 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2120 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2121 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2123 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2124 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2126 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2127 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2129 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2130 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2131 let context = &self;
2132 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2134 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2137 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2138 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2140 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2141 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2143 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2144 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2146 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2147 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2151 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2158 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2159 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2160 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2164 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2165 included_htlcs += 1;
2168 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2169 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2173 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2174 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2175 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2176 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2177 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2178 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2183 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2185 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2186 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2191 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2192 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2196 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2197 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2201 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2202 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2204 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2205 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2206 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2208 total_pending_htlcs,
2209 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2210 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2211 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2213 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2214 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2215 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2217 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2219 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2224 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2225 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2227 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2228 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2230 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2231 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2233 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2234 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2235 let context = &self;
2236 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2238 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2241 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2242 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2244 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2245 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2247 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2248 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2250 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2251 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2255 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2262 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2263 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2264 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2265 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2266 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2267 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2270 included_htlcs += 1;
2273 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2274 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2277 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2278 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2280 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2281 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2282 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2288 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2289 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2292 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2293 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2295 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2296 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2298 total_pending_htlcs,
2299 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2300 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2301 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2303 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2304 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2305 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2307 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2309 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2314 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2315 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2316 match self.channel_state {
2317 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2318 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2327 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2329 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2330 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2333 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2335 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2336 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2337 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2341 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2342 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2343 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2346 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2348 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2349 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2352 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2353 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2354 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2355 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2356 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2357 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2358 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2359 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2360 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2361 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2362 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2364 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2365 // return them to fail the payment.
2366 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2367 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2368 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2370 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2371 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2376 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2377 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2378 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2379 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2380 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2381 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2382 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2383 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2384 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2385 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2388 if generate_monitor_update {
2389 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2390 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2391 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2392 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2396 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2398 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2399 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2402 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2403 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2404 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2405 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2409 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2410 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2411 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2412 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2414 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2415 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2416 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2417 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2419 match &self.holder_signer {
2420 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2421 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2422 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2423 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2424 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2427 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2431 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2432 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2433 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2434 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2435 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2436 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2439 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2440 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2442 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2449 // Internal utility functions for channels
2451 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2452 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2453 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2455 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2457 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2458 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2459 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2461 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2464 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2466 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2469 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2470 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2471 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2473 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2475 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2476 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2477 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2478 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2479 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2482 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2483 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2484 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2485 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2486 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2487 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2488 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2491 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2492 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2494 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2495 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2498 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2499 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2500 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2501 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2502 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2503 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2506 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2507 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2508 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2509 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2512 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2513 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2515 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2516 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2517 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2521 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2522 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2523 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2525 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2526 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2527 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2528 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2530 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2531 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2533 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2535 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2536 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2537 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2538 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2540 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2541 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2545 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2551 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2552 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2553 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2554 // outside of those situations will fail.
2555 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2559 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2564 1 + // script length (0)
2568 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2569 2 + // witness marker and flag
2570 1 + // witness element count
2571 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2572 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2573 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2574 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2575 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2576 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2578 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2579 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2580 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2586 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2587 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2588 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2589 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2591 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2592 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2593 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2595 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2596 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2597 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2598 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2599 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2600 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2603 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2604 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2607 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2608 value_to_holder = 0;
2611 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2612 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2613 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2614 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2616 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2617 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2620 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2621 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2624 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2627 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2628 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2630 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2632 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2633 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2634 where L::Target: Logger {
2635 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2636 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2637 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2638 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2639 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2640 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2641 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2642 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2646 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2647 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2648 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2649 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2651 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2652 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2655 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2656 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2657 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2659 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2660 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2661 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2662 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2663 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2664 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2665 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2667 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2668 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2669 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2671 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2672 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2674 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2677 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2678 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2682 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2686 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2688 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2689 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2690 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2691 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2694 // Now update local state:
2696 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2697 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2698 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2699 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2700 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2701 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2702 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2706 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2707 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2708 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2709 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2710 // do not not get into this branch.
2711 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2712 match pending_update {
2713 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2714 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2715 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2716 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2717 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2718 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2719 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2722 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2723 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2724 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2725 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2726 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2727 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2728 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2734 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2735 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2736 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2738 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2739 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2740 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2743 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2746 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2747 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2749 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2750 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2752 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2753 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2756 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2759 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2760 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2761 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2762 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2767 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2768 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2769 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2770 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2771 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2772 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2773 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2774 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2775 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2776 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2777 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2778 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2779 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2780 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2781 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2783 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2784 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2785 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2786 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2787 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2790 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2791 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2792 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2798 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2799 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2801 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2805 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2806 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2807 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2808 /// before we fail backwards.
2810 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2811 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2812 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2813 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2814 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2815 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2816 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2819 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2820 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2821 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2822 /// before we fail backwards.
2824 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2825 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2826 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2827 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2828 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2829 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2830 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2833 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2834 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2835 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2837 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2838 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2839 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2841 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2842 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2843 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2845 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2850 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2857 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2858 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2859 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2860 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2861 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2865 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2866 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2867 force_holding_cell = true;
2870 // Now update local state:
2871 if force_holding_cell {
2872 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2873 match pending_update {
2874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2875 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2877 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2883 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2890 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2891 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2892 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2898 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2900 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2901 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2904 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2906 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2911 // Message handlers:
2912 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2913 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2914 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2915 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2916 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2917 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2918 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
2921 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2922 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2924 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2925 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2926 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2927 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2929 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2932 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
2933 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2937 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2938 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2939 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2940 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2941 // when routing outbound payments.
2942 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2946 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2947 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2948 let mut check_reconnection = false;
2949 match &self.context.channel_state {
2950 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
2951 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
2952 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
2953 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
2954 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
2955 check_reconnection = true;
2956 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
2957 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
2958 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
2959 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
2960 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2962 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
2963 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
2966 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
2967 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
2968 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
2970 if check_reconnection {
2971 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2972 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2973 let expected_point =
2974 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2975 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2977 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2978 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2979 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2980 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2981 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2982 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2984 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2985 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2986 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2987 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2988 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2990 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2996 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2997 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2999 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3001 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3004 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3005 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3006 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3007 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3008 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3009 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3011 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3014 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3015 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3016 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3018 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3019 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3022 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3025 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3028 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3031 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3035 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3036 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3037 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3040 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3044 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3045 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3046 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3047 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3048 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3049 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3050 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3051 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3052 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3053 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3054 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3056 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3057 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3058 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3059 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3060 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3061 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3065 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3066 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3069 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3070 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3071 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3073 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3074 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3075 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3076 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3077 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3078 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3079 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3083 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3084 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3085 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3086 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3087 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3088 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3089 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3093 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3094 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3095 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3096 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3097 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3101 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3102 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3104 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3105 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3106 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3108 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3109 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3113 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3116 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3121 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3122 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3126 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3127 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3128 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3129 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3130 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3131 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3132 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3133 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3134 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3136 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3137 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3138 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3139 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3140 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3143 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3144 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3145 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3146 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3150 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3153 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3157 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3158 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3159 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3163 // Now update local state:
3164 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3165 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3166 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3167 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3168 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3169 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3170 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3175 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3177 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3178 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3179 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3180 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3181 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3182 None => fail_reason.into(),
3183 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3184 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3185 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3188 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3192 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3194 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3195 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3197 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3203 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3206 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3207 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3210 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3214 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3217 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3218 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3221 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3225 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3229 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3230 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3233 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3237 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3241 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3242 where L::Target: Logger
3244 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3247 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3250 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3254 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3256 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3258 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3259 let commitment_txid = {
3260 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3261 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3262 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3264 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3265 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3266 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3267 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3268 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3273 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3275 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3276 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3277 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3278 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3281 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3282 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3283 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3289 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3290 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3291 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3292 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3293 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3294 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3295 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3296 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3297 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3298 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3299 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3305 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3309 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3310 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3311 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3312 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3313 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3314 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3315 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3316 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3317 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3318 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3319 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3320 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3321 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3324 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3325 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3326 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3327 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3328 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3329 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3330 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3332 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3333 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3334 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3336 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3337 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3338 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3341 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3342 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3345 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3347 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3348 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3349 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3352 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3355 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3356 commitment_stats.tx,
3358 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3359 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3360 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3363 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3366 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3367 let mut need_commitment = false;
3368 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3369 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3370 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3371 need_commitment = true;
3375 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3376 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3377 Some(forward_info.clone())
3379 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3380 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3381 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3382 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3383 need_commitment = true;
3386 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3388 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3389 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3390 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3391 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3392 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3393 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3394 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3395 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3396 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3397 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3398 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3399 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3401 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3403 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3404 need_commitment = true;
3408 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3409 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3410 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3411 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3412 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3413 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3415 nondust_htlc_sources,
3419 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3420 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3421 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3422 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3423 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3425 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3426 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3427 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3428 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3429 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3430 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3431 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3432 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3433 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3434 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3435 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3436 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3437 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3438 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3440 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3441 &self.context.channel_id);
3442 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3445 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3446 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3447 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3448 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3449 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3450 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3451 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3452 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3453 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3457 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3458 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3459 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3460 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3463 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3464 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3465 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3466 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3467 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3468 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3469 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3471 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3472 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3473 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3476 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3477 /// for our counterparty.
3478 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3479 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3480 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3481 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3483 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3484 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3485 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3486 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3488 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3489 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3490 updates: Vec::new(),
3493 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3494 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3495 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3496 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3497 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3498 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3499 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3500 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3501 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3502 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3503 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3504 // to rebalance channels.
3505 match &htlc_update {
3506 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3507 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3508 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3510 match self.send_htlc(
3511 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3512 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3514 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3517 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3518 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3519 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3520 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3521 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3522 // into the holding cell without ever being
3523 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3524 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3525 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3528 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3534 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3535 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3536 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3537 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3538 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3539 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3540 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3541 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3542 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3543 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3544 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3545 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3547 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3548 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3549 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3550 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3551 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3552 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3553 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3554 // for a full revocation before failing.
3555 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3556 update_fail_count += 1;
3559 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3561 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3568 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3569 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3571 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3572 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3577 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3578 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3579 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3580 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3581 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3583 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3584 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3585 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3587 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3588 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3594 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3595 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3596 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3597 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3598 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3599 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3600 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3601 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3602 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3604 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3607 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3610 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3614 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3616 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3617 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3622 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3623 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3624 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3625 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3626 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3627 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3628 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3629 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3630 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3633 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3635 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3636 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3639 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3640 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3641 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3642 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3644 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3646 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3651 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3652 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3653 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3654 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3655 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3656 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3657 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3658 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3662 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3663 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3664 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3665 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3666 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3667 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3668 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3669 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3670 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3672 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3673 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3676 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3677 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3678 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3679 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3680 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3681 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3682 let mut require_commitment = false;
3683 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3686 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3687 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3688 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3689 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3691 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3692 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3693 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3694 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3695 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3696 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3698 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3702 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3703 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3704 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3705 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3706 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3708 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3709 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3710 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3715 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3716 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3718 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3722 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3723 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3725 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3726 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3727 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3728 require_commitment = true;
3729 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3730 match forward_info {
3731 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3732 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3733 require_commitment = true;
3735 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3736 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3737 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3739 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3740 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3741 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3745 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3746 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3747 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3748 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3754 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3755 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3756 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3757 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3758 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3760 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3761 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3762 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3763 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3764 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3765 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3766 require_commitment = true;
3770 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3772 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3773 match update_state {
3774 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3775 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3776 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3777 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3778 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3779 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3781 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3782 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3783 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3784 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3785 require_commitment = true;
3786 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3787 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3792 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3793 let release_state_str =
3794 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3795 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3796 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3797 if !release_monitor {
3798 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3799 update: monitor_update,
3801 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3803 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3808 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3809 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3810 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3811 if require_commitment {
3812 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3813 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3814 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3815 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3817 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3818 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3819 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3820 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3821 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3823 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3824 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3825 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3826 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3827 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3830 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3831 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3832 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3833 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3834 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3835 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3837 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3838 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3840 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3841 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3843 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3844 if require_commitment {
3845 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3847 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3848 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3849 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3850 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3852 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3853 &self.context.channel_id(),
3854 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3857 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3858 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3860 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3861 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3863 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3864 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3870 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3871 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3872 /// commitment update.
3873 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3874 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3875 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3877 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3878 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3881 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3882 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3883 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3884 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3886 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3887 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3888 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3889 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3890 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3891 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3892 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3894 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3895 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3897 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3898 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3900 if !self.context.is_live() {
3901 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3904 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3905 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3906 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3907 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3908 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3909 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3910 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3911 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3912 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3913 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3917 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3918 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3919 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3920 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3921 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3922 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3925 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3926 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3930 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3931 force_holding_cell = true;
3934 if force_holding_cell {
3935 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3939 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3940 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3942 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3943 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3948 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3949 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3951 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3953 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3954 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3955 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3956 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3960 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3961 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3962 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3966 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3967 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3970 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3971 // will be retransmitted.
3972 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3973 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3974 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3976 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3977 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3979 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3980 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3981 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3982 // this HTLC accordingly
3983 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3986 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3987 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3988 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3989 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3992 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3993 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3994 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3995 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3996 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3997 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4002 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4004 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4005 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4006 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4007 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4011 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4012 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4013 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4014 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4015 // the update upon reconnection.
4016 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4020 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4022 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4023 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4027 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4028 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4029 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4030 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4031 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4032 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4033 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4035 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4036 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4037 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4038 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4039 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4040 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4041 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4043 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4044 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4045 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4046 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4047 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4048 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4049 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4052 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4053 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4054 /// to the remote side.
4055 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4056 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4057 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4058 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4061 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4063 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4064 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4066 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4067 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4068 // first received the funding_signed.
4069 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4070 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4071 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4072 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4074 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4076 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4077 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4078 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4079 funding_broadcastable = None;
4082 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4083 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4084 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4085 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4086 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4087 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4088 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4089 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4090 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4091 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4092 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4093 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4094 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4095 next_per_commitment_point,
4096 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4100 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4102 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4103 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4104 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4105 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4106 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4107 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4109 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4110 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4111 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4112 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4113 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4114 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4118 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4119 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4121 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4122 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4124 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4125 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4128 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4129 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4130 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4131 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4132 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4133 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4134 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4135 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4136 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4140 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4141 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4143 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4146 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4149 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4151 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4152 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4153 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4154 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4155 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4156 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4157 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4158 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4159 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4160 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4162 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4164 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4166 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4172 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4175 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4176 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4177 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4179 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4180 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4182 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4183 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4186 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4187 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4188 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4189 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4191 SignerResumeUpdates {
4198 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4199 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4200 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4201 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4202 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4203 per_commitment_secret,
4204 next_per_commitment_point,
4206 next_local_nonce: None,
4210 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4211 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4212 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4213 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4214 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4215 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4218 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4219 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4220 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4221 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4222 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4223 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4224 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4225 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4226 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4227 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4232 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4233 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4235 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4236 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4237 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4238 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4239 reason: err_packet.clone()
4242 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4243 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4244 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4245 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4246 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4247 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4250 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4251 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4253 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4261 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4262 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4263 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4264 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4268 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4269 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4270 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4271 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4272 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4273 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4274 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4278 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4279 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4280 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4284 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4285 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4290 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4291 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4292 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4293 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4294 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4295 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4296 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4301 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4302 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4304 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4305 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4306 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4307 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4308 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4309 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4310 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4311 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4314 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4316 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4317 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4318 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4319 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4323 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4324 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4328 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4329 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4330 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4331 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4332 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4333 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4336 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4337 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4338 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4339 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4340 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4343 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4344 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4345 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4346 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4347 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4348 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4349 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4350 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4354 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4355 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4356 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4358 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4359 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4360 our_commitment_transaction
4364 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4365 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4366 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4367 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4369 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4371 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4373 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4374 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4375 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4376 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4377 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4380 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4381 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4382 channel_ready: None,
4383 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4384 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4385 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4389 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4390 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4391 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4392 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4393 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4394 next_per_commitment_point,
4395 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4397 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4398 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4399 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4403 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4404 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4405 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4407 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4408 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4409 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4412 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4415 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4417 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4418 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4419 our_commitment_transaction
4423 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4424 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4425 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4426 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4427 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4428 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4429 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4431 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4433 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4434 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4435 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4436 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4437 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4438 next_per_commitment_point,
4439 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4443 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4444 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4445 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4447 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4450 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4451 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4452 raa: required_revoke,
4453 commitment_update: None,
4454 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4456 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4457 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4458 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4460 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4463 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4464 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4465 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4466 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4467 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4468 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4471 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4472 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4473 raa: required_revoke,
4474 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4475 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4478 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4479 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4480 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4481 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4482 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4485 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4486 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4487 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4488 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4493 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4494 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4495 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4496 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4498 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4500 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4502 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4503 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4504 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4505 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4506 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4507 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4508 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4509 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4511 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4512 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4513 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4514 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4515 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4517 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4518 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4519 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4520 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4523 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4524 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4525 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4526 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4527 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4528 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4529 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4530 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4531 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4532 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4533 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4534 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4535 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4536 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4537 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4539 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4542 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4543 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4546 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4547 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4548 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4549 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4550 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4551 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4554 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4555 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4556 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4557 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4558 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4559 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4562 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4568 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4569 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4570 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4571 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4573 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4574 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4575 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4576 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4577 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4578 return Ok((None, None, None));
4581 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4582 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4583 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4585 return Ok((None, None, None));
4588 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4589 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4590 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4591 return Ok((None, None, None));
4594 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4596 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4597 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4598 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4599 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4601 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4602 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4604 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4605 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4607 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4608 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4609 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4610 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4612 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4613 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4614 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4618 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4624 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4625 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4627 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4628 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4631 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4632 /// within our expected timeframe.
4634 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4635 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4636 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4639 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4642 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4643 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4647 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4648 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4650 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4653 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4654 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4655 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4656 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4659 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4660 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4664 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4666 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4667 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4670 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4671 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4672 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4675 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4678 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4679 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4680 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4681 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4683 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4686 assert!(send_shutdown);
4687 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4688 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4689 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4691 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4694 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4699 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4701 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4702 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4704 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4705 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4706 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4707 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4708 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4709 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4712 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4713 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4715 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4716 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4718 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4722 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4723 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4724 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4725 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4726 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4727 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4729 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4730 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4737 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4738 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4740 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4743 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4744 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4746 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4748 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4749 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4750 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4751 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4752 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4753 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4754 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4755 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4756 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4758 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4759 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4762 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4766 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4767 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4768 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4769 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4771 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4774 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4777 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4780 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4784 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4788 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4789 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4790 return Ok((None, None, None));
4793 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4794 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4795 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4796 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4798 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4800 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4803 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4804 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4805 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4806 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4807 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4811 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4812 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4817 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4818 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4819 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4820 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4821 monitor_update: None,
4822 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4823 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4824 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4825 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4827 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4828 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4829 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4830 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4834 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4836 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4837 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4838 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4839 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4841 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4844 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4845 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4847 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4848 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4849 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4850 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4851 monitor_update: None,
4852 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4853 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4854 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4855 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4857 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4858 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4859 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4860 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4865 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4866 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4867 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4868 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4870 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4871 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4872 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4874 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4876 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4883 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4884 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4887 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4888 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4890 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4891 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4894 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4895 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4896 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4897 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4898 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4900 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4902 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4904 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4905 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4908 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4909 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4910 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4911 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4912 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4913 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4914 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4915 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4920 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4921 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4922 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4923 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4925 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4929 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4930 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4931 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4932 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4934 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4940 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4941 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4942 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4943 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4944 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4945 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4946 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4948 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4949 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4952 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4954 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4955 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4961 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4962 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4963 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4964 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4965 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4966 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4967 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4969 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4970 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4977 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4978 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4981 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4982 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
4985 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4986 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4990 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
4991 &self.context.holder_signer
4995 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4997 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4998 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4999 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5000 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5001 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5002 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5004 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5006 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5014 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5015 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5019 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5020 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5021 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5022 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5025 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5026 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5027 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5028 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5031 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5032 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5033 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5034 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5035 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5036 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5039 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5040 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5041 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5042 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5043 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5044 if !release_monitor {
5045 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5054 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5055 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5058 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5059 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5060 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5062 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5063 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5065 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5066 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5068 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5069 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5070 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5073 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5074 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5075 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5076 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5077 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5078 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5080 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5081 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5082 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5084 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5085 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5086 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5087 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5088 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5089 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5095 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5096 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5097 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5098 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5101 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5102 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5103 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5106 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5107 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5108 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5111 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5112 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5113 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5114 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5115 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5118 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5119 self.context.channel_update_status
5122 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5123 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5124 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5127 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5129 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5130 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5131 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5135 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5136 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5137 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5140 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5144 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5145 // channel_ready yet.
5146 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5150 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5151 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5152 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5153 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5155 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5156 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5157 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5159 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5160 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5163 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5164 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5166 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5167 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5168 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5169 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5170 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5171 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5172 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5173 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5175 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5179 if need_commitment_update {
5180 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5181 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5182 let next_per_commitment_point =
5183 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5184 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5185 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5186 next_per_commitment_point,
5187 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5191 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5197 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5198 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5199 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5200 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5201 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5202 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5203 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5205 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5208 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5209 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5210 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5211 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5212 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5213 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5214 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5215 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5216 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5217 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5218 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5219 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5220 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5221 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5222 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5223 // channel and move on.
5224 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5225 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5227 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5228 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5229 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5231 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5232 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5233 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5234 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5235 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5236 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5237 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5238 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5243 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5244 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5245 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5246 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5247 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5250 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5251 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5252 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5253 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5254 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5255 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5258 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5259 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5260 // may have already happened for this block).
5261 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5262 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5263 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5264 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5267 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5268 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5269 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5270 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5278 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5279 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5280 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5281 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5283 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5284 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5287 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5289 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5290 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5291 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5292 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5294 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5297 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5300 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5301 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5302 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5303 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5305 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5308 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5309 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5310 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5312 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5313 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5315 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5316 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5317 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5325 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5327 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5328 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5329 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5331 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5332 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5335 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5336 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5337 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5338 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5339 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5340 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5341 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5342 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5345 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5346 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5347 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5348 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5350 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5351 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5352 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5354 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5355 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5356 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5357 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5359 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5360 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5361 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5362 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5363 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5364 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5365 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5368 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5369 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5371 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5374 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5375 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5376 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5377 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5378 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5379 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5380 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5381 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5382 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5383 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5384 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5385 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5386 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5387 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5388 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5389 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5390 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5396 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5401 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5402 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5404 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5405 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5406 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5407 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5409 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5412 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5414 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5415 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5416 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5417 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5418 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5421 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5422 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5425 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5426 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5427 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5428 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5429 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5430 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5432 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5433 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5436 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5437 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5438 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5439 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5440 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5446 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5447 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5448 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5449 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5454 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5458 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5462 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5463 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5467 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5471 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5472 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5475 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5479 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5481 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5486 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5487 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5488 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5490 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5495 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5497 None => return None,
5500 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5502 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5503 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5505 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5506 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5509 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5515 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5517 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5518 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5519 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5520 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5521 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5522 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5523 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5525 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5526 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5527 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5528 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5529 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5530 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5531 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5532 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5533 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5534 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5535 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5536 contents: announcement,
5539 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5544 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5548 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5549 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5550 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5551 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5552 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5553 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5554 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5555 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5557 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5559 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5561 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5562 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5564 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5566 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5567 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5570 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5571 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5573 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5576 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5579 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5580 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5581 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5582 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5583 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5584 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5587 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5589 Err(_) => return None,
5591 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5592 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5597 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5598 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5599 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5600 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5601 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5602 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5603 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5604 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5605 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5606 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5607 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5608 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5609 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5610 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5611 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5612 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5615 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5618 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5619 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5620 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5621 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5622 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5623 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5624 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5625 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5626 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5628 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5629 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5630 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5631 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5632 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5633 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5634 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5635 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5636 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5638 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5639 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5640 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5641 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5642 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5643 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5644 next_funding_txid: None,
5649 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5651 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5652 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5653 /// commitment update.
5655 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5656 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5657 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5658 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5659 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5660 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5661 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5664 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5665 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5666 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5668 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5669 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5674 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5675 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5677 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5679 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5680 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5682 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5683 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5684 /// regenerate them.
5686 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5687 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5689 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5690 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5691 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5692 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5693 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5694 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5695 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5696 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5698 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5699 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5700 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5702 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5704 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5705 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5709 if amount_msat == 0 {
5710 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5713 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5714 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5716 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5719 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5720 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5721 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5724 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5725 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5726 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5727 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5728 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5729 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5730 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5734 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5735 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5736 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5737 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5738 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5739 else { "to peer" });
5741 if need_holding_cell {
5742 force_holding_cell = true;
5745 // Now update local state:
5746 if force_holding_cell {
5747 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5752 onion_routing_packet,
5759 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5760 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5762 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5764 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5770 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5771 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5772 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5776 onion_routing_packet,
5780 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5785 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5786 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5787 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5788 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5790 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5791 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5792 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5794 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5795 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5799 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5800 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5801 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5802 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5803 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5804 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5805 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5808 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5809 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5810 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5811 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5812 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5813 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5816 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5818 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5819 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5820 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5821 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5822 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5824 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5825 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5828 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5829 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5830 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5831 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5832 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5833 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5834 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5835 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5836 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5837 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5838 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5841 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5845 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5846 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5847 where L::Target: Logger
5849 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5850 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5851 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5853 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5855 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5856 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5857 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5858 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5859 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5860 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5861 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5862 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5863 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5864 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5865 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5871 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5874 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5875 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5876 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5877 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5878 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5879 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5881 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5882 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5883 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5885 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5886 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5887 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5890 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5891 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5895 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
5896 &commitment_stats.tx,
5897 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
5898 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
5899 &self.context.secp_ctx,
5900 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5902 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5904 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5905 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5906 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5907 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5909 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5910 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5911 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5912 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5913 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5914 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5918 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5923 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5924 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5926 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5932 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5933 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5935 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5936 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5937 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5938 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5939 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5940 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5941 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5942 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5944 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5945 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
5946 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5949 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5950 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5951 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5957 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5959 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5960 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5961 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5962 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5963 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5965 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5967 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5973 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5974 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5975 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5976 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5977 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5979 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5980 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5984 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5987 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
5988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5990 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5993 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5994 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5995 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5998 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6001 // use override shutdown script if provided
6002 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6003 Some(script) => script,
6005 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6006 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6007 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6008 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6012 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6013 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6015 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6020 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6021 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6022 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6023 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6025 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6026 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6027 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6028 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6029 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6030 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6033 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6034 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6036 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6037 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6038 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6041 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6042 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6043 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6044 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6045 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6047 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6048 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6055 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6056 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6058 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6061 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6062 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6063 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6065 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6066 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6070 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6074 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6075 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6076 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6077 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6080 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6081 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6082 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6083 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6084 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6085 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6086 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6087 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6089 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6090 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6091 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6092 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6094 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6095 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6097 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6098 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6100 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6101 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6102 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6104 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6105 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6107 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6108 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6109 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6110 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6111 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6114 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6115 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6117 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6118 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6120 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6122 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6124 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6125 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6126 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6130 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6131 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6133 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6134 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6135 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6136 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6140 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6141 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6142 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6146 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6147 Ok(script) => script,
6148 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6151 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6154 context: ChannelContext {
6157 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6158 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6159 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6160 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6165 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6167 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6168 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6169 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6170 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6172 channel_value_satoshis,
6174 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6176 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6177 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6180 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6181 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6184 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6185 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6186 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6187 pending_update_fee: None,
6188 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6189 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6190 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6191 update_time_counter: 1,
6193 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6195 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6196 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6197 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6198 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6199 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6200 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6202 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6203 signer_pending_funding: false,
6205 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6206 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6207 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6208 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6210 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6211 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6212 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6213 closing_fee_limits: None,
6214 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6216 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6217 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6218 short_channel_id: None,
6219 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6221 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6222 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6223 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6224 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6225 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6226 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6227 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6228 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6229 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6230 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6231 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6232 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6234 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6236 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6237 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6238 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6239 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6240 counterparty_parameters: None,
6241 funding_outpoint: None,
6242 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6244 funding_transaction: None,
6245 is_batch_funding: None,
6247 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6248 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6249 counterparty_node_id,
6251 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6253 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6255 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6256 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6258 announcement_sigs: None,
6260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6261 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6262 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6263 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6265 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6266 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6268 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6269 outbound_scid_alias,
6271 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6272 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6274 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6275 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6280 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6282 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6286 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6287 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6288 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6289 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6290 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6291 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6292 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6293 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6294 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6296 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6301 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6302 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6303 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6306 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6307 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6308 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6309 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6312 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6314 next_local_nonce: None,
6318 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6319 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6320 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6321 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6322 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6323 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6324 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6325 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6326 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6327 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6328 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6331 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6332 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6334 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6336 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6337 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6338 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6339 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6342 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6343 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6345 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6347 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6348 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6350 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6351 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6352 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6353 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6354 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6355 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6358 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6359 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6361 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6362 if funding_created.is_none() {
6363 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6364 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6365 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6372 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6373 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6374 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6375 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6376 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6377 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6378 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6379 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6380 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6381 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6384 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6385 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6386 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6387 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6388 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6389 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6395 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6396 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6397 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6398 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6399 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6400 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6402 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6404 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6406 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6407 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6412 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6413 // We've exhausted our options
6416 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6417 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6420 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6421 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6422 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6423 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6425 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6426 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6427 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6428 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6429 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6430 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6432 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6434 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6435 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6438 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6439 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6440 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6442 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6443 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6446 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6447 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6450 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6451 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6455 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6456 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6457 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6458 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6459 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6460 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6461 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6462 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6463 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6464 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6465 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6466 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6467 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6468 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6469 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6470 first_per_commitment_point,
6471 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6472 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6473 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6474 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6476 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6481 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6482 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6484 // Check sanity of message fields:
6485 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6488 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6491 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6494 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6495 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6497 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6500 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6502 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6504 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6505 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6508 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6509 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6512 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6515 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6519 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6520 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6523 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6526 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6529 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6532 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6535 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6538 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6542 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6543 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6546 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6547 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6549 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6550 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6553 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6554 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6557 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6558 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6559 &Some(ref script) => {
6560 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6561 if script.len() == 0 {
6564 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6567 Some(script.clone())
6570 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6577 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6578 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6579 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6580 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6581 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6583 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6584 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6586 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6589 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6590 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6591 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6592 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6593 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6594 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6597 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6598 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6599 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6602 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6603 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6605 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6606 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6608 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6613 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6614 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6615 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6616 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6617 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6621 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6622 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6624 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6625 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6627 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6628 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6629 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6630 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6633 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6635 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6636 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6637 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6638 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6640 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6641 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6643 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6644 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6646 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6647 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6648 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6649 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6650 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6651 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6655 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6656 initial_commitment_tx,
6659 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6660 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6664 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6665 if validated.is_err() {
6666 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6669 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6670 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6671 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6672 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6673 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6674 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6675 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6676 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6677 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6678 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6679 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6680 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6682 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6683 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6684 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6685 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6686 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6687 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6688 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6689 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6691 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6692 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6693 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6695 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6697 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6698 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6700 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6702 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6704 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6705 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6706 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6709 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6712 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6713 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6714 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6715 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6720 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6721 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6722 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6723 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6726 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6727 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6728 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6729 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6730 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6731 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6732 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6733 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6734 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6735 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6736 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6739 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6740 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6742 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6743 // support this channel type.
6744 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6745 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6749 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6750 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6751 // `static_remote_key`.
6752 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6755 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6756 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6759 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6762 channel_type.clone()
6764 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6765 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6771 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6772 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6773 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6774 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6775 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6776 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6777 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6778 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6779 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6782 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6786 // Check sanity of message fields:
6787 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6790 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6793 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6796 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6797 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6800 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6803 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6804 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6806 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6808 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6809 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6812 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6815 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6819 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6820 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6823 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6826 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6829 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6832 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6835 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6838 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6842 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6844 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6845 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6850 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6851 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6852 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6853 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6856 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6859 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6860 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6861 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6863 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6867 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6868 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6869 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6870 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6874 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6875 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6876 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6880 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6881 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6882 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6883 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6887 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6888 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6889 &Some(ref script) => {
6890 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6891 if script.len() == 0 {
6894 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6897 Some(script.clone())
6900 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6907 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6908 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6909 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6910 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6914 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6915 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6920 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6921 Ok(script) => script,
6922 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6925 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6926 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6928 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6931 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6935 context: ChannelContext {
6938 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6939 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6941 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6946 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6948 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6949 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6950 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6951 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6953 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6956 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6958 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6959 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6962 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6963 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6964 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6966 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6967 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6968 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6969 pending_update_fee: None,
6970 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6971 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6972 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6973 update_time_counter: 1,
6975 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6977 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6978 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6979 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6980 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6981 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6982 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6984 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6985 signer_pending_funding: false,
6987 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6988 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6989 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6990 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6992 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6993 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6994 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6995 closing_fee_limits: None,
6996 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6998 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6999 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7000 short_channel_id: None,
7001 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7003 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7004 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7005 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7006 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7007 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7008 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7009 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7010 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7011 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7012 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7013 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7014 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7017 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7019 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7020 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7021 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7022 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7023 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7024 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7025 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7027 funding_outpoint: None,
7028 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7030 funding_transaction: None,
7031 is_batch_funding: None,
7033 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7034 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7035 counterparty_node_id,
7037 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7039 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7041 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7042 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7044 announcement_sigs: None,
7046 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7047 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7048 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7049 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7051 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7052 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7054 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7055 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7057 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7058 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7061 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7066 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7068 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7074 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7075 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7077 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7078 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7079 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7080 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7083 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7084 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7086 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7088 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7089 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7092 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7095 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7096 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7097 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7099 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7100 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7101 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7102 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7104 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7105 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7106 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7107 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7108 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7109 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7110 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7111 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7112 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7113 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7114 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7115 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7116 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7117 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7118 first_per_commitment_point,
7119 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7120 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7121 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7123 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7125 next_local_nonce: None,
7129 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7130 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7132 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7134 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7135 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7138 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7139 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7141 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7142 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7143 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7144 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7145 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7146 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7147 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7148 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7149 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7150 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7151 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7153 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7156 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7157 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7158 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7162 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7163 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7166 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7167 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7169 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7170 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7172 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7174 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7175 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7176 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7177 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7180 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7181 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7182 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7183 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7184 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7186 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7188 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7189 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7190 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7193 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7194 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7195 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7199 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7200 initial_commitment_tx,
7203 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7204 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7207 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7208 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7211 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7213 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7214 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7215 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7216 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7218 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7220 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7221 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7222 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7223 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7224 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7225 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7226 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7227 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7228 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7229 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7230 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7232 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7233 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7234 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7235 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7236 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7237 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7238 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7240 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7241 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7243 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7244 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7245 let mut channel = Channel {
7246 context: self.context,
7248 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7249 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7251 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7255 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7256 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7258 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7264 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7265 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7266 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7267 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7268 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7270 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7271 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7272 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7273 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7279 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7280 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7281 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7282 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7283 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7284 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7289 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7290 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7291 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7292 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7294 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7295 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7296 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7297 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7302 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7303 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7304 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7305 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7306 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7307 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7312 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7313 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7314 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7317 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7319 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7320 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7321 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7322 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7323 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7325 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7326 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7327 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7328 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7330 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7332 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7333 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7334 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7336 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7338 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7340 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7342 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7343 // deserialized from that format.
7344 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7345 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7346 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7348 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7350 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7351 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7352 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7354 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7355 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7356 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7357 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7360 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7361 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7362 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7365 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7366 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7367 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7368 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7370 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7371 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7373 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7375 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7377 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7379 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7382 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7384 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7389 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7390 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7391 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7393 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7394 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7395 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7396 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7397 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7398 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7399 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7401 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7403 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7405 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7408 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7409 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7410 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7413 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7415 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7416 preimages.push(preimage);
7418 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7419 reason.write(writer)?;
7421 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7423 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7424 preimages.push(preimage);
7426 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7427 reason.write(writer)?;
7430 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7431 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7434 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7435 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7436 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7437 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7439 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7440 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7441 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7444 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7445 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7446 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7447 source.write(writer)?;
7448 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7450 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7451 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7453 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7455 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7456 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7458 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7460 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7461 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7466 match self.context.resend_order {
7467 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7468 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7471 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7472 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7473 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7475 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7476 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7477 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7478 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7481 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7482 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7483 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7484 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7485 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7488 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7489 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7490 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7491 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7493 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7494 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7495 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7497 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7499 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7500 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7501 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7502 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7504 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7505 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7506 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7507 // consider the stale state on reload.
7510 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7511 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7512 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7514 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7515 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7516 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7518 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7519 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7521 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7522 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7523 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7525 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7526 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7528 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7531 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7532 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7533 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7535 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7538 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7539 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7541 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7542 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7543 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7545 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7547 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7549 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7551 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7552 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7553 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7554 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7555 htlc.write(writer)?;
7558 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7559 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7560 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7562 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7563 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7565 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7566 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7567 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7568 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7569 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7570 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7571 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7573 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7574 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7575 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7576 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7577 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7579 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7580 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7582 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7583 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7584 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7585 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7587 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7589 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7590 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7591 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7592 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7593 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7594 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7595 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7597 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7598 (2, chan_type, option),
7599 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7600 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7601 (5, self.context.config, required),
7602 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7603 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7604 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7605 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7606 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7607 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7608 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7609 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7610 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7611 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7612 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7613 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7614 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7615 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7616 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7617 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7618 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7619 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7620 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7621 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7622 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7629 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7630 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7632 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7633 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7635 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7636 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7637 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7639 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7640 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7641 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7642 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7644 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7646 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7647 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7648 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7649 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7650 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7652 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7653 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7656 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7657 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7658 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7660 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7662 let mut keys_data = None;
7664 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7665 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7666 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7667 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7668 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7669 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7670 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7671 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7672 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7673 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7677 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7678 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7679 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7682 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7684 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7685 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7686 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7688 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7690 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7691 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7692 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7693 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7694 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7695 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7696 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7697 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7698 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7699 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7700 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7701 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7702 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7707 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7708 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7709 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7710 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7711 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7712 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7713 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7714 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7715 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7716 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7717 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7718 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7720 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7724 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7725 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7728 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7729 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7731 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7733 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7734 blinding_point: None,
7738 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7739 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7740 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7741 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7742 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7743 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7744 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7745 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7746 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7747 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7748 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7749 blinding_point: None,
7751 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7752 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7753 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7755 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7756 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7757 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7759 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7763 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7764 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7765 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7766 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7769 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7770 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7771 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7773 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7774 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7775 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7776 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7779 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7780 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7781 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7782 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7785 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7787 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7789 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7790 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7791 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7792 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7794 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7795 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7796 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7797 // consider the stale state on reload.
7798 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7801 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7802 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7803 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7805 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7808 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7809 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7810 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7814 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7815 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7817 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7818 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7820 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7821 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7823 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7829 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7830 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7832 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7833 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7836 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7838 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7839 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7840 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7841 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7843 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7846 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7849 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7851 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7852 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7854 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7855 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7857 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7860 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7861 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7863 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7864 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7865 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7869 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7870 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7871 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7873 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7879 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7880 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7881 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7882 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7883 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7884 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7885 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7886 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7887 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7888 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7890 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7891 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7892 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7893 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7894 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7895 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7896 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7898 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7899 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7900 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7901 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7903 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7905 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7906 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7908 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7910 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7911 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7913 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7914 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7915 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7916 (2, channel_type, option),
7917 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7918 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7919 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7920 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7921 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7922 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7923 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7924 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7925 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7926 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7927 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7928 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7929 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7930 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7931 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7932 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7933 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7934 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7935 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7936 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7937 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7938 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7939 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7940 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7943 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7944 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7945 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7946 // required channel parameters.
7947 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
7948 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7950 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7952 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7953 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7954 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7955 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7958 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7959 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7960 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7962 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7963 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7965 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7966 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7971 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7972 if iter.next().is_some() {
7973 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7977 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7978 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7979 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7980 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7981 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7984 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7985 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7986 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7988 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7989 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7991 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7992 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7993 // separate u64 values.
7994 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7996 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7998 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7999 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8000 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8001 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8003 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8004 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8006 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8007 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8008 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8009 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8010 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8013 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8014 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8016 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8017 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8018 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8019 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8021 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8022 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8024 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8025 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8026 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8027 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8028 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8031 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8032 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8036 context: ChannelContext {
8039 config: config.unwrap(),
8043 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8044 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8045 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8048 temporary_channel_id,
8050 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8052 channel_value_satoshis,
8054 latest_monitor_update_id,
8056 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8057 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8060 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8061 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8064 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8065 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8066 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8067 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8071 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8072 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8073 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8074 monitor_pending_forwards,
8075 monitor_pending_failures,
8076 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8078 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8079 signer_pending_funding: false,
8082 holding_cell_update_fee,
8083 next_holder_htlc_id,
8084 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8085 update_time_counter,
8088 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8089 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8090 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8091 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8093 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8094 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8095 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8096 closing_fee_limits: None,
8097 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8099 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8100 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8102 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8104 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8105 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8106 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8107 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8108 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8109 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8110 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8111 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8112 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8115 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8117 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8118 funding_transaction,
8121 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8122 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8123 counterparty_node_id,
8125 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8129 channel_update_status,
8130 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8134 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8135 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8136 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8137 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8139 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8140 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8142 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8143 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8144 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8146 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8147 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8149 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8150 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8152 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8155 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8164 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8165 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8166 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8167 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8168 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8169 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8170 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8171 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8172 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8173 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8174 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8175 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8176 use crate::ln::msgs;
8177 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8178 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8179 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8180 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8181 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8182 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8183 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8184 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8185 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8186 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8187 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8188 use crate::util::test_utils;
8189 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8190 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8191 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8192 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8193 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8194 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8195 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8196 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8197 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8198 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8199 use crate::prelude::*;
8201 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8204 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8205 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8211 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8212 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8213 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8214 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8218 signer: InMemorySigner,
8221 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8222 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8225 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8226 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8228 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8230 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8231 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8234 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8238 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8240 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8242 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8243 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8244 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8247 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8248 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8249 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8250 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8254 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8255 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8256 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8260 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8261 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8262 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8263 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8266 let seed = [42; 32];
8267 let network = Network::Testnet;
8268 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8269 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8270 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8273 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8274 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8275 let config = UserConfig::default();
8276 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8277 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8278 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8280 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8281 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8285 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8286 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8288 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8289 let original_fee = 253;
8290 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8291 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8292 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8293 let seed = [42; 32];
8294 let network = Network::Testnet;
8295 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8297 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8298 let config = UserConfig::default();
8299 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8301 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8302 // same as the old fee.
8303 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8304 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8305 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8309 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8310 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8311 // dust limits are used.
8312 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8313 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8314 let seed = [42; 32];
8315 let network = Network::Testnet;
8316 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8317 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8318 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8320 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8321 // they have different dust limits.
8323 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8324 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8325 let config = UserConfig::default();
8326 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8328 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8329 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8330 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8331 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8332 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8334 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8335 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8336 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8337 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8338 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8340 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8341 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8342 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8343 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8345 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8346 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8347 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8349 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8350 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8351 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8353 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8354 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8355 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8357 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8358 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8359 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8360 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8363 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8365 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8366 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8367 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8368 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8369 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8370 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8371 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8372 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8373 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8375 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8376 blinding_point: None,
8379 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8380 // the dust limit check.
8381 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8382 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8383 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8384 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8386 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8387 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8388 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8389 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8390 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8391 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8392 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8396 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8397 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8398 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8399 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8400 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8401 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8403 let seed = [42; 32];
8404 let network = Network::Testnet;
8405 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8407 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8408 let config = UserConfig::default();
8409 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8411 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8412 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8414 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8415 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8416 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8417 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8418 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8419 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8421 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8422 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8423 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8424 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8425 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8427 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8429 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8430 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8431 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8432 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8433 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8435 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8436 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8437 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8438 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8439 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8443 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8444 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8445 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8446 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8447 let seed = [42; 32];
8448 let network = Network::Testnet;
8449 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8450 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8451 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8453 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8455 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8456 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8457 let config = UserConfig::default();
8458 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8460 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8461 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8462 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8463 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8465 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8466 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8467 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8469 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8470 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8471 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8472 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8474 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8475 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8476 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8478 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8479 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8480 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8482 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8483 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8484 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8485 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8486 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8487 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8488 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8490 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8492 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8493 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8494 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8495 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8496 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8500 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8501 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8502 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8504 let seed = [42; 32];
8505 let network = Network::Testnet;
8506 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8507 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8508 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8510 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8511 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8512 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8513 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8514 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8515 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8516 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8517 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8519 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8520 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8521 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8522 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8523 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8524 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8526 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8527 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8528 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8529 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8531 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8533 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8534 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8535 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8536 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8537 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8538 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8540 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8541 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8542 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8543 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8545 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8546 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8547 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8548 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8549 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8551 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8552 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8554 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8555 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8556 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8558 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8559 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8560 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8561 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8562 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8564 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8565 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8567 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8568 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8569 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8573 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8575 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8576 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8577 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8579 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8580 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8581 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8582 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8584 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8585 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8586 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8588 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8590 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8591 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8594 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8595 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8596 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8598 let seed = [42; 32];
8599 let network = Network::Testnet;
8600 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8601 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8602 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8605 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8606 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8607 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8609 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8610 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8612 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8613 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8614 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8616 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8617 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8619 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8621 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8622 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8624 // Channel Negotiations failed
8625 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8626 assert!(result.is_err());
8631 fn channel_update() {
8632 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8633 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8635 let seed = [42; 32];
8636 let network = Network::Testnet;
8637 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8638 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8639 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8641 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8642 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8643 let config = UserConfig::default();
8644 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8646 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8647 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8648 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8649 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8650 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8652 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8653 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8654 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8655 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8656 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8658 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8659 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8660 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8661 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8663 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8664 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8665 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8667 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8668 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8669 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8671 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8672 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8673 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8675 short_channel_id: 0,
8678 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8679 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8680 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8682 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8683 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8685 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8687 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8689 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8690 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8691 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8692 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8694 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8695 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8696 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8698 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8701 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8705 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_ser() {
8706 // Ensure that channel blinding points and skimmed fees are (de)serialized properly.
8707 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8709 let seed = [42; 32];
8710 let network = Network::Testnet;
8711 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8713 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8714 let config = UserConfig::default();
8715 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8716 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8717 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8719 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8721 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8722 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8723 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8724 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8728 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8729 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8730 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8732 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8735 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8737 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8738 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8739 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8740 blinding_point: None,
8742 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8743 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8745 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8748 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8751 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8753 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8756 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8757 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8758 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8760 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8761 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8764 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8765 blinding_point: None,
8767 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8768 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8771 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8774 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8775 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8776 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8778 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8779 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8780 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8781 } = &mut dummy_add {
8782 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8783 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8785 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8788 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8790 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8791 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8792 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8793 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8794 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8795 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8796 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8797 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8800 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8802 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8803 use bitcoin::sighash;
8804 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8805 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8806 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8807 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8808 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8809 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8810 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8811 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8812 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8813 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8814 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8815 use crate::sync::Arc;
8816 use core::str::FromStr;
8817 use hex::DisplayHex;
8819 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8820 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8821 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8824 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8826 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8827 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8828 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8829 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8830 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8832 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8833 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8839 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8840 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8841 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8843 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8844 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8845 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8846 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8847 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8848 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8850 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8852 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8853 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8854 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8855 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8856 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8857 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8859 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8860 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8861 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8862 selected_contest_delay: 144
8864 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8865 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8867 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8868 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8870 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8871 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8873 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8874 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8876 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8877 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8878 // build_commitment_transaction.
8879 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8880 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8881 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8882 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8883 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8885 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8886 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8887 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8888 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8892 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8893 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8894 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8895 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8899 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8900 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8901 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8903 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8904 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8906 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8907 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8909 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8911 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8912 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8913 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8914 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8915 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8916 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8917 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8919 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8920 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8921 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8922 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8924 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8925 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8926 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8928 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8930 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8931 commitment_tx.clone(),
8932 counterparty_signature,
8933 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8934 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8935 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8937 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8938 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8940 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8941 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8942 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8944 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8945 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8948 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8949 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8951 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8952 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8953 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8954 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8955 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8956 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8957 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8958 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8960 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8963 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8964 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8965 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8969 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8972 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8973 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8974 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8975 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8976 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8977 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8979 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8980 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8981 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8982 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8984 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8985 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8986 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8987 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8988 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8990 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8991 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8992 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8993 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8994 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8995 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8997 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9001 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9002 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9003 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9004 "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", {});
9006 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9007 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9009 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9010 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9011 "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", {});
9013 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9014 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9015 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9016 "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", {});
9018 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9019 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9021 amount_msat: 1000000,
9023 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9024 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9026 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9029 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9030 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9032 amount_msat: 2000000,
9034 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9035 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9037 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9040 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9041 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9043 amount_msat: 2000000,
9045 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9046 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9047 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9048 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9049 blinding_point: None,
9051 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9054 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9055 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9057 amount_msat: 3000000,
9059 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9060 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9061 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9062 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9063 blinding_point: None,
9065 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9068 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9069 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9071 amount_msat: 4000000,
9073 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9074 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9076 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9080 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9081 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9082 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9084 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9085 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9086 "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", {
9089 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9090 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9091 "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" },
9094 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9095 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9096 "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" },
9099 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9100 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9101 "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" },
9104 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9105 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9106 "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" },
9109 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9110 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9111 "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" }
9114 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9115 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9116 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9118 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9119 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9120 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9123 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9124 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9125 "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" },
9128 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9129 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9130 "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" },
9133 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9134 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9135 "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" },
9138 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9139 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9140 "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" },
9143 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9144 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9145 "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" }
9148 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9149 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9150 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9152 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9153 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9154 "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", {
9157 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9158 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9159 "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" },
9162 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9163 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9164 "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" },
9167 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9168 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9169 "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" },
9172 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9173 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9174 "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" }
9177 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9178 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9179 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9180 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9182 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9183 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9184 "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", {
9187 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9188 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9189 "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" },
9192 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9193 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9194 "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" },
9197 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9198 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9199 "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" },
9202 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9203 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9204 "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" }
9207 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9208 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9209 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9210 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9212 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9213 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9214 "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", {
9217 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9218 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9219 "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" },
9222 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9223 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9224 "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" },
9227 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9228 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9229 "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" },
9232 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9233 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9234 "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" }
9237 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9238 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9239 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9241 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9242 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9243 "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", {
9246 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9247 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9248 "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" },
9251 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9252 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9253 "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" },
9256 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9257 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9258 "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" }
9261 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9262 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9263 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9265 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9266 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9267 "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", {
9270 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9271 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9272 "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" },
9275 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9276 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9277 "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" },
9280 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9281 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9282 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9285 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9286 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9287 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9289 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9290 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9291 "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", {
9294 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9295 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9296 "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" },
9299 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9300 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9301 "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" }
9304 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9305 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9306 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9307 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9308 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9309 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9311 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9312 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9313 "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", {
9316 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9317 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9318 "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" },
9321 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9322 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9323 "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" }
9326 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9327 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9328 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9329 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9330 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9332 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9333 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9334 "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", {
9337 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9338 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9339 "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" },
9342 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9343 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9344 "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" }
9347 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9351 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9352 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9353 "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", {
9356 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9357 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9358 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9361 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9362 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9363 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9364 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9365 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9367 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9368 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9369 "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", {
9372 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9373 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9374 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9377 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9378 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9379 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9380 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9381 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9383 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9384 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9385 "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", {
9388 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9389 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9390 "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" }
9393 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9394 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9395 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9396 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9398 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9399 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9400 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9402 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9403 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9404 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9405 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9406 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9408 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9409 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9410 "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", {});
9412 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9413 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9414 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9415 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9416 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9418 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9419 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9420 "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", {});
9422 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9423 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9424 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9426 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9427 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9428 "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", {});
9430 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9431 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9432 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9433 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9434 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9436 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9437 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9438 "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", {});
9440 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9441 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9442 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9443 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9444 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9446 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9447 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9448 "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", {});
9450 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9451 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9452 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9453 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9454 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9455 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9457 amount_msat: 2000000,
9459 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9460 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9462 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9465 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9466 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9467 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9469 amount_msat: 5000001,
9471 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9472 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9473 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9474 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9475 blinding_point: None,
9477 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9480 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9481 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9483 amount_msat: 5000000,
9485 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9486 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9487 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9488 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9489 blinding_point: None,
9491 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9495 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9496 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9497 "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", {
9500 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9501 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9502 "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" },
9504 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9505 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9506 "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" },
9508 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9509 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9510 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9513 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9514 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9515 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9516 "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", {
9519 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9520 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9521 "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" },
9523 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9524 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9525 "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" },
9527 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9528 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9529 "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" }
9534 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9535 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9537 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9538 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9539 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9540 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9542 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9543 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9544 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9546 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9547 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9549 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9550 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9552 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9553 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9554 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9558 fn test_key_derivation() {
9559 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9562 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9563 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9565 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9566 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9568 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9569 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9571 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9572 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9574 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9575 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9577 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9578 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9582 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9583 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9584 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9585 let seed = [42; 32];
9586 let network = Network::Testnet;
9587 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9588 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9590 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9591 let config = UserConfig::default();
9592 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9593 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9595 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9596 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9598 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9599 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9600 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9601 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9602 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9603 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9604 assert!(res.is_ok());
9608 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9609 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9610 // resulting `channel_type`.
9611 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9612 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9613 let network = Network::Testnet;
9614 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9615 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9617 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9618 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9620 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9621 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9623 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9624 // need to signal it.
9625 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9626 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9627 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9628 &config, 0, 42, None
9630 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9632 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9633 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9634 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9636 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9637 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9638 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9642 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9643 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9644 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9645 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9646 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9649 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9650 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9654 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9655 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9656 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9657 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9658 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9659 let network = Network::Testnet;
9660 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9661 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9663 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9664 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9666 let config = UserConfig::default();
9668 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9669 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9670 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9671 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9672 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9674 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9675 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9676 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9680 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9681 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9682 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9684 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9685 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9686 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9687 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9688 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9689 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9691 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9695 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9696 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9699 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9700 let network = Network::Testnet;
9701 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9702 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9704 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9705 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9707 let config = UserConfig::default();
9709 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9710 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9711 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9712 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9713 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9714 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9715 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9716 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9718 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9719 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9720 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9721 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9722 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9723 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9727 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9728 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9730 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9731 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9732 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9733 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9735 assert!(res.is_err());
9737 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9738 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9739 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9741 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9742 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9743 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9746 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9748 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9749 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9750 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9751 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9754 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9755 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9757 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9758 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9760 assert!(res.is_err());
9764 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9765 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9766 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9767 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9768 let seed = [42; 32];
9769 let network = Network::Testnet;
9770 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9771 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9772 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9774 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9775 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9776 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9777 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9779 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9780 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9781 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9786 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9796 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9798 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9803 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9804 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9810 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9813 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9814 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9815 &accept_channel_msg,
9816 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9817 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9820 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9821 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9822 let tx = Transaction {
9824 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9828 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9831 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9834 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9835 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9836 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
9837 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9838 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9839 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9843 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9844 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9852 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9853 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9854 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9855 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
9857 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9858 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9865 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9866 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9867 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9868 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9869 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9871 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9872 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9873 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9881 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9882 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
9885 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9886 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9887 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
9888 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());